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To make the world a better place to live for all, member States of theUnited Nations adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development in September 2015. This represents a plan of action for
people, the planet and for prosperity and is a clear recognition of the
need for global strategies to the global problems that we face. Agenda
2030 not only presents us with a set of sustainable development goals but
also the necessary means of implementation. In this framework,
governments will need to integrate these goals into their policies and laws,
and take considered measures towards their achievement.
Throughout this process, UNCTAD will of course act in support and
partnership with member States. Through its analytical work and research,
UNCTAD aims to inform economic policymakers, helping them in their
decision making, and promote policies that optimally address global and
domestic economic inequalities and contribute to the 2030 Agenda.
It is widely acknowledged that sustainable and inclusive economic
growth requires higher levels of economic productivity through
diversification, technological upgrading and innovation. Appropriate
industrial and trade policies are necessary but not sufficient to achieve
this. There remains a need for complementary and coherent policies that
ensure countries benefit from free trade. Competition policy is one of
these policies, which governments need to develop and implement in order
to achieve the goals of the 2030 Agenda.
One of the fundamental aims of competition policy and law is to
increase competitive market pressures by addressing anticompetitive
business practices, as well as anticompetitive State regulations and
measures. When these pressures are absent, especially due to the presence
of monopolies or cartels, then higher prices, lower quality products and
economic injustice will prevail. This will have adverse effects for the
poorest and most vulnerable people, most especially if those markets are
concerned with the provision of basic goods and services.
Effective competition policies may address market failures and create
a competitive business environment, thereby promoting efficiency and
Foreword
stimulating innovation. Such an environment will consequently increase
consumer choice and enhance product quality.
Competition regimes could also promote the development agenda by
influencing policymaking through advocacy activities. Competition
authorities should cooperate with sector regulators and other government
bodies to ensure that regulations or policies do not violate competition
principles, whilst remaining complete and coherent.
This publication serves to shed light on the role of competition policy
and law as essential policy tools towards achieving sustainable and inclusive
development. It provides a series of studies, which clearly reflect, from a
pragmatic perspective, the importance of effective implementation of
competition policies and regulations for sustainable development.
Competition and regulatory reforms undertaken throughout the world
show the importance of competition not only for economic growth but
also for job creation and innovation by small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs). In countries or sectors where economic power is highly
concentrated in the hands of a few corporate groups, competition policy
and law may contribute to inclusive growth by promoting the participation
of underprivileged economic agents, through the establishment of rules
of fair and free competition. This is particularly relevant for entities such
as SMEs, smallholder farmers or businesses owned by historically
underprivileged populations.
I would like to emphasise the importance of using the framework of
competition in regional integration agreements to promote equitable
regional arrangements. Appropriate competition policies and laws, as well
as their effective implementation, are key to restoring fair competition at
a regional level and to maximising the benefits from regional integration
agreements in favour of the public interest, rather than particular vested
interests.
I would like to thank CUTS for their invaluable work in promoting
competition policy for achieving sustainable development, ever since its
establishment over 30 years ago. I reiterate that UNCTAD, as it has been
for over three decades, is committed to continuing its work in the areas
of competition and consumer protection policies, all the while working
closely with civil society organisations, such as CUTS International.
Dr. Mukhisa Kituyi
Secretary General
UNCTAD
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In September 2015, countries adopted the 2030 Agenda for SustainableDevelopment along with a set of 17 ‘goals’ referred to as Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) to end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure
prosperity for all. World leaders agreed to develop structured national
action plans to achieve these ambitious ‘global goals’ through the
participation of both state and non-state actors. The international
community made commitments to support such processes and
programmes.
CUTS International’s mission of ‘consumer sovereignty in the
framework of social justice, economic equality and environmental balance
within and across borders’ is well aligned with a number of these SDGs.
Hence, CUTS endeavoured to explore how some of its initiatives under
specific programmatic areas synergise with some of the SDGs. Pursuant
to this ambition, CUTS envisaged this volume entitled, ‘Pursuing
Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs)’. Competition Policy and Law is one of the
programmatic areas of CUTS, and hence was keen to explore the
contribution of competition and regulatory reforms towards achievement
of the SDGs.
This publication was made possible by a project that CUTS has been
implementing with support from DFID (UK) and BMZ (Germany)
facilitated by GIZ (Germany). The project entitled ‘Competition Reforms
in Key Markets for Enhancing Social & Economic Welfare in Developing
Countries’ (CREW Project, www.cuts-ccier.org/CREW) has been
implemented in four countries: Ghana, India, The Philippines and Zambia
in two sectors: Staple Food and Passenger Transport. The aim of the
project is to demonstrate impacts of competition and regulatory reforms
on consumer and producer welfare. The experience of the CREW project
inspired CUTS to explore the relevance of competition and regulatory
reforms for achievement of the SDGs, especially in developing and least
developed countries.
Preface
There is little disagreement that competition reform is an extremely
important component of a market economy. Effective markets are crucial
for growth and economic development, especially in the developing ‘south’
and can contribute to job creation and poverty reduction. Anticompetitive
policies and practices in the market affects producers and consumers
alike – thereby stifling the process of economic growth. It is logical to
deduce that there is scope for introduction of elements of competition
and regulatory reforms into structures and national action plans to achieve
some of the ambitious SDGs.
CUTS and CUTS Institute for Regulation & Competition (CIRC) have
designed a unique initiative for the last 10 years, to provide a platform for
international practitioners and experts to expand the frontiers on
competition and regulatory reforms, thereby contributing to the discourse
on competition reforms in the developing world. Once every two years,
CUTS and CIRC organises the Biennial Competition, Regulation &
Development Forum.
The 4th edition of this conference was held in Nairobi in December
2015 with support from DFID (UK), BMZ (Germany) and GIZ
(Germany). In addition, the G-77 Secretariat, World Bank and OECD
came forward to support this conference, given its focus on “Relevance
of Competition & Regulatory Reforms in Pursuing Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) in Developing Countries”.
The agenda of this conference (www.cuts-ccier.org/CREW-
Final_Conference), was developed based on the findings of the CREW
project – which has boosted CUTS confidence that competition and
regulatory reforms can indeed help meet some of the objectives enshrined
in the SDGs. In the run up to the conference, CUTS had issued a ‘Call for
papers’ for scholars and practitioners from both the developed and the
developing world to present their views on four distinct ‘thematic areas’
that would help strengthen the understanding about the interface between
competition reforms and the SDGs. These ‘thematic areas’ were:
(i) Government Policy Promoting Competition, Innovation and Jobs
(ii) Competition for Inclusive Economic Growth
(iii) Competition Reforms as a Tool for Public Welfare
(iv) Trade, Regional Integration and Competition Reforms
This volume presents a set of 16 papers contributed from across the
globe from Australia to Argentina – which were carefully selected by a
panel of distinguished scholars on the subject. Conscious of the volume
of this publication, we have categorised it into four Parts corresponding
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with the above four ‘thematic areas’, for easy reading. We hope the readers
will find this volume to be an interesting composition of contemporary
academic thinking and practice – which would enhance the visibility of
competition and regulatory reforms in the context of the achievement of
the SDGs.
Finally, I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to my colleagues
for timely preparation of this publication. My sincere gratitude to Mukhisa
Kituyi, Secretary General of UNCTAD for writing an excellent Foreword,
and we thank him for having formally inaugurated the conference in
Nairobi. CUTS would like to extend our warm appreciation to all writers
who responded to the ‘call for papers’. It was indeed a tough assignment
for reviewers to select papers for this publication. We thank our
development partners for their support and cooperation in making this
volume possible.
Pradeep S. Mehta
Secretary General
CUTS International
Pursuing Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving SDGs xvii

An Overview
The conference entitled, ‘Relevance of Competition and RegulatoryReforms in Pursuing Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)’ was
organised by CUTS in Nairobi, Kenya on 12-13  December, 2015. This
was the culmination event of a three-year project being implemented by
CUTS (referred to as the CREW project, www.cuts-ccier.org/crew) and
was designed as the 4th CUTS/CIRC Biennial Competition, Regulation &
Development Forum. The earlier three forums were held in New Delhi,
India.
Being organised close on the heels of the adoption of the ambitious
‘Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development’, this event aimed to explore
the relevance of competition and regulatory reforms as tools for achieving
some of these ‘global goals’. The section below tries to highlight this linkage
through some illustrations.
Linking Competition Reforms with SDGs
It was revealed from the discussions in the conference as well that
while the link between competition reforms and some of the ‘global goals’
(SDGs) were direct, it was rather indirect/weak with the others.
GOAL 1 (End poverty in all its forms everywhere)
Poverty reduction is one of the steepest challenges for developing
country policymakers – hence, remains a priority in government policies.
An important approach to poverty reduction is to empower the poor,
provide them with productive employment and increase their access to
land, capital and other productive resources. But this approach may not
be successful unless these people are linked to the markets and markets
are made to work for the benefit of the poor.
GOAL 2 (End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and
promote sustainable agriculture)
Food is a basic necessity but is prone to anticompetitive tendencies,
especially affecting its pricing and its availability. How committed are
governments to deal with these anticompetitive tendencies in dealing with
these problems? In some countries, on average, about 40-45 percent of
income is spent on food expenditure and any policy that can be used to
make food less expensive would complement poverty reduction efforts.
Effective agricultural sector policies, which facilitate greater (and
regulated) engagement of private sector in ‘inputs’ markets like fertiliser
and seeds, has the potential (as demonstrated under the CREW and other
projects) to make good quality inputs available at lower costs to farmers,
especially benefitting small farmers. In many developing and least
developed countries, monopolies (public and private) seem to control
agriculture markets, which make it difficult for small farmers to derive
benefits while selling their produce in these markets.
GOAL 3 (Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages)
Based on existing literature and practice, it is now well-established
that a healthy competition regime (accompanied with sound regulatory
framework) can be instrumental in improving access to healthcare services
and medicines, especially in developing countries. In most developed
countries, various stakeholders in the supply chain are regulated extensively
to improve the affordability and availability of medicines as well as maintain
levels of service.
GOAL 4 (Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote
life-long learning opportunities for all)
GOAL 5 (Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls)
There is growing recognition that public policy in developing world
can no longer remain oblivious of the needs and aspirations of women –
whether in the social setting or from an economic angle. Governments
and development partners are now investing lot of resources and attention
to explore avenues for boosting women’s economic empowerment, as a
means to strengthening their position in society. CUTS has also noted
this from the experience in Ghana, where ‘women traders’ (referred to
as ‘Market Queens’) are seen to control over 95 percent of the
procurement of staple food (maize) – and are very highly respected.1
Similarly, women self-help groups (SHGs) in various parts of India
have grown from being a pastime activity to a major contributor of the
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village economy in many parts of the country.2  In both these (above)
cases, scope was created in policies to ensure greater participation of
women in specific ‘economic’ activities – and should be looked at as lessons
for polity.
Existence of various types of barriers and challenges for women to
engage meaningfully in various markets is well documented – and is
something that governments and development partners need to look closely
at.
GOAL 6 (Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and
sanitation for all)
GOAL 7 (Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern
energy for all)
Across the developing world, inefficiency of the public sector as the
sole provider of these services in meeting citizens’ demands led to the
proliferation of private providers in them. The evolution of the regulatory
framework and the policy environment was not able to keep pace with
this process, and therefore led to ‘market failures’. Therefore, benefits of
economic liberalisation and private sector engagement in these sectors
have not led to the envisaged benefits (meeting citizens’ needs). Attainment
of these goals would not be possible without the development and
application of effective regulatory frameworks in these sectors, which
should also encourage ‘citizens engagement’ in these reforms.
GOAL 8 (Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth,
full and productive employment and decent work for all)
GOAL 9 (Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable
industrialisation and foster innovation)
There is abundant evidence in literature and practice of how a well-
functioning/vibrant market can stimulate innovation, productivity and
efficient resources use – key pointers for achievement of inclusive and
sustainable economic growth. Dutz and Hayri (2000) established that
there is a strong correlation between the effectiveness of competition
policy and economic growth. Kahyarara (2004) established a positive
relationship between competition policy and productivity, investment and
exports.
Further, the volume of infrastructure needs in developing countries
imply the engagement of private sector through public procurement
processes. Incorporation of ‘pro-competitive’ elements in public
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procurement process can help participation of a number of private sector
operators in the bidding process, and help save costs.
Lessons for Policy
The CREW project (Competition Reforms for Enhancing Social &
Economic Welfare in Developing Countries) generated knowledge and
evidence to reinforce the belief that promoting competition reforms
through relevant policies can contribute towards achievement of social
and economic welfare. The core objectives of the CREW project were
to:
• enhance understanding of the benefits from effectively undertaking
competition reforms in developing countries as an intrinsic part of
the overall reforms agenda;
• develop and test a methodology (with indicators) for assessing the
efficacy of competition reforms in achieving impacts on developing
country consumers and producers;
• sustain the momentum on prioritising competition reforms, gained
from stakeholder awareness and greater understanding about the
associated benefits and participation in related processes in
developing countries; and
• advocate for greater importance to competition policy and law issues
in the national development agenda to national and international
stakeholders.
The following key policy lessons emerged from the CREW project,
which are relevant for the wider community of policymakers and
practitioners – especially in the staple food and bus transport sectors.
These issues were discussed in details during the two day event:
i. There is value in having the right regulatory safeguards (mostly
competition policy) in place to ensure that benefits of trade and
economic liberalisation can be derived fully by the citizens/country.
ii. Although subsidies are generally a departure from normal
competition principles, they can assist farmers in remote areas
where the private sector might generally not be willing to
participate.
iii. Government grain procurement institutions might be best suited
to focus on maintaining strategic reserves (for food security
xxii Pursuing Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving SDGs
purposes). Both public and private entities should participate in
the procurement process with the overall objective to ensure that
procurement is done on time, farmers get the right price for their
produce and that payments to farmers are made at the time of
transaction.
iv. Although keeping public sector run transport companies has helped
in ensuring that cheaper transport exists, these are characterised
by several inefficiencies. Many governments have maintained
‘monopoly’ public sector operators in this market, which has
imposed considerable financial burden on the government.
v. Bus fare regulation process should be done in such a way that
there is a balance between enhancing consumer and producer
welfare. Right now, in many developing countries, ths process is
neither scientific nor inclusive or transparent. Given the pressure
on urban areas, governments should focus on developing effective
regulatory framework for bus transport.
Key Take-aways for Practitioners
The discussions during the two day conference were also instrumental
in revealing the following key ‘take aways’ for practitioners of competition
policy and law, especially in the developing countries:
(i) Continued misgivings about competition benefits by policymakers
Considerable efforts have been made by advocates and researchers to
bring practical evidence based on real examples on the critical role that
competition, enhanced by competition reforms, plays in better allocation
of resources and higher level of GDP and growth. However, there is still
low level of buy-in about the importance of competition reforms by
policymakers, particularly in developing countries. This is because some
conspiracy theorists are also lobbying against competition reforms, mostly
because they benefit from anticompetitive practices.
In addition, although competition reforms help all progressive
stakeholders in the growth agenda, promotion of the competition reforms
agenda has been left mainly to the competition authorities, with other
arms of government taking a back seat, often swayed by the above
‘lobbyists’. Critical government arms responsible for policy reforms are
therefore vulnerable to lobbying by powerful businesses (often found to
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be perpetrators of anticompetitive practices). Competition advocates thus
need to ensure that they remain aware of such challenges and devise
strategies to adequately articulate the correct position regarding the impact
of competition reforms to growth, to enhance buy-in of competition
reforms in developing countries.
(ii) Importance of competition enhancing policy reforms in promoting
innovation and jobs
Based on case studies presented in conference papers from Nigeria,
Mexico, China and India, the importance of adopting competition oriented
reforms in promoting innovation and jobs was also discussed. From a
paper from Nigeria, the impact of having more choice through competition
in secondary schools in Nigeria was discussed. It was recommended that
policymakers should focus on supply-side reforms that would entail
assessment of availability of good quality of schools in the ‘marketplace’.
At the same time, educational authorities should also develop indicators
of ‘performance measures’ of schools, especially to ensure that there is
some level of competition at the time of admission. Lessons from the
implementation of competition law in Mexico demonstrate the importance
of encouraging competition policy to spread its roots in the domestic
system first, before supporting those roots through international assistance.
International support without a strong domestic competition system is
bound to create limitations in terms of impact on the economy.
In China, the Chinese government and the competition agencies
expressly linked competition law and policy with China’s development
goals. Thus, since the 2008 Anti-Monopoly Law, much of competition
law discourse was focused on the role of competition law in helping to
improve people’s wellbeing and livelihood in addition to promoting the
pursuit of innovation by businesses. This, therefore, made it easy for
government buy-in.
Lessons from India in the staple food sector (wheat) showed that
private participation in the seeds sector was picking up in States like Bihar
– and the benefits were gradually being felt by the farmers. Although
organized agriculture markets were introduced under the Agriculture
Produce Market Committees in the 1970s with the objective of protecting
farmers from exploitation by intermediaries, the policy denied private
investment, invited corruption, and artificially restricted the number of
market players, resulting in restrictive and monopolistic markets with
high transaction costs.
xxiv Pursuing Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving SDGs
(iii) The role of competition in inclusive growth
Competitive markets tend to impose limitations in promoting
innovation, demonstrating the need for a regime that protects intellectual
property rights to compliment competition objectives. Competition on
its own might discourage innovation, demonstrating the need for significant
initiatives, policies and institutions to stimulate innovation in developing
economies.
Improperly targeted subsidies also tend to cause market distortions.
For example, the Zambia government introduced a floor price at which
maize would be procured by the Food Reserve Agency (FRA). This was
set above market prices. Contrary to the envisaged impact of benefiting
the poor smallholder maize farmers, the high prices benefited only the
net maize sellers, comprising only about 28 percent of all farming
households. The net sellers are mostly better off farmers who can produce
more as poor farmers do not largely sell to the FRA. Thus, improperly
targeted subsidies, which are generally a departure from competition
principles, tend to distort competition with little benefits to farmers, which
does not promote inclusive growth.
(iv) Competition reforms as a tool for public welfare
Competition reforms also serve as a tool for enhancing public welfare,
which includes both consumer and producer welfare. Although
competition is often promoted by enhancing private sector participation,
benefits from such competition are often subdued by policy barriers, leaving
consumers at the mercy of market distortion effects. Examples include
India, where policy measures to promote competitive grain trading were
introduced in the 2000s, but continue to be characterised by road-blocks
due to administrative instruments and interventionist measures from
policy. While competition is not the panacea for public welfare, it
complements other tools that can be used to safeguard the interest of
both consumers and producers in trade.
(v) Continuous dialogue between competition advocates and public policy
implementers at national level
As explained in the earlier section, competition and regulatory reforms
can be used as a tool to attain certain social and economic objectives
aligned with specific SDGs. There seems to be direct interface with SDGs
1, 2 and 3.  Further, competition policy can also be seen to be relevant in
the attainment of SDGs 4 to 9.
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It is, therefore, crucial that a process of continuous dialogue is initiated
and sustained between the competition fraternity (and advocates) and
government officials, agencies and other practitioners involved with the
designing and implementation of programmes for achievement of various
SDGs at the national level.
(vi) Inter-linkages between competition policy, trade and regional
integration
While regional integration brings with it benefits to regional economies,
the different levels of development and capacities among member states
means that small economies and small firms are usually vulnerable to
market dominance by larger firms, who are normally from richer
economies. As a result, safeguards are needed in the form of an effective
competition law and a sound regulatory environment, which can play an
important role in preventing market distortions and ensuring consumer
welfare. Where regional integration gives rise to market dominance or
market distortion, it results in perpetuation of inequality among and within
the integrating countries. Incorporating competition rules and related
regulatory reforms into regional trade agreements can therefore strengthen
economic growth and market integration. The benefits of incorporating
competition rules in regional integration help address barriers within
member states’ borders, as well as cross-border anticompetitive business
practices that cannot be remedied by trade policy instruments.
(vii) Need to properly package ‘benefits of competition’
In his keynote speech at the conference, the Guest of Honour, Dr.
Ekwow Spio-Garbrah, Trade & Industry Minister of Ghana pointed to
the need for competition policy advocates to show demonstrable benefits
of competition to SMEs and private sector to ensure that they do not
oppose competition policy and law. The presence of many banks in Ghana,
which can be seen as reflecting high levels of competition, has not
necessarily brought about competition as interest rates in Ghana are
between 30-100 percent even though there are about 40 banks and over
200 micro finance institutions.
It was also pointed out that business is likely support any policy reform
which can be seen to have a positive impact on profit, which is the main
motive for business. Thus, the impact of competition reforms on profits
needs to be properly explained to business. In addition, competition reforms
also mean different things to different people, which is why some
stakeholders may not support the process. This generally underlines the
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need for creating awareness about what competition is within the context
of competition policy and how the benefits are expected to materialise.
This is something that the CREW project endeavoured to do – and CUTS
would continue to reach-out with its knowledge to people in the
developing world.
Endnotes
1 Refer to the Ghana Diagnostic Country Report (prepared under the CREW project
of CUTS) at:
http://www.cuts-ccier.org/CREW/pdf/Diagnostic_Country_Report-Ghana.pdf
2 Assessment of success and failure of SHGs in India, available at:
http://planningcommission.gov.in/reports/sereport/ser/ser_shg3006.pdf
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Role of Government in promoting sustainable
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Theoretical Overview
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Governance Mechanisms and
Regulation
Test of the Mediating Effects of Regulatory
Decision Tools in the Communications Regulator
KUO-TAI CHENG
Associate Professor
Department of Environmental and Cultural Resources,
Institute for Human Resource Development
National Hsin-Chu University of Education
Taipei, Taiwan
Abstract
Research shows consistent relationships between governance
mechanisms and regulations. In this study, the authors developed and
tested a model of regulation for examining the mediating effects of
regulatory decision tools on the relationships between governance
mechanisms and regulations in the communications regulator. Covariance
structural analyses revealed regulatory decision tool variables to be
influential mechanisms through which governance mechanisms affect
regulation. Specifically, regulatory instruments and delegated powers
mediate the effects of independence and participation on regulation.
Although accountability was related to delegated powers, neither
accountability nor personnel was related to enhanced regulations. The
importance of the proposed regulatory decision tool model is discussed
in this study.
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Introduction
Research related to regulatory governance has recently clarified the
utility of using governance mechanisms for enhancing regulation. Such
research1 has demonstrated that governance mechanisms are indeed
associated with regulations with some governance mechanisms, such as
independence-enhancing regulations are administered across countries
while other governance mechanisms are correlated with specific sectors
or countries. For example, Stern and Holder used six governance
mechanisms – namely, clarity or roles and objectives, autonomy,
participation, accountability, transparency, and predictability – to assess
13 Asian developing countries for the Asian Development Bank (ADB)2.
Case studies by international organisations, such as the World Bank
and ADB offer interesting narrative views but cannot allow statistically
robust effects of the relationship and mediation from the development of
an independent regulatory agency. Relatively little literature is available
on measuring governance mechanisms, regulations, and regulation
decision-making tools, where privatisation, liberalisation, and regulatory
agencies started3.
Furthermore, very little research has examined the mechanisms through
which governance mechanisms influence regulations4. According to Cheng
(2015), results showed that relevant governance mechanisms and
regulation predict both individual and organisational capture. Further,
regulation partially mediates the relationship between governance
mechanisms and regulatory capture in the regulatory space.
The mechanism of ‘accountability’ was found to play a critical role in
the prediction of regulatory captures because it had direct impact on
individual capture and indirect impact on individual and organisational
capture through its relationship to regulation. Further, participation was
found to play a critical role in the prediction of organisational capture,
and its effect was primarily direct rather than indirect.
Currently, little empirical research exists on governance mechanisms
and regulation by the mediating effects of regulatory decision tools. As
Majone argued, the international diffusion of regulation as a distinct type
of policy making seems to be particularly important in explaining the
current renaissance of regulatory analysis5.
Furthermore, no attempt has been made to explain the relationship in
the extent of regulatory problems and practice. Are regulations, governance
mechanisms, and regulatory decision tools linked to the communications
regulator and the instruments deployed by the regulator? The purpose of
the present study is to build on these findings and enhance understanding
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of governance mechanisms by assessing the regulatory decision-making
processes that mediate relationships between governance mechanisms
and regulations.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the main issues arising from
some recent theoretical literature and its implications for regulatory
practice, which will provide the basis for producing the hypotheses. The
need exists to explore relevant research linking governance mechanisms,
regulation, and regulatory decision tools in order to discuss research
pertaining to regulation and governance mechanisms as well as formulate
expectations for the relationship between these constructs.
Thus, this study is designed to test the hypotheses. Section 2 summarises
the argument about governance mechanisms and regulation and discusses
some of the underlying issues affecting the relationship among governance
mechanisms, regulation, and regulatory decision tools. Section 3 discusses
the research method and scales. Section 4 presents the research analysis
and results. The paper ends with a few concluding discussions.
Literature Review
Regulation and Governance Mechanisms
“Like many other political concepts, regulation is hard to define, not
least because it means different things to different people.”6 In the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)7
report, regulation refers to the diverse set of policy instruments by which
governments set up requirements on enterprises and citizens. Regulations
include laws, formal and informal orders, and subordinate rules issued by
all levels of governments and rules issued by non-government or self-
regulatory bodies to whom governments have delegated regulatory
powers.
Regulation, in general, explains the idea of the imposition of controls,
restraints, and the application of rules8. However, regulation is hard to
define as it relies on different explanatory ways. Regulation is “both a
technical fix to a problem and a source of problems itself and (…)
inherently a site where different political and economic forces come into
contest”9.
As Black argues, “regulation is the sustained and focussed attempt to
alter the behaviour of others according to defined standards or purposes
with the intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes,
which might involve mechanisms of standard-setting, information-
gathering and behaviour-modification”10.
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As Black argued that definitions of regulation implicit the term
regulatory state even more limited11. In this study, ‘Regulation’ is defined
as a type of legal instrument and process, and is the control of service
providing public utilities as well12. Regulations for public utilities are
controlling, governing, directing, altering, adjusting with reference to some
standard or purpose. Therefore, regulators can have incentives for
regulatory failures, and there should be clear governance mechanisms
that limit or curb potential misbehaviour.
Furthermore, Levy and Spiller (1994) defined the governance structure
as “the mechanisms that societies use to constrain regulatory discretion
and to resolve conflicts that arise in relation to these constraints13”.
Ashworth, Boyne and Walker (2002) argued that, according to the evidence
in Wales, regulatory misbehaviour and performance ambiguity are the
most noticeable problems and are more prevailing in local services than
in national services.
“Apart from the problem of ‘capture’, too much discretion by regulators
also increases the ‘regulatory risk’ faced by regulated firms, with
potentially adverse effects on regulatory outcomes.”14
In practice, it is of significance for regulatory agencies to forfend
interpretation of their objectives as well as avoid discretion. Therefore,
regulatory governance – firmly grounded in the wider theme of good
governance15 also refers to the complexity of the interplay of policy actors
in the process of regulation. This suggests the need for regulatory design
incorporating governance mechanisms. Thus regulatory governance
mechanisms should be designed to limit regulatory failures.
“Regulatory mechanisms should therefore be designed to limit
regulatory risk. For example, statutory or legal requirements on the
regulators to ensure that firms can finance their regulated activities can
reduce the risk of regulatory expropriation and avoid a possible source of
investment distortions, thereby increasing social welfare16”.
Moreover, tensions between different levels of regulatory governance
appear in practice, indicating the need for a combined regulatory
governance of the effects of the different governance mechanism on
regulatory performance17. As such, it can be argued that strong and
effective governance features (including sound decision-making processes)
are essential as the only way discovered thus for offering boundaries and
accountability on regulatory decisions.
Regulatory processes can be thought of as a design mechanism with
two dimensions18: governance and incentives. Regulatory governance
entails the creation of a transparent and predictable regulatory system
that can be sustained over time19.
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Regulatory incentives refer to the mechanisms that are connected with
pricing, subsidies, and other operating policies. Regulatory governance
initially matters more than regulatory incentives as the sustainability of
the institutional environment reform is developed primarily and initially
from a sound and strong framework of regulatory governance20.
In addition, in the absence of either a regulatory agency or any prior
experience in regulating public and private utilities sectors, it is reasonable
to assume that a sound and strong framework of regulatory governance
initially represents a commitment by the government to reduce regulatory
failure21.
Gulen, Makaryan, Volkov, and Foss (2007) offered a list of governance
mechanisms that different studies found to be desirable or even necessary.
They then determined four most important government mechanisms:
Independence, Enforcement Powers, or Authority, Transparency and
Accountability, and Competency.
According to their analysis, transparency and accountability appear to
be unanimously desired characteristics. Some studies22 even offered
further governance mechanisms, such as Communication, Consultation,
Consistency, Predictability, Impartiality, and Flexibility that put into
transparency and enhance accountability.
In 1997, the UK Better Regulation Task Force (BRTF) published its
Principles for Good Regulation, defining five principles: transparency,
accountability, proportionality, consistency, and targeting23.
These principles are very similar to those in Smith’s24 study. Meanwhile,
Stern and Holder (1999) used six governance criteria for the ADB: clarity
of roles and objectives, autonomy, participation, accountability,
transparency, and predictability. All of these authors emphasised on the
clarity of assignment of functions, regulatory autonomy, accountability,
and transparency.
Further, for the regulatory body to realise its role as effectively as
possible, the regulation seeker’s coverage of the regulator, the jurisdictional
boundaries between the regulatory body and the Ministry, and relations
with other regulators are of interest25. It is also evident that the regulatory
agency should not be influenced by the regulation seeker’s subject to its
regulation.
Warrick Smith (1997) argued the importance of independence, defining
it with following requirements:
• Distant relationship with the regulatees, consumers and other
private interests;
• Distant relationship with political authorities
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• attributes of organisational autonomy, such as earmarked funding
and exemption from restrictive civil service salary rules – necessary
to further the growth of the requisite expertise and corroborate
those having not so close relationships.
However, Levy and Spiller (1996) do not make substantive suggestions
about the required nature of governance mechanisms other than to
emphasise the need to correspond to the institutional endowment of the
countries in question. “Regulators have the power to generate and
redistribute rents across various interest groups, for instance, by creating
or preserving monopoly positions or by maintaining cross-subsidies in
the tariff structure”.
Therefore, they might have incentives to use this power to gain or
maintain support from their political principals. “At the same time,
regulated firms or the beneficiaries of regulation, such as user groups
have a strong incentive to attempt to ‘capture’ the regulator. There is also
a risk that the regulators will use their discretion to expropriate producers,
distorting investment incentives in the industry. These political economy
considerations point to the need for careful design of regulatory
frameworks26".
Therefore, the need exists to set up governance mechanisms to restrain
the discretionary scope of regulators and resolve the conflicts between
regulators and those seeking regulation.
The contemporary literature identifies four possible approaches:
economic, social, political, and institutional. Cheng and Hebenton (2008)
argued that only the institutional approach is quite robust to investigate
regulation and governance. Such an approach also provides the advantage
in that it allows for the exploration of the five interrelated aspects (clarity
of roles; participation; independence; accountability and transparency)
of a regulatory framework that captures the main governance mode of
regulation and governance. These formed the basis of the questionnaire
used in the current study27.
An OECD report, Gonenc et al. (2000) highlighted the need to design
regulatory governance mechanisms and institutions to abridge the
possibility of regulatory capture by regulation seeker or other interest
groups as well as the effects of regulatory uncertainties on the regulation
seeker’s investment behaviour28. On the other hand, Correa et al29 argued
that “independence and accountability attributes are more developed than
regulatory means and instruments, mostly qualified personnel and
regulatory tools and decision-making procedures, particularly with respect
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to those mechanisms that can guarantee consistency of decisions and reduce
arbitrariness”.
Most of these variables of governance mechanisms for regulation have
been analysed in studies of governance and regulatory governance
conducted by, for instance, the World Bank, OECD, ADB, National
Economic Research Associates (NERA), International Monetary Fund
(IMF), and many researchers. Levy and Spiller30  agued that “the
governance structure incorporates the mechanisms a society uses to restrain
the discretionary scope of regulators and to resolve the conflicts to which
these restrain give rise”.
It is also necessary and of significance to determine to which extent
particular solutions to the challenges of regulation and governance are
embedded in traditions and practices specific to national political and
administrative systems and probably also to particular policy fields31.
Cheng and Hebenton (2008) conducted a qualitative analysis on
governance mechanisms for telecommunication liberalisation and
regulation. Their results showed that governance mechanisms are
important in the process of liberalisation and regulation. In addition,
liberalisation can generate very few welfare improvements when not
combined with good regulatory governance and robust legal framework.
However, their results do not show the relationship between
governance mechanisms and regulations. Thus, we expect that each of
the five governance mechanisms (clarity of Roles, Accountability,
Transparency, Participation, and Independence) in the current study will
have significant correlations with regulations.
Regulatory Decision Tools
Regulatory decision-making processes range from formal hearings, as
in the United States, to more informal processes, such as those in the
United Kingdom. Wherever the balance is struck, the focus should be on
transparency in decision-making, which reduces opportunities for
improper influences and underscores the fairness and legitimacy of
decisions32.
According to Smith’s work, regulatory decision-making process usually
enhances governance mechanisms that can extend regulation seeker
interested in a decision with the opportunity to express their views, release
the decision and the elaborate reasons for concluding that decision, and
challenge the decision through an appeals process to assure that the
regulatory body remains accountable.
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In Correa et al.’s (2006) survey, 18 of the 21 agencies surveyed were
legally required to formally document the decision-making process,
detailing the actions of each actor involved. However, only eight regulators
were required to cite jurisprudence in support of their decisions, weakening
the consistency of regulatory decision-making over time.
In addition, formal documentation of the decision-making process was
legally required and must contain every legal action of those actors directly
involved in the process. Also important was the fact that in the case of
only six regulators, decisions were made without previous communication
and discussion among board members33.
Therefore, the regulatory agency is a non-departmental public
organisation mainly involved with rule making, which might also be
responsible for face finding, monitoring, adjudication, and enforcement34
(Levi-Faur, 2011). Regulatory agencies have become highly popular by
delegating powers from the government to independent regulatory bodies,
thereby enabling the executive to reassure regulation seekers that it will
not be able to arbitrarily intervene in the market.
Furthermore, the degree of delegation involves the level to which the
executive, the legislature, or both seek to bind their hands in order to
produce credibility and predictability35. However, appropriate legal
delegation is clearly not enough to secure effective regulation36. The
content of regulatory decision-making is important, but the key issue is
the decision tools if the objective is to guarantee regulatory credibility
and stability.
The survey of Brazil regulatory agencies stated that five out of the
eight regulatory instruments presented. For example, methodology for
tariff revision and instruments for quality monitoring were available for
at least 13 agencies. More sophisticated instruments, especially those
related to economic regulation (as opposed to technical regulation), were
less available. Almost all surveyed agencies considered themselves to have
the power and legal means to secure compliance with their decisions.
However, one-fifth of the agencies’ personnel was admitted by public
examinations (this share was higher for older agencies than for the newer
ones), with this share being 26 percent and 18 percent among federal and
state agencies, respectively. Approximately, 95 percent of the agencies’
staff had undertaken short-term courses37.
Independence refers to governance mechanisms that isolate regulatory
body from the interests of the regulatee. As regulatees assess the regulatory
decision-making process, both the decision-making rules and participation
facets should be well-considered. An additional important mechanism is
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accountability, which refers to offering effective arrangements for
appealing the regulatory agency’s decision.
 To strengthen the regulatory decision-making process, transparency
is needed to ensure open decision-making that necessitates publishing
decisions and meetings by unwrapping relevant information, declaring in
advance the schedule of meetings and their respective agendas, and making
available to third parties the minutes of meetings held38.
In other words, regulators require not only the right to ask information,
but also the substantive legal powers and regulatory instruments to enforce
the request (for example, issue warnings and impose fines). The quality
of selection of personnel is also significant in the regulatory decision-
making process.
Earlier discussions of regulation and governance have emphasised a
number of GMs, such as the agency’s autonomy and the clarity of its
roles and objectives; decision-making processes, transparency, and
predictability; decision tools and personnel; and participation and
accountability. Other mechanisms to describe regulatory governance have
also been suggested in the literature39 suggested five critical mechanisms:
1. Accountability
2. Independence
3. Clarity of roles
4. Participation and
5. Transparency
In this study, we opted to test Reg, GMs, and regulatory decision tools
(RDTs), which are closely linked in the literature.
As Minogue asserted (2002), “to understand fully the ‘governance of
regulation’… we must also examine the characteristics of the public policy
process. This means looking beyond the institutional façade to grasp the
‘real world’ of public action”40. Regulations, as institutions, establish rules
for agents and create structures of incentives and constraints41.
In addition, both formal and informal institutions and their enforcement
qualities are fundamental, and enforcement depends heavily on informal
rules, such as norms, customs, and conventions42. The institutional
approach adopted in the research is the study of institutions, described
by Rhodes43 as ‘a subject in search of a rationale’. It is also “a subject
matter covering the rules, procedures, and formal organisations of
government”44.
However, institutions are no longer equated with organisations
(Lowndes, 2002, p.91). Rather an “institution is understood more broadly
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to refer to a stable, recurring pattern of behaviour”45. In other words,
the institutional approach highlights formal regulations and organisational
structures and behaviours as well as informal conventions46 that add
breadth and depth to an understanding of institutional links in the
regulatory decision-making.
Regulatory decision tools that help review the regulation are a key
way to improve the quality of the regulation. Improving regulatory quality
is an ongoing task that is becoming important in the regulatory policy
agendas in Taiwan. Consequently, communications regulations need to
be framed within the context of governance, not government.
Communications regulation in this research is firmly grounded in the
broader theme of good governance.
Further, it is involved in exercising regulatory functions that go beyond
the design and implementation of regulatory decision tools, or their
coordination, and also embrace wider issues that are integral to governance
mechanisms, such as clarity of roles, participation, independence,
accountability, and transparency. Regulatory governance also refers to
encompassing the complex interplay of regulators, governance
mechanisms, and their decision tools in the process of communications
regulation. Therefore, the institutional links for decision tools and
governance mechanisms for regulations are critical for ensuring that
objectives are achieved; otherwise, there is a risk of policy or regulatory
failure.
Finally, it can be argued that there is a need to explore relevant research
linking governance mechanisms, regulations, and Regulatory Decision
Tools (RDTs) to discuss research pertaining to regulations and governance
mechanisms as well as formulate the expectations for the relationships
between these constructs. In the following chapter, the study designed to
test hypothesised model will be described, which is as following:
Hypothesis 1: Regulatory instruments correspond with regulation.
Hypothesis 2: Delegated powers and regulations exhibit a positive,
direct relationship.
Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between delegated powers and
regulations is mediated by regulatory instruments.
Hypothesis 4: Regulators scoring high on accountability report
stronger intentions regarding personnel of regulatory
decision tools.
Hypothesis 5: Regulators scoring high on independence report
stronger intentions regarding regulatory instruments of
regulatory decision tools.
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Hypothesis 6: Intentions for regulatory instruments mediate a positive
relationship between independence and regulation.
Hypothesis 7: Regulators scoring high on participation report stronger
intentions regarding delegated powers of regulatory
decision tools.
Hypothesis 8: Intentions for delegated powers mediate a positive
relationship between participation and regulation.
Method
Participants and Procedure
Mounting pressures to ensure better regulations are also arising from
communications development in Taiwan. Regulation has moved into many
new areas, while the complexity of rules has also increased. Regulatory
processes encompass the development of new regulations, the revision of
existing regulations, and the implementation of existing regulations.
A range of regulatory decision tools and governance mechanisms have
been developed to improve the outcomes of regulatory processes. These
trends indicate that regulatory governance for a communications regulatory
agency is more crucial than ever. One of the central goals of
communications regulators is to ensure that regulations efficiently produce
economic, social, and administrative benefits, i. e. that benefits justify
costs that costs are the minimum needed to produce any level of benefits,
and that resources are allocated to their highest values.
Hence, it is important for communications regulators to understand
the likely consequences of different regulatory decision tools and
governance mechanisms and to compare them with the goals of economic,
social, and administrative regulations.
The participants comprised 164 employees in the National
Communications Commission (NCC), an independent regulator of
Taiwan. The response rate was 82 percent. There were 49 women (30
percent) and 115 men (70 percent). The mean level of job experience was
29.45 months (SD=30.17 months). Data were obtained during a concurrent
test validation project.
Prior to testing, all participants were given a letter containing a brief
explanation of the purpose of the study (i.e., test validation) and a research
statement ensuring the confidentiality of their individual test results.
Immediately after testing, participants completed a regulatory decision
tools questionnaire, which was short demographic form requesting
background information.
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One important element of this research is the analysis of the effect of
regulatory governance in the communications. In fact, there is a need for
the research on the links among regulation, governance mechanisms, and
regulatory decision tools to help regulators have a better understanding
of the regulatory policies for which they are responsible or to which they
may make a contribution.
Grindle (1980) argued that, in order to understand reform elements,
the behaviour of regulators and constraints on their actions must be studied
against the backdrop of the institutional contexts within which they
operate. This opens a space for choice in the design and implementation
of regulation and decision tools by considering factors that influence these
regulatory choices and actions. As a result, the contributions of regulatory
officers are significant to regulatory governance in communications
regulatory decision-making.
For the purposes of the studies envisaged under this research, regulatory
officers were selected to obtain focussed results and avoid the constraints
of data sources. The decision of whom to select was made using multiple
criteria, so that representation is possible across a number of facets of
governance for regulation.
Information from regulatory officers is highly valued as they are the
regulators who have the most knowledge regarding institutional links for
regulatory decision tools and governance mechanisms for regulation.
Informants were more articulate, more knowledgeable, and closer to the
event, action, process, or setting than others. One of the advantages of
this approach is the ability to investigate a contemporary phenomenon,
such as regulatory decision tools, governance mechanisms, and regulatory
governance within a real-life context.
Measures
The study adopted a cross-sectional approach to measure all variables
simultaneously. An anti-common method variance (CMV) strategy was
also embedded in the measurement. A series of standardised scales were
used, as detailed in the sub-sections.
Governance Mechanisms
Governance mechanisms were adopted to measure governance
mechanisms for regulation. This scale is composed of 25 items47. Sample
items included:
• How would you evaluate the interference from other government
authorities to the practices of regulatory agency?
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• How would you evaluate the influences from the regulated utility
to the practices of regulatory agency?
• How would you evaluate the current information collecting
mechanism of regulatory agency?
• How would you evaluate the importance of collecting opinions from
the regulatees, consumers and other stakeholders in the regulatory
decision-making?
• How would you evaluate the importance of legal requirements for
the publication of the regulatory agency’s decision?
The participants’ responses were recorded using a 5-point Likert scale
(1=completely disagree, 5=completely agree). Higher scores meant higher
levels of governance mechanisms, indicating that participants demonstrated
more governance mechanisms for regulation48.
Regulation
The regulation scale was based on the definitions of OECD (1997)
and Black (2002). This scale is composed of nine items. Three kinds of
regulations – ‘economic’, ‘social’, and ‘administrative’ – were used to
measure the outcome of regulation, as perceived by the respondents, who
were employees of a regulatory agency.
Sample items included ‘Is regulation useful to do the price regulation’?
and ‘Is regulation useful to reduce the paperwork’?
The participants’ responses were recorded using a 5-point Likert scale
(1= completely disagree, 5 = completely agree). Higher scores meant a
higher level of expectation, indicating that participants had stronger
expectations toward regulation49.
Regulatory decision tools
The regulatory decision tools scale was revised and used to measure
regulatory governance in infrastructure industries50. The regulatory
decision tools scale is a nine-item measure. Sample items included ‘How
do you evaluate regulatory instruments are available to the operation of
regulatory agency’?, ‘How do you evaluate regulatory instruments are
available the agency’s power to promote competition in the market’?,
and ‘How would you evaluate the human resources and expertise available
to the agency’?
The responses were based on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = completely
disagree, 5 = completely agree). Higher scores meant a higher level of
expectation, indicating that participants had stronger expectation toward
using regulatory decision tools.
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Results
Table 1.1 presents correlation coefficients and other descriptive
statistics for all variables assessed in this study. Relationships between
GMs and RDTs are generally as predicted: The largest correlation for
accountability is with personnel (r =0.15), independence is with regulatory
instruments (r =0.48), and participation is with delegated powers (r =0.39).
Participation is also correlated with regulatory instruments (r =0.39).
Furthermore, the GMs expected to correspond with regulation are
indeed correlated with regulators’ ratings (r=0.21 and 0.26 for
independence and participation, respectively).
Finally, as expected, regulatory instruments and delegated powers are
correlated with regulation (r =0.36 and 0.21, respectively), whereas
personnel is not significantly related to regulation (r =–0.10). Taken
together, the correlational results support many of the hypotheses
postulated in this study and prompted an examination of the relationships
among these variables using the maximum-likelihood method of covariance
structure analysis to test for mediation (Bentler, 1995).
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics and Inter-correlations
among All Variables
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Independence 103.8 14.9 (0.89)
2. Clarity of Role 86.7 18.4 0.41* (0.84)
3. Participation 107.5 13.5 0.47* 0.34* (0.84)
4. Accountability 97.3 12.5 –0.23* –0.18* –0.01 (0.83)
5. Transparency 95.8 16.1 0.36* 0.20* 0.21* –0.03 (0.91)
6. Personnel 28.3 5.2 0.04 –0.11 0.01 0.15† 0.09 (0.76)
7. Regulatory 43.3 7.6 0.48* 0.18* 0.39* –0.11 0.12 0.14† (0.89)
Instrument
8. Delegated 46.9 5.5 0.32* 0.15† 0.39* 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.50* (0.88)
Powers
9. Regulation 35.9 12.8 0.21* 0.14† 0.26* –0.12 –0.05 –0.10 0.36* 0.21*  (0.86)
Note: Reliabilities are reported in parentheses along the diagonal. The 95 percent
confidence interval for correlations greater than or equal to 0.16 does not include 0 (0.01 <
0.16 < 0.31). The 90 percent confidence interval for correlations greater than or equal to
0.14 does not include 0 (0.01 < 0.14 < 0.27).
a N = 164.
* p < 0.05, two-tailed.   † p < 0.05, one-tailed.
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To ameliorate the effects of common-method variance (CMV) resulting
from the utilisation of self-rated measures, the authors collected the data
in two stages. CMV emerges when self-rated measures are simultaneously
used, as in some cases the observed relationships between variables are
inflated, jeopardising the reliability of data analysis51.
To assess the potential for regression coefficient instability, collinearity
diagnostics were conducted. Specifically, we calculated variance inflation
factor (VIF) scores, which measure the extent to which collinearity among
the predictors affects the precision of a regression model in each step.
Variance inflation is the consequence of multicollinearity. VIF scores of
less than 10 are typically considered acceptable52. No VIF score exceeded
1.9. Harman’s single factor test has been adopted to examine the potential
CMV53.
All the research variables were first merged into one factor, and the
results showed poor fit, suggesting that one single factor of merging all
variables was inappropriate for the data analysis (x2(210) = 3664.32, p <
0.001, RMSA = 0.15, NFI = 0.45, CFI = 0.19, IFI=0.21, SRMR=0.16).
Then an unmeasured latent construct method to measure the potential
influence of CMV is adopted as recommended by Podsakoff et al. (2003).
The chi-square difference test was not statistically significant [ x2(1)
= 3.60, ns]. Results were consistent with the findings of Harman’s single
factor test. To simplify, the influence of CMV was very less; hence, the
research dataset should be accepted for further data analysis.
The first three hypotheses, concerning relationships among the
regulatory decision tools variables and regulation, were specifically tested
with comparisons of three substantive models.
First, a saturated model (Model 1) was tested that included all
hypothesised paths between the governance mechanisms variables and
mediator variables, direct paths from independence and participation to
regulation, paths from regulatory instruments and delegated powers to
regulation, and paths from delegated powers to regulatory instruments
and personnel.
Second, a model was tested that eliminated the path between delegated
powers and regulatory instruments (Model 2). Third, a model was tested
that retained the delegated powers-regulatory instruments path but
eliminated the delegated powers-regulation path (Model 3). The results
of these analyses, as well as additional models described below, are shown
in Table 1.2.
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Models 2 and 3 are both nested within Model 1, allowing the use of
chi-square difference tests to compare models. A comparison of the
saturated model (Model 1) and the model leaving out the delegated powers-
regulatory instruments link (Model 2) yielded a significant result, x2 (1,
N=164) = 31.16, p < 0.01, supporting at least partial mediation of the
delegated powers-Reg relationship.
A comparison of Model 1 with the model leaving out the delegated
powers-regulation link (Model 3) yielded an insignificant result, x2 (1,
N =164)=0.13, ns, supporting the complete mediation of the delegated
powers-regulation relationship by regulatory instruments.
Thus, Hypothesis 3 is supported over Hypothesis 2, as the relationship
between delegated powers and Reg is not direct, but rather completely
mediated by regulatory instruments. Hypothesis 1 is also supported by a
significant relationship (  =0.41, p < 0.01) between regulatory instruments
and regulation.
Hypotheses related to the GMs variables were similarly tested with a
series of comparisons whereby Model 3 was compared with two additional
nested models. The first additional model (Model 4), the direct-effects-
Table 1.2: Fit Indices for Covariance Structure Analysis
                                                                                                                 Model comparison test
Model Number and Type x2 df CFI NFI RMSEA Compa- x2 df
rison
1. Saturated model 25.29 17 0.97 0.91 0.05
2. Without delegated 56.45 18 0.84 0.79 0.11 2 vs.1 31.16* 1
powers – regulatory
instruments path
3. Without delegated 25.42 18 0.97 0.91 0.05 3 vs.1 0.13 1
powers – regulation path
4. Direct effects onlya 83.06 20 0.73 0.70 0.14 4 vs.3 57.46* 2
5. Indirect effects onlyb 27.90 20 0.97 0.90 0.05 3 vs.1 2.48 2
Note: N = 164 for all chi-square analyses. CFI = comparative fit index; NFI = normed fit
index (any goodness of fit > 0.90 is an indication of acceptable overall model fit); RMSEA =
root-mean-square error of approximation (any RMSEA < 0.10 is an indication of acceptable
fit).
a With direct effects on Reg only. This model does not include paths from GMs to the RDT
variables.
b With indirect effects for GMs only. This model does not include direct effects from
governance mechanisms to regulation, although there are direct effects from the RDT
variables to regulation. Thus, this model represents the hypothesised mediation model.
* p < 0.05, two-tailed.
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only model, eliminated the independence-regulatory instruments and
participation-delegated powers paths. The second additional model (Model
5), the indirect-effects-only model, retained the GMs-mediator paths but
eliminated the direct effects from independence and participation to
regulation.
A comparison of Model 3 and Model 4 yielded a significant result, x2
(2, N=164) = 57.64, p <0.01, suggesting that the effects of independence
and participation on regulation are at least partially mediated by the
regulatory decision tools variables. A comparison of Model 3 and Model
5 yielded an insignificant result, x2 (2, N=164)=2.48, ns, suggesting that
the regulatory decision tools variables mediate the effects of independence
and participation on regulation.
The hypothesised model of mediation (Model 5, the indirect-effects-
only model) thus fit the data acceptably: x2(20, N=164) = 27.90,
comparative fit index = 0.97, normed fit index = 0.90, root-mean-square
error of approximation = 0.05. The standardised solution for this model
is presented in Figure 1. Hypothesis 4 is supported by the significant
linkage between accountability and personnel (  = 0.18, p < 0.05).
Hypothesis 5 is supported by the significant relationship between
independence and regulatory instruments ( =0.39, p<0.01). Hypothesis
6, predicting regulatory instruments to mediate the independence-Reg
relationship, is supported by finding the hypothesised mediation model
(Model 5) to have a fit equivalent to the fit of the model that also included
a direct path between independence and regulation (Model 3). The
independence-regulation relationship is approximately 76 percent mediated
by regulatory instruments.
Hypothesis 7 is supported by the link between participation and
delegated powers (  =0.48, p < 0.01). Hypothesis 8, predicting that
delegated powers mediate the participation-Reg relationship, is supported
by finding the hypothesised mediation model (Model 5) to have a fit
equivalent to the fit of the model. This also included a direct path between
participation and regulation (Model 3).
To further explore the nature of the effect for participation, we
examined whether the association between participation and regulation
was also mediated directly through regulatory instruments. To test this
finding, we examined an additional model that added a path between
participation and regulatory instruments to the model reported in
Figure 1.1. The fit indices did not improve, suggesting no direct relationship
between participation and regulatory instruments.
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This test suggests that a direct path between participation and regulatory
instruments is not an alternative to the mediated relationship through
delegated powers. The overall indices, along with the nested model
comparison tests, thus indicate that the theoretical model of mediation
(Model 5) fits the data well. The participation-regulation relationship is
approximately 35 percent mediated by delegated powers and regulatory
instruments.
Figure 1.1: The standardised solution for the indirect-effects-only
model (model3)
* p < 0.5.   ** p < 0.01.
Discussion and Conclusions
Relatively little is known about the mechanisms through which
governance mechanisms affect regulation Limited research54 has provided
initial support for the long-held view related to the proximal means by
which GMs affect Reg through regulatory decision-making process.
This study extends the knowledge of this relationship by focussing on
three fundamental regulatory decision tools that regulators can pursue in
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the regulatory process, including personnel. For example, the regulator’s
employee is admitted by public examinations), delegated powers. For
example, the regulator has sufficient legal powers and means to secure
compliance with its decision, and regulatory instruments (the regulator
has the power and legal means to guarantee compliance with its decision).
Hypothesis 1 is supported by a significant relationship ( =0.41, p<0.01)
between regulatory instruments and Reg. Hypothesis 3 is also supported
over Hypothesis 2, as the relationship between delegated powers and
Reg is not direct, but rather completely mediated by regulatory
instruments. Moreover, Hypothesis 4 is supported by the significant
linkage between accountability and personnel ( =0.18, p < 0.05).
Hypothesis 5 is supported by the significant relationship between
independence and regulatory instruments (  = 0.39, p < 0.01).
The results demonstrate that regulatory instruments and delegated
powers (indirectly through regulatory instruments) mediate relationships
between two governance mechanisms (participation and independence)
and regulation. Independent regulators were more likely to be enhanced
by regulatory instruments, which in turn enabled them to perform better
as regulators. Participation was more likely to enhance delegated powers,
which linked to regulation through regulatory instruments. Mediation
for the independence – regulation relationship is relatively easy to interpret.
The major portion of the relationship between independence and
regulation was indirect through regulatory instruments, as expected.
The nature of mediation for the participation – regulation relationship
is somewhat weaker and more complex. The indirect effect of
participation on regulatory instruments is mediated through delegated
powers. Nevertheless, a moderate direct effect also remained between
participation and regulation.
Hypothesis 6, which predicted that regulatory instruments mediate
the independence-regulation relationship, is supported by the finding that
the hypothesised mediation model (Model 5) has a fit equivalent to the fit
of the model that also included a direct path between independence and
regulation (Model 3). Hypothesis 7 is supported by the link between
participation and delegated powers (â = 0.48, p < 0.01).
Hypothesis 8, predicting that delegated powers mediate the
participation-regulation relationship, is supported by the finding that the
hypothesised mediation model (Model 5) has a fit equivalent to the fit of
the model that also included a direct path between participation and
regulation (Model 3).
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Our results suggest that regulatory instruments, rather than delegated
powers, are the enhanced decision tool most strongly associated with
regulation. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that delegated powers
should be retained in models explaining how governance mechanisms
and affect regulation.
First, modest correlations with regulatory instruments and with
personnel suggest that delegated powers are indeed a separate construct.
Second, the post hoc analyses related to participation illustrate that the
effect of participation on regulatory instruments is mediated by delegated
powers. For these reasons, it is believed that it is significant for future
research to examine all three regulatory decision tool variables, not just
personnel and regulatory instruments.
The personnel factor was positively related to accountability, as
expected. This finding supports the hypothesis that highly accountable
regulators are more likely to be enhanced to get along with other regulatees
in the regulatory process, although the personnel factor for regulatory
decision tools was not related to regulation in the NCC.
Therefore, we are unable to test all dimensions of the proposed decision
tools model within the context of the present study, and any conclusions
related to personnel are tenuous and incomplete. Future research should
examine whether a path between delegated powers and personnel explains
regulation in the NCC, in which there is greater opportunity for the
personnel of regulatory decision tools. It should also be noted that
accountability, clarity of role, and transparency were not found to be
strongly related to regulation.
Although our literature findings support the utility of a model based
on the five governance mechanisms and regulations, we acknowledge that
other perspectives of GMs exist, such as predictability55. Other
perspectives focus on differences, such as regulatory capacity56 and
autonomy57. Still other perspectives focus more on context factors such
as institutional endowment58.
Additional research is needed to integrate these concepts within our
model. Moreover, the support for the regulatory decision tool perspective
that we adopt should not necessarily be interpreted as evidence against
other perspectives that similarly help us understand the complex regulatory
process. A potential limitation of this study is that both the GMs and
RDTs measures were obtained from self-responses, thereby introducing
common-method bias.
Due to the fact that intentions are virtually impossible to measure except
through self-response, future studies might ay reduce this confound by
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obtaining alternative indicators of governance mechanisms. Nevertheless,
given the governance mechanisms – RDT correlations obtained in this
study (mean r=0.18; maximum r =0.48), it seems reasonable to conclude
that our measures of governance mechanisms and RDT are likely assessing
separate constructs. A second limitation of this study is the cross-sectional
design, which does not allow for an assessment of causality.
Thus, for example, we are unable to definitively test the validity of the
assumption that delegated powers cause regulatory instruments. An
alternative explanation is that regulators are enhanced to attain regulatory
instruments in order to have more delegated powers.
Overall, the present study extends current theory in two primary ways.
First, it provides support for a process model of regulatory decision tools
that combines governance mechanisms and RDT variables. Such findings
enhance our understanding of how governance mechanisms affect
regulation. These findings also underscore the central role of the regulator
in determining regulations in the regulatory process. Second, our study
supports and extends the development of theoretical models of regulation.
Regulatory decision tools have long been viewed as having a central
role in regulation. This study adopts the decision-making perspective and
identifies broad decision tools toward three fundamental orientations in
the regulatory process: personnel (for example, the regulator’s employee
is admitted by public exams), regulatory instruments (for instance, the
regulator has the power and legal means to guarantee compliance with its
decision), and delegated powers. For example, the regulator has sufficient
legal powers and means to secure compliance with its decision).
Although the relative importance of these regulatory decision tools
might differ depending on the demands of specific sectors and countries,
the proposed framework appears to comprehensively specify a decision
tool, explaining what regulators are trying to decide in the regulatory
process – namely, personnel, delegated powers, and regulatory
instruments. Assessing a regulator’s decision through these three broad
tools provides one method for comprehensively measuring regulatory
decision- making in the regulatory process.
Future models investigating the determinants of regulation might thus
benefit from including measures of personnel, delegated powers, and
regulatory instruments as tools of decision-making.
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Abstract
Competition has not been at the heart of the process of policymaking
debates in many countries. Its role in economic development,
competitiveness of national economies, trade and investment has not been
fully appreciated, particularly in developing countries and remains fragile
in the political context and in public opinion. Governments over time
have adopted trade and regulatory policies in open contradiction with
competition principles.
This paper addresses the role of the government towards laying down
policies keeping in mind the crucial need for competition to inform them
(policies) with a view to sub-serving sustainable economic growth.
There is and can be no perfect competition in the real world.  What
one notices in the market is a set of imperfectly competitive markets,
where firms engage in strategic behaviour to maximise their profits and
to restrict opportunities available to their competitors. Such kind of
behaviour results in the distortion of competition, exploitation of
consumers and imposition of various economic and social costs on the
society, adversely affecting its welfare in general.
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Competition and Economic Development
Market economies are about competitiveness, performance and
efficiency and cannot function without competitive conduct of market
operators. It is true that markets are shaped by a multitude of other factors
including governmental policies but without a minimum amount of
economic freedom and a culture of competition, the economy is likely to
be dominated by rent seeking of operators and prevalence of anti-
competitive practices.
This is why the famous Washington consensus of the United Nations
of 1989 declared that development would result from trade liberalisation,
privatisation and deregulation. Liberalisation can be circumvented by
private restraints and the privatisation of public monopolies is likely to
miss its target if substituted by private market dominance and collusive
practices.
It cannot be gainsaid that competition is essential for achieving the
benefits of market liberalisation and competitiveness. This has been
recognised by the Monterrey consensus of 2002, which stressed on the
importance of private sector development but also the need for good
governance in both the public and private sectors.1  The idea of competition
is fundamental to modern economic thinking and there is a well-developed
body of theory to explain how the pursuit of economic self-interest, within
an appropriate framework, has beneficial effect for economic efficiency,
consumers and society.2
Economic reforms including competition reforms that disregard market
functioning and fail to promote competitive behaviour are bound to fail
in their very objectives.3
Role of Government
For addressing the role of the government, a distinction needs to be
drawn between ‘competition law’ and ’competition policy’. Competition
policy is defined as ‘those government measures that directly affect the
behaviour of enterprises and the structure of industry’.4 The objective of
competition policy is to promote efficiency and maximise welfare. 
There are two elements of such a policy.  The first involves putting in
place a set of policies that enhance competition in local and national
markets. These would include a liberalised trade policy, relaxed foreign
investment and ownership requirements and economic deregulation. The
second is legislation designed to prevent anticompetitive business practices
and unnecessary government intervention – competition law. An effective
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competition policy promotes the creation of a business environment which
improves static and dynamic efficiencies and leads to efficient resource
allocation, and in which the abuse of market power is prevented mainly
through competition. 
Competition policy can be regarded as a genus, of which competition
law is a specie. The former covers a whole array of executive policies and
even approaches, whereas the latter is a piece of legislative enactment
having the character of enforceability in a court of law.
Government’s role combines its responsibility to put in place an
appropriate competition law and complement it with its responsibility to
posit a well-designed competition policy.
Multiple Objectives and Conflict
A source of tension in many countries, particularly the developing ones,
is the priority attached to competition policy relative to the rank order
assigned to other governmental policies, including that having the support
of statutes. Multiple objectives are allowed to rein in the competition
policy, as a result of which, conflicts and inconsistent results surface to
the detriment of the consumers. For instance, promoting small businesses
and maintaining employment could conflict with attaining economic
efficiency. With this kind of small business objective, competitors rather
than competition may get protected.
Competition policy or competition regime seeks to maintain and
encourage the competitive process with a view to promoting economic
efficiency and consumer welfare. Its objective is to spur firms and
individual players in the market to compete with each other to secure the
patronage of customers in terms of, inter alia, competitive prices, good
quality and greater choice for them.
The most common objectives of competition policy applied with varying
emphasis in different countries are economic efficiency, consumer welfare
and public interest. In his analysis of new concepts for competition policy
and economic development, Singh5 has suggested that standard objectives
of competition regime should be reconsidered to bring in notions, such
as, inter alia, an optimal degree of competition as opposed to maximum
competition, an optimal combination of competition and cooperation
between firms, dynamic rather than static efficiency and consistency
between competition and industrial policies. The role of the Government
would therefore, inter alia, include framing of a competition policy besides
legislating an appropriate competition law keeping in view the goals and
needs of the country.
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The central exercise therefore, is, to pursue an appropriate competition
policy without being constrained by or conflicting with other public policy
objectives. Within this exercise, the main issue is the priority attached to
competition policy objectives in the overall framework of governmental
policies. For this purpose, it is necessary to list governmental policies that
impact on competition policy. Micro-industrial governmental policies that
may support or adversely impinge on the application of competition policy
would include: 
• Industrial policy
• Reservations for the small scale industrial sector
• Privatisation and regulatory reforms
• Trade policy
• Procurement policy
• Fiscal Policy 
There are more policy areas but only six of them have been chosen
because of space restraint.
A National Competition Policy (NCP) would help to address numerous
policy-induced competition distortions which otherwise could not be
checked under the competition law, because they were sanctioned under
other public policies.
Taking India as an illustration cubicle, a brief treatment of the six
policy areas is attempted below.
Industrial Policy
The Indian statute, Industries (Development and Regulation) Act,
1951 (IDR Act) is essentially designed to promote and regulate industrial
development. If competition principles, fair and free trade and market
driven environment are desirable objectives, the need for the regulatory
statute for industrial development may not be necessary at all. No licence
or permission need be a requirement for an industrial undertaking to be
set up or for the expansion of an existing undertaking except for location
(avoidance of urban-centric location), for environment protection (anti-
pollution, banning chemical industries in habitat concentrations), for 
prevention of use of scarce resources (timber from trees), for discouraging
conspicuous consumption, for protection of monuments and National
heritage and for protecting the society from threats to public health
(tobacco, liquor etc.). Subject to the aforesaid safeguards and similar ones
in National interest, the IDR Act doesn’t seem to have relevance anymore.
Pursuing Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving SDGs 37
But yet, the IDR Act was used to regulate growth of Industrial activity
till 1991, when economic reforms were ushered in. Along with the now
repealed Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (MRTP
ACT), the surveillance over Industrial growth was intense. Big becoming
bigger was an ugly concept. After the reforms of 1991, many controls
called the licence-permit Raj were taken off the Statutes and Regulations.
MRTP Act was replaced in 2002 by the new Competition Law,
Competition Act, 2002. Many industries were deregulated and no licence
is required for them now.
Ironically, MRTP Act, competition law for India from 1969 till 2002
concentrated in regulating, if not inhibiting Industrial growth and in
controlling monopolies but hardly fostering competition in the market.
Industrial growth is a major source of stability in an economy. The primary
objectives of the Industrial policy are to maintain a sustained growth in
productivity, to enhance gainful employment, to encourage innovation,
to achieve optimal utilisation of human resources, to attain international
competitiveness and to transform India into a major partner and player in
the global arena.
The signal reform of 1991 focussed on deregulating Indian industry,
allowing the industry freedom and flexibility in responding to market
forces and providing a policy regime that facilitated and fostered growth
of Indian industry. Another reform of great significance was, as mentioned
above, the replacement of the MRTP Act by Competition Act, 2002. The
Mantra in the new competition law was COMPETITION. Noteworthy
is the fact that India has grown significantly industrially over the two
decades since the reforms and in particular, competition reforms.
The role of the government needs to focus not only in promoting
competition, thereby facilitating growth of Indian industry but to ensure
that its policy decisions do not create anticompetitive outcomes. An
example of such policy induced distortions is given below:
Fleet and Equity Requirements for Domestic Passenger Air Service6
According to India’s Civil Aviation Requirement (CAR), Section 3,
Part II and III, a scheduled service operator using aircraft with a take-off
mass of 40,000 kg or more must purchase or lease a minimum of five
aircraft with start-up equity requirement of Rs.50 crores. Additionally,
as an airline’s fleet grows in increments of upto five planes, equity
requirements grow by Rs.20 crores. For aircraft with take-off mass less
than 40,000 kg, the minimum start-up fleet is five aircraft (purchased or
leased) with the minimum equity requirement starting at Rs.20 crores
and growing by Rs.10 crores with every five additional aircraft.
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Given the high cost of entry into the civil aviation sector, these
regulations unnecessarily raise barriers to entry. Hence, the fleet and
equity requirement instituted by these regulations limit the number of
new entrants.
On the contrary, the incumbent firms are not facing any potential
threats from new entrants and hence are following collusive practice
amongst them. Without many new competitors entering the market, there
exists no incentive to change the way these established airlines operate
and therefore, customer service and choice are adversely affected.7
Reservations for Small Scale Industrial Sector
India has been following a policy for decades encouraging and
protecting the small scale industrial sector. There are both efficient and
inefficient small scale units and well-managed and ill-managed ones.
Competition principles would dictate the theory that inefficient and ill-
managed firms should exit from the market. The concern implicit in this
theory is that exit of such firms will render employed persons being thrown
out of employment, thus aggravating the unemployment situation in the
country. It cannot be denied that the small scale sector generates significant
employment but it does so at a considerable cost to the exchequer by way
of loss of revenue entailed by a plethora of exemptions from indirect
taxes available to this sector of the economy.
Thus, while a policy for the welfare of the small scale sector cannot be
regarded as unreasonable, it must be tempered by the knowledge that it
involves heavy costs. Reservation of products for small scale and micro
enterprises has led to poor quality of output. Since, many of them are
suppliers of ancillaries to organised producers, it leads to the overall poor
quality of products to consumers. Efficiency of such suppliers is poor
because of the lack of skills, low capital availability, poor quality of
machinery, heavy labour orientation, poor cost control, low output and
poor quality of outputs. 
In a paper presented to the Expert Group8 constituted by the Ministry
of Commerce, Government of India to study the interaction between
Trade and Competition Policy, a pointed reference was made to the
plethora of laws and rules in India that explicitly protect favoured players
and reduce competition in the name of public interest.9
Public interest is frequently and unabashedly invoked to protect one
specific interest group (unionised labour, small scale industries, handloom
weavers) with no explanation of how or why the interest of this group
transcends all others. Such protectionism in the name of public interest
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leads to sacrifice of efficiency, raises potential costs and risks and
discourages new investment. 
The Expert Group referred to above observed that “all governmental
policies will have to be viewed through the competition lens to ensure
that consumer interest and welfare and economic efficiencies and
development dimensions are not pejorated”.10   
The trend in the policies of the government, over the years has been
towards dereservation of many products, which hitherto have been
reserved for the small scale sector. Exempting small scale industries from
the applicability of competition law may not be and will not be necessarily
a solution for the welfare and interest of the small scale sector.  Protection
of such units can only be a drag on the economy and waste of scarce
resources (particularly capital resources). If at all there should be a national
goal in this area, it should be the welfare of the efficient and well-managed
small scale sector. Exemption from the competition principles cannot be
a handmaiden to be used for protecting laggards in the small scale sector. 
Having said this, in order to encourage and assist the efficient and
well-managed small scale sector units, policies providing cheap credit to
them, increasing the threshold limit for the small scale sector (having
regard to inflation over the last few years and the exchange rate changes)
and the like could be laid down.
In respect of the small scale sector in India, economic reforms over
the last two decades have effected progressive reduction of reservation
of products, thus encouraging them to become competitive. The reforms
in this area inherit the competition principle.
Privatisation and Regulatory Reforms
Recent years have seen widespread regulatory reforms and the
privatisation of many State-owned enterprises in many countries. These
reforms have been undertaken as a result of an increased awareness and
evidence of regulatory failure. The increase in reliance on market
mechanisms to promote economic progress is exemplified by the trend
towards the privatisation, de-regulation, adoption and enforcement of
Competition Law.11
India is now taking on hand the implementing of the second generation
economic reforms (the first generation reforms have been under
implementation for some time now, particularly after 1991). But still,
even now, there are price controls and dual pricing in India leading to
distortions in the market. For instance, restrictions on sugarcane prices
and procurement, production capacities, dual pricing of sugar (levy and
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non-levy), restraint of exports and imports and many others like
restrictions have enabled the inefficient producers of sugar to continue
and prevent the rise of a competitive industry. 
Policymakers in India are aware that there is an imperative need to
further the economic reforms of liberalisation, de-regulation and
privatisation so as to enable the consumers to reap the benefits of
competition in the market. Nonetheless, a caveat needs to be added that
while competition principles may govern and inform most governmental
policies, there should be some flexibility in the competition policy to
provide for the needs, aspirations and goals of the country.  It also needs
to be said that economic reforms including liberalisation, de-regulation
and privatisation should be so designed that they strengthen the
competition policy and vice-versa. These two paradigms should be
complemental to each other.
Trade Policy
Trade liberalisation and competition reforms are complementary to
each other and neither can fully achieve its objects without the other.
Given this premise, an appropriate approach would be to adopt
competition policy simultaneously with trade liberalisation and other
economic reforms such as privatisation and deregulation. In this way,
competition policy would act as a catalyst for economic reforms and
development based on market-oriented principles. 
While an open trade policy will be supportive of competition policy
objectives, it is not always that the former will be a guarantor of
competition in all circumstances. Governmental policies, particularly those
that give rise to restraints and distortions in trade practices and the market,
may be a threat to the attainment of competition objectives. All trade
policies may, therefore, be required to fall within the framework of
competition principles. The framework needs to be based on two
parameters, one, whether a restriction affects all competitors or just
foreign competitors and the other, whether the restriction falls within
the category of measures that have been traditionally subject to competition
law disciplines.
Trade policies laid down by the government include measures relating
to industrial policies, domestic regulations, licencing requirements,
discriminatory standard-setting practices, state monopolies and state
trading enterprises, all of which may be restricting competition
domestically and impeding market access to foreigners. In the interest of
consumers and free and fair trade, it is necessary to have an effective
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competition policy to ensure that trade policies fall within the contours
of competition principles. 
Trade policy includes tariffs, quotas, subsidies, anti-dumping actions,
domestic content regulations and export restraints. Trade policies of this
kind and of a similar nature need to conform to competition principles
and where they do not, will be required to be refashioned, so that they
do. To make the competition policy effective it should be ensured that
there should be no physical or fiscal barriers to domestic trade from one
end of the country to another.  It would mean fiscal measures, such ase
uniform Sales Tax, abolition of Octroi, elimination of such other State
level entry or exit taxes and elimination of all physical control of goods
movement throughout the country.
The benefits of trade liberalisation have been seen in the relaxation of
quantitative restrictions and reduction of tariffs. Yet, the trade policies
adopted in furtherance of developmental objectives may have several
anticompetitive dimensions. Some likely instances of potential distortions
of this nature are given below:
Inverted duty structure
One of the unusual facets of the current import duty structure is its
inverted nature witnessed in a few sectors at present. An inverted duty
structure refers to a situation where the duty on the finished product is
lower than that on raw materials and intermediate products. This is a
distortion when the higher duty on raw materials results in production
costs that are higher than the selling price of the imported finished product
and hurts the domestic manufacturer who relies on the raw materials for
production.12
Yet another instance of inverted import duty structure
A concern rose in the cement industry which, in early 2010, urged the
Centre to abolish import duty on raw materials such as coal, petroleum
coke and gypsum since cement as a finished product does not attract
duty. The industry, therefore, argued that duty on them should be
abolished in line with the established principle that import duty on inputs
should not be higher than that of finished product. The government was
requested to align value-added tax on cement with that of steel at four
percent against 12 percent levied currently since both are important raw
commodities for the infrastructure sector.13
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Safeguard duty
In July 2010, the Government of India imposed 16 percent safeguard
duty on soda ash imports from China in order to protect domestic
producers. The safeguard duty was expected to benefit domestic
manufacturers of soda ash. However, the market players reported neither
increase in the price of soda ash as a resulting impact of such a move nor
a reduction in imports from China. According to market estimates India’s
soda ash imports surged by 69 percent after the safeguard duty
imposition.14
Even though the collected facts and estimates may lean towards the
justification of the imposition of the safeguard duty, thorough investigation
needs to be conducted to ensure that the situation merits the levy.
Furthermore, a long time span of imposition of the safeguard levy would
promote inefficiency among protected domestic producers to the
detriment of competition. Levy of safeguard duty can be justified if absence
of such duty is seen as associated with a significantly reduced market
share of domestic producers, thus, threatening their businesses.
However, as mentioned earlier, care must be taken that the domestic
producers do not get too comfortable under this cushion that it becomes
a resting spot for inefficiency. The role of the government is manifest in
such cases that it should reckon the competition principles before deciding
on the imposition of safeguard duty.
Procurement Policy
There are many procurement policies that favour some specific
companies over others or distort competitive neutrality between the public
and private market players by way of some preference clauses, riders or
conditionalities or produce anticompetitive outcomes because of the
manner in which they may be implemented. While there may be sound
policy reasons for these, the benefits need to be compared with the
potentially higher prices that distort competition as well as harm the
consumers. Hence, it must be established clearly and in a transparent
manner that the objectives behind such policies override possible adverse
impact on competition and are necessary to achieve some social and
environmental objectives15. An example is given herein:
In a recent tender call for Ayurvedic medicines, the Directorate of
Ayurveda, Government of Rajasthan was seen to bend the rules governing
the procurement of medicines by adding riders/conditions that
manufacturers must have minimum five years of experience, a condition
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that did not figure in the original call for tenders. This condition was
inserted later while the tender process was on.
Of the existing PSUs and co-ops that manufacture Ayurvedic medicines,
only eight had an experience of five years and more. That an experience
of minimum of five years was necessary to ensure the level of quality
sought was not adequately demonstrated by the purchase committee and
consequently, such a rider acted as a deterrent for entry. Also, operations
of most of the qualifying companies were being managed by the same set
of people which raised doubts regarding collusive behaviour between the
officials and the specific manufacturers.”16
Purchase preference
An example of anticompetitive policy of the government is the fact
that public sector undertakings (PSUs) are in significant force in India
and receive preferences that restrict competition by the private sector.
Preference in procurement policies distorts competitive neutrality in the
market place. As CUTS research report17 notes, “[T]he concept of
competitive neutrality means that government-supported business activities
should not enjoy net competitive advantages over their private sector
competitors.”
For some years, PSUs enjoyed purchase preference, if the price quoted
by them fell within 10 percent of the lowest bidder’s quote. Wiser counsel
prevailed and government did away with the said preference to PSUs in
2008.
Fiscal Policy
Fiscal policy includes, tax policy, expenditure policy, subsidy or state
aid, investment or disinvestment strategies and debt or surplus
management. Under the existing tax policy, the present multiple tax
structure impels high compliance cost, excessive litigation and uncertainty
about ultimate tax incidence at the time of investment or business
transactions. The competitiveness of the Indian industries is adversely
affected by the cascading effect of multi-layered taxes which increases
the cost of indigenous manufacture. The inefficiency of the existing indirect
tax structure and consequent adverse impact on India’s economic growth
are described below:
Impact on competitiveness of indigenous goods and services18
The existing tax structure is having a cascading impact on cost of
indigenous manufacture of goods and services. For example, value added
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tax (VAT) is levied on the sale value of a product which includes excise
duty element, Thus VAT is also charged on excise duty amount. Similarly
when VAT paid raw material is used in manufacture, it forms part of the
excisable value (cost of manufacture) on which excise duty is levied. Thus
excise duty is also charged on VAT element.
Similar is a case of service tax levied on services. Central sales tax is
levied on inter-state sale of goods. This cascading of taxes at each stage in
a supply chain makes Indian goods expensive. In the case of some
indigenous products, the resultant competitive disadvantage due to
cascading taxes alone can be as high as 10 percent to 15 percent of the
price. Such tax disadvantage reduces the competitiveness of indigenous
goods and does not allow India to tap the export potential of manufactured
goods and agro-based processed foods.
Subsidies/State Aid
Subsidies have often been used to foster the development of new
industries especially in developing countries. Subsidies are also often
granted as part of a ‘defensive’ industrial policy, when they are targeted
towards distressed firms, with the goal of preventing foreign takeover,
avoiding the disappearance of an activity deemed essential for the country’s
economy, or avoiding layoffs and the ensuing social troubles.19
In India, subsidies are granted both by the Central Government and
state governments. Examples include the recurring support to agriculture,
power, airlines, and coal mining. Subsidies increase inefficiencies and lead
to soft budget constraints for the beneficiary. Governments think that
production itself creates economic value-an idea that sometimes makes
them protect businesses regardless of their performance. Rampant and
wasteful subsidies cause a drain on the fiscal budget as well. An instance
is given herein:
In India, agricultural trade policy is a part of a larger food and
agriculture policy regime that seeks to maintain food self-sufficiency while
providing support to the agricultural sector. The Government of India
uses a variety of policy instruments in attempting to achieve these goals,
input subsidies being one such major tool. Over the years, the amount of
such subsidies has increased to unsustainable levels especially in the
fertiliser sector. This has had several detrimental effects where the
beneficial effects of such subsidies have been outweighed by macro-
economic imbalances.
The huge subsidies granted to the fertiliser industry carry the objective
of promotion of domestic agricultural production and achieving self-
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sufficiency in food production. This is having an adverse impact on the
fiscal deficit. While domestic policy support should continue, the Indian
fertiliser industry should be made more competitive in order to achieve
efficiency gains in the long run so that gradually such subsidies may be
phased out.20
Competition, Economic Growth, Innovation and
Efficiency
It cannot be gainsaid that economic growth manifested by increases in
employment and real wages is a function of competition in the market.
Competition is likely to result in overall enhanced gross domestic product
(GDP) growth as well as social gains in terms of greater consumer welfare
and over-all poverty reduction. It is, therefore, important that competition
is not hampered or distorted by governmental policies.
There is empirical evidence of the benefits of competition policies vis-
a-vis economic development, greater efficiency in international trade and
consumer welfare listed in a Report.21 The evidence, albeit referring to
experiences of developed countries, indicates substantial benefits from
the strengthening of the application of competition policy principles in
terms of ‘greater production, allocative and dynamic efficiency, welfare
and growth.’
The Report further concludes that the consumer and producer welfare
and economic growth and competitiveness in International Trade have
all flowed out of competition policies, deregulation and surveillance over
restrictive business and trade practices. Noting that competition rewards
good performance, encourages entrepreneurial  activity,  catalyses entry
of new firms,  promotes greater efficiency on the part of enterprises,
reduces cost of production, improves competitiveness of enterprises and
sanctions poor performance by producers, the empirical evidence in the
Report suggests that competition ensures product quality,  cheaper prices
and passing on of cost savings to consumers.
The Report also observes that competition promotes two types of
efficiencies namely static efficiency (optimum utilisation of existing
resources at least cost) and dynamic efficiency (optimal introduction of
new products, more efficient production processes and superior
organisational structures over time). The UNCTAD Report provides the
following empirical evidence to substantiate its conclusions.
In the Netherlands, it has been calculated that the average annual
consumer loss arising from collusive practices or restrictive regulations
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in several service sectors amounts to 4,330-5,430 million guilders (around
US$ 2.1-2.7bn).22 Data relating to the US show that a bid–rigging
conspiracy (which was eventually prosecuted) for the sale of frozen
seafood had an average mark-up over the competitive price over a one
year period of 23 percent.23 The break down of price-fixing conspiracies
in some industries led to steep declines in manufacturing costs.24
In a study, Bayoumi et al,25 have estimated that differences in levels of
competition account for more than 50 percent of the current gap in GDP
per capita between the Euro area and the US. They conclude that more
intense product market competition would enhance growth and
employment. Aghion et al26 and Dutz and Hayri27 echo these views
through their empirical work.28
A study29 by the Australian Productivity Commission, undertaken to
assess the benefits of promoting competition in Australia, estimated the
expected benefits from a package of competition promoting and
deregulatory reforms (including improvements in the competition rules)
to lead to an annual gain in real GDP of about 5.5 percent, or A$23bn,
where consumers would gain by almost A$9bn besides seeing increases
in real wages, employment and government revenue.30
Innovation increases dynamic efficiency through technological
improvements of production processes and/or the creation of new
products. Competition, an important driver of productivity spurs
innovation, sub-serving the interests of consumers.
Effective competition is the instrument for attaining economic growth
through enhanced innovation, efficiency and productivity as well as
ensuring social gains by overall poverty reduction and greater consumer
welfare. It is therefore of paramount importance that the government
consciously formulates policies that are compatible with competition
principles. Equally imperative is the need for such policies to promote
competition in the market. It has been highlighted supra in this paper that
competition is often distorted by factors such as anti-competitive practices
of enterprises as well as policies and regulations adopted and implemented
by the government that have anticompetitive outcomes.
There does not appear to exist any mechanism or a comprehensive
policy in the existing competition regime of India which ensures that
policies are formulated in a manner that their anti-competitive outcomes
are minimised as a result of which, they are least competition restrictive.
The extant competition law, Competition Act, 2002 empowers the
Competition Commission of India (CCI) to deal with anticompetitive
practices such as cartels, price-fixing etc. which cause appreciable adverse
effect or have the potential to cause appreciable adverse effect on
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competition in the relevant market. But there is no comprehensive policy
in force to prevent and avoid distortions induced by Government policies,
statutes and regulations. It is understood that a draft NCP has been drafted
that is awaiting the approval of the government.
NCP may likely help harmonise government policies and regulations
at all levels, foster competitive neutrality and launch competition
assessment mechanism for government policies and regulations as well as
ensure that deviations from competition principles to serve social and
environmental objectives are notified and publicly justified. Finally, such
effort needs to be backed by a strong culture of competition and political
will in order to be successful in its endeavour.
Role of Governance
It is in this context that government has the responsibility to inhere
good, efficient and effective governance. Most, if not all activities ultimately
have at their consummating point, the consumer. Consumer welfare and
interest aim at the charter of economic liberty designed for preserving
free and unaffected competition as the rule of governance.  The premises
on which the charter rests are unrestrained interaction of competitive
forces, maximum material progress through rational allocation of economic
resources, availability of goods and services of acceptable and good quality
at reasonable prices and finally a just and fair deal to the consumers. State
governance has to factor these, if it has to live up to its responsibilities by
the country and its subjects.
Good governance essentially involves a reform process, which includes
fostering of competition in the market.
Good State governance is likely to serve the interests of consumers
and the society, if competition principles inform its myriad policies. Market
paradigm, if properly implemented has to focus on competition principles,
which should inform legislative and executive policies. For buttressing
domestic competition, every country needs to have a sound competition
policy and an appropriate competition law to enforce the policy.
Competition reforms are the need of the hour.
Competition reforms would help in travelling towards the broad
objectives outlined above by focussing on the following:
1. All policies of the government need to be cleared on the touchstone
of Competition
2. Using the provision relating to advocacy in Competition Act, 2002
(section 49), the existing policies of the government may be examined
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and tested on the touchstone of competition and amended as may
be appropriate
3. Governmental policies and regulations need to be harmonised in
terms of competition principles
4. Competitive neutrality between public and private market players
should be ensured
5. Any deviation from competition principles should be notified with
justifications, as for instance, on social and environmental objectives
6. The NCP should be finalised expeditiously and brought into force
7. Political will as necessary to implement competition reforms needs
to be nursed
8. Effective steps towards creating competition culture in the country
need to be undertaken
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Abstract
The rapid adoption of competition regimes across the developing world
in the last 25 years1 suggests a growing consensus that economic
development and prosperity is predicated on competitive interactions
among producers. Much of the early work on how to achieve the full
benefits of a competition regime in developing countries focussed on the
specificity and breadth of prohibitions of anticompetitive behaviour
encompassed in a country’s competition laws, the strength of the
enforcement of such prohibitions, and whether or not competition laws
in developing countries should include merger regulation. By contrast,
both academic research and practitioners’ initiatives by the International
Competition Network (ICN), the World Bank (WB), the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and others have
increasingly emphasised on the importance of a broader competition policy,
and in particular the centrality of competition advocacy.
Competition advocacy has been defined by the ICN as the “promotion
of a competitive environment for economic activities by means of non-
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enforcement mechanisms, mainly through [a competition agency’s]
relationship with other governmental entities and by increasing public
awareness [of] the benefits of competition.”2 For developing countries
with relatively ‘young’ competition agencies, a growing literature
recommends a focus on competition advocacy as a way to achieve
significant gains at relatively modest expense and as a chance to both
gather expertise and build political support.
A key objective of such an advocacy role for competition agencies is to
establish within the government a vocal promoter of competition
principles, as a counterweight against rent-seeking by private actors
through anticompetitive laws or regulations (or against ministries/agencies
with particularistic agendas). As the ICN put it: “By having a competition
advocacy role, the agency can counter or at least minimise the adverse
effects of rent-seeking behavior prevalent in [many] countries.”3
But can competition advocacy by public competition agencies yield
the promised benefits?  Does it?  There is a striking dearth of empirical
work examining whether — and, if so, under what conditions —
competition advocacy by competition agencies indeed serves the public
interest. In this paper, we provide what we believe is the first systematic
empirical analysis using data from outside the US to examine competition
advocacy as an anti-rent-seeking policy.
We are able to do so because the World Bank (WB), from 2002-2005,
included in its enterprise surveys in some countries questions that asked
about political lobbying by the respondents’ own company or in their
industry. The responses to these survey questions, which focused
specifically on lobbying legislators and government officials for laws and
regulations that would yield material benefits for the company, provide
an exceptionally direct measure of the level of rent-seeking activity,
allowing us to analyse the effectiveness of competition advocacy as an
anti-rent-seeking policy in Ukraine.
The selection of Ukraine for a case study of competition advocacy as
an anti-rent-seeking policy may seem surprising, given the political upheaval
in Ukraine since the 2013-14 revolution and the problems with which the
Ukrainian competition agency has struggled in the aftermath, including
being implicated in corruption scandals disclosed after the 2014 regime
change.4
For analytical purposes, however, an examination of competition
advocacy in Ukraine 2002-2005, is not just unencumbered by the later
problems of the Ukrainian competition regime, it holds exceptional
analytical promise: Ukraine is one of the few countries in which the rent-
seeking questions were asked on two WB Enterprise Surveys (in 2002
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and 2005), and it is the only one that experienced – between the first and
the second WB survey – a significant competition law revision that
strengthened the advocacy powers of the Ukrainian competition agency.
We show that the increased advocacy role for the Ukrainian
Antimonopoly Committee (AMC) indeed resulted in a substantial,
statistically highly significant decline in the level of rent-seeking, which
does not appear to be explicable by specific events or broader
developments in Ukraine’s sometime turbulent political economy. The
findings suggest that forceful competition advocacy holds great promise
for reducing rent-seeking and thus fostering sustainable development.
Competition Advocacy: Foundations for a Theory
In a significant shift, competition advocacy has recently become popular
among scholars and competition policy practitioners alike. In the 1990s,
when competition policy experts from Latin America started to call for
greater emphasis on competition advocacy in the work of developing
country agencies, many competition law experts in OECD countries were
still skeptical. These experts considered advocacy at best a questionable
distraction from the law enforcement task and an undesirable diversion
of scarce agency resources — and at worst a dangerous politicisation of
the work of competition agencies.5
Today, competition policy scholars widely consider advocacy the most
important ‘non-litigation strategy’ for competition agencies, helping
competition agencies ‘spur business rivalry.’6  Its importance has been
highlighted by practitioners from around the world;7 it is recognised as a
designated, distinct form of competition policy implementation within
many competition agencies;8 and in 2013, the World Bank established an
annual Competition Policy Advocacy Contest to recognise exceptional
advocacy work by competition agencies.9
Advocacy is now recognised as an important and distinct part of
competition policy because it promises to foster market competition in
ways traditional competition law enforcement cannot.  For instance, by
educating policymakers, consumers, and business (wo)men about the
benefits of the market process, advocacy seeks to foster the somewhat
amorphous but important “culture of competition.”10
Competition advocacy, moreover, “unmask[s] the social costs” of laws
and regulations that intentionally or inadvertently restrict market entry
(domestically or transnationally), restrict price competition, create
monopolies or dominant positions in a market or create bottlenecks in
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value chains – and presses public officials to justify restrictions that have
such anticompetitive effects.  In doing so, advocacy targets what may be
the most important impediments to market competition: in developing
countries governmental distortions of the market in the form of exclusive
privileges and selective interventions, through which a privileged few gain
at everyone else’s expense.11
Accordingly, the ICN and others consider advocacy one of the most
important objectives of competition advocacy to inhibit, or at least reduce,
“rent-seeking.” As defined by Krueger in her seminal article, rent-seeking
constitutes exploiting – or seeking the creation of – government restrictions
in order to transfer wealth to the rent-seeking agent.12
As highlighted subsequently by Bhagwati, lobbying or otherwise
inducing legislators or regulators to implement rules that make it harder
for existing competitors to sell their goods or for new competitors to
enter the market may be perfectly legal political behavior, but such rent-
seeking or “directly unproductive profit-seeking” is distortionary and
wasteful, since it uses time and resources to transfer rather than create
wealth, i.e. without producing any additional goods or services.13
The Relationship between Competition Law, Advocacy, and Rent-Seeking
Ironically, effective competition law enforcement may increase the need
for policies that inhibit rent-seeking. As Tullock suggested in “The Welfare
Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft,”14 individual economic actors
and firms may be thought of as allocating resources and efforts between
productive activities and alternative ways of achieving gains, such as
lobbying for protective tariffs or competition-inhibiting regulations.
Applying a standard political economy framework, Tullock argued that
the choice should be a function of the perceived relative payoff of the
available strategies. If the expected utility of lobbying for government
intervention (i.e., the rents that are obtainable from government
intervention, multiplied by the probability of obtaining the intervention
through lobbying) is large, relative to the expected utility of productive
activity, we should expect rent-seeking. Tullock, therefore, posits that
“domestic producers [will] invest resources in lobbying for the [rent-
producing measure] until the marginal return on the last dollar so spent
[is] equal to its likely return producing the transfer.”15
Rodriguez and Menon apply this logic to the realm of antitrust law
and policy in their chapters on “The Political Economy of Antitrust
Enforcement” and “The Limits of Competition Advocacy.”16  Building
on earlier work by Rodriguez with Coate and Williams,17 they develop a
model of the trade-off between rent-seeking and organising private cartels,
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which yields the expectation that effective competition law enforcement
encourages firms to resort to rent-seeking to make up for the loss of
profits otherwise (or previously) obtained through anticompetitive actions:
The establishment of an antitrust regime may cause an increase
in other forms of government protection. … If the activities of an
antitrust agency only make it more difficult to cartelise privately,
the special interest group [that consequently] is ‘worse off’ than
before [will] at the margin, … seek more rents through government
protection. [… Ultimately,] interest groups will choose that
combination of private collusion and [lobbying for] government
protection which maximises expected benefits.18
Note, however, that the baseline against which Tullock’s model works
— investing resources and efforts into productive activity — has dropped
out of Rodriguez and Menon’s model.  If we restore that option, we get a
choice set (for each producer) that consists of (i) investing in productive
activity, (ii) investing in lobbying for rent-producing government
intervention (we will call this “government protection” from market
competition), and (iii) investing in anticompetitive behaviour, such as price-
fixing, market-sharing, or bid-rigging (which we will call “private
protection”). If we now apply standard political-economic reasoning to
this choice set, we see that lowering the probability of achieving a given
level of government protection-induced rents through lobbying — while
also lowering the probability of achieving gains through private protection
due to competition law and enforcement (as assumed by Rodriguez and
Menon) — should reduce the amount of resources invested in seeking
government protection as well as the amount invested in private protection
and instead increase investments in productive activity.
The implication of this line of reasoning is that, for competition policy
to yield the desired economic benefits, competition law enforcement needs
to be combined with policies that reduce the incentives to invest in lobbying
for government protection, i.e. to engage in rent-seeking. So how might
competition advocacy lower the rents that can be achieved through
(lobbying for) competition-reducing government intervention in markets
— or lower the likelihood of achieving those rents?
Competition advocacy is, above all, concerned with monitoring the
impact of state action on competition and minimising any unnecessary
negative impact.19 To do so, competition authorities may review existing
and proposed laws and regulations, advise regulatory bodies or executive
agencies on how to achieve the most pro-competitive implementation of
law and policies, and generally raise awareness of the benefits of market
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competition among policymakers, business executives, and the general
public (and awareness of the conditions that are conducive to achieving
those benefits). In doing so, competition agencies seek to convince the
legislature and the executive ‘to abstain from adopting unnecessarily
anticompetitive measures, and to help regulatory agencies clearly delineate
the boundaries of economic regulation.’20
They may do so directly — e.g., by alerting legislators and government
officials to the (possibly unintended or unrecognised) anticompetitive and
hence rents-producing effects of existing or proposed policies, laws, or
regulations — as well as indirectly, by making the economic costs of anti-
competitive measures publicly known. Competition advocacy thus should
not only reduce the willingness of public interest-oriented legislators and
government officials to be responsive to the demand for government
protection from rent-seeking interest groups, but, ceteris paribus, it should
also increase the political costs of affirmatively responding to rent-seeking
demands, which should reduce the responsiveness even of entirely self-
interested public officials and thus reduce the likelihood that lobbying
would be successful.  In principle, then, competition advocacy is a
promising and indeed necessary complement to competition law
enforcement.
There is, however, one problem with relying upon competition agencies
to provide a counterweight to interest groups that might lobby legislators
or government (executive branch) officials for protection: Competition
agencies are, as Rodriguez and Menon point out, themselves part of the
government. And the members of the legislature, as well as the elected
officials in the executive branch who would be the prime targets for rent-
seeking lobbying arguably also to have at least some leverage over the
competition agency.21
Sometimes this susceptibility to influence attempts by political leaders
is a matter of bureaucratic hierarchies, such as when an agency is
subordinate to a government ministry, or when the agency leadership
serves at the discretion of the head of government. In other cases,
susceptibility exists as a matter of democratic accountability, such as when
agency representatives are required to appear (and answer questions)
before committees of the legislature. And almost always, government
leaders have some influence via the budgeting process and at least initially
via the personnel appointment process. Advocacy powers therefore may
need to be explicitly defined and mandated in the law in order for
competition advocacy to have a chance of providing an effective
counterweight to rent-seeking lobbying for anti-competitive legislation
or regulations.
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From Theory to Hypotheses
This brief discussion of our theoretical approach allows us to specify
two hypotheses with observable implications. First, by providing
information to political leaders about the benefits of maintaining
competitive markets and the harm of adopting anti-competitive laws and
regulations, competition advocacy reduces the political attractiveness of
the anti-competitive (rent-seeking) measures demanded by special interests.
A veto-right for the competition agency may even outright prevent the
adoption of such measures. This leads to:
H1: The more a competition authority engages in competition
advocacy—and the stronger its advocacy role – the less effective
will be any attempts of lobbying government officials or legislators
for exclusive benefits (rents).
In keeping with the assumption of the theoretical model developed
above, according to which firms engage in rent-seeking only for
instrumental reasons, i.e. only when investing resources in rent-seeking
promises greater gains than investing those resources into productive
activity (or possibly other forms of anti-competitive behaviour), we expect
the reduction in the effectiveness of rent-seeking to also reduce the
incentives to engaging in rent-seeking in the first place:
H2: The more a competition authority engages in competition advocacy
– and the stronger its advocacy role – the less firms should engage
in rent-seeking.22
Empirical Analysis
Assessing the relationship between competition advocacy and rent-
seeking empirically requires us to overcome several challenges. First, there
is no readily available, well-established measure of rent-seeking lobbying
by firms — our outcome of interest. Second, neither scholars nor the
international networks of antitrust agencies have created a measure of
competition advocacy powers and practices for a broad range of
countries.23
We overcome these challenges (with some caveats) and present what
is, to the best of our knowledge, the first systematic empirical analysis of
competition advocacy as an anti-rent-seeking policy in a developing or
transition economy. For a measure of rent seeking, we take advantage of
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the World Bank’s “Productivity and Investment Climate Private Enterprise
Survey,” which between 2002 and 2005 (only) in some countries contained
up to three questions that pertained specifically to firms’ lobbying
activities.24 Specifically, two questions (45a and 45b) asked respondents
(i.e., business owners and senior managers) about the effectiveness of
attempts by firms in the respondent’s industry to “gain advantages in the
drafting of laws, decrees, regulations, and other binding government
decisions” by lobbying members of the legislature or the executive,
respectively. The two questions and the response options offered for each
of them were:
In many countries, firms are said to give unofficial, private
payments or other benefits to public officials to gain advantages in
the drafting of laws, decrees, regulations, and other binding
government decisions. To what extent have the following practices
had a direct impact on your business?
(a)Private payments or other benefits to Parliamentarians to affect
their votes.
(b)Private payments or other benefits to Government officials to
affect the content of government decrees.
RESPONSE OPTIONS FOR EACH QUESTION: NO IMPACT [0];
MINOR IMPACT [1];
MODERATE IMPACT [2];
MAJOR IMPACT [3];
DECISIVE IMPACT [4];
NOT APPLICABLE;
DON’T KNOW
In addition, one question (44a) asked directly about the
respondent firm’s lobbying activities to “influence the content of
laws or regulations.” The exact question wording was (emphasis in
the original):
Think about national laws and regulations enacted in the last
two years that have a substantial impact on your business: Did your
firm seek to lobby government or otherwise influence the content
of laws or regulations affecting it?
RESPONSE OPTIONS:  YES OR NO
None of these three questions by itself fully captures rent-seeking
behaviour, but they provide – subject to the usual caveats regarding elite
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surveys – quite good measures of several aspects of rent-seeking, which
should be both valid and reliable across countries and over time.25 In
Ukraine, the three questions were asked, as part of a battery of questions
about business-government relations, in both 2002 and 2005, allowing
for a (quite short) over-time analysis.26
The 2003 Reform of the Ukrainian Competition Regime and Its Effect
on Rent-Seeking
Ukraine gained independence from the Soviet Union in August 1991.
Ukraine enacted its first competition law in 1992, as part of sweeping
political and economic reforms that entailed the transition of the previously
state-dominated economy to a capitalist market economy, including
privatisation of many previously state-owned enterprises. AMC Law,
followed in 1993, establishing Ukraine’s Anti-Monopoly Commission
(AMC).27 While the virtual absence of a state apparatus at the moment
of independence28 in some respects left the country with what the 2013
UNCTAD peer review described as “some of the highest barriers to the
formation of an effective competition policy system”29 it also made it
possible to establish a new bureaucracy unencumbered by prior
commitments – to the point that the AMC by the early 2000s became one
of the most respected, professional parts of the Ukrainian public
administration.30An independent regulatory body (whose chairman,
however, was until recently appointed and dismissed by the President of
Ukraine at his/her discretion), the AMC was given both prosecutorial
and adjudicatory authority, including the power to conduct investigations,
prosecute offenses of the competition law, and issue decisions.
The privatisation process was successful insofar as, by 2005, the private
sector accounted for 85 per cent of industrial output and 74 per cent of
employment.31 The liberalisation efforts were substantially undermined,
however, by a lack of transparency in public administration, so much so
that Boner and Kovacic’s 1997 analysis reports a widespread perception
that government leaders, contrary to their “strong outward commitment
to pursue radical, market-oriented reforms,” were in fact manipulating
or extensively intervening in markets to generate private benefits (that is,
rents) for various special interests through actions such as regulatory
discrimination.32
Writing in 2000, Sundakov confirms this assessment, noting that the
obscurity and vagueness of Ukrainian business laws and regulations leads
to excessive administrative discretion and ‘creates an incentive for
entrepreneurs to divert resources [away from productive activities] to
attempts to bypass legal requirements.’33 These problems were
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compounded by high concentrations of economic power in many industries,
as well as pervasive corruption at the individual level, which was getting
increasingly institutionalised: “Each [oligarchic business] group has
representatives in the Parliament and in the political parties to support its
interests, and often also control mass media sources.”34  In short, Ukraine
in the early 2000s was a country much in need of effective competition
advocacy. But could the AMC supply such advocacy?
From the time of its establishment, the AMC has from the time of its
establishment had authority to engage in advocacy activities at all levels
of government. Under Article 7 of the 1993 Law, the Commission had
the power to make recommendations to Parliament and any executive
agency for the amendment of laws and regulations that impede
competition, the implementation of measures to limit monopoly, and the
termination of measures that may have an adverse effect on competition.
Moreover, Boner and Kovacic point out that the AMC’s structure has
always been particularly conducive to competition advocacy in that the
Chairman of the Commission is a member of the Cabinet of Ministers.
“In this forum,” Boner and Kovacic write in 1997, “the AMC has
been extraordinarily active, if not always successful, in attempting to
influence new legislation and structural reform in Ukraine … [and] has
taken a number of steps to counteract the tendencies of state bodies to
impede competition and private sector development.”35  Under the original
1993 law, however, the targets of such recommendations were only obliged
to consider the proposal; they were free to reject it, as long as a rationale
for the rejection was provided.
By the early 2000s, the AMC often therefore and increasingly found
itself out-maneuvered by rent-seekers and corrupt officials.  This resulted
in an amendment to the AMC Law in 2003, which significantly increased
the AMC’s authority in the realm of competition advocacy.36 The new
provision, Article 20.4, was designed to bolster the AMC’s capacity to
ensure that state agencies act in accordance with Article 15 of the Law of
Ukraine on the Protection of Economic Competition, which prohibits
any action that confers an unfair advantage to one business entity over
another.37
Under Article 20.4, “the bodies of state power, bodies of local self-
government, bodies of administrative and economic government and
control” are required to obtain AMC approval for any “draft regulatory
legal acts and other decisions that could lead to the limitation or distortion
of competition, in particular.”  This requirement is broad in scope, applying
to any government action “that may result in prevention, elimination,
restriction, or distortion of the competition in relevant markets.”38
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Crucially, Article 20.4 renders the AMC’s opinions on decisions that
may impact competition binding, forbidding recipient agencies from
implementing regulations or decisions in the absence of AMC approval.
The 2003 reform thus significantly strengthened the formal-legal
authority of the AMC in the realm of competition advocacy. And the
AMC appears to have made use of its increased authority promptly,
rejecting about seven per cent and imposing conditions on another 14 per
cent of the draft regulations, laws, and resolutions reviewed between
2003 and 2005.39
For example, when the local government in Ternopil in 2003 set fees
for outdoor advertising, which were twice as high for advertisers from
outside Ternopil than for locals, the AMC stepped in, forcing the local
government to abandon the discriminatory fee structure. Similarly, when
two government ministries developed a new health regulation requiring
the disinfection of rail cars after the transport of foodstuffs, which included
a short list of specific firms that allowed to provide these disinfection
services (despite the availability of a substantially larger number of
companies offering such services), the AMC intervened to replace the
list with a provision that allowed anyone to provide the required
disinfection services, as long as they meet the relevant, general technical
standard.40
Given that the reform strengthening the AMC’s advocacy powers was
launched after the first World Bank enterprise survey in Ukraine was
conducted in 2002 and fully implemented by the time the second survey
was conducted in 2005, data from the two surveys allows us to analyse
the effect of a significant strengthening of competition advocacy within
the same country over a relatively short period of time.41
Statistical Analysis
Given the operationalised dependent variables and the changes in the
Ukrainian competition law between 2002 and 2005, we seek to assess
the following operationalised hypotheses by comparing the responses to
questions 45a, 45b, and 44a from the World Bank survey from the 2005
survey in Ukraine to the responses from the 2002 survey in Ukraine:
H1: Given that the 2003 reforms granted the AMC something akin to
veto power over laws and regulations that might have an anti-
competitive effect – thus explicitly defining and mandating stronger
advocacy powers for the AMC – we expect a reduction in the
perceived effectiveness of lobbying both legislators and government
(executive branch) officials from 2002-2005.
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H2: Given that the 2003 reforms strengthened the AMC’s advocacy
role, we expect to find a smaller share of firms in 2005 having recently
attempted to influence the content of laws or decrees to their benefit
than in 2002.
Table 3.1 reports the results of difference of means tests for questions
45a and 45b, as well as two-sample test of proportions for question 44.
We find that the perceived effectiveness of rent-seeking lobbying declined
between 2002 and 2005 — to a statistically clearly significant extent
despite an already low baseline — both with regard to lobbying legislators
and with regard to lobbying officials in the executive branch.  Turning to
the other survey question (44), we find that the share of Ukrainian
enterprises whose representatives report having lobbied public officials
to influence the content of laws or regulations affecting them, dropped
from 26.8 per cent in 2002 to 16.3 per cent in 2005 — a substantively
large and highly statistically significant decline in the level of rent-seeking.42
Table 3.1: Differences in (Perceived Effectiveness of) Rent-Seeking,
Ukraine (2005 vs. 2002)
                                Perceived Effectiveness (0-4) of Lobbying…         Rent-Seeking:
Legislators Gov. Officials % Having Attempted
mean Ukraine 2005 0.173 0.202 16.3%
(537 obs) (539 obs) (594 obs)
mean Ukraine 2002 0.294 0.332 26.8%
(401 obs) (401 obs) (462 obs)
difference -0.121** -0.129** -10.5%***
[95% confidence [-0.0242   -0.218] [-0.0300   -0.229] [-5.49%   -15.5%]
interval]
z- or t-statistic 2.45 2.55 4.16
Note:  The two “Perceived Effectiveness” columns show the average impact rating in
2005 versus 2002 for engaging in each of the noted forms of rent-seeking lobbying
on a scale from 0 to 4, where 0 indicates “no impact” and 4 indicates “decisive
impact.” The “Attempted Rent-Seeking” column shows for each of the two surveys
the percentage of respondents who answered the question affirmatively (“Yes”). The
reported statistical significance is based on conducting the tests reported in the text:
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1, two-tailed tests.
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Overall, the statistical analysis of the responses from the World Bank
enterprise surveys in Ukraine suggest, with great consistency across the
three different questions, that rent-seeking by Ukrainian firms became
significantly less prevalent after the reform that strengthened the Ukrainian
AMC. These findings yield strong support for both H1 and H2 —
supporting the ICN’s assessment that ‘the possibility [of competition
advocacy-conducting agencies] to influence the outcome of a policy or
regulatory process is enormous whenever decision-making organs are
obliged by law to heed the advice of the competition authority.’43
Developments in the Ukrainian Political Economy as an Alternative
Explanation?
Can we really attribute the reduction in reported and perceived rent-
seeking between 2002 and 2005 to the strengthening of the AMC’s
competition advocacy powers rather than broader developments in
Ukrainian political economy? Ukraine experienced momentous political
change between 2002 and 2005, but we submit that careful consideration
of the most pertinent events and their precise chronology suggest that
neither a specific event nor broader developments during those years
provide a compelling alternative explanation.44
The 2002 enterprise survey was conducted between June 19 and July
31, 2002;45 the 2005 survey between March 10 and April 20, 2005.46 At
the time of the 2002 survey, respondents would thus have known the
outcome of the March 2002 Parliamentary election (though they were,
strictly speaking, supposed to answer all questions based on fiscal/business
year 2001, only); similarly at the time of the 2005 survey, they would
have known political events through mid-April 2005 (but not later
developments, and they were supposed to answer the questions based on
developments through the end of fiscal year 2004, only). This suggests
the following political context as potentially important:
The 2002 survey took place during the entrenched regime of President
Leonid Kuchma (in office since 1994) and his prime minister, Viktor
Yanukovych, built on Soviet-era political-bureaucratic and economic-
administrative elite that was seen as largely captured by oligarchic clans
and highly corrupt.47
After a political scandal that implicated Kuchma directly and personally
in the abduction and murder of a popular journalist best known for
publicising corruption in the government ended Kuchma’s ambition to
run for a third term, the Presidential election of 2004 came down to a
run-off vote on 21 November 2004 between Yanukovych and Viktor
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Yushchenko.  When, after reports of widespread voter intimidation,
electoral fraud, and other irregularities during the run-off, the Election
Commission declared Yanukovych the winner by three per cent, even
though independent election monitors’ exit polls had shown Yushchenko
ahead by 11 per cent,48 large and soon daily protests broke out in Kyiv
and other towns across Ukraine. These protests became known as the
“Orange Revolution,” eventually prompting the Ukrainian Supreme Court
to annul the November run-off and schedule a new vote for December
26, 2004, which Yushchenko won 52 per cent to 44 per cent.  Yushchenko
was inaugurated on January 23, 2005.
None of the events prior to Viktor Yushchenko’s election or
inauguration suggest any reasons to expect the substantial reduction in
rent-seeking behaviour and effectiveness observed in the World Bank
survey. The macroeconomic situation also changed very little between
2002 and 2005,49 providing no reason to expect a reduction in rent seeking
due to an increase in alternative profitable opportunities (see theoretical
discussion above). The availability of an alternative explanation therefore
hinges on the possibility that Ukrainian business survey respondents
substantially revised their (reported) behavior and assessment of the
efficacy of rent-seeking lobbying in response to Yushchenko’s coming to
power in the 3 months between President Yushchenko’s inauguration on
23 January 2005 and the close of the WB survey on 20 April 2005.
Although we cannot rule this out with certainty, it seems highly implausible,
not just because of the mismatch between the shortage of time and size of
the effect.  As reported on Wikipedia, Yushchenko “was a charismatic
candidate who [during the election campaign] showed no signs of being
corrupt,”50 and many—at least in the West—initially had very high hopes
for the new regime.
But there were also, already at the time, accounts of the Orange
Revolution that described it as a “revolt of the millionaires against the
billionaires”51 and merely a “reshuffle among the oligarchs,”52 suggesting,
if anything, an intensification of rent-seeking as a more numerous group
of “new” insiders sought to become beneficiaries of the state’s largesse.
Later analyses also support this assessment when they conclude that the
Orange Revolution did not in any substantial way change “the rent-seeking
and rent-giving symbiotic relationship between President, Parliament,
government, and big business”53 and that “the new government also [soon]
became tainted with corruption.”54 Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index for Ukraine also exhibits hardly any
improvement between 2002 and 2005.55
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In sum, the change in the assessed efficacy of rent-seeking lobbying, as
well as in the frequency of such lobbying, summarised in Figure 1, appears
to be indeed attributable to the boost in the AMC’s competition advocacy
powers.
That said, we want to emphasise that competition agencies – even
well-resourced, relatively independent agencies, such as the Ukrainian
AMC – cannot single-handedly defeat rent-seeking or deter corruption
against powerful political forces, as developments in more recent years
sadly illustrate: In December 2010, Viktor Yanukovych, the former prime
minister on whose behalf the Kuchma regime had rigged the 2004 election
triggered the Orange Revolution, succeeded in being elected President
(with oversight powers over the AMC). He swiftly established what the
OECD has called a “kleptocratic regime”56 with rampant corruption at
all levels of the state bureaucracy.  Corruption reportedly also was found
at the highest levels of the Anti-Monopoly Commission, eventually leaving
the AMC demoralised and with a decimated budget and workforce –
developments from which the agency is still trying to recover. Thus,
although we see no reason to believe that the political context provides
an alternative explanation for the observed change in the survey responses
between 2002 and 2005, political context clearly matters.
Conclusion
Seeking to influence public policy in accordance with one’s interests is
every citizen’s right in a democracy. Those with highly concentrated
interests, however, are often able to exercise highly disproportionate
influence over the legislative and executive branches of government,
resulting in laws or public policies that benefit the concentrated interests
at everyone else’s expense. And a pure market solution in the form of
pushback from widely dispersed private actors is unlikely. As Rodriguez
and Menon put it starkly: “No individual consumer in any nation affected
by the proliferation of rent-seekers has an incentive (or wherewithal) to
take action and to challenge those benefitting from government largesse.”57
Authorising competition agencies to engage in competition advocacy is
intended to re-balance the scales and make rent-seeking through anti-
competitive laws, regulations, or decisions less likely.
This paper has presented the first systematic empirical analysis using
non-US data to assess competition advocacy as an anti-rent-seeking policy.
The findings suggest that competition advocacy indeed reduces the
effectiveness of rent-seeking, and even the propensity to engage in rent-
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seeking lobbying. On balance, this research thus suggests that competition
advocacy holds much promise to increase both aggregate benefit from,
and the number of beneficiaries of, a market economy. Governments
seeking sustainable development should make such advocacy a priority,
since rent-seeking is an important, common and often severe impediment
to sustainable growth and development.
More broadly, our analysis suggests that non-enforcement strategies
of implementing laws and regulation, such as competition law and policy
in this case – can be highly effective. Yet, power or authority to engage in
such non-enforcement actions may nonetheless need to be proscribed or
backed up in law for such strategies to reach their full potential.
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Abstract
Reforms to improve standards and reduce social segregation in schools
have been in place in Nigeria for more than two decades. Some of these
reforms reflect an increasingly market-inspired and competitive
orientation. The paper intends to set out the impact of the specific reforms
designed to increase parental choice and school competition in light of
the government’s continuing commitment to basic education.
To establish the context for these reforms, the paper will set out the
objectives for, and economic arguments in support of, state-funded
compulsory education, and highlights the government failures which
prompted the introduction of an education quasi-market. Drawing on
economic theory and evidence from Nigeria and internationally, the paper
will focus on the central, and at times conflicting, issues of efficiency and
equity, in particular in secondary schools. 
Overall, the paper will argue that while the introduction of choice and
competition reforms may have delivered some improvements to academic
standards, this has likely been achieved at the expense of increased social
segregation within schools.  In particular, the paper will show that where
the supply of good schools continues to be limited, schools have both the
opportunity and incentive to ‘cream-skim’ the most able and privileged
students.
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In response to the growing trend of giving free rein to parental choice
in the Nigerian education system, the paper will articulate the rationale
for continuing government intervention in the education sector and, in
conclusion, make recommendations on how best to develop this regulatory
reform in ways which better promote social inclusiveness. Data would
be drawn from the empirical literature and other relevant government
and international publications.
Secondary Education: Objectives and Provision
Secondary education provides a broad-based education for 12-17 years
olds in Nigeria. The whole course falls into two parts – the first of three
years’ duration, marked on its completion by the Junior Secondary School
Certificate Examination (JSSCE), the second of three years, with the Senior
School Certificate Examination (SSCE). The secondary schools are run
by a mixture of state and non-state providers, reaching millions of children
– although there are still issues of access to education.1
Owing to the deteriorating state of education in the country, and the
vision of the Federal Government to increase the access to quality basic
education, the ‘Universal Basic Education’ (UBE) reform was launched in
1999. This represents the country’s strategy and viable opportunity for
achieving ‘Education for All’ (EFA). In particular, UBE reform provides
for every Nigerian child, without exception, basis literacy and numeracy
as well as knowledge of the culture of the society and the ability to
communicate.2
In economic terms, education delivers both private and social returns,
and the wider economic and social benefits in particular are at the heart
of the objectives for public-funded schooling. In short, investment in the
nation’s people, or human capital, is deemed to lead to both increased
economic productivity and improved social cohesion. Thus, the
overarching objectives of public-funded schooling are to ensure that
education is delivered as efficiently as possible to get the maximum
economic and social benefit, and to do so in a way which is equitable.3
In one form or another, these objectives have been apparent in the
Nigerian education system since the introduction of regional provision of
education in the 1950s.4  However, they have evolved over time to reflect
changed economic and social circumstances, notably as part of the
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and more recently in response
to globalisation and economic crises. Since the return of democratic
government in 1999, more emphasis has been laid on equity and efficiency,
with a specific focus on effective delivery of education in light of increased
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global competitive pressures.5 The next section will critically examine
the economic argument in favour of continued public intervention in
secondary education.
Economic Case in Favour of Continued Public Funding
For Secondary Education
The effective and equitable delivery of educational benefits is also
central to the economic arguments for education being predominantly
funded by the state. In economic theory, government intervention is
warranted in part when markets are considered to be inefficient in
delivering a service, known as market failures, and in the case of education
‘externalities’ are the most common market failures used to justify state
subsidy.6
Externalities, or spillovers, occur when individual or business activities
affect others, who neither pay nor receive compensation for these benefits
or costs.7 In a market system, both consumers and producers are
considered to be focussed primarily on their own ends, and this lack of
concern for the wider effects of their actions is therefore considered to
be a market failure.8 In education, individuals may not always consider
the wider costs and benefits of their education to society,9 with the positive
externalities defined by McMahon (2004: 211) as ‘the social or public
benefits from the education of each individual that benefit others in the
society in both current and future generations’.
On the other hand, there is consensus on the wider economic benefits
which go beyond the improved productivity of individuals to encompass
the positive impact that better educated employees can have on other
workers and their organisations.10 The wider non-economic social returns
to education, however, are more contested. While Hanushek (2002:162,
in Machin and Stevens, 2004) argues that details of social externalities
are ‘noticeably elusive’, McMahon (2004) and Oreopoulos and Salvanes
(2011) find considerable evidence of non-financial benefits such as
improved health effects, reduced poverty and inequality and contribution
to democratisation and political stability.
Imperfect information is another market failure used to justify public
intervention. According to economic theory, for markets to operate
efficiently they must provide consumers with adequate information to
pursue their best interests; in the case of education government
intervention is motivated in part “by the belief that consumers will not
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possess complete information and that the market, by itself, will supply
too little information.”11
For instance, if education were privately funded, parents would need
enough information about both the costs and benefits of schooling to
justify their investment and it is argued that since they may not be fully
aware of the longer term benefits for their children, they are likely to give
more weight to costs than benefits and underinvest in their children’s
education.12
Likewise, institutions lending money to parents for their children’s
education would find it difficult to assess which students were more likely
to succeed in education, and therefore be able to repay loans, and would
tend to favour the children of wealthier parents with assets to secure the
loans.13 These factors would tend to discourage significant take-up of
education outside of the wealthy classes. Consequently, the problem of
understanding the benefits of education, and the danger of underinvestment
in education, provides justification for education to be made compulsory
and subsidised.14 In this way, education is thus referred to as a ‘merit
good’, which ‘government compels individuals to consume.’15 A case for
public intervention in education is clear because the consumers might not
make informed decisions for their future social welfare.16
Next, the need to promote equity rather than efficiency is another
globally acknowledged justification for public intervention in education.
As noted above, if parents were to pay for their children’s education,
then the children of richer families, or those who valued education more
highly,  would be favoured and better educated. Children excluded from
education would therefore be denied the individual benefits of schooling
and the broader economic and social benefits of an educated population
would be reduced.
Stiglitz (2000:427) notes that the “widespread belief that children’s
access to education should not depend on their parents’ financial ability”
provides the strongest argument in favour of public financing. This
argument is essentially one of redistributing the educational benefit, and
is grounded in Tobin’s (1970:264) concept of “specific egalitarianism”,
in which access to certain goods “should be distributed less unequally
than the ability to pay for them”. Le Grand (2007: 13) concurs and extends
the equity argument to include social class, gender and ethnicity, reflecting
that if on those grounds “some parents have preferential access to
education for their children, then this is widely regarded as unfair or
inequitable”.
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Brief History of Education Reform in Nigeria
Since 1955, educational reform in Nigeria has become an issue of focus
for successive administrations, with the intention of providing universal,
compulsory and subsidised schooling, although differences in emphasis
have always existed in different regions and states. By 1976, the federal
government became conscious of the global competitive advantages that
proper education confers on citizens and therefore introduced the
Universal Primary Education (UPE) scheme to replace the regional
education reforms. Thus, the differences that had existed in the different
regions (states) earlier were checked by the federal government.17
By the early 1980s, however, the UPE reform was widely seen as failing
on both the efficiency and equity grounds, with concerns about regional
social disparities, falling standard of the education and decline of
educational infrastructures.18 The predicament was also linked in part to
funding, especially with the introduction of the SAP which necessitated
reduction in social expenditure by government.19
These pitfalls that characterised the UPE reform led to the launch of
the ‘Universal Basic Education’ (UBE) in 1999 to replace UPE. The reform
seeks to universalise access of all children to educational opportunities
for nine years.20 Nevertheless, there are concerns about parental
preferences for schools due to quality delivery and quality outcomes of
UBE, poor infrastructures, irregular payment of teachers, inadequate
funding and the widespread poverty, all of which factors are working
against education.21
Educational Reforms: Objectives, Impact and
Recommendations for Choice and Competition Policies
For almost three decades, and most significantly since the 1976 UPE
reform introduced genuinely ‘UPE’, the arguments above provided the
foundation for compulsory schooling in Nigeria. By the mid-1980s,
however, the public education system was widely seen as failing on both
the efficiency and equity fronts, with concerns about low academic
attainment and persistent social segregation in secondary schools. This
problem of confidence in education was linked in large part to SAP-induced
economic meltdown,22 with widespread fear that Nigeria did not have an
education system that could sustain economic competitiveness regionally
and internationally.
By 1999, UBE reform was introduced. Although UBE was eventually
passed into law in 2004, there were mounting concerns about the quality
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of basic education in Nigeria.23 For instance, there have been issues about
the standard of UBE in terms of insufficient instructional facilities/
technologies, inadequate teaching personnel, problem of curriculum
implementation, among others.24 Because of these problems Nigerian
public schools are no longer option for the middle-class and rich parents
who are able to enroll their children in private schools.
In 2004, UBE reform was officially put in place across the 36 states of
Nigeria by the Act of Parliament (UBE Act) in order to address these
failures in the public (basic) education system. It is believed that without
sustainable reform, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and EFA
desired goals cannot be achieved. UBE included a wide range of reforms
covering components of national unified curriculum, parental obligations,
funding responsibility (among three arms of government), and relegation
of catchment areas together with more autonomy for schools.
Basically, the main objective of the choice and competition reform is
to raise the quality of education through the introduction of market forces
in terms of what is referred to as ‘quasi-market.’25 The quasi-market
encompasses the market components of providers competing for
customers; however, it is unlike the normal markets because such services
are still paid for by the government, after user’s choices have been
ascertained. As noted by Le Grand (2007), quasi-markets circumvent the
differential issues stemming from services that are only available to the
people that can pay for them.
In education sector, choice and competition reforms mostly include
parental capability to make a choice regarding the schools they prefer for
their kids, together with sufficient funding for them. Schools are given
greater managerial autonomy but still required to follow a national
curriculum. In economic terms, such reforms are expected to improve
educational outcomes for the same resource through increasing demand-
side pressure from parents for good schools and giving supply-side
flexibility to schools, in an attempt to allocate their budgets in such a way
that would result in better educational attainments.26
However, one criticism that can be levelled at this outcome is that it is
only the relatively well off and well-educated who want it and will be
motivated to use it. Consequently, this reform might not have a positive
impact on the equitable distribution of educational gains. There are
evidential supports for this contention; however, studies in this area are
very scarce in Nigeria, and one may have to rely on the literatures from
the developed countries.27
International evidence has shown that there are mixed results for the
impact of market reforms. As Hirsh (2002: 6) points out, ‘policies
Pursuing Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving SDGs 81
associated with school choice have nowhere proven to be a magic bullet
to improve educational system but nor have they created a general
catastrophe for education. Rather their effects have been specific and
local’. What emerges from Hirsh’s finding is that the impact of market
reforms hinges on the way the education reforms are designed, introduced
and localised in a particular context. Drawing on the experience from
Nigeria, and internationally, the next  section will examine in more detail
the evidence in relation to the main objective of increasing educational
efficiency through quasi-market reforms and any possible consequences
this has for equity and social inclusiveness.
Efficiency and Equity: Evidence from Nigeria and
lnternational Arena
Firstly, the international evidence on the impact of choice mechanism
on educational efficiency is mixed. Some findings have shown increased
efficiency while some cases with huge spending on education showed
little or no improvement in academic achievement. For instance, Hirsh
(2002) and Waslander et al (2010) find little evidence that market
approaches are more effective in improving teaching and learning than
other educational reforms.
In Nigeria, there is a consensus that exam results have partially or not
improved in the past 10 years; yet the extent to which this can be ascribed
to choice policies is challenging. There are challenging conclusions
regarding the exam results of the students. Igbuzor (2006) and Asikhia
(2010) note that academic performance (WASSCE results) have not
improved because of the unqualified teaching force, gender issues and
socio-cultural beliefs, and adherence to traditional assessment strategies.
It then looks trickier to generalise the improvement of students’
performance through exam results due to inconsistent evidence and wide
disparities in Nigeria. Relevant in this regard, Gorard et al. (2003: 89)
note that ‘the evidence can do little more than suggest that this is an
impact of market forces for there are so many other confounding changes
over the same time’.
In the context of the quasi-market where schools compete for students,
Burgess et.al. (2006:15) argue that schools “have the incentive to improve
measured performance”. However, that does not necessarily mean
improvement in actual performance because there may be a tactical
manipulation of behaviour to secure strategic advantage.28 Selecting highly
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performing students – known as ‘cream skimming’ – can result in better
exam results, without actually improving effectiveness.
Globally, there is no evidence to show that choice policies reduce
segregation. However, there are mixed findings in the levels of increases
in segregation detected (Waslander et al, 2010; Le Gran et al, 2008). In
Nigeria, schools that are most successful in terms of published market
information have skewed student populations. As these assessments are
modified by assumptions around the intersection of class, ethnicity, socio-
cultural beliefs and gender, choice appears to lead to segregation and
homogenisation of student populations.
For example, as some schools secure desired students and strong
position in the marketplace, others become left behind with an under-
supply of students, who are mostly from low socio-economic groups.
These circumstances lock the latter category of schools in a series of
poor academic achievement and student and teacher attrition, which has
implication for choice policies. But in all these issues, Gorard et al (2003:
186) point out the possibility that ‘what choice policies may do is change
the rules by which segregation takes place, but without markedly increasing
or eliminating levels of segregation that are largely shaped by structural
factors’.
Choice and competition policies, in an effective market, are expected
to be mutually reinforcing. Here, the supply of schools increases or
decreases in relation to demand. Nonetheless this, it appears not to work
well in the quasi-market. Relevant to demand-side, parents do not react
to underperforming schools by withdrawing their wards; and on the
supply-side, popular schools do not easily meet the growing demand. Given
the local problems (as mentioned earlier) in Nigeria, different reforms to
increase social diversity in Nigeria have not generally and effectively
corresponded with parental demand with school supply. This challenging
process of choice by both parents and schools result in more segregated
schools, pointing to the fact that when schools are over-subscribed, choice
is efficiently usurped and annexed by schools, and none looks good for
parents.29
Other elements for selection based on merit, state quota, exigency and
environment  intensify segregation. Segregation can also occur when such
schools are mostly allowed to participate in the selection of the students;
they tend to select relatively advantaged students and such a practice
(cream-skimming) promotes inequality (see Gorard et al, 2003; Le Grand,
2007).
Educational reforms are not often about models, but outcomes. And
since social processes are not always linear, it appears difficult to suggest
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a definitive pattern of behaviour in educational reform strategies. Any
model that attempts to explain the process of change, therefore, must
rely on measure of outcomes of the process that reconciles equity,
individualism, social mobility and equal opportunities. Therefore, if the
choice policies are meticulously measured, it can help in exercising
informed choice as to how to pursue, implement and improve these policies.
International evidence shows that strategically measured choice policies
with broader equity and social justice concerns have the potency to address
segregation problem. In Nigeria, the control measures can embrace the
geo-political and socio-economic mix in order to reduce social segregation.
Conclusion and Recommendations
This paper has described the way education is delivered and funded.
Taking account of the economic case for continued public intervention in
the funding of education has also provided a new set of insights, positions
and identities in consideration of which the roles of parents and schools
are expected to change. The main objective of using choice and
competition in the education system is to enhance academic achievement
of students from both wealthier and low-income groups. Although neo-
liberal ideas such as school choice reform policies can deliver outcomes
in some circumstances, it does not apply to all situations and, as Hirsh
(2002:21) has noted, it is ‘neither a cure-all nor a catastrophe for the
quality of education’.
The impact of choice policies on school performance and student
achievement is hotly contested. However, some of the evidence drawn
from Nigeria reveals that exam results have not improved owing to such
factors as social-economic and cultural forces and wilful motivations
produced by published performance assessments. Though some
international research offers some evidential support for beneficial effects,
there is also a great deal of evidence showing no effects or negative
consequences.30
That said, choice reforms appear to be ideal but the benefits have not
been widespread because they carry with them dilemmas, including the
way opportunistic and tactical behaviours have been apparent in schools,
among parents and students. The evidence about education quasi-market
also reveals that it has not boosted the chances of underprivileged children
studying in better schools and also has not resolved the undue segregation
between schools.
In Nigeria, access to secondary education continues to improve
(courtesy of the introduction of UBE in 1999). At the same time, it
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continues to be challenging, not only because of debates over the nature
and role of secondary education but also because of differences in the
ways stakeholders and policy-makers understand what constitutes access.
Thus, inasmuch as the argument for continued public intervention in
education is based on the equity concerns of educational benefits, the
failure of market-driven policies to address segregation remains a
challenging one, indeed. As challenging as the problem associated with
choice policies can be, they can still help in reducing social segregation if
those policies are appropriately implemented based on specific social
contexts.
Based on what emerges from the findings in the paper, below are the
recommendations that can fit in with the development of choice policies
to achieve a reasonable measure of equitable outcomes in secondary
schooling in Nigeria:
1. School supply: The educational stakeholders should devise effective
assessment of the present policies aimed at cumulative supply of
good schools in order to ensure the availability of appropriate
incentives and structures for the expansion of good schools and
establishment of new schools in the marketplace.
2. Performance measures: Concerned educational authorities should
assess the performance measures to reduce the opportunities for
schools to cream-skim students during admission period. The word
limit for this paper has not given chance to thoroughly look at
performance measures, though such measures together with choice
reforms remain indispensable.
3. Regulation of Choice: Concerned authorities should adopt control
mechanisms to address choice and equity concerns, particularly on
the introduction of ‘fair banding’ as coined by West (2006) at
grassroots’ level to guarantee a better geo-political and socio-
economic mix in schools. Taking away admission controls from
schools also has the potential of circumventing any attempt at cream-
skimming.
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Abstract
Mexico adopted its first competition law in 1992 in preparation for
the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Despite having
provisions against monopolies in its constitutions of 1857 and 1917, a
comprehensive law prohibiting cartels, preventing abuses of dominance,
providing merger review, and an agency to implement these laws was a
new phenomenon for Mexico. Moving quickly to 2015, the competition
policy scene has dramatically changed in Mexico. The Federal Competition
Commission (CFC) whose investigative powers significantly increased
through reforms in 2006, 2011, 2013 and 2014 has become a well-
respected enforcement agency that ranks above some Western European
competition agencies with longer histories and much greater resources in
Global Competition Review’s (GCR’s) annual rankings.
This paper explores the political factors that have contributed to the
transformation of the Mexican competition regime from an ineffective
regime in a highly concentrated economy into a relative success story. As
an agency relatively well-endowed with financial and human resources in
an upper middle-income country, the CFC has some advantages compared
to agencies in poorer countries.
This paper investigates the sources of success of Mexico’s competition
regime with a perspective that emphasises both domestic and international
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the politics of competition law reforms. Specifically, it explores how the
CFC succeeded in gathering the political will needed to pass competition
policy reforms that strengthened enforcement starting in 2006.
Introduction
Mexico adopted its first competition law – the Federal Law on
Economic Competition (FLEC) in 1992 in preparation for signing of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). At the time few
domestic actors knew what competition law meant and what impact it
would have on them. For the Federal Commission of Economic
Competition (FCC), the early years proved to be a period of trial and
error. Actors within the government and the private sector criticised the
Commission for being weak, court proceedings triggered by companies’
complaints slowed down investigations, and a number of FCC’s decisions
were reversed by the district courts on procedural grounds.
By 2015, the competition policy scenario in Mexico had changed
dramatically. The FCC’s investigative powers significantly increased
through a series of reforms starting in 2006, and it has become a well-
respected enforcement agency that is held up as a model among the
emerging economies.
This paper explores the political factors that have contributed to the
transformation of the Mexican competition regime from an ineffective
regime in a highly concentrated economy into a relative success story
with a perspective that emphasises the politics, both domestic and
international, of competition law reforms. Domestically, it is argued that
a constituency in favour of better competition policy enforcement –
composed of consumers, firms traditionally excluded from markets, and
competition lawyers  –  gradually emerged and acquired voice in Mexico.
These favourable domestic conditions were reinforced by pressures
generated by foreign firms seeking access to Mexican markets, and by
the support of international organisations, such as the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Competition
Network (ICN). These organisations provided information, expert
evaluations and political support for the FCC in its negotiations with
domestic policy makers, and therefore, combined with domestic factors,
enabled significant reforms of the Mexican competition regime.
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The Federal Law on Economic Competition
The proposal for a competition law surfaced in the context of the
regulatory reforms of the late 1980s in Mexico. However, the idea of
protecting competition in the market place dates back to the constitutions
of 1857 and 1917. The Mexican constitution of 1857 prohibited
monopolies, and the constitution of 1917, in addition, included provisions
against cartels and abuses of dominance1. These provisions were not
enforced due to the absence of implementing regulations, and in practice
numerous state and private monopolies dominated the economy2. The
1934 Organic Law of Monopolies was likewise unenforced3.
Until the end of the 1980s, many businesses were shielded from external
competition through the chambers of commerce, industry or by some
level of government4. The degree of economic concentration in the
economy was found to be high. In 1992, nearly 25 companies accounted
for 47.1 percent of Mexican Gross Domestic Product or  GDP5 .
The debt crisis of 1982 motivated a number of institutional reforms
through the rest of the 1980s and the 1990s. In the context of these
reforms, officials at the Economic Deregulation Unit at the Secretary of
Commerce and Industrial Development (SECOFI) became convinced of
the necessity to adopt a competition law6.
Moreover, progress in the negotiations with the US and Canada on
NAFTA provided an additional impetus for the adoption of a competition
law, as NAFTA’s Chapter 15 committed the parties to the adoption of
measures proscribing anti-competitive business conduct. The process
resulted in the adoption of the FLEC in the Mexican Congress in 1992
and the establishment of the Federal Competition Commission (FCC) as
the agency responsible for its implementation in 1993.
The FLEC includes provisions against cartels and abuses of dominant
position, and allows for merger review and competition advocacy. It
classifies potentially anti-competitive practices as either absolute or
relative. Absolute monopolistic practices include hard core cartels between
competitors on price, output, market division and bid rigging, and are
prohibited per se7.
What in other countries would be treated under monopoly or abuse of
dominance provisions are treated as relative monopolistic practices, which
might be found illegal only if the agents have substantial power in a defined
relevant market8. Some of these are specified in the law, such as resale
price maintenance, tied sales, exclusive dealing and refusals to deal, while
others could be reached by the catch-all provision9 that define ‘any conduct
that unduly damages, or impairs the competitive process and free access
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to production, processing and distribution and marketing of goods and
services’ as anti-competitive10.
The FLEC prohibits mergers, which aim to  reduce, distort or hinder
competition11. All mergers that go beyond a certain threshold in terms of
sales or assets have to be notified to the FCC12. In assessing mergers, the
FLEC requires the FCC to consider whether the merging parties would
be able to fix prices unilaterally, substantially restrict competitors’ access
to the market or engage in unlawful monopolistic conduct in assessing
mergers.
State-owned enterprises are subject to FLEC’s provisions on relative
and absolute monopolistic practices, except in areas of ‘strategic concern’,
which Article 28 of the Mexican constitution lists. Other than these
exceptions, the FLEC applies to all economic actors, public or private. In
fact, the FCC has brought cases against Petróleos Méxicanos (Pemex)
despite the company being a state-owned monopoly in a strategic sector.
The FCC interpreted the constitutional provision as applying only to
Pemex’s role in oil exploration and refinement, and charged the company
for abusing its dominance in the market for distribution by forcing
companies that bought its gas to also use its transport network.
The FCC can give its opinions if another organ of the state acts in a
way to restrict competition, but the opinion has no binding effect13. The
FLEC empowers the FCC to give its opinion on the effects that existing
legislation, regulations, and administrative acts might have on competition,
and upon request by the Federal Executive, on the effects of competition
on new laws and regulations proposed to the Congress14.
Early Experiences
A number of obstacles to the effective implementation of the FLEC in
the early years originated from the provisions of the law itself and the
powers granted to the FCC under the law. First of all, the FCC had few
tools to address problems in the highly concentrated sectors of the
economy. The FLEC did not allow the FCC to restructure monopolies,
which might have been a reasonable decision given the lessons drawn
from the experience of other countries15. However, it soon became clear
that a lack of powers to address structural monopolies could be
problematic in a country like Mexico with a highly concentrated economic
structure.
In addition, the division of responsibilities between sector regulators
and the FCC proved problematic. The FCC was responsible in identifying
whether a firm has market power in a sector, but it was up to the sector
Pursuing Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving SDGs 93
regulator to address this behaviour after the decision of the FCC, with
the FCC not being party to the negotiations or the preparation of regulation
to deal with the anti-competitive conduct. This division of responsibilities
became problematic if the sector regulator was too weak, or ‘captured’
by the actors whose behaviour it was supposed to regulate, or did not
have any power to sanction the actors16.
The investigative powers granted to the FCC were also widely perceived
to be inadequate17. The FCC did not have powers to conduct dawn raids,
and it did not initially count on a leniency programme, which impeded its
efforts to fight cartels. Moreover, the maximum fines it could impose
(and effectively collect) were not deemed adequate to deter firms from
engaging in anti-competitive conduct. Prior to the 2011 reforms, The
Economist (2010) commented that it was profitable for firms to cheat
even if caught.
In addition to the weaknesses of the legislation, the judicial system in
Mexico had a significant impact on the effective implementation of the
FLEC. Under the FLEC, the parties to a competition case had ample
opportunities for judicial review if they were dissatisfied with the FCC’s
decisions18.
The first of these is the amparo (injunction) action, which can be
claimed by anyone arguing ‘that he is being subjected to an unconstitutional
statute or that his due process rights are being infringed’19. Amparo claims
were used aggressively and in increasing numbers by private actors against
the FCC, and complicated competition law enforcement.
They delayed the FCC’s proceedings, as firms frequently filed multiple
claims in different districts or filed subsequent amparos throughout the
proceedings. For instance, after the FCC declared TELMEX to be a
dominant carrier in 1998 – a necessary step for the sector regulator to
step in and impose remedies – its decision was stayed by a series of amparos,
changes to its declaration, and further amparos, until finally a court
annulled the FCC’s decision in 2006 because the evidentiary basis for it
was outdated20. Amparos might also delay the collection of fines, taking
away the ‘bite’ of FCC’s decisions. Dealing with the amparos filed against
it has imposed a significant strain on the agency’s resources.
A second way in which the parties to a FCC case could seek judicial
relief was through an appeal to the Federal Court of Fiscal and
Administrative Justice. This court normally reviews tax cases, but it asserts
jurisdiction to review any agency action that involves the imposition of a
monetary payment obligation on a private party, and it has thus reviewed
a growing number of cases in which the FCC imposed fines21.
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The FCC lost a number of cases under this court on the grounds that
its orders imposing fines were not adequately justified. The OECD (2004,
47) reports that due to judicial and procedural intricacies of the system,
the FCC was able to collect only 9.5 percent of all the fines it imposed
between 1997-2002, with 18.5 percent revoked or lost on judicial review,
and 72 percent remaining uncollected.
A few broader issues with respect to the judiciary have affected the
implementation of the FLEC. The unfamiliarity of the district courts with
substantive antitrust issues was one of them. In its early years, the FCC
saw many of its decisions reversed at the district courts, mostly on
procedural grounds22.
In addition to the judges’ unfamiliarity with competition policy issues,
the civil law model in Mexico “has traditionally involved detailed legislative
enactments, and courts are unused to dealing with a statute as short and
non-specific as the FLEC. By ruling adversely on a procedural point, the
court can send the case back to the FCC and avoids resolving the antitrust
question”23.
Critics also raise questions about the weakness of the judicial system
in Mexico in resisting outside pressures, especially those coming from
big business. In their empirical analysis of amparo requests in competition
cases24 find that companies directly or indirectly controlled by billionaires
were more likely to secure an amparo from the courts compared to other
firms. They cautiously interpret these results as supportive of their claim
that concentrated business interests have undue influence in the Mexican
judicial system.
 This does not necessarily mean that the judicial system is corrupt, as
big business also commands significant resources to hire the best law
firms to defend itself. Del Villar (2009, 334) notes that the FCC’s annual
budget is equal to two days’ worth of profits by TELMEX and RadioMóvil
Dipsa (TELCEL), the two big companies that dominate the landline and
cellular phone markets in Mexico, both controlled by Carlos Slim.
Reforms to the FLEC
Reforms in 2006, 2011, 2013 and 2014 have addressed some of the
problems that impeded the effectiveness of Mexican competition regime.
The 2006 reform introduced a leniency programme. It also enabled the
FCC to impose structural remedies, such as divestitures in monopoly cases,
and expanded the list of relative monopolistic conditions listed in the
Article 10 of the 1992 FLEC25.  With the 2011 reforms, the FCC acquired
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powers to conduct dawn raids. The FCC’s fight against cartels was
reinforced additionally by expanding the scope for criminal prosecution
against individuals in cartel cases.
The 2011 reforms strengthened the FCC’s deterrent power by increasing
maximum fines from US$7min to 10 percent of the firm’s annual revenues
in Mexico. The reform granted the FCC with more flexibility to reach
settlements with parties while the investigation is ongoing, while before
it could only come to a settlement after concluding its investigation26.
The FCC was also granted with the power to issue interim measures,
by which it can oblige firms to cease alleged anti-competitive conduct
while an investigation is carried out. Finally, class actions for damages in
competition law cases were allowed27.
The competition regime in Mexico saw its most fundamental reforms
in 2013 and 2014 in the context of the Pact for Mexico. After being
elected to office in 2012, Enrique Peña Nieto announced the Pact for
Mexico, an agreement between the three main parties on a broad package
of reforms including in education, taxes, the economy and the legal system.
Such a sweeping reform agenda became possible thanks to internal politics
of the two opposition parties, and Peña Nieto’s skillful management of
powerful interest groups and private actors28.
In the oil and gas sector, the reforms included changes to the
constitution that allow for private and foreign investment in refining,
pipelines, petrochemicals, transportation and storage of oil, gas and
petroleum products.
In telecommunications, the reforms created the Federal Institute of
Telecommunications (IFETEL), an independent legal entity to regulate
the telecommunications and broadcasting, and made this agency
responsible for competition matters in these two sectors.
The IFETEL can impose one-sided regulations on firms that it finds to
be dominant in these markets. The law also removes the 49 percent limit
on foreign ownership of telephone services, and raises the limit of foreign
ownership to 49 percent in broadcasting, which opens the way for greater
foreign investment.
The competition policy reform started in 2013 with constitutional
amendments that changed the legal status of the FCC, reconstituting it as
a legally independent entity under the Mexican constitution. The reform
established specialised courts to oversee appeals to competition law and
telecommunications cases.
The amparo requests in these areas are also to be resolved by these
specialised courts. In 2014, the Mexican congress adopted a new
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competition law, as implementing regulation to the 2013 constitutional
amendments. The new FLEC creates an investigation unit within the FCC
in order to separate investigative authority from decision-making authority.
The law further strengthens the FCC’s powers by expanding the scope
of evidence that it can collect through dawn raids, and increasing the
fines it can impose. The new law expands the list of relative monopolistic
practices. Finally, an important change is that FCC resolutions are not
subject to a judicial stay pending the outcome of litigation.
What explains the gradual strengthening of the Mexican competition
law through legislative and constitutional reforms since 2006? My
argument is that the interplay of a number of domestic and international
factors has brought about the reforms. Domestically, consumers and firms
that have been traditionally excluded from concentrated markets have
generated pressures for better competition law enforcement.
Consumers’ interests arise from the potential benefits competition
might bring in the form of lower prices. Economic concentration hurts
Mexican consumers, especially the poorest sectors of the society, which
devote 7 percent of their spending to overcharging by firms with market
power29. However, consumer interests are diffuse and hard to mobilise.
Historically, very few consumer organisations existed in Mexico, but
the situation is gradually changing with the emergence of non-governmental
organisations, such as the Observatel, the watchdog of regulatory reforms
in the telecoms sector30 or Controlaría Ciudadana, which monitors public
policies, such as competition policy and the fight against corruption.
The FCC has also entered into an agreement with the Office of the
Federal Prosecutor for the Consumer (PROFECO) in 2005, providing for
more cooperation and coordination between the two organisations and
more direct channels for the FCC to hear about consumer concerns.
PROFECO has the right to introduce the equivalent of class action suits
in competition cases, and has brought two such cases recently against
dominant landline and cellular phone companies TELMEX and TELCEL
to attempt to recover money on behalf of millions of consumers31.
Domestic firms that have difficulty entering markets dominated by
large players create another source of pressure for better competition
law enforcement. For instance, Avantel, a Mexican cellular provider sued
TELMEX nine times for abuse of dominant position32.
 Finally, domestically competition lawyers and bar associations have
become important actors with a stake in the proper functioning of the
system, for instance by helping to provide training to Mexican judges in
competition matters.
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International pressures for reforming the Mexican competition law
have reinforced these domestic demands. Foreign firms have been a source
of pressure for the Mexican government to improve the effectiveness of
competition laws. For instance, in 2000, the US government brought a
dispute against Mexico in the World Trade Organisation (WTO),
principally on behalf of AT&T and MCI, claiming that its telecoms
regulations breached its obligations under the General Agreement on
Trade in Services.
The Federal Commission of Telecommunications (COFETEL) had
granted TELMEX, the firm with the largest share of outgoing calls, the
power to fix the ‘termination rate’ to be paid by all foreign carriers, such
as AT&T and MCI – for calls terminating in Mexico33.
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) ruled against Mexico, forcing
COFETEL to change the regulation, with significant downward impact
on international settlement rates and hence the price of international
calls34.
Mexico’s greater economic openness, and its bilateral, regional and
multilateral trade agreements mean that foreign firms will increasingly be
sources of pressure for access to domestic markets and generate pressures
for better enforcement of competition laws. In fact, the recent reforms
allowing for greater foreign ownership in telecoms companies allowed
AT&T to acquire the third and fourth large players in the mobile phone
market in Mexico, generating pressures for better services and lower
prices35.
A significant impetus for the broader reform agenda in Mexico has
been the desire to increase the competitiveness of the Mexican economy.
International organisations, such as the IMF (2006), the World Bank (2007)
and the World Economic Forum have repeatedly emphasised lack of
competition as a significant impediment to growth. The recommendations
of these organisations are frequently reported in the national media and
become part of the public debate, and have thus been important input for
reforms.
Organisations, such as the OECD and the ICN have had an even more
direct impact on the reform process in Mexico. The OECD Competition
Commission has worked closely with the FCC. Through its peer reviews,
the OECD provided a neutral voice to the discussion by presenting a non-
partisan analysis of the state of competition policy in Mexico and simply
outlining best practices based on its experience in the area with OECD
member countries.
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The OECD report was used and cited in communications with the
legislature and federal public administration”. The OECD also provided
lengthy comments on the draft of reforms. The ICN similarly was
influential in ensuring that reforms to the Mexican competition law
followed international best practices.
Despite many positive aspects of the recent reforms, there have also
been some controversial areas where the most recent Mexican law departs
from international practice. For instance, in order to better address
monopolies, which most experts agree are an important problem for the
Mexican economy and Mexican consumers, the FLEC prohibits ‘barriers
to competition’, defined as any structural market characteristic or conduct
that limits the access of competitors or interferes with free competition.
‘Barriers to competition’ as a concept has been criticised for being too
vague and without foundation in mainstream competition law and
economic theory36. Furthermore, the FCC is given the power to conduct
market studies and impose behavioural or structural remedies if ‘barriers
to competition’ are found to exist in a sector. This is criticised as being an
‘extreme intervention’ into the working of the markets37 and potentially
a responsibility that could overburden the competition agency and
undermine its independence38.  In 2014, the FCC undertook a ‘resource-
intensive’ market study of the financial sector, for instance, which took
energy away from enforcement efforts39.
The 2014 reforms gave the FCC the power to identify and regulate
access to ‘essential inputs’, essentially setting maximum prices for
infrastructure, which gives it a vague and sweeping authority40 (Phillips
2014). This provision is also problematic because it might create
disincentives for firms to invest in infrastructure41. Finally, the reforms
give jurisdiction over competition in the telecommunications sector to
the newly-established and constitutionally independent IFETEL, which
might prove problematic.
Sector regulators tend to have regular and closer relations with the
players in the sectors that they regulate, which might undermine their
independence. In the European context, Petit (2004) has also raised
questions about potential overlaps and jurisdictional confusion with the
multiplication of sector regulators along competition authorities. It will
be crucial to ensure a harmonious working relationship and cooperation
between the IFETEL and the FCC in the coming years.
There have also been some practical issues in competition enforcement
in the aftermath of the reforms. The FCC has seen some significant staff
turnaround, with seven new commissioners taking charge in the first year
of reforms, and eighty-four competition enforcers leaving the FCC in
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2013, and fifty-six in 201442.The agency has also had to devote substantial
resources to institution building, which resulted in modest enforcement
in 201443.
 Some observers have also complained that FCC investigations have
slowed down during this time of adaptation. Nonetheless, the FCC boasts
high success rate at the courts in the last two years and is contributing
successfully to the Mexican legislative and administrative process through
its competition advocacy.
 It has also enjoyed a boost to its budget of 32 percent for 2013 and 60
percent for 201444. These positive developments and its increased powers
set the FCC on a solid path for good enforcement. Together with the
National Development Plan 2013-2018, which emphasises the need for
an industrial policy that seeks to “deepen and strengthen market
competition as the main tool to build a dynamic economy”, competition
policy in Mexico should contribute to the competitiveness of the Mexican
economy45.
Conclusion
After adopting a modern competition law in 1992, Mexico struggled
to enforce this law effectively in its first decade. The FCC encountered
many problems, such as legislative loopholes, insufficient powers to
conduct investigations and to sanction breaches, insufficient financial
resources, defeats at the district courts, and the frequent use of amparos
that significantly delayed the conclusion of proceedings and strained the
scarce resources of the agency.
The early problems of the Mexican competition regime draw our
attention to the difficulty of making foreign legal transplants work in
contexts where the local institutional setting, combined with powerful
private and public interests can easily frustrate efforts. Mexico’s problems
in enforcing its competition law are fairly typical among new competition
regimes.
A series of reforms starting in 2006, and culminating in a fundamental
revamp of the law and the FCC in 2014 have addressed many of these
problems. What made the reforms possible in the Mexican context were
pressures from an emerging domestic constituency for a more competitive
economy reinforced by pressures and guidance from international
organisations and foreign firms. This analysis of the reform process draws
attention to the importance of encouraging competition policy to spread
its roots in the domestic system and supporting those roots through
international assistance and guidance.
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Abstract
Since embarking on economic reform and opening up in 1978, China
has achieved remarkable economic growth, with an average GDP growth
rate of 10 percent during 1978-2006, and absolute poverty has decreased
significantly as a result. However, this rapid and high economic growth
has also resulted in a number of social and environmental problems.
Recognising a need to change its mode of development, since 2006
and especially since the adoption of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011–
2015), the Chinese government has focused on achieving sustainable
development, encompassing economic, social, and environmental goals.
One of the tools available to the Chinese government to help it promote
and achieve sustainable development is its competition law, called the
Anti-Monopoly Law, which came into effect in August 2008.
The paper will examine whether and how the Chinese government
has promoted competition law, policy, and reforms and enforced the Anti-
Monopoly Law, with a focus on how the Chinese government has used
competition law and policy to address issues relating to sustainable
development. The paper begins by looking at the ways and context in
which competition law, policy, and reform are discussed within and by
the Chinese government (especially the competition agencies) and how it
is linked to other government policies, goals, and priorities. The paper
then analyses the enforcement activities of the Chinese competition
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authorities, in particular looking at the industries affected, types of
competition policy instruments used, geographic scopes of concern, and
nature of the competition restrictions targeted. Such analyses are conducted
with a view to evaluating how the Chinese government has used
competition law and policy to help promote sustainable development.
Introduction
Since embarking on economic reforms and opening up in 1978, China
has achieved remarkable economic growth, with an average gross domestic
product (GDP) growth rate of 10 percent during 1978-2006,1 and absolute
poverty has decreased significantly as a result.2 However, this rapid and
high economic growth has also resulted in a number of social and
environmental problems. For example, inequality in China has almost
doubled since 1981 and its Gini coefficient has remained at a relatively
high level of between 0.47 and 0.49 in the past decade, according to official
figures.3 Pollution and environmental degradation have led to public health
and environmental issues, and in 2008 it was estimated that environmental
degradation and resource depletion cost China approximately nine percent
of its gross national income (GNI).4
Recognising a need to change its mode of development, since the
adoption of scientific development and socialist harmonious society by
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and especially since the
implementation of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011–2015), the Chinese
government has focussed on achieving sustainable development rather
than aggregate economic growth and the absolute living standard. China’s
sustainable development strategy encompasses economic, social, and
environmental goals including enhancing scientific and technological
development and innovation, improving people’s wellbeing and livelihood,
reducing poverty, improving the environment, resource use, and
development ability, and coordinating the development of the economy,
society, people, resources, and the environment.5
The Chinese government has often referred to its competition law as
one of the laws that is essential to helping it to promote and achieve
sustainable development. Called the Anti-Monopoly Law6 (AML), it came
into effect in August 2008 and, similar to the competition laws of adopted
by many other countries, prohibits horizontal and vertical anticompetitive
agreements,7 abuses of dominance,8 and anticompetitive mergers.9 In
addition, the AML prohibits anticompetitive abuses of administrative
power10 (also known as administrative monopolies), which are regarded
as major barriers to furthering economic reforms.11
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This paper examines the role that competition law and policy plays in
achieving sustainable development outcomes in China. The paper first
considers how competition law and policy is linked to the reform and
development agenda in China. It then explores how the AML has been
implemented by the Chinese competition agencies to help promote and
achieve sustainable development outcomes.
Relationship between Competition Law and Policy and
China’s Reform and Development Agenda
Competition law and policy has long been linked to China’s broader
government reform and development agenda. Since the socialist market
economy was officially recognised in March 1993, competition and the
market mechanism have been viewed as essential to China’s socialist
market economy and the promotion and furtherance of China’s economic
reforms and opening up.12 Indeed, promoting the healthy development of
the socialist market economy is one of the express objectives of the AML.13
Competition law is viewed as an essential part of a legal system that is
required to support the functioning of a market economy.14 The Chinese
government believes that the AML provides a basic framework that helps
to establish competitive market structures, promote and ensure
competitive conduct, and guide the future direction of China’s economic
reforms.15 It also helps to maintain fair and orderly market competition
by eliminating market distortions, rectifying disorderly market
competition, and providing clear, transparent, and predictable standards
of conduct.16
Competition law and policy is also coordinated with other policies
and priorities to jointly promote and achieve economic, development,
and other outcomes.17 This coordination role of competition law and
policy is referred to in Article 4 of the AML.18 In China, competition law
serves broader macroeconomic goals and is viewed as a tool that can be
used by the government to intervene and achieve particular outcomes.19
Although the government recognises that the market plays the decisive
role in allocating resources in the economy, it nonetheless remains subject
to the macroeconomic control of the socialist state.20
Discussions of competition law and policy often occur in the context
of specific development and reform goals and priorities. These include
innovation and innovation-driven development, people’s wellbeing and
livelihood, and price regulation and stabilisation. These matters are
explored in this section.
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Innovation and Innovation-driven Development
The promotion of innovation has become an increasingly important
aspect of Chinese competition law and policy. The Chinese government
recognises that competition plays a fundamental role in encouraging
innovation by providing incentives for businesses to innovate, which, in
turn, promotes economic development and transformation.21 Competition
law is also regarded as part of the institutional environment that fosters
innovation.22
This increased emphasis on innovation in competition discourse is
consistent with the growing importance of innovation to China’s reform
and development strategy. The Chinese government has made it a priority
to transform China’s economic development model into one of sustainable
development and China’s economy into an innovation economy.23 In 2006,
it launched a major 15-year programme to develop science and technology
and promote innovation.24
In November 2013, the CCP adopted a wide-ranging reform blueprint
at the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP and
recognised that innovation is key to deepening science and technology
structure reform.25 Following on from the Third Plenum, the CCP and
the State Council jointly adopted an innovation-driven development
strategy in March 2015, which focusses on creating an institutional
environment (of which the market is one) conducive to innovation.26
Innovation will also be a focus in the Chinese government’s Thirteenth
Five-Year Plan, which will be finalised by the National People’s Congress
in March 2016 and apply from 2016 to 2020.27
The focus on innovation is part of the Chinese government’s goal to
shift its development model from one focussed on economic growth to
one that is sustainable, and to move China from traditional, low technology,
and low value-add activities into more innovative, knowledge-intensive,
high technology, and high value-add activities.28 In particular, the Chinese
government is focussed on indigenous innovation and encourages Chinese
businesses to develop their own technology and products.29
The Chinese government aims to decrease China’s reliance on imported
intellectual property (IP) and technology and narrow the technology gap
between China and other countries.30 However, it also believes that
indigenous innovation is built upon a foundation provided by foreign IP
and technology, and there are some concerns about the conduct of these
foreign IP and technology holders.31
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People’s Well-being and Livelihood
The Chinese government expressly relates competition law and policy
to the improvement of people’s wellbeing and livelihood. Officials at
Chinese competition agencies have stated that their competition
enforcement priorities are industries related to people’s wellbeing and
livelihood such as consumer goods, public utilities, telecommunications,
pharmaceuticals and transportation.32 They believe that anticompetitive
conduct in these sectors, which all relate to essential goods and services,
affects people’s lives and harms China’s economic development.33
The enforcement of competition law in essential goods and services
such as staple foods, housing, public utilities, transportation, and other
basic infrastructure services can help to ensure that people have access to
goods and services that are lower priced and of higher quality. In particular,
poorer people are more vulnerable to higher prices that result from a lack
of competition in these industries, as they tend to spend a higher proportion
of their income on essential goods and services than wealthier people.34
Price Regulation and Stabilisation
The Chinese government regards competition law as part of the legal
system that regulates prices, maintains price stability, and curbs inflation.35
In turn, price regulation and competition enforcement serve the needs of
macroeconomic regulation and control.36
As China’s economy has shifted from being a planned to a socialist
market economy where the market plays a decisive role in allocating
resources, the government’s role in the economy has also changed. The
government determined the prices of all products under the previous
planned economy. In contrast, under the current socialist market economy,
less than five percent of the total retail sales of consumer goods are either
guided or pre-determined by the government.37
However, this shift to market prices does not mean that the government
has no pricing-related role in the market. Rather, the government has
changed its function to one of supervision and regulation of pricing conduct
ex post.38 Competition law is a law that the government can apply to
carry out this price supervision and regulation role.
The relationship between competition law and the pricing regulation
system is reflected in the fact that the National Development Reform
Commission (NDRC) is one of the three competition agencies in China.39
The NDRC’s AML enforcement role is price-specific, as it is responsible
for enforcing the AML to address price-related non-merger conduct. In
addition to being a competition agency, the NDRC is also responsible for
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regulating the prices of certain key commodities and controlling and
stabilising the general level of prices under the Price Law.40
The department within the NDRC that is responsible for the AML is
also responsible for price supervision. The NDRC has made it clear that
it believes that its AML’s enforcement activities will strengthen price
regulation and maintain the stability of overall price levels.41 It will also,
in carrying out such work, consider matters such as new economic
development strategies and challenges, innovation, social equality, and
the development of the socialist market economy.42
Competition Enforcement and Promotion of Sustainable
Development
In the six and a half years since the AML has been in operation, the
Chinese competition agencies have taken enforcement action across a
variety of industries and against both small domestic businesses and larger,
multinational companies. As of December 31, 2015, more than 1300
mergers have been reviewed, and an overwhelming majority of those
mergers were approved unconditionally (1276 mergers, 97.85 percent),
two mergers prohibited (0.15 percent), and 26 mergers conditionally
approved (1.99 percent). Nearly 100 investigations or decisions relating
to anticompetitive agreements, abuse of dominance behavior, and abuses
of administrative power have been made.43
There is broad recognition that the Chinese competition agencies have
made great improvements in their enforcement capabilities and practice
in the past six years, although some commentators have criticised the
Chinese competition agencies for unfairly targeting foreign companies
and not conducting their investigations and reviews with sufficient due
process and transparency.44
An examination of the AML enforcement activity to date reveals some
enforcement priorities and patterns that suggest that the Chinese
competition agencies are enforcing the AML in a manner that not only
addresses concerns about anticompetitive conduct but also helps promote
and achieve the sustainable development related goals.
Innovation and Innovation-driven Development
Several enforcement investigations and decisions demonstrate that the
Chinese competition agencies are using the AML to address issues relating
to intellectual property rights (IPRs). The AML applies to the
anticompetitive abuse of IPRs to eliminate or restrict market
110 Pursuing Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving SDGs
competition,45 which might fall under the prohibition of anticompetitive
agreements, abuses of dominance, or anticompetitive mergers.46
In the merger context, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM, which
is responsible for merger enforcement under the AML) has looked at
issues relating to IPR licencing in its reviews of Google’s acquisition of
Motorola Mobility,47 Microsoft’s purchase of Nokia’s Devices and Sales
business,48 and most recently, Nokia’s acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent.49
These transactions occurred in communications and technology-related
markets, where the main barrier to entry is access to IPRs. The merging
parties in each transaction owned a number of key IPRs. In Google/
Motorola Mobility and Microsoft/Nokia Devices and Sales, the IPRs in
question related to smartphone manufacture and smartphone operating
systems, whereas in Nokia/Alcatel-Lucent, the merging parties held
communications technology standard essential patents (SEPs).
In each case, the MOFCOM was concerned about the ability of
smartphone manufacturers and other downstream businesses to obtain
IPR licences. As IPRs are essential for entry into the relevant markets,
refusal to grant licenses for these IPRs could harm competition.
A related concern was whether licensees would be able to resist or
counter increases in or high licencing fees. To address its concerns, in
both the Google/Motorola Mobility and Microsoft/Nokia Devices and
Sales transactions, as condition to its approval, the MOFCOM required
the merging parties to, inter alia, provide access to certain categories of
IPRs on a fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) basis and
maintain existing licencing practices for some other types of IPRs.
Additionally, the MOFCOM required that Microsoft not increase its
licencing fees on specific non-SEPs for eight years. In the Nokia/Alcatel
Lucent acquisition, the MOFCOM required that Nokia confirm that it
would not seek injunctions to prevent the use of SEPs granted on a FRAND
basis and to make certain commitments to its licencees and potential
licencees in China when transferring a SEP to a third party.
Similarly, IPR licencing fees and practices were the subject of the
NDRC’s investigations of Qualcomm50 and InterDigital.51 Both companies
hold SEPs for wireless communication standards. The NDRC was
concerned that the companies had acted anticompetitively by, inter alia,
charging unfairly high licencing fees, bundling the licencing of non-SEPs
to SEPs, and requiring their Chinese licencees to cross licence their relevant
patents free of charge. In both cases, the companies offered commitments
to address these concerns. They each committed to not tie the licensing
of SEPs with non-SEPs and to not require Chinese licencees cross licence
their patents free of charge.
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Qualcomm also stated that it would charge patent royalties based on
65 percent of the net wholesale price for smartphones sold in China (which
represents a reduction in its royalty rate) and adopt a rectification plan to
change some of its business practices in China and satisfy the NDRC’s
decision.52 InterDigital also made a commitment to not charge
discriminatory and high licensing fees to Chinese businesses.
In addition to undertaking investigations, the Chinese competition
agencies have specifically considered IPR-related issues in their
implementing regulations. In April 2015, the State Administration for
Industry and Commerce (SAIC, which is responsible for non-price related
non-merger conduct under the AML) issued regulations on the
anticompetitive abuse of IPRs,53 which took nearly six years to prepare.
Just two months later, the Chinese government announced that an antitrust
guideline on the anticompetitive abuse of IPRs would be prepared by the
NDRC and adopted by the Anti-Monopoly Commission (AMC).54
The AMC is a cross-ministry body that sits under the State Council
and was established to organise, coordinate and guide China’s competition
policy.55 The fact that the AMC, rather than the Chinese competition
agencies individually, will promulgate this guideline shows the importance
attached to this issue by the Chinese government. Unlike the SAIC’s IPR
regulation, which is adopted only by the SAIC and not binding on the
other Chinese competition agencies, once adopted by the AMC, the
antitrust guideline will bind all three competition agencies. Further, the
IPR antitrust guideline will be only the second regulation adopted by the
AMC,56 reflecting its significance.
The Chinese competition agencies’ concern about IPR-related matters
fits in with the Chinese government’s emphasis on innovation and
innovation-driven development. IPRs are essential to innovation and
technological advancement, and the anticompetitive abuse of IPRs stifles
innovation.57 High IPR licencing fees are also thought to be not conducive
to encouraging investment in research and development or the sustainable
development of businesses.58 Reflecting this view, in March 2015, the
head of the Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau at the NDRC
(the department within the NDRC responsible for AML matters) stated
that abuse of IPRs will be the next major focus of its enforcement
activities.59
Moreover, it is not surprising that the competition agencies’ IPR-related
enquiries have involved the telecommunications industry. Mobile
communications is part of the new generation information technology
industry, which was designated a new strategic industry that would be
developed vigorously by the Chinese government in the Twelfth Five-
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Year Plan (2011–2015).60 China is also the world’s largest producer and
consumer of smartphones.61
The ability of Chinese smartphone manufacturers to obtain relevant
IPR licenses, the level of IPR licencing fees (the cost of which may ultimately
be borne by Chinese consumers), and licencing practices of IPR holders
will influence China’s ability to develop this strategic industry. These
AML enforcement actions relating to IPR, however, have attracted some
controversy, as there is speculation and concern that the AML is being
used to reduce royalty payments and obtain better terms and conditions,
bargaining power, and competitive advantage for Chinese licencees, and
that the rights of IPR holders are being curtailed.62
People’s Well-being and Livelihood
The substantial majority of competition enforcement activity has
occurred in sectors where people purchase goods and services, such as
food and beverages, public utilities, information technology and
telecommunications, health, automobiles and after-sales services,
transportation, and other consumer goods. Such industries are important
for people’s wellbeing and livelihood as they relate to essential goods and
services or people’s day-to-day activities. This is consistent with the stated
enforcement priorities of the Chinese competition agencies.
In particular, the SAIC and the NDRC have targeted cartels relating
to materials used in the construction sector. The construction sector is
vital to China’s sustainable development. In China’s first official
urbanisation plan issued in 2014, the Chinese government stated that
urbanisation will drive sustainable and healthy economic growth in China,
and it aims to have 60 percent of its population living in urban areas by
2020 (as compared to 53.7 percent in 2014).63
As such, the Chinese government, together with the private sector,
has invested, and is continuing to invest, heavily in urban infrastructure
such as housing, transportation networks, and public utilities.64 One of
the guiding principles of China’s urbanisation plan is the decisive role of
the market in resource allocation.65 The enforcement of the AML to
remove anticompetitive conduct in the construction sector is consistent
with China’s urbanisation and sustainable development aims.
Further, the construction industry impacts people’s wellbeing and
livelihood. In addition to building public infrastructure and services that
will be accessed by the public, the construction industry is a large employer,
especially of migrant workers who are typically poor, from rural areas,
and leave their hometowns to work in other places for a majority of the
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year. In 2013, the total number of such migrant workers in China was
166.10 million,66 and it was reported that one in five migrant workers
worked in the construction industry.67
Price Regulation and Stabilisation
A number of the NDRC’s investigations and decisions reflect the view
that the AML and the Price Law are part of a suite of laws that helps it
regulate and supervise prices. The NDRC has relied on the AML and the
Price Law simultaneously to investigate and sanction price-related
conduct, especially in the early years of AML enforcement. Such
investigations include a rice noodle cartel in Guangxi Province,68 a
paperboard cartel in Zhejiang Province,69 pricing conduct in the tourism
industry in Hainan Province and Yunnan Province,70 minimum shipping
fees in the courier industry in Xiamen,71 and pre-delivery inspection fees
in the automobile industry in Wuhan.72
Further, more recently the NDRC has enforced the AML to address
its concerns about pricing, independent of the Price Law, in a manner
that is consistent with serving the macroeconomic control of the state. In
the past couple of years, it appears that the NDRC has started to use the
AML as an alternative to using interventionist or non-legal measures to
carry out its price supervision role. Generally, the NDRC tends to promote
the use of direct government intervention to address problems.73 This is
not unusual, given its history as the price-setting and economic planning
authority under the planned economy. Typical measures used include
freezing prices, restricting exports, or directly asking companies not to
increase their prices.74 In 2011, for example, the NDRC took such
measures to help it control the prices of instant noodles, cooking oil,
pork, flour, soap, detergent, washing powder, and shampoo products.75
The NDRC’s propensity for intervention might be changing, as it seems
to be increasingly relying on the AML to address pricing issues. For
example, since 2008, the price of imported infant formula has increased
substantially (reportedly by more than 30 percent) and imported infant
formula has been in short supply.76 The NDRC had, for the first few
years, used interventionist approaches to address these issues, however
they were ineffective in preventing the price of foreign infant formula
from rising.77
The NDRC subsequently initiated an AML investigation into infant
formula producers in March 2013.78 In contrast to its previous
interventionist efforts, this investigation resulted in some of the investigated
infant formula producers committing to reducing prices even before the
NDRC’s decision was handed down.79 The NDRC claims that its AML
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investigation resulted in the nine investigated infant formula producers
lowering their prices by more than RMB 2.4 billion in total.80 The NDRC
took a similar approach in 2014 to address concerns about the high prices
of imported and foreign branded cars and auto parts in China and
investigated a number of foreign car manufacturers and their local dealers
for potentially breaching the AML.81 A range of car manufacturers very
quickly reduced their prices in response to the AML investigation.82
Conclusion
Whilst the Chinese government recognises that competition law and
policy helps to promote and maintain competition and achieve better
outcomes for consumers, competition law and policy sits firmly within
the government’s broader reform and development agenda. The Chinese
government and the competition agencies expressly link competition law
and policy with China’s sustainable development goals, and much of
competition law discourse in China is focused on the role of competition
law in helping to improve people’s wellbeing and livelihood, promote the
pursuit of innovation by businesses, and regulate and supervise prices,
with a view to macroeconomic regulation and control. This narrative of
competition law and policy is corroborated by the enforcement actions
taken by the competition agencies, as these sustainable development
objectives are reflected in the investigations and outcomes that have been
pursued by the competition agencies to date.
With this in mind, given the association between competition law and
policy and the Chinese government’s development and reform strategies,
the future development and direction of competition law, policy, and
enforcement in China may adapt and fluctuate with changes in China’s
development and reform priorities or as the structure of China’s economy
changes. The upcoming release of China’s Thirteenth Five-Year Plan, for
example, will not only provide detail about China’s development priorities
over the next five years but also shed light on the development of Chinese
competition law, policy and practice in the near future.
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Abstract
This work aims to study strategies used in Argentine local development
experiences, focussing on industrial design, marketing and
entrepreneurship. In order to this purpose, backgrounds are analysed with
this approach adding the study of three strategic plans for national and
provincial-level that are currently in force. With the analysis of the
transport system in the last decade, an accelerated cost increase is evident,
resulting in a relatively higher price of distributed products. This situation
that was initially perceived as a disadvantage finally set up an opportunity
to produce locally.
The goal of this paper is to provide tools that contribute to the work
shipped by key institutions for local development (public, private and
intermediary organisations), and the way these interact with the actors
and the territory. In particular, the identification of productive sectors
and the selection of goods that can be produced and consumed locally, as
a key input for the formulation of projects.
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Introduction
The initiative inscribed as the zero step of the Improvement Scholarship
project (Call 2014) of Technological Research Commission of the Province
of Buenos Aires (CIC-PBA), has been evaluated successfully. The approach
comprises the integration of design, marketing and entrepreneurship as
an effective methodology for contribution to the local development in
small villages.
Overall, the supplies considered are: 1. Strategic Industrial Plan 20 20
(PEI)1; 2. Federal and Participative Agri-food and Agribusiness Strategic
Plan 2010-2016 (PEA2)2; and 3. Strategic Productive Plan Buenos Aires
2020 (PEPBA)3. These strategic plans constitute the main political
guidelines for national and provincial productive development.
The focus will be on strategies that allow to capitalise locally: territorial
potentialities (endogenous) and exogenous favourable conditions, which
comes from the national and sub-national context. Leading with this a
local growth with development, this last one defined as territorial equity,
social inclusion and environmental sustainability (Arocena, 2002).
Context and Industrial Policies
In Argentina, after the conclusion of the last military process, happened
between 1976 and 1983, a democratic cycle began. In it, successive
institutional and political transformations called ‘first generation’ ones
(related to human rights, new rights began and guarantees democracy
under the rule of law) were experienced.
In the early 90s the called ‘second generation’ reforms were performed,
driving the transformation of the state (affecting the operation of the
market economy, opening the domestic market, privatisation, integration
into the global world currency stability). It emerged with this a dynamic
model that initially resulted in the deepening of the economic policy
implemented by the military dictatorship (Azhiazu, 1994).
The change in external conditions, exhibited a strong vulnerability,
generating more external and internal (social) debt, unprecedented levels
of exclusion and growing social inequality.
In this context, a crisis occurred in 2001 that triggered the resignation
of President Fernando de la Rúa, and presented a context of political and
social instability. He was followed by transitional President Eduardo
Duhalde, who transformed the government’s agenda, selecting problems
and popular demands.
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In this context, was implemented one of the first programmes aimed
at developing the social economy and solidarity, the National Plan for
Local Development and Social Economy Manos a la Obra (PMO)4: for
the first time lines of work are set at national-level for recovering companies
in the hands of their workers and aiming at strengthening local
development (Srnec, 2009).
Thus began a tradition in socio-productive policies in Argentina, away
from the welfare practice of the previous decade, foregrounding the local
development and strengthening local power, the participation of citizens,
nurturing ties between actors (Ibíd.). We identify actors as agents capable
of producing changes in the territory. These can be individual or collective,
of public, private or mixed type. Individual actors are workers,
professionals, entrepreneurs, investors, etc.; while with collective actors
refers to states, governments, businesses and Non-government
Organisations (NGOs).
Cravacuore (2005) agrees with this, but stresses that at this phase the
national government was decentralising the role of planner, giving way to
local governments. In this process,  these sub national governments were
strengthened in this new role, although the actors continue awarding loans
to the national-level.
The government of Duhalde was succeeded by the government of
Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, prevalent until today.
Pedrazzi (2010) argues that this government deepened measures
established by Duhalde, progressing over this structure in the economic,
political and social-level with a deepening of the model.
In this framework, was presented the PEA2, which promotes the
participation of actors from different sectors in four Federal Councils, 23
spaces for interaction and dialogue between the provinces, 53 Faculties,
national and international organisations and over 140 business chambers5.
In 2012, PEI was introduced with the aim of developing eleven
industrial production centres in regional forums, with individual and
collective actors, institutionally concatenating the nation, provinces,
municipalities, public institutions and NGOs articulate collectively the
Project (Ministerio de Industria, 2012).
Logistics and Transportation of Goods
In the last decade, in a context of economic expansion, the
transportation of goods found its highest level of costs (see Figure 7.1).
On one hand, a railway system exclusively dedicated to transport
commodities, and on the other, a goods transporting system that moves
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95 percent of the country’s cargo requirements, increasing (Canitrot &
Garcia, 2013).
Source: Canitrot & García (2013, p. 41)
This situation led to an empowerment of workers and employees of
the automotor transport loads sector, who obtained the highest increase
in real wages over the last decade: 122 percent6.
These costs significantly influenced the final price of goods for use
and consumption, thereby configuring a stage with greater opportunities
for local development.
Focussing on the Province of Buenos Aires
Taking as reference the PEI (national plan), in 2013 was agree the
PEPBA (provincial plan), which like national plans, promotes among its
objectives: increasing productivity and exports, import substitution,
reducing unemployment, industrialisation of the primary activities and
boost to entrepreneurs and lagging regions by local development7.
In the area of this province there are currently 87 Local Development
Agencies, 15 Project Incubators and six Technological Poles.
Local Development Agencies are mixed public-private organisations
that promote local production development and articulate the use of
Figure 7.1: Distribution of interurban
cargo transportation in Argentina
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instruments to support the competitiveness of enterprises, to energise
the local production and economic activity (Kosacoff, 2008).
These organisations have the task of designing and implementing a
specific territorial strategy, build an agenda of regional territorial issues
and seek solutions in a framework of complementarity and public-private
commitment. It is for these reasons, that Local Development Agencies
can be conformed in all municipalities, according to the territorial scale
required (see Figure 7.2).
Figure 7.2: Geographical Distributions of Local Development
Agencies of the Province of Buenos Aires
Source: Ministerio de la Producción, Ciencia y Tecnología. http://www.mp.gba.gov.ar/
spmm/desarrollo_local/mapaprod/mapa_agencias.php
Project Incubators are spaces of assistance to promote projects and
ideas for sustainable productive enterprises. It is a tool to support the
creation of new enterprises, which aims are to strengthen the productive
fabric of the region.
Entrepreneur participants in these incubators, get linkages and strategic
alliances for the promotion, development, consolidation and/or
enhancement of their projects. Incubators also provide services, such as
legal advice; physical space for conducting meetings or for the installation
of the enterprise; participation in fairs and exhibitions; trade links;
fundraising and mentoring business.
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In addition, the Direction of Local Productive Development (provincial
government), in conjunction with the Innovative Projects Incubator
EMTEC, performs transfers methodologies.
From the different local scopes, industrial designers and marketing
professional actors can be linked with the nearest incubators to their
location, to get advice and support in the early stages of their enterprises.
In this manner, incubators increase its outreach to a micro-regional scale.
Table 7.1: Incubators of Buenos Aires Province
Name of the Incubator Municipality State
EMTEC Innovative Projects Incubator La Plata Active
FRAY LUIS BELTRÁN Business Incubator San Martín Active
UNSAM Business Incubator San Martín Active
Olavarría Incubates Olavarría Active
Red Gesol Hurlingham Active
DINÁMINA SE Tigre Active
INCUEI Luján Active
Junín Business Incubator Junín Active
Olmos Undertakes La Plata In conformation
Coronel Suárez Business Incubator Coronel Suárez In conformation
INCUTEC Berazategui In conformation
Gender Incubator La Plata In project
Bahía Blanca Business Incubator Bahía Blanca In project
Azul Business Incubator Azul In project
Center for Development De la Costa In project
Source: Ministerio de la Producción, Ciencia y Tecnología. http://www.mp.gba.gov.ar/
spmm/desarrollo_local/download/incubadoras_activas.xls
Technological Poles (PTs) located in the Province of Buenos Aires, are
next to the National Universities, which have careers related to technology.
These clusters act as articulators between human resources (scientists
and technicians) of universities and the productive system, to develop
solutions for the specific needs of each sector.
The PTs allows the development and technological innovation,
combining the efforts of small and médium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to
enhance their growth, creating jobs and promoting local and regional
development8.
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Thus, companies that are linked to a Pole, receive more benefits and
possibilities to innovate, than other firms operating independently.
These PT, have the potential to configure productive development
models and key business for each area of the Province of Buenos Aires.
The holders of the different productive enterprises might eventually attend
these centres of research and transfer home their projects, even if they
are away from their local areas.
Table 7.2: Technological Poles of
the Buenos Aires Province
Ubication of the Technological Poles State
1. Bahía Blanca Active
2. Junín Active
3. La Plata Active
4. Mar del Plata Active
5. Tandil Active
6. San Nicolás In project
Source: Ministerio de la Producción, Ciencia y Tecnología.
http://www.mp.gba.gov.ar/spmm/desarrollo_local/download/
polos_tecnologicos_activos.xls
Local growth with development does not belong to any specific
discipline, began as an interdisciplinary project of socio-economic
research, and this is its main strength. Meanwhile, his weakness is that
does not have a recognised theoretical framework, but rather its configured
by the user, who can supplement it with his discipline (Sforzi, 2007).
In local development, the key is the involvement of civil society
organisations in the taking of decisions, when plans for development of a
territory are determined (Quetglas, 2008).
According to Cuervo (1999), who see the local field as an opportunity,
agree to support their ideas-project in emerging advantages resulting from
the valuation of own resources and synergies of growth and welfare,
instead of waiting for extra local assistance.
The local development conceived as integrated, allows the system actors
of a territory to jointly develop; also, constitutes a challenge to build a
more just, prosperous and caring society9.
Our approach to local development -product of the study of several
authors and empirical evidence-, argues that it must be expressed as
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territorial equity, social inclusion and environmental sustainability, looking
for a local growth with sustainable development (Thomas, 2012).
For Boisier (2001) the local development should be based on social
capitalisation of resources and endogenous potentialities of a community
or sector, in order to deal with exogenous variables that are unfavourable.
Must be taken (social, technical, natural, cultural, institutional and
economic) territorial capabilities in order to strengthen common projects,
encourage the construction of a territorial identity and achieve social
welfare, for the sustained growth of community solidarity.
Regarding emplacement of these policies, local development involves
thinking the territory of a particular way: consider a small sector where
minimum and indispensable actors manifest, belonging to the same identity
portion, sharing a region and common values; achieved this, the territory
where it will be project is conformed10.
For a territory interesting from a development perspective, Boisier
(2001) defines that it should be organised, that is, having a community
with administrative and political regulation, and local identity.
Actors, Institutions and Territory
As mentioned before, local actors can be individual or collective. When
we refer to collective actors, in the public scope we find: sub-national
authorities (municipal, provincial and regional), universities, schools,
training institutions, public financial institutions; and in the private sector:
commercial chambers, associations, professional councils, financial
institutions, workers’ cooperatives, trade unions, private universities,
NGOs, etc. These actors in order to be considered locals or territorials
must indispensably share a defined spatial location.
To conform the territory where the local development will be
projected, must be take a particular place or micro-region, looking at a
bare minimum number of actors who share an identity and values (PEA2,
PEI, PEPBA).
In this logic, to improve the interaction between the actors and territory
different institutional plans are project and create. Strategic plans analysed,
aimed at generating agreements among actors at different levels, to achieve
a seamless and synergistic interaction.
The policies11 share the same goal: that the primary links (producers
who process the raw material, entrepreneurs and small businesses), achieve
long-term profitability.
In our evaluation with this perspective, we find that as Madoery (2001,
p.3) indicates, the social processes in contemporary society are produced
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in dynamic, unique and unrepeatable space-time matrixes. Consequently,
it’s necessary to re-signify the role of actors – individual and collective,
the features of social organisation and the context in which they operate;
as the development decisional matrix can no longer be controlled only by
state or market mechanisms.
Therefore, we consider that policies should be diagrammed where the
involved society participate in the development process, framing it in the
respective institutional and cultural environment.
These issues, are not yet precisely delineated on the most recent
programmes. In this proposed scheme, we find on the subject of local
development a mediating role.
The Subject of Local Development
The subject of local development, is the figure of the protagonist and
beneficiary of the development process. We say that he acts as a mediator
because it has a role of territorial entrepreneur, which collects information
from the environment and interact with other agents like entrepreneurs,
officials, politicians, incorporating proposals and acting; with the capacity
to intervene in key aspects of management (Alberqueque 1999).
Aligned to the idea that local development does not belong to any
particular discipline, various technical and professional profiles can assume
the leading and militant role in local development processes (Arocena,
2002, p. 137).
Martínez (2010) presents the actors in his development scheme as
centrals, clarifying -in line with our observations, that there are certain
points where development policies implemented by governments, should
be careful in order to really benefit involved. He specifically states that:
“The system of promotion of productive activity established, must consider
as priority actors the local residents” (translated, Martinez, 2010, p11).
This seeks to ensure that the external human support introduced into
the territory, is make after an exhaustive analysis of the limitations of the
community. The intervention must have at exclusive and superior aim to
improve opportunities for the inhabitants of the territory, and no facilitate
the way for companies to invest in communities using low labour cost
and taking profits.
Here again we agree with Martínez (2010), that the system should we
be careful: if the social net is weak for the development of production
projects, programmes should be designed for State intervention to correct
this weakness in the ‘places of life’, in instead of replacing local actors by
Pursuing Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving SDGs 131
outsiders, because these almost inexorably will be temporary (Sforzi, 2007,
p. 36).
The Role of the State
The role of the State as we advance is relevant and determinant in
many cases; acts as a harmoniser and catalyst, articulating public and
private plans of the actors.
The PEI, which reflects the current government official proposal for
the coming years, expound that public investment made in infrastructure,
education, technology and science since 2003, has led to significant
progress; but the intention is to deepen that dynamic, incorporating local
resources (human, natural and financial) in order to increase investment
in the own territory, focussing the search for sustainable development
(Ministerio de Industria, 2010).
In this plan 11 industrial production centres are rescued. The objective
is to develop regional forums where workers, academics, businessmen,
representatives of the Ministries of Finance, Industry and Federal Planning,
provincial and municipal governments, meet in a space conducive to
articulation of various sectors to realise the re-industrialisation.
This process is organised by working on value chains, composed by all
necessary activities to produce a good from its initial conception to delivery
to the final consumer. This system emphasises the dynamics of the
relationships inter and intra sectorial of the economy.
Thus, the objective of PEI is to achieve competitiveness along each
chain and in all productive chains. Specifically, it presents science as a
crucial resource and with it an ‘industrialisation of rurality’ in terms of
generating an industry upcoming to the location where the resources are
generated, that reaches international standards of leadership increasing
the competitiveness of the entire value chain (Ministerio de Industria,
2012, p. 273).
In our judgment, to improve the living conditions of a micro-region or
small towns in the province of Buenos Aires, at present, the focus should
be set on the local production and marketing of goods for use and
consumption, pointing to the replacement of extralocal goods (Del Giorgio
Solfa & Girotto, 2009).
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The Role of Industrial Design
In the context of local development, we conceive the figure of industrial
designer in a central position with respect to the articulation between
entrepreneurs and users, analysing specific needs, technological and human
resources available in the territory, to capitalise efficiently in the design
and development of new products (Dean, 2001).
In this case, the industrial designer will focus on executing the steps
involved in the process of satisfying the needs of families, the same time
as they focus on the replacement of goods produced in other regions of
the country.
Along the way, it will connect various disciplines from the local
productive system to final recipients of the market (Sierra, 2012).
In this sense, the industrial designer can be configured as an agent of
change in productive enterprises, articulating the technical knowledge
that will adapt in response to the dynamic needs of the local society
(Alburquerque, 1999).
Also, the transfer of product design to entrepreneurs, will seek to
promote the autonomy of the different actors, capitalising features of
local identity (Garbarini, Delucchi, and Vazquez, 2010).
In these cases, the designer will have the role of identifying which are
the regional characteristics that could be manifested in the morphological
communication (symbolic), to enhance the products developed12 .
It is further displayed the role of manager and organiser of the
production system, where the contribution of the design focusses on
facilitating technological processes undertake by small manufactures in
their change of scale13.
The Role of Marketing
The marketing dimension represented by different technicians and
professionals in the field of management and economics, mainly will
comprise two processes: 1. Analysis and diagnosis of: value chains;
territorial resources; and cost structure and prices of extra local products.
2. Development of marketing plans for local products and services (Cipolla
& Manzini, 2009).
The first process will focus on identifying opportunities for local
economic development. Therefore, first the main productive chains of
the territory will be analysed, selecting those with important processes
outside the territory. In them, the external links feasible to be developed
in the locally will be recognised.
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We believe that the processes of buying goods are more inefficient
when local prices exceed the actual prices excessively. In this logic, it will
be taking into account the rising price involving no local transport of
products.
Can also be identified opportunity among land resources, rescuing
particularities of rural, urban and architectural landscape, which will be
essential to recognise a potential tourist profile (Girotto & Del Giorgio
Solfa, 2009).
In the role incumbent on the second process, in response to the projects
generated in the framework of local development, it will be design and
implement marketing plans to promote new or existing, local products
and services (Simonato, 2009; Del Giorgio Solfa, 2012b).
Some of these strategies promotional product will be aimed at
promoting the purchase of local products; others will point to the
development of products and services channels –of local production-
projected to expand the regional market (Cipolla & Manzini, 2009).
The Role of Entrepreneurs
Though the local development approach will allow different actors to
become entrepreneurs, can mainly consider two profiles: the social
entrepreneur and the business entrepreneur.
The social entrepreneur is a charismatic leader with social acceptance,
that committed to the idea of local development, will interact with the
other actors adding followers and spreading the benefits and potentialities
of the approach (Giordano, 2012).
Instead, the business entrepreneur, attentive to socioeconomic and
productive needs, projects action and mobilises resources to generate
new business assuming the risks involved14.
In this framework, entrepreneurs in the technology sector are an
important perspective for new productive enterprises. Among them we
have the technicals and professionals of the areas: agriculture, food,
biology, construction, electrical, electro-mechanical, electronic,
gastronomy, hospitality, industrial, mechanical, environmental, civil and
water works, chemicals, tourism, etc. (Thomas, 2012).
Considering that most of the bonaerenses parties have secondary
technical training institutions, they could play a fundamental role in the
processes of local development, cooperating further in professional
education, aligned to local productive enterprises (Narodowski, 2008).
134 Pursuing Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving SDGs
In this context, then we understand that education can develop skills
and contribute to the generation of business initiatives based on negotiation
skills, leadership, new product development, creative thinking and
technological innovation15.
Needs and Potentialities of Productive Chains
In the towns of the province of Buenos Aires, there are needs for goods
of use and consumption in reasonable qualities and prices (Quetglas, 2008).
Specifically, in small towns that are distant, far from the metropolitan
region.
On one hand, we understand that transportation and distribution of
certain products manufactured in the Greater Buenos Aires, would
produce a deficiency in the processes of acquisition and purchase of the
residents of this kind of localities.
This deficiency lies essentially in the high transport costs assumed by
the final price of the product, resulting in up to 100 percent  more expensive
(furnishings large size).
On the other hand, levels of development and innovation in such
localities, remains paralysed because of the disarticulation of production
systems initiated over two decades ago and whose effects result in lower
development opportunities for communities, less employment and
emigration to others most dynamic regions (Schorr, 2004).
In this reasoning, we found that the main potentialities are focus on
those goods for use and consumption of low complexity that can be
produced in the territory. There are a number of furniture goods and
consumer products (food, cleaning chemicals), which can be produced or
finished there16.
From a provincial perspective, analysing the bonaerenses productive
chains, we found that some can be more or less competitive depending on
the Sub-space where they are located.
From the provincial policy, the PEPBA highlights the value chains that
can enhance local development and value addition at source.
To rate the needs and potentialities of the productive chains, we will
take the classification of the PEPBA which, on the basis of the PEI, defines
eight Subspaces (see Figure 7.1) and define in each of them the productive
chains in which it will base its production plan.
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In these subspaces we find among 4 and 11 productive chains, which
we will consider overall, although in this paper we focus on the needs
and potentialities common to the type of locations that we aim (see Table
7.3).
It can be seen from the analysis of this table that the Buenos Aires
production system is varied and displays important coexisting productive
chains in its vast territory.
For certain productive chains, the chances of capitalising our
comprehensive approach that includes design, marketing and
entrepreneurship are greater than others, but in most cases, we found
that the PEPBA promotes the incorporation of them in the ranging process
of their local development objectives.
Figure 7.3: Subspaces Distribution
Source: Ministerio de la Producción, Ciencia y Tecnología (2012, p. 9).
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Local and Human Scale Development
To deepen the local dimension, which we will define what we consider
as local and human scale development.
The local scale is the establishment of a limit on the number of people
living in the territory will be subject to development interventions, to
consider it into our local scale (Arroyo, 2001).
It has been agreed that this population range should be between 5,000
and 30,000 inhabitants, based on criterion, which seeks cover
municipalities with potential for territorial development, with important
and balanced domestic consumption, whose progress is hampered by the
proximity of parties with higher productive scale constituted as regional
heads17.
Even though strategic plans evaluated, considered most relevant regions
and productive chains, we will focus on local development programs based
on the needs and potentialities common to such localities.
In this way, we consider key at Max-Neef, Elizalde, & Hopenhayn
(1986) who define human scale development as: the sustained in the
satisfaction of basic human needs, the generation of growing levels of
self-reliance and organic articulation between: humans, nature and
Table 7.3: Detail of Existing Productive Chains Existent in
each Sub-space, their Needs and Potentialities
Sub-space Productive Chain
South Petrochemical Complex; Onion;Oiler complex; Sheep.
South West Wheat Flour Mill; Footwear Complex; Emerging Tourism;
Apicultural complex; Barley.
North West Oleaginous complex; Textiles; Corn and Poultry.
North Est Metalworking Complex; Autoparts complex; Apicultural complex;
Fruit.
Capital Horticulture; Petrochemical Complex; Naval Complex;
Software and Computer Services.
Coastline Tourism; Incipient Dairy Complex; Clothes; Naval Complex;
Software and Computer Services.
Centre Cattle; Dairy; Swine; Cement; Agricultural Machinery.
Greater Footwear; Textiles and Clothing; Dairy; Automotive - Automotive
Buenos Aires parts; Agricultural Machinery; Capital Goods; Construction
Materials; Software and Computer Services; Petrochemical
Complex; Medicinal Products for Human Use; Industrial Forest.
Source: Own elaboration based on data of Ministerio de la Producción, Ciencia y
Tecnología (2012)
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technology; global processes with local behaviours; social with personal;
planning with autonomy and civil society with the State.
Thus human needs, self-reliance and organic articulations constitute
the fundamental pillars of human scale development (Max-Neef, et al,
1986, o.14).
The authors specify that for this type of development work, it must be
based on a real prominence of people, to achieve the passage of person-
object to person-subject where the main problem is the scale: there is no
possibility of prominence in giant systems, hierarchically organised from
top to bottom (Max-Neef, et al, 1986, o.14).
Conclusions and Proposals
In the first instance, the review of the literature about local
development, entrepreneurship, industrial design and marketing together
with institutional inputs (strategic plans and mixed territorial resources)
and the statistical information available, we can conclude that its feasible
to integrate actions to contribute to local development. Context analysis
allowed us to recognise a manufacturing vacuum in small populations,
product of the disarticulations -of small and micro industries- in the 90s.
The focus in the province of Buenos Aires, took us to contextualise a
type of territory starred by municipalities with great potential for local
and sustainable development. And also, recognise, which are the natural,
human and institutional resources that can support the endogenous
development of these local territories.
Furthermore, understanding the roles of each of the disciplinary
dimensions we suggest to integrate, we discovered in what degree each
actor -individual and synergistically- can cooperate with implementation
activities of local development projects.
In addition, the establishment of an appropriate scale of populations
to design this type of local development strategies, together with the
analysis of the potentialities – common endogenous and differential
regional results were obtained, which allowed identifying some common
objectives for local manufacturing (Thomas, 2012).
These targets, especially considered the development of use and
consumption products for the home, based on production – of low
complexity – of furniture (wood, melamine and upholstery), meat
(especially pork) and chemical (bleach, detergent, soap), among others.
These manufactures can (re)organised perfectly in local territories,
employing more people and lowering prices (see Table 7.4).
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In addition, other distinctive potentials were identified  – according to
the analysed regions-, resulting in sectors related to tourism, cultural
industries, etc.
It is in these sectors and this kind of commodities of use and
consumption, where the greatest potential exists, and where the disciplines
of marketing, industrial design and entrepreneurship could act on behalf
of the local and productive development.
It should be noted that the protagonists and/or recipients of local
development not only benefit to getting products to more realistic prices,
but will contribute to the creation of a more balanced territory in terms
of employment opportunities, development and welfare. Therefore, this
integrated design, marketing and entrepreneurship is key to local
development in the province of Buenos Aires.
For an initial stage, local development agencies allow the organisation
of entrepreneurial actions of territory and extra-local supports, coming
from technological poles and nearest projects incubators. In this way,
although not all municipalities have PT or incubators, they can capitalise
somehow the state available resources.
Table 7.4: Examples of Contributions of Industrial
Design for each Dimension
Productive
System
Product
Packaging/
Container
Marketing
Furniture
• Materials
optimisation
• Integration of
carpentry, blacksmith
and upholstery.
• Design of wood,
melamine and
upholstered products.
• Self-assembly design.
• Reduced packaging.
• Communication and
assembly instructions.
• Modular and
personalized products.
• Strengthening of the
“buy local”.
Food
• Design of Implements
for the primary and
secondary production
in low scale.
• Design of new
products based on
consumer behaviour.
• Communication of the
quality, designation of
origin and other
qualities.
• Additional benefits for
consumption.
• Development of the
product portfolio.
• Higher quality
perceived by low
production scale and
proximity.
Chemicals
• Implements design
for fractionation at
low and medium-
level.
• Dispensers design for
specific uses.
• Design of new
packaging based on
consumer behaviour.
• Low prices.
• Quality with local
responsibility.
Pursuing Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving SDGs 139
In subsequent stages, should be established:
1. Survey of design and administration professionals
2. Presentation of local needs to the involved actors
3. Establishment of working groups for projects formulation and
4. Monitoring of the validated projects
With the purpose of improve the capabilities of local development for
the bonaerenses territories and increase the quality of life of its inhabitants,
is proposing to revalue these disciplinary fields and perform this proposal
for immediate implementation.
Certainly, it is quite convincing that its worth assign resources to a
policy of local development-based on design, marketing and
entrepreneurship – in the province of Buenos Aires.
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Endnotes
1 The Strategic Industrial Plan 20 20 (Plan Estratégico Industrial 20 20) is a plan
developed by the Ministry of Industry of Argentina. On it, eleven industrial
productive centers are selected for being developed in regional forums compounds
by: employers, workers, academics, ministries of Economy, Industry and Federal
Planning, provincial governments and municipal governments. It is an institutional
articulation between nation, provincies and municipalities, public institutions and
NGOs. It is a collective project with key guidelines for the development of industrial
sectors with perspectives until 2020.
2 Federal and Participative Agri-food and Agribusiness Strategic Plan 2010-2016
(Plan Estratégico Agroalimentario y Agroindustrial Participativo y Federal 2010-
2016) is a plan developed by the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of
Argentina, which aims to promote a shared vision for the agri-food and
agribusiness related sectors. It proposes to establish long-term policies that generate
predictable, stable rules and a collective national project through the involvement of
the different social actors and building institutional capacities.
3 The Buenos Aires Productive Strategic Plan 2020 (Plan Estratégico Productivo
Buenos Aires 2020) is a plan elaborated by the Ministry of Production, Science and
Technology of the Province of Buenos Aires. It provides the basis for develop
human resources and infrastructure, to make possible the objectives of PEI 20 20
at the provincial level; by describing and analysing the existing productive chains in
the eight sub-areas strategically defined.
4 The National Plan for Local Development and Social Economy ‘Let’s get to work’
(Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Localy Economía Social Manos a la Obra) is a public
policy promoted by the Ministry of Social Development of Argentina, to promote
social economy through technical and financial support to productive enterprises
for social inclusion that are generated within the framework of local development.
5 Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca, 2010
6 Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo y Seguridad Social, 2014
7 García-Tabuenca, Crespo-Espert, & Cuadrado-Roura, 2011; Ministerio de la
Producción, Ciencia y Tecnología, 2012
8 Narodowski, 2008; Kotsemir, Abroskin, and Meissner, 2013
9 Arocena, 2002; Rodríguez, 2006; Del Giorgio Solfa, 2012
10 Del Giorgio Solfa, 2012
11 Moalosi, Popovic, & Hickling-Hudson, 2007; Li, Su, & Huang, 2008
12 Chang, Wysk, & Wang, 2006; Aguilar-Zambrano & Hernández-Romero, 2012
13 Spadafora, Barbieri, Cajade, Bonano, & La Rocca, 2010
14 Gunes, 2012; Zappe, Hochstedt, Kisenwether, & Shartrand, 2013
15 Okudan, Ma, Chiu, & Lin, 2013
16 Arroyo, 2001; Del Giorgio Solfa & Girotto, 2009
17 Ibid
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Section II:
Competition for Inclusive
Economic Growth
Designing competition reforms in developing and least
developed countries to better contribute to inclusive
economic growth, especially by creating greater scope
for Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises (MSMEs)
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Abstract
Kenya embarked on policy reforms relating to competition law since
the early 1980s. The paper takes a ‘political economy’ perspective to assess
the policy outlook and economic choices entailed in the legal framework
of competition law in Kenya. ‘Political economy’ is defined as a discipline
within the social sciences that is concerned mainly with the nature and
causes of the wealth of the nation and its distribution to different sections
of society. Kenya, in East Africa, provides a feasible testing-ground for
the theoretical claims of different schools of thought concerned with
competition policy in particular and political economy more generally.
The paper examines the points of convergence and divergence between
the overarching national policy to foster ‘development’ on the one hand,
and the specific policy choices relating to competition law and the
institutional practice of competition authorities in Kenya on the other.
The main argument of the research is that while Kenya’s national economic
policy outlook took a turn to the right in the early 1980s, with a de-
emphasis of the role of the State to spur development, the laws and policies
to regulate competition in Kenya appear more suited to mixed-economy
environment rather than to an unfettered free-market regime. The paper
concludes that, of the countries examined, South Africa offers Kenya the
most illustrative example with regard to the design and implementation
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of a competition policy well-attuned to the broader vision of the national
economy.
The African Context of Competition Law
Political independence was attained by the majority of African countries
in the 1960s and 70s.1 The attainment of sovereignty, however, has not
led to the economic transformation of these countries. The historical period
beginning in the 1980s marks the beginning of the ascendancy of neo-
classical economics in Africa Zeleza: 1996. During the 1960s and 1970s,
State-led development was seen as the best way of promoting the economic
development of Africa.
The triumph of neo-liberalism in Africa was facilitated by the perceived
failure of Keynesianism in developed countries, the failure of
‘developmentalism’ in developing countries, and by the collapse of the
Soviet bloc2. Privatisation’ and ‘Deregulation’ became the major pursuit
by global capital in the drive to penetrate the markets of developing
countries.
African economies are disarticulated in the sense there are few forward
or backward linkages between the commodity-exports sector and other
sectors of the economy. In these respects, sub-Saharan African countries
in general are comparable with each other. African economies lack a
capital goods sector of any note and rely on imports of heavy machinery
and vehicles. Africa remains highly reliant on foreign investment,
particularly from the former colonising countries; and looks to the latter
countries as the primary source markets for external trade, tourism, loans
and foreign aid.
The structural weaknesses of the African State have been attributed
to a host of causes. Ademujobi and Olukoshi identify two major challenges
faced by African countries in general.3 First, is their overdependence on
the external world, and second is the under-exploitation of their
development potentials at the national, regional and continental levels.4
Africa’s principal challenge in the twenty-first century is how to design
and implement effective policies to promote industrialisation and economic
transformation. In the 21st century, African countries are integrated into
the world economic system mainly as importers of finished products and
exporters of primary products and raw materials.
 African countries often rely on multinational corporations (MNCs)
as agents for technological transfer and economic development5.
Technology, manufactured goods and technical know-how have, however,
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been imported at prices way above those earned from exports, creating a
situation of unequal exchange between Africa and the world market.6
Neo-liberal economic theory considers the security of property rights
to be of paramount importance for the functioning of an efficient market;
however, the efficiency of the market is said not to be dependent on the
distribution of property rights (Froneman: 2007: 216). Similarly, the
distribution of income produced by the market is not an economic concern,
but a political one (Froneman: 216). Those that argue that efficiency is
the only aim of competition policy insist that competition authorities should
intervene only when an anti-competitive practice has been committed
and is detected.7
In opposition to this view, one main argument from the literature on
‘market failure’ is that the government must establish public enterprises
to ensure that the public interest is catered for (Aseto & Okelo: 1997: 7).
Public enterprises under government control are meant to maximise social
welfare, and improve on the decisions of private enterprises when
monopoly power or externalities introduce divergence between private
and social objectives (Aseto & Okelo: 8).
For a market to function properly there must be competition and also
regulation of those monopolies that exist, whether these belong to the
public or the private sector (Nove: 1992: 48).
Biersteker provides three justifications for State intervention in markets
from a ‘political-economy’ point of view (Biersteker: 1992).
Firstly, the State could intervene to correct a market failure. The market
fails on its own when the prices of goods and services give false signals
about their real value, confounding communication between producers
and consumers (Aseto & Okelo: 1997: 7).
Secondly, the government could intervene to provide a genuine public
good. Thirdly, State intervention could be justified on the ground that it is
necessary for the State to take control of the ‘commanding heights’ of the
economy to ensure provision of a greater public good.
Antitrust laws have been applied against two types of combinations:
the first type is the so-called ‘close-knit combination’ that is formed by
trust, holding company, merger or consolidation. The second type is the
‘loose-knit combination’ which refers to (restrictive) agreements among
individual competitors to, for instance, fix prices (Stelzer: 1986: 107).
The main goals of competition policy include: (1) to promote economic
efficiency through a proper functioning of markets; (2) to ensure equity;
and, (3) to control the economic and political power of big business.
Different writers, however, disagree on which of the objectives listed
above or their combinations should be the subject of competition policy.
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Mehta, for example, appears not to lend support to the position that
‘efficiency’ should be the only goal of competition policy. He argues that
“although efficiency has been a central role of antitrust, it should not be
the only one” (Mehta: 2013: xxxii).
The drive to enact competition laws in African countries has been
taking root steadily since the mid-1980s. Competition laws passed by
many African countries have attracted the criticism that they could be
unresponsive to local needs and conditions:
Competition laws in most developing and third world countries …are
mostly fashioned after the existing legislation originating from the
European Union (EU) or the United States of America (USA). While a lot
of these pieces of legislation are often modified to suit the needs of these
developing countries, it is usually not the case that a cautious approach is
taken to ensure that imported legislation is designed to meet the specific
national challenges in Africa (Adeleke: 2011: 5).
This paper addresses the general context of competition law in Africa
from a ‘political economy’ perspective and is grounded on the economic
history of Africa between 1900 and 2015. ‘Political economy’ is a discipline
within the social sciences that is concerned with the nature and causes of
the wealth of the nation and its distribution to different sections of society.
For the classical political economists including Adam Smith, David Ricardo,
John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx, political economy was a science defined
by its subject matter, i.e. the ‘science of the economy’, and the economy
itself was treated as part of a much wider social context.
Part I of the paper outlines the social, political, and economic context
of Africa roughly between the years 1900 and 2015. Part II gives the
historical background to competition policy and law by revisiting the
emergence of the anti-trust movements in the United States of America in
the 1890s. In part III below, the basic arguments of competition theory,
which are derived from neo-classical economics, are critically examined
and the ascendancy of neo-liberal economics in Africa since the 1990s is
re-visited.
Part IV of the paper defends its case that Kenya and South Africa are
fit for a comparative examination and concludes the paper. The paper
focusses on the economic structures established during the period of
colonial (including apartheid) rule in Kenya (1895-1963) and South Africa
(1867-1994).
Two questions are posed in the paper concerning the general context
of competition law in Africa: the first question is: what are ‘the established
hierarchies’ of the national economy of Kenya and South Africa? This
question touches on the mode of integration of African countries into the
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world capitalist system in the opening decades of the 20th century. The
second question asks: ‘in whose interests does the national economy of a
given African country function’8?
Dumont submits that it impossible to conduct an action in the economic
sphere without political repercussions (Dumont: 1968: 169). He concludes
that one cannot attain ‘development’ for an African country by remaining
apolitical; such an attitude, in his view, could only be hypocritical (Dumont:
169).
The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa
The ‘commodity boom’ that held so much promise for African exports
in the world market since had already begun to fade out by the year 2011.
The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) noted in its 2013 report:
Since 2000 the continent has seen a prolonged commodity boom and
sustained growth trend. And although growth slowed from an average of
5.6 percent in 2002-2008 to 2.2 percent in 2009 – hit by the global financial
crisis and steep food and fuel price rises – Africa quickly recovered with
growth of 4.6 percent in 2010. The continent’s growth slipped again in
2011 owing to political transition in North Africa (ECA: 2013: 6).
Although Africa registered strong growth at about 5.0 percent in 2012,
in early 2016 oil prices fell to their lowest since 2004, clearly pointing to
a steady leveling off of the ‘commodity boom’ that has lasted for slightly
more than a decade.
This section locates Africa within the international political economy.
It retraces the integration of African countries as peripheries, and later as
semi-peripheries of the world capitalist system in the last decades of the
19th century (Mikell: 1989). It draws mostly from writers belonging to
the critical school in international relations (IR) discourse, especially the
work of Robert Cox and Branwen G Jones.
To develop an understanding of the world economy as an analytical
category, this research draws on the history of the rise of capitalism in
Western Europe in the fifteenth century, the development of western
capitalism throughout ‘the long 16th century’, the transformation of
capitalism from a competitive phase to a monopoly phase in the late
nineteenth century, and the spread of industrial-finance capitalism to
Africa, through the vehicle of imperialism, during the last three decades
of the 19th century.
Chanock observes that the failures of the States created by colonialism,
and their powerlessness in relation to the goals of development can be
directly linked to “the structure and workings of the world economy”
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(Chanock: 2002: 44) Zeleza categorises the contending positions on
African economic and social history between 1950 and the mid-1990s
into seven major schools of thought: (i) ‘nationalist and liberal narratives’
(ii) ‘orthodox development theory’ (iii) ‘classical Marxist theory’ (iv) ‘Raul
Prebisch (ECLA)’ (v) ‘unequal exchange’ (vi) ‘dependency theory’ and
(vii) ‘successful capitalism in the periphery’(Zeleza: 1996).
It is not possible to summarise this vast literature in this contribution.
These theories on the political economy of contemporary Africa can be
grouped simply into two: (a) theories that emphasise the ‘structural causes’
of Africa’s marginal position in the world economy on the one hand: (iv,
v, vi in the list above); and (b) theories that focus on the ‘agency’ of African
countries to attain industrialisation, on the other hand: (i, ii, iii, vii in the
list).
Competition cannot be adequately understood without appreciating
the process of accumulation and reproduction of capital in any given
‘national market’ and within the world economy.9 Capital accumulation
originates in the production of commodities which embody both use value
and exchange value (money) (Mandel: 1995: 6).
Cox describes the emergence of capitalism, its spread and the
emergence of capitalism’s ‘monopolist phase’.
Capitalist development is a process that was put together gradually
over a period of some five centuries, beginning in western Europe from
the 14th century before it became, in the nineteenth, a coherent expansive
force on a world scale. This expansive force at the mid-nineteenth century
point was in a competitive phase. From the late 19th century, capitalist
development entered a new, monopolistic phase (Cox: 1987: 51).
In capitalist societies, the State’s regulation of competition between
individual capitalists invites disputes within the dominant classes, whose
cohesion is a pre-condition for their domination over the rest of society
(Berman & Lonsdale: 1997: 79). Reproduction of capital, Marx explains,
is the unity of the process of production and the process of circulation
(Mandel: 60).
Money is the epitome of human self-alienation under capitalism, since
it reduces all human qualities to quantitative values of exchange (Giddens:
1971: 214). Due to the ever-present class-conflict in the surrounding
society, Berman and Lonsdale insist, every capitalist State must necessarily
be involved in ‘a process of abstraction’10.
In order to maintain its own legitimacy – the state must be seen to act
on behalf of the social order as a whole… the twin functions of
guaranteeing the technical and legal conditions of capital that competition
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cannot provide – monetary and tariff rules, property laws and so on – and
of maintaining the hierarchy of class domination have both been abstracted
from the economic to the political sphere within each national social
order11.
The crisis of legitimacy experienced by many African States has given
currency to the argument that the unitary structure is unsuitable to African
socio-cultural conditions. However, this leads to a more disturbing
question, should African countries and peoples do away with the whole
idea of the State? According to Mafeje, taking into consideration Africa’s
vulnerability to the forces of globalisation, it would not be in Africa’s
interests to abandon the State form, because the State is the most important
single actor in the political and economic arena in Africa (Mafeje: 2002:
78).
Beckman observes that what neo-liberal ideology wishes to prevent
from being realised with its prescriptions of ‘privatisation’ and
‘deregulation’ is the ‘economic nationalism’ of developing countries:
In an effort to deligitimise the principal ideological rival [which is]
economic nationalism- neoliberals seek to delegitimise the State, the main
locus of nationalist aspirations and resistance to the neoliberal project. In
order to undercut the claims by the State to represent the nation, its alien
nature is emphasised. Its retrogressivenss is explained in terms of
(detachment from) civil society... rent-seeking, patrimonialism and
autonomy (Beckman: 1998: 46).
The contestation between global business and developing countries
more generally has witnessed the USA acting as the leading advocate for
reform, by pushing other countries to deregulate their financial markets
(Greider: 1997: 33).
Deregulation includes the following strategies: relaxation of controls
on capital inflows and outflows, ‘flexibility’ of labour and environmental
laws, removal of interest rate controls and removal of taxes on currency-
exchange transactions. Writing in 1997, Greider noted that ‘transnational
commerce’ had “aggressively campaigned over three or four decades to
free itself from various social controls imposed by … governments”
(Greider: 33).
Global capital has also tried to penetrate developing countries’ market
through bilateral investment treaties (BITs) signed between developed
and developing countries. The profusion of BITs since the mid-1990s has
brought to the fore issues touching upon States’ sovereign decision making
authority, States’ accountability to their respective populations and the
State’s unique role as guardians of the public interest12.
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The general tenor of recent BITs is that they are primarily instruments
to constrain the sovereign power of home governments to interfere with
investor property. What is more, some constitutive agreements of the
World Trading Organisation (WTO), such the TRIPS Agreement, appear
to have been designed with the interests of global capital as their primary
theme of focus. It is submitted that the international economic and political
context that Africa encounters during the second decade of the twenty-
first century is as important as the national economy and that both contexts
should inform the choice of ‘goals’ to be served by competition law in
African countries.
Some economic historians and scholars trace the emergence of a
functioning ‘world economy’ to the late nineteenth century, (MacMillan:
1996) while others point to the 18th century, and even earlier.13 Strachey,
for example, notes that between the years 1815 and 1870, the “well-
organised, large-scale British trading corporations” of that period had an
immense bargaining power against “disorganised peasant societies even
without acquiring sovereignty over them” (Strachey: 1959: 73; Keynes:
1920).
In these circumstances, he concludes, an ‘anti-imperialist climate of
opinion’ was formed in Britain (Strachey: 72-3).  Robinson and Gallagher
describe British relations with Africa during the last 50 years of the 19th
century as conforming to their brief formulation: “informal empire where
possible, formal empire if necessary”14. Although this appealing summing
up is not entirely inappropriate, their main thesis that ‘monopoly capitalism’
did not drive the imperialist annexation of Africa in the late 19th century
remains intensely contested.15
The main thesis of the economic imperialism argument is that capitalism,
upon reaching the monopoly stage of the trusts in the last three decades
of the nineteenth century called for imperialism. The period between the
Universal Exhibition of 1851 where Britain, then the world leader in
industry exhibited the latest equipment and products to a largely pre-
industrial European and North American audience, and the year 1866, is
seen as the highest point of the liberal era (Cox: 1987: 151). The 1870s
oversaw the decline of liberal free trade policies in Europe and the rise of
a new imperialist era.
Late nineteenth century imperialism captured Africa for the world
capitalist system and transformed Africa’s pre-capitalist relations of
production to “part-economies, externally oriented to suit the dynamic
of a capitalism that had been imposed upon them from outside”
(Berman & Lonsdale: 78). Although Lenin is often grouped together with
Hobson, Hilferding, and others who argue that 1880s imperialism resulted
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from the transition of capitalism to a monopoly phase, Stokes insists that:
“[on] the vital question of chronology Lenin made it plain that the era of
monopoly finance capitalism did not coincide with the scramble for
colonies between 1870 and 1900 but came after it” (Stokes: 1969: 285).
Strachey’s book, written at the sunset stages of the British Empire in
1959, is meant to dissuade the public in Britain and United States from
running an empire. He discouraged enthusiasts of empire in the several
political parties that he claimed allegiance to throughout his long political
career from the continuation of British colonialism into the latter decades
of the twentieth century.16 Strachey wrote that the primary motives behind
British imperialism were capitalistic in nature:
[T]o turn the terms of trade in our i.e. British favour was not the
characteristic purpose of the intensified imperialism, which set in after
1870. Its main purpose was rather to secure fields of investment for the
surplus capital, which could not be so profitably invested at home, given
the existing distribution of the national income. And the successful
achievement of massive foreign investment, and of the imperialism that
went with it, immediately enriched, not the British people, but a narrow
class of investors (Strachey: 1959: 154).
Although he arrived at this conclusion, Strachey made the following
claim: “there is no evidence that Britain’s imperial possessions enabled
her to enrich herself by turning the terms of trade in her favour” (Strachey:
148).
Strachey’s observation amounts to saying that empire was not a net
gain for Britain but a balanced sum with benefits and losses oscillating
more or less equally between Britain and the colonies during the history
of imperialism.
It is to be wondered whether that actually was the case with respect
to British colonialism. Strachey defined terms of trade ‘from the British
point of view’ as: “the ratio of the prices of our imports and exports... the
terms of trade are said to have become more favourable to Britain when
the prices of the things she sells have, on the average, gone up and the
prices of the things she buys have gone down (148)”.
Even accepting Strachey’s conclusion that Britain did not benefit more
economically than the colonies which were under British tutelage
throughout the life-span of the empire, this apparently technical conclusion
would need to be counterbalanced by the observation that imperialism
need not benefit the whole British nation.
It is important to recall, as indeed Strachey himself found, that a narrow
class of capitalist ‘investors’ did derive massive economic gain from
imperialism. If then this is the case, has not imperialism done its bidding?
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It may be asked, in response to Strachey, can one genuinely claim that
the books are evenly-balanced between Britain and her African subjects
in colonial Kenya, South Africa or Zimbabwe just because the vast majority
of British citizens did not partake a share in the theft commissioned by
the Cecil Rhodes and Captain E S Grogans of imperial tradition, who
gained huge financial windfalls from brazen seizure of African lands and
commandeering of African mineral wealth?
Strachey ought to have interrogated his data more deeply than to have
adopted it in one long leap. Britain’s ‘terms of trade’ during the imperial
period need to be inspected carefully beneath the general form, or veneer,
in which international trade data is officially recorded.
Extending Strachey’s system of imperial book-keeping to the Congo
Free State, and proceeding thereupon to ask oneself how the balance fell
between Belgium and the Congo Free State during King Leopold’s reign,
leads to very interesting destinations. Imperialism was of benefit to some
actors; in particular, it benefitted individuals, mostly white men and their
progeny, and corporate entities.
Perhaps of equal importance to ‘whether monopoly capitalism led to
imperialism in the closing decades of the nineteenth century’ is the
economic effect of the colonial legacy in Africa. Magubane points out
one key difference to be observed between the development of capitalism
in Western European countries such Britain compared to the African
periphery. In his view, in the capitalist societies of Western Europe, the
working classes (ploretariat) managed to break away completely from
the subsistence economy with the onset of industrial capitalism in the
19th century.17 This was not the case in colonial Africa, Magubane insists:
In Africa, on the other hand, because of the traditional system of land
tenure and because of the extractive nature of colonial capitalism, the
integration of African peasants into the world capitalist system was
marginal. It led to impoverishment without complete proletarinisation.18
In the colonial period, Magubane emphasises, African migrant
labourers were not allowed to break away completely from the “tribal”
social environment (183). This situation was based on the rationalisation,
which assumed that African cities and towns, and commerce in these
urban areas, were for ‘whites only’(183).
Magubane’s ‘colonial capitalist mode of production’ (CCMP) concept
coheres with Basil Davidson’s characterisation of colonial capitalism as
having a ‘dual character’19.
Brett would also seem to support this position where he argues that
since the colonial government policy supported British firms in Kenya,
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Uganda and Tanzania, Africans were denied the opportunity to accumulate
capital through entrepreneurship. He concludes that colonialism laid the
foundation for Africa’s future dependence on the multinational corporation
for the capital and skills required if industrialisation was to advance:
“An alternative strategy based upon the attempt to establish small-
scale industry using technology which could be managed by members of
the indigenous population would probably have taken longer to mature,
but would not have had the negative effects so clearly visible in the present
situation.”20
Before the effects of the Second World War brought about a change in
industrial policy for the colonies, official and unofficial circles in Britain
continued to believe that primary commodity production provided the
only really viable base for colonial development (Berman: 1990: 178). Up
to the mid-1930s British firms opposed the development of competitive
manufacturing in the Empire (Berman: 178).
In 1939, it was recommended that certain industries be established in
British colonies (such as Kenya) to reduce their reliance on imports
(Nyong’o: 1992: 11). African colonialism was extractive in nature and
left behind structures, institutions and infrastructure designed to benefit
non-Africans21.
Nyong’o gives three reasons why industrialisation did not take root in
the colonies: Firstly, very few industries were established and even these
were scattered. Secondly, colonial industries were aimed at serving tiny
markets, mainly the settler communities, or else to produce certain
commodities in the colonies during the war. Thirdly, industrialisation in
the colonies did not aim to establish long-term projects that would
eventually culminate in the development of a capital goods sector (Nyong’o:
10).
Import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategies were initiated in
the 1960s and 70s and were characterised by massive public investment
and ownership of enterprises and financial institutions. This period saw a
major expansion of the State in the economy throughout the developing
world. The State influenced, regulated, planned, mediated, distributed,
and even produced goods and services (Biersteker: 200).
The basis for State intervention in Africa was necessitated by the
colonial legacy of underdevelopment. The State as the pre-eminent
institutional organisation in society was involved in the process of
accumulation and reproduction of capital.
Africa’s State system is a legacy of European colonisation; a despotic
and exploitative system of governance supposedly adapted and changed
for the better with independence (xii).
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The hallmarks of the African State include: ethno-political
fragmentation, patron-client relations between political elites and the
people, dependency, and underdevelopment. These asocial characteristics
of African States are the result of processes of political socialisation dating
from the colonial era that alienates rulers from the ruled22.
Some critics have argued that Africa’s pioneering nationalists in the
1950s should have understood that nation-states fashioned from the
structures and relationships of colonial States and thereby produced from
European and not African history were bound to be heading for trouble23.
African independence governments have had to manage divided
communities created by arbitrary colonial borders with varying success.
The independent State, Nyerere argued, had the twin tasks of
development and nation building (Nyerere: 1967). The State preceded
the nation. According to Bujra and Lando, the factors that led African
countries to embrace authoritarian single party rule and military
dictatorship in the late 1960s continue to condition African politics and
have made it difficult for African polities to cohere.
The inability of many African States to consolidate democratic
governance or even simply to create some form of stable political order
invites a range of questions. First, it might be asked, what are the reasons
for the chronic crisis of legitimacy affecting the State in Africa (Bujra &
Lando: 2010: xii)?
Secondly, what has led to the failure of formal political institutions
and the widespread exclusion of substantive groups from power in Africa
(Bujra & Lando: xii)?
In East Africa, Tanzania proved a more cohesive nation compared to
Kenya and this is usually attributed to the late Julius Nyerere’s quality of
leadership.
According to Founou-Tchigoua, the new African elites that assumed
power with the attainment of independence inherited “the crisis of the
post-colonial model that had exhausted its potential for expansion and
had consequently brought about budget and trade deficits that could not
be managed without massive foreign aid”24.
This crisis of macro-economic management was followed by the general
crisis of capitalistic expansion in the industrialised countries and the
disorganisation of the international monetary system caused by the
unilateral decision of the USA in 1971 to withdraw from the Bretton
woods institutions’ monetary system, which was based on fixed but
adjustable interest rates, and also based on the latitude given to States to
control movement of capital25.
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Private banks had free rein to lend credits to countries in the global
South, and this triggered off an international and regional financial crisis26.
Petro-dollars accumulated by international banks during the 1973 oil crisis
were off loaded to developing countries in the form of cheap loans (Shivji:
2007: 16).
Although the oil weapon strengthened the diplomatic bargaining power
of oil-rich African States such as Algeria, Libya and Nigeria in the 1970s
and enabled Angola to survive a costly civil war, it seriously disadvantaged
non-oil countries, such as Kenya, which faced increases in prices of
petroleum products and manufactured products amounting to three or
four times their pre-1973 levels27. By the end of the 1970s, cheap loans
had turned into heavy debt burdens as the limits of the early growth
experienced throughout the 1960s were reached.
Generally speaking, no African country had an economic base that
could enable it to avoid falling into the “debt trap”.28 The Cold War
helped African leaders, such as Kaunda, Mobutu, Moi, and Mugabe attract
a disproptionate share of aid, notwithstanding poor policy regimes, and
to strengthen their hold on power by playing geo-politics29.
Privatisation, Deregulation and State Intervention in Africa
(1980-2015)
Africa’s industrialisation strategies after independence were designed
to reverse the effects of the colonial legacy and thus to achieve
‘development’. Regrettably, the ISI strategies upon which Africa was to
industrialise were for the greater part externally-generated. More
importantly, some African governments lacked the managerial and
financial capacity to operate public enterprises and financial institutions30.
ISI strategies did not bear fruit in Africa, unlike in East Asia, leading to
mounting and unsustainable deficits, stagflation and debt crises in many
countries by the end of the 1970s (ECA: 2013: 8).
Per capita growth rates in GDP for all developing countries declined
from an annual average of 3.4 percent between 1965 and 1980 to 2.3
percent between 1980 and 1989 (Grindle). For sub-Saharan Africa the
average was -2.2 percent, hence the claim that the 1980s were
a ‘lost decade’ insofar as the economic growth of African countries is
concerned. In the 1980s African countries adopted structural adjustment
programmes (SAPs), which forced them to de-industrialise. The theoretical
bases of the SAPs was that the market was efficient and government
interventions inefficient.
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Consequently, long-term development planning was abandoned and
industrial policies neglected in most African countries (ECA: 8). SAPs
had a two-pronged strategy for African development. Firstly, the State
would be ‘rolled back’ from its involvement in the economy by privatising
public enterprises and confining the State to its traditional role as regulator.
Secondly, even as a regulator, the State would be bound to act within the
framework of the rule of law rather than through authoritarian commands
(Nyong’o: 2002: 25). There was a shift from development strategies that
were State-led to strategies that placed greater emphasis on market forces
to generate economic growth (Grindle: 1996).
In the 1990s, three senior International Monetary Fund (IMF) officials
gave eight requirements for the raising of the rate of private investment,
productivity and growth in Africa.31 These are (1) maintenance of a stable
macro-economic environment; (2) far-reaching improvements in
governance to avoid interference with private activity and to develop and
maintain a transparent and stable legal and regulatory environment that
reduces risks faced by domestic and foreign investors; (3) trade
liberalisation; (4) privatisation; (5) civil service reform; (6) banking reform;
(7) liberalisation of the agricultural sector; and (8) improving labour market
flexibility and competitiveness.
The argument for privatisation of publicly-owned firms finds
justification from at least two main approaches: one approach focuses on
the concept of utility maximisation behaviour of property-owners
(principals) and the managers of their property (agents). It argues that
because both the principals and agents of every enterprise wish to
maximise profit, subject to the information available to them during their
decision-making, the decisions made by the totality of firms in the market
can only result in allocative efficiency for the entire market.
The second argument for privatisation is the so-called ‘public-choice
theory’. It involves a political game between the public, politicians,
bureaucrats, and managers of public and private enterprises. Public-choice
theorists argue that each of these groups have their own distinct utility
functions which they seek to maximise; however, these groups do not
have access to identical information.
Public-choice theory argues that in democratic societies, the partial
information held by these groups and the divergent interests they pursue
will result ultimately in internal inefficiencies of publicly-owned
enterprises. Public-choice theory asserts that managers of publicly-owned
enterprises will tend to form coalitions with politicians and bureaucrats
to secure higher pay, greater power and prestige. It is claimed that such is
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not the case for private sector managers who must ensure that their firms
remain profitable to enjoy similar pay, power and prestige.
Politicians, it is claimed, may find it to their advantage to set prices of
publicly-owned enterprises at below marginal cost so that their chances
of electoral success are enhanced. Thus the economic efficiency of public
firms could be sacrificed where it does not improve the electoral prospects
of political leaders.
Bureaucrats, for their part, are claimed to be primarily interested in
increasing their departmental budgets to the largest extent possible in
order to obtain pay-offs (rent-seeking behaviour). Public-choice theorists
submit that the power and welfare of government ministers is naturally
linked to that of bureaucrats working under them, and that coalitions
between managers, politicians and bureaucrats will ordinarily result in
the internal inefficiency of public firms.
Public choice theory rests on the assumption of methodological
individualism (Nove: 43). Like neo-liberal economics, public choice theory
disregards the complexities of human motivation and their effect on quality
of performance by assuming ‘maximisation’ of personal utility or profit
(43).
The counter-theory to privatisation and deregulation can be traced to
the classical political economists including Smith and Marx but also to
20th century economists such as Baran, Keynes, and Gerchenkron. Smith
noted that public authorities have a role to “erect and maintain certain
public works and public institutions which it can never be in the interest
of any individual … to erect and maintain” (Smith: 1776).
The Origins of Competition Law: A Brief History the
Antitrust Movement in the US
From the 1890s the landscape of the ‘economic system of the West’,
as Sampson calls it, was progressively dominated by large-scale enterprises
(Sampson: 49). From the middle of the 19th century certain developments
in transport, storage and telecommunications had paved way for the
creation of a more integrated international economy (Jenkins: 1987: 4).
The latter half of the 19th century oversaw a phenomenon that some
historians describe as the ‘industrial revolution’ (Gay & Webb: 1976).
There was rapid development of railways, iron steam shipping,
refrigeration and temperature-cooling techniques, and the invention of
the telegraph (Jenkins: 1987: 4).  Importantly, the third quarter of the
19th century saw the superseding of ‘competitive’ capitalism by
‘monopoly’capitalism’ (Magubane: 1976: 176).
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In the United States, for example, what began as a highly competitive
oil industry with a large number of firms in the 1850s, came to be
dominated by Rockefeller’s Standard oil Trust during the last quarter of
the 19th century (Jenkins: 51-2).
Chandler’s historical study of the changing structure of ‘the American
industrial enterprise’ emphasises the rise of ‘new administrative needs’ in
the 1890s; resulting, in his view, from an increase in output by firms that
less twenty years before in the 1870s were concerned only with
manufacturing ( Chandler: 1962: 24).
Chandler observes that following the depression of the 1880s and early
1890s, the US economy experienced the rise of ‘the great impersonal
corporations’ which, “besides manufacturing goods, sold them directly
to retailers or even to the ultimate consumer, and purchased or even
produced their own essential materials and other supplies” (Chandler:
25).
The currently fashionable phrase ‘global value chains’, although not
invented in the 1890s, adequately captures the structural integration of
these multi-departmental enterprises, administered by full-time
professional managers rather by small family groups (Chandler  24).
The Sherman Anti-trust Act was passed in 1890; it marks the beginning
of the ‘anti-trust movement’ and had no counterpart in Europe at a similar
time (Sampson: 1975: 44).
The originator of the bill that later became the Sherman Act, Senator
John Sherman, stated that it was motivated by a need to “declare unlawful,
trusts and combinations in restraint of trade and production” (Sampson:
44).
The Sherman Act was specifically designed to break-up the monopoly
of Standard Oil of New Jersey which had dominated the oil industry in
the USA for more than thirty years, as Sampson explains:
The anti-trust movement … was supported not only by the theory of
free enterprise but also by a faith in the power of the individual against
organisations. The trust-busters saw themselves as defending the very
core of democracy… (T)hey would turn on the oil companies as the
symbols of everything that was sinister and secretive in modern industrial
society (Sampson: 49).
The Sherman Act “was the first major counter-attack by the US federal
government against corporate monopoly” represented by the large-scale
trusts (Sampson: 50). The court in Standard Oil Company of New Jersey
v. United States  clarified that what the Sherman Act was meant to break
was the unification of power and control not as a result of normal methods
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of industrial development, but by new means of combination which were
resorted to … with the purpose of excluding others from the trade and
thus centralising in the combination a perpetual control of the movements
of … products in the channels of interstate commerce32.
In United States v United States Steel Corporation (1920),33 the
question whether the “mere size” of a corporation could be considered
as violating the objects of the Sherman Act was considered by the court.
Both the majority decision and the dissenting opinion in United States
Steel were in agreement that the mere power or size of a corporation
itself did not offend the Sherman Act. The dissent by Justice Day captures
the intent of the Sherman Act on the question:
The (Sherman Act) was framed in the belief that attempted or
accomplished monopolisation, or combinations, which suppress free
competition, were hurtful to the public interest, and that a restoration of
competitive conditions would benefit the public (Stelzer: 19).
One basic difference between EU and USA competition policy can be
noted: in the USA dominant firms might defend their anti-competitive
conduct on grounds that such conduct did not result in any harm to
consumers. American courts have tended to concentrate on conduct whose
effect directly restrains output or increases price, to the immediate
detriment of consumers, and to disregard as not constituting anti-
competitive conduct those practices that do not directly cause such effect.
In the EU, on the other hand, the protection of competition as an
institution is regarded as a principal objective of competition law. This
being the case, anti-competitive conduct could not be excused in the EU
on the reasoning that consumer welfare was not thereby harmed. There
is a tendency in the EU to protect the structure of competition in the
market rather than protect against losses to consumer welfare in the short-
term (Soames:20).
In the EU, a competitive market is theorised to have long-run benefits.
The basic assumption in the EU’s approach seems to be that harm to the
competitive process will indirectly cause anti-competitive harm. In
comparison to US courts, the European Commission (EC) has been more
willing to assume harm based on potential adverse effects to the
competitive process34.
With such fundamental differences in approach between the EU and
the USA on how to ensure markets remain competitive, developing
countries cannot be expected to adopt either the USA or the EU
competition law frameworks without self-examination.
It bears emphasis that there is no universally-accepted definition of
‘anti-competitive conduct’. According to Sutherland, anti-competitive
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conduct is merely that which a particular community regards as
undesirable conduct in the context of commercial competition35.
Kenya’s national economic policy outlook took a turn to the right in
the 1980s, with a de-emphasis of the role of the State to spur development.
Kenya introduced Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the early
1980s36.
The Competition Act of Kenya (2010) provides among its objectives
to “increase efficiency in the production, distribution and supply of goods
and services” as well as the “promotion of innovation, the protection of
consumers and enhancement of regional integration”37.
“Equity” is not listed as one of the goals to be pursued by competition
institutions under the Competition Act of Kenya. This could well turn
out to be a significant omission for a country with a long history of racial
exclusion from economic opportunity (1895-1963) and a post-
independence experience (1963-2015) of ethnic polarisation and conflict
grounded primarily on issue of distribution of public resources, especially
land (Kibwana: 1996).
Major Assumptions of Competition Theory: The
Concept of ‘Efficiency’
Neo-classical economists argue that under conditions of perfect
competition, there is both ‘allocative efficiency’ and ‘productive efficiency’.
Productive efficiency, as understood by neo-classical theorists of perfect
competition, argues that goods and services will be produced at the lowest
cost possible in a perfectly competitive market; and that this will result in
a saving on the society’s expenditure incurred in the process of production.
According to neo-classical economic theory, consumer welfare is
maximised in conditions of perfect competition. According to this
argument, nation-states should not interfere with the ‘good of mankind’
(Smith: 1776). Allocative efficiency means that in a perfectly competitive
market, economic resources are allocated between the different goods
and services produced in precisely the quantities which consumers wish.
Secondly, it means that the wishes of consumers can be discovered from
the price that consumers are prepared to pay on the market.
Neo-classical economic theory stands accused of making several
“unworldly assumptions” about the nature and characteristics of
markets38. Classical economics assumes that market mechanisms will
operate in order to develop a rational international division of labour,
which will optimise the world’s productive resources (Swainson: 1980:
2).
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What perfect competition means is that on any particular market there
is a very large number of buyers and sellers, all producing identical (or
homogeneous) products; consumers have perfect information about
market conditions; resources can freely flow from one area of economic
activity to another; and there are no impediments (or barriers to entry)
which can prevent the emergence of new competition39.
Working from the basic presupposition of perfect competition, neo-
classical economics derives its theory of general equilibrium which argues
that all factors of production receive an income equal to their marginal
product. General equilibrium theory argues that a producer will keep on
producing and only stop at the point where the cost of producing a further
unit (the marginal cost) exceeds the price he would obtain for it (the
marginal revenue)40.
The trend towards concentration and centralisation of production, and
monopoly profits, has brought to question the whole scheme of capitalist
markets operating on the basis of competition between numerous firms
producing identical products. Neo-classical economics does not address
the problem of monopoly as a growing factor in the modern economy: on
the contrary, it assumes there are many producers of homogenous products
competing on the basis of price in the market at all times.
Baran and Sweezy demonstrated that by the year 1966, if there was
any competition in the US economy it was between oligopolistic
corporations41. However, the economic theory taught in US universities
and business schools continued to stress that competition was the basic
condition of the US market and of all markets in general.
Baran’s other concern was that, by 1956, the unproductive sector of
the US economy (represented by luxury consumers, unproductive
‘industries’ like advertising and finance, and government) had become
‘well larger’ than the productive sector42. This pointed to a ‘crucial
contradiction’ of the economic system of the USA.
In Baran’s view, the system’s resources were not directed “in the line
of welfare, abolition of exploitation, [and] freeing civilization from the
wealth fetishisation” but towards the “progressive degradation of
civilisation”43. For Baran, the defining marks of the monopoly-capitalist
order are ‘waste’ and ‘irrationality’44. For example, with respect to the
automobile (motor-car) industry in the US, Baran and Sweezy argued that
more than 25 percent of the purchase price in the period between 1950
and 1956 was accounted for by unnecessary model changes.45
Another weakness of neo-classical economics is that does not unravel
the operations of the economy (in the sense that Adam Smith or Marx
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understood the nature of their work) but is content with unjustified
abstraction from real conditions in different countries in the world
economy. In the 21st century, “economists are more liable to be recruited
at higher levels from science and mathematics rather than from the
classical social science disciplines”46. This situation is attributable to the
deference accorded to “mathematics and statistics as opposed to more
general knowledge of the economy and the method and critique of the
social sciences” within the economics profession47.
Since perfect competition is usually unattainable and monopolies are a
common feature in the real world, some writers have argued for a more
run of the mill theory of ‘workable competition’. They submit that
competition law that recognises these hard truths of the market ought to
be based on four main objectives:
The first thing is that it will have to prevent agreements between
individual firms which have the effect of restricting competition between
them. Secondly, it will need to deal with attempts by monopolists or
dominant firms to abuse their position and prevent new competition from
emerging. Thirdly, it will need to ensure that workable competition is
maintained in oligopolistic industries. Fourthly, it will need to monitor
mergers between independent firms whose effect will be to concentrate
the market and diminish the competitive pressures within it48.
Such a design for competition law recognises that price competition,
which is usually presented as an inviolable condition of capitalism, no
longer dominates capitalist markets49. Under conditions of monopoly,
the monopolist is in a position to affect the market price of his products
by reducing the volume of his own production.
A dominant firm may realise that if it earns large supra-competitive
profits it will attract new competition and instead may settle for a quiet,
uncompetitive life by selling at a depressed price which is sufficiently low
to discourage other firms from entering the market50. Foster concludes
that it is necessary for neo-classical economic theory to deny the reality
of monopoly in order for the theory to preserve itself51.
Kenya and South Africa: The Case for a Comparative
Examination
Kenya and South Africa (RSA) share a broadly similar colonial history.
Both Kenya and RSA were brought under British sovereignty in the late
nineteenth century. 52 The State-sector was already well-established and
was a major factor in the economy of Kenya and RSA at the end of white
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minority rule in 1963 and 1994 respectively. RSA is usually seen as an
exceptional case in Africa; while, further up north in East Africa, Kenya
is seen as a regional exception.
Among the earliest settlers invited to Kenya to ‘open up’ the colony by
Sir Charles Eliot, commissioner of the East African protectorate until
1904, were many South Africans. The settlers believed in the superiority
of ‘European civilisation’ over the African way of life “… in some kind of
vaguely conceived absolute sense, which was thought to have both moral
and intellectual dimensions” (Leo: 34).
The settlers not only took their primacy for granted, but also seemed
to lack any great concern for minimising the harmful effects of European
settlement upon Africans. On the contrary, it was the effect of the African
presence upon Europeans that was viewed with alarm (Leo: 35).
The 1902 Crown Lands Ordinance gave the commissioner power to
sell or lease land to settlers. Sir Charles Eliot thought that Kenya would
make a good white man’s country (Olivier: 1927: 63). The colonial
government introduced in 1902 a hut tax whose chief purpose was to
compel Africans to work on farms the government had allocated to British
settlers (Leo: 34).
The 1918 Resident Labourers’ Act compelled the African ‘squatter’
to work for 180 days in a year for European landowners. By the mid-
1920s more than half of all able bodied men in two of the largest ethnic
communities in Kenya (the Kikuyu and Luo) were estimated to be working
for Europeans (Leys; 1974: 31). Within the space of a generation they
had effectively been converted from independent peasants, producing cash
crops for the new markets, into peasants dependent on agricultural wage-
labour (Leys: 31).
In 1960, Europeans controlled 7mn acres of land, which comprised
about 50 percent of Kenya’s arable land and 20 percent of the country’s
highly productive areas. In addition, 61,000 Europeans accounted for
about 40 percent of the total wage bill in a country with 169,000 Asians
and 7.8 million Africans (Ochieng’: 1992). In 1960, about 4,000 European
farms accounted for 83 percent of the total agricultural exports of the
country (Ochieng’: 176).
The negotiations held in Lancaster between 1960 and 1963 between
the departing British administration and the incoming Africa regime of
Kenya resulted in a constitutional bargain that would be mirrored thirty
years later in the talks between the African National Congress (ANC)
and the National Party in RSA. Kenya opted for the capitalist path at
independence in a seminal economic policy document53.
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The independence constitution of Kenya contained in Clause Six (6) a
property rights clause that obliged the incoming African government to
pay for settler farms. The compensation to settlers, as set out in the
constitution, had to be paid in cash and not by bond: nationalist leaders,
such as Oginga Odinga, the first vice-president of independent Kenya,
viewed this as a drain on modest national resources (Odinga: 1967: 259).
The fundamental agreement of the negotiators in both cases was that
disruptive changes to the economy at the end of white minority rule were
to be avoided at all costs. The watch-words of the transition from colonial
and apartheid rule to black majority rule in Kenya and RSA were:
‘reconciliation’ and ‘stability’. Redistribution of wealth to the majority, a
fundamental objective fuelling the liberation struggles in Kenya and RSA
respectively, was subordinated to the objective to maintain ‘stability’ of
the existing economic structures.
 Thus the constitutional bargain to usher in the independence of Kenya
in 1963 would serve as a template for the South African settlement to end
apartheid between 1990 and 1994. The charge that the African elites that
assumed power in Kenya in 1963 and in South Africa in 1994 accepted a
‘sell-out’ deal from the Europeans has spawned a political movement in
South Africa that is committed to reverse the basis of that settlement.54
The Mandela-Mbeki administration is accused of ‘privileging the political
struggle over the economic struggle’ (Marais: 2001), resulting in a lop-
sided settlement with De Klerk’s Nationalist Party.
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission noted in its final
report that ‘violence’ was the most ‘consistent’ feature in that country’s
history. Before the discovery of South Africa’s wealth in gold and diamonds
during the 1870s, Britain held only a few pockets of commercial and
agricultural capitalism along South Africa’s coastline. Those regions had
been put under British sovereignty at the end of the Napoleonic wars in
1815.
 The disintegration of the independent African peasantry in South Africa
followed the establishment of a highly centralised mining industry in the
country which needed a steady supply of cheap, unskilled labour.
 The dismantled African peasantry would become the chief source of
cheap labour, while a range of measures would be applied to guarantee
and regulate the supply of labour. Administrative measures were introduced
to establish and police a racial division of labour separating skilled
European labour from unskilled African labour. The basis of British
colonialism in South Africa during the final decades of the nineteenth
century is summarised by Strachey in a revealing paragraph:
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The question of who should use [African] labour and benefit from the
surpluses which it produced, the British in mining or the Boers in farming,
could, it turned out, only be decided by war [Anglo-Boer war (1899-
1901)]. That this was in truth the issue is well commemorated by the
terminology in use to this day [1959] in the City of London in regard to
the matter. The City has always been, and still is, in the coining of its
slang at least, delightfully frank.
How apt it is that South African gold-mining shares are known as
‘Kaffirs’! Thus in a single word the underlying fact is revealed that what
is really being exploited in South Africa is not only the gold of the Rand
nor the diamonds of Kimberley, but the exceptionally cheap labour of the
Africans, or Kaffirs, conveniently embodied in the mined gold or diamonds
(Strachey: 1959: 92).
Some observers described apartheid as ‘colonialism of a special type’55.
Other writers saw in South Africa the development of a ‘Two-Nation
society’ between the years 1900 and 1990. South Africa’s ‘Two-Nation
society’ was characterised by the phenomenon of the State subsidising
the privilege of a ‘racially defined minority [with] the trappings of a social
welfare state’ (Marais: 2001).
Lipton is a good representative of the ‘liberal’ viewpoint in South African
historiography. Her survey of the growth of settler capitalism in South
Africa reveals that Apartheid was a socially adaptive process. Lipton’s
account of the evolution of apartheid in South Africa from 1910 to 1970
is that although apartheid played a crucial role in shaping ... socio-economic
patterns; its effect was not to make [RSA] a uniquely different society,
but to shift the incidence of poverty onto blacks. This exacerbated many
of the social evils and denied blacks the chance to escape from them
which equality of opportunity, and various stages of the life-cycle, usually
allows to at least some of the poor56.
This view assumed that capitalism was ‘non-astrictive’ or ‘colour-blind’:
the industrial development of South Africa would lead, liberals argued, to
the dismantlement of apartheid. The liberals argued that because apartheid
could not be defeated politically, it had to be made unworkable
economically until it collapsed. During the 1980s, apartheid was theorised
as a peculiarly Afrikaner creation, since European countries had folded
up their empires in Africa and Asia in the 1950s, 60s and 70s (Thompson:
1992).
The radical viewpoint in South African historiography, on the other
hand, views apartheid as a complement to the capitalist system of South
Africa from the inauguration of the Union of South Africa 1910 through
Apartheid in 1948 up to the early 1990s. Representing the radical
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standpoint, Ben Magubane saw apartheid “not as the result of a
psychological aberration that one must deem irrational, but rather as a
thoroughly rational arrangement supporting South Africa’s” white,
hegemonic capitalism57.
Legum and Margaret pointed out that apartheid appeared to contradict
a central argument of Marxist theory, which holds that those who control
the key means of production, distribution and exchange would control
the political machinery of their own society. In 1963, English-speaking
South Africans controlled 99 percent of mining capital, 94 percent of
industrial capital, 88 percent of finance capital and 75 percent of
commercial capital58.
Despite this massive capital outlay in the hands of South Africans of
British origin, the country was ruled by the Afrikaner section of ‘white
South Africa’ between 1948 and 1990. The radicals’ response to this
observation was that apartheid represented the ascendancy of white
hegemonic capitalism in general, rather than a section of South Africa’s
European community. In the radicals’ view, “apartheid was designed to
secure labour for all capitals, not to deprive any employer of it” (Marais:
2001).
Amin summarises the debate around the relationship between
capitalism and apartheid in a lucid paragraph:
South African capitalists developed … a project aimed at moving up in
the global system by means of an industrialisation process that would be
firmly protected and supported by the state. The apartheid system was
perfectly rational in that context. Cheap productive labour does not
necessarily create a problem of reeling surplus value when the demand
can be stimulated by raising the incomes of the ruling minority and by
expanding some exports. The claim that there existed a fundamental
conflict between apartheid and capitalism misunderstood what was at
stake (Amin: 2001: viii).
Mamdani seems to occupy his own ground somewhere between liberal
and radical historiography (Mamdani: 1996). Mamdani views apartheid
as ‘late colonialism’, .i.e. basically a continuation of the British colonial
policy of the 1920s. The 1922 Stallard Commission appointed by the British
colonial administration in South Africa laid down the principle that an
African should only be in the towns to “minister to the needs of the white
man and should depart therefrom when he ceases to minister”. The
‘civilised labour policy’, introduced in 1924, reserved unskilled labour
for Africans and placed African wages at about 10 percent of wages earned
by whites (Olivier: 1927).
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The ANC has been in existence since 1912. Between 1990 and 1994,
the ANC claimed that upon assuming power it would establish a
‘developmental State’ and ‘lead, co-ordinate and plan’ an economic strategy
aimed at: (i) job creation, and; (ii) redistributing resources to the poor.
However, in the negotiations leading to the 1994 constitution, the ANC
agreed to a clause in the constitution that would guarantee the Reserve
Bank of RSA independence. The result of this accommodation by the
ANC to the interests of capital was to effectively remove monetary policy
from democratic oversight and accountability.
The ANC’s economic policy during the Mandela presidency (1994-
1999) and his successor Thabo Mbeki (1999-2008) was contained in two
documents: the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and
the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). Despite their
redistributive rhetoric, both the RDP and GEAR were compatible with
three objects favoured by financial capital, i.e.: (i) privatisation; (ii)
liberalisation and (iii) convertibility. The RDP advocated for strict limits
on State spending, while GEAR went even further to view government
spending as an impediment to economic growth.
GEAR prescribed fiscal austerity and aimed to reduce the public sector
debt which stood at 56 percent of GDP in 1996 to 3 percent of GDP by
the year 2000. GEAR strategy placed the duty of economic salvation on
the private sector through private investment and privatisation. However,
GEAR provided no detailed linkage between its macroeconomic linkages
and industrial policy. The neo-corporatist vision to ‘lead, co-ordinate and
plan’ a redistributive economic policy became frozen inside the ANC.
The RDP and GEAR policies showed a desire to distribute economic
benefits widely across society without, however, raising the anxiety of
capital-owners. The penetration of RSA financial markets by foreign capital
was encouraged by the ANC, as was the migration of local capital overseas.
The strategy of Black Economic Empowerment was introduced by the
ANC and quickly became prominent in government tendering and
procurement processes as well as in privatisation drives.
Marais argues that South Africa’s economy is marked by three main
features, two of which are endemic to most middle-income developing
countries. Firstly, South Africa’s economy is heavily reliant on commodity
exports for foreign exchange. Secondly, South Africa’s industrial sector
appears to have been arrested in the semi-industrialised phase (Marais:
2001: 105).
The third feature and which could lend some credence to the claim of
South African exceptionalism is that the country has well-developed
transport, information and communications systems. Marais, however,
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contends that South Africa’s systems of communication and transport
are ‘inefficient’, although those systems may be likened to those found in
First World countries in terms of ‘sophistication’.
Marais lists four conditions affecting South African industry that are
also shared by a majority of African countries: low productivity, limited
skills base, ageing plants, and a dependency on imports of capital goods.
The general conclusion is that South Africa’s integration into the world
economy throughout the 20th century rested on three pillars: as a primary
product (mainly minerals) exporter, an importer of capital goods and
technology, and a net recipient of indirect portfolio investment and direct
foreign investment by multinational corporations (Marais: 106). Marais
is dismissive of the viewpoint that South Africa is an exception on the
continent in terms of economic structure, calling it a “revisionist fantasy
lacking supportive evidence”(Marais: 105).
Leys in his 1974 work on underdevelopment in Kenya argued that the
country lacked an indigenous bourgeoisie that could catalyse industrial
transformation (Leys: 1975). Leys early work was located within the
‘dependency tradition’ and pictured the African elite that had ascended
to power at independence as a ‘comprador regime’ that sought alliances
with foreign capital, rather than devising ways to replace international
capital on the local scene.
Leys’ revised (1978) thesis was more ambivalent as to the soundness
of the main arguments of dependency theory. Swainson, in her 1980 survey
of multinational corporations operating in Kenya, was even more optimistic
than Leys of the possibilities of Kenya launching itself along the path to
industrialization (Swainson: 1980).
Swainson traced the development of an indigenous (i.e. African/black)
capitalist class in Kenya to the colonial era. She argued that this class did
not lack the capacity to usher in industrial transformation in Kenya, along
the lines of the English bourgeoisie in the 19th century. Swainson located
this class of African capitalists in the State sector.
According to Leo, Kenyan capitalism seemed such a success that by
the mid-1980’s even Marxist writers “did not take a non-capitalist
development route seriously as an alternative for Kenya”59. By the early
1990s, however, matters had turned sour for Kenyan industrialisation.
Coughlin argued that many forces conducive to rapid industrialisation in
Kenya during the 1960s and 1970s sought to hinder it in the 1980s and
90s60.
He gave the example of multinationals and local industrialists who
lobbied against tariff reforms that would help new industries to make
intermediate inputs locally. Coughlin grouped together “merchants,
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monopolists, and politicians” in Kenya who became ‘allies’ for the “quick
kill” while also killing jobs and a whole range of industries that could
have manufactured products like ‘screwdrivers, cutlery, pencils, ceramics
and sisal bags (Coughlin: 1992)’.
Despite the shared historical ties and trajectories of colonialism and
anti-colonialism, not many parallels have been drawn between the political
economy of Kenya and RSA.61 The colonial State in Kenya and RSA
operated an economic system where the European settler minority enjoyed
a monopoly in several departments including: (i) a monopoly over fertile
land and the production of cash-crops like coffee and cotton; (iii) a
monopoly in banking and marketing services; and (iii) job reservation
where unskilled menial work was reserved for Africans.
Colonial marketing and processing facilities relied on the importation
of capital-intensive technology managed by expatriates and controlled
from abroad (Brett: 1974). Railway line branches were located in European
farming areas. The colonial system of taxation discriminated against the
African majority by levying hut and poll taxes on Africans exclusively.
Despite contributing the largest amount in the tax collected by the
colonial administration, Africans received only modest investments in
expenditure for health, education and housing. This is the general context
within which competition policy and law must be anchored. A narrow
focus on efficiency might not in the best interests of African countries.
174 Pursuing Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving SDGs
Endnotes
1 Birmigham: 1993; Boahen: 1985
2 Saad-Filho: 2003: 11
3 Ademujobi & Olukoshi: 2009: 4.
4 Ademujobi & Olukoshi: 4.
5 Gachuki & Coughlin: 1988: 91
6 Nyong’o: 2002: 22; Amin: 2014
7 Mehta: xxviii. See part III in this paper explaining ‘productive efficiency’ and
‘allocative efficiency’.
8 The framing of these two questions is adapted from John Saul who poses the same
questions in reference to the “labour aristocracy debate” in the African setting. For
a summary of the ‘labour aristocracy debate’ in Africa see Foster: 2014; Zeleza:
1996.
9 According to Marx, “primitive accumulation” is that process which is not the
result of industrial capitalist activity but its “pre-condition”, Tucker: 1972. Rosa
Luxembourg, in contrast to Marx and some Marxist writers like Mandel, does not
freeze “primitive accumulation” to the historical period (pre-1850) before the
emergence modern industrial capitalism. Luxembourg insists that modern
industrial capitalism must engage in foreign conquests and imperialist wars (i.e.,
primitive accumulation) if the system itself is to continue to exist.
10 Berman & Lonsdale: 79
11 Ibid
12 Hollis: 2002: 235. See also Horn “[E]very approach to provide legal or non-legal
protection of foreign investment has to deal with the problem of inequality of the
parties involved, i.e. the sovereign host state on one hand, and, on the other, the
foreign private investor, typically a foreign company or a domestic company
controlled by foreign investors” 7
13 Braudel: 1976; Robinson: 1983; Buck-Morss: 2009
14 Robinson & Gallagher: 1953; Wright: 1976
15 The Robinson-Gallagher thesis is presented as a counter-narrative to the Marxist
theory of imperialism (especially the version of Lenin: 1939), see Wright: 145.
16 Importantly, Strachey served in the British cabinet as the Minister for War during
the Second World War.
17 Gutkind & Wallerstein: 1976: 182
18 Gutkind & Wallerstein: 182
19 Davidson: 1966: 202-3
20 Brett: 1974. It would appear that by the phrase “the negative effects so clearly
visible in the present situation” Brett is referring to Africa’s general condition of
‘underdevelopment’.
21 ECA: 2013: 6; Rodney: 1972; Swainson: 1980; Leys: 1975; Nyong’o: 1992.
22 Abdalla Bujra and Samuel Lando ‘Introduction’ xiv.
23 Davidson:1992: 197
Pursuing Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving SDGs 175
24 Founou-Tchigoua: 2002: 155
25 Founou-Tchigoua: 155
26 Ibid
27 Tordoff: 2002: 14; Morten: 2011
28 Founou-Tchigoua: 155
29 Gray & McPherson: (2001):731
30 Coughlin & Ikiara: 1992
31 Fischer, Hernandez-Cata & Khan: 1998
32 221 US 1 (1911); Stelzer: (1986) 5
33 251 US 417 (1920); Stelzer: 10-19
34 This was the position of the European Court of Justice in British Airways v
Commission of the European Communities (First  Chamber Case T-219/99);
Adeleke: 48.
35 Sutherland: 2000: 7.
36 The sort of “mixed-economy” preferred by Kenya’s founding President Jomo
Kenyatta, and his cabinet minister in charge of economic affairs Tom J Mboya, was
an economy that was “predominantly driven by the private sector, but with ample
room for producer cooperatives, state-operated enterprises, and small holder
production for the market” see Chege: 2007.
37 Section 3 of the Competition Act of Kenya 2010, compare with Section 8 (c) and
(d) of the Competition Act of South Africa 1998.
38 Foster: 2014: 55
39 Whish:1985: 2
40 See Introduction: The theory of competition; Whish: 1985: 2
41 Baran & Sweezy: 1966
42 Foster: 2014: xvii
43 Foster: xviii
44 Foster: 40-1
45 Foster: 40
46 Milonakis & Fine: 2009: 15
47 Milonakis & Fine: 15
48 Whish “Introduction” 11
49 Foster: 2014: xiii
50 Whish ‘Introduction’ 7
51 See ‘Chapter 3 – Free Competition and Monopoly Capital’ Foster: 2014: 51-73.
52 Marais: 2001, dismisses the view that South Africa is an exception on the African
continent. The argument for ‘Kenyan exceptionalism’ can be gleaned from
Swainson: 1980. In contrast, Barkan: 1995 does not argue for a Kenyan
exceptionalism. For a recent summary of the debate around ‘Kenyan
exceptionalism’ and whose conclusion is that Kenya’s growth in the 1960s and
‘70s was closely paralleled on the continent see Morten: 2011: 2-23.
176 Pursuing Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving SDGs
53 The full title of the 1965 publication by the government of Kenya is “African
Socialism and its relation to planning in Kenya”.
54 The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), a political party that came third in the
most recent elections in South Africa, and led by the erstwhile leaders of the ANC
Youth League, has publicly expressed its aim to implement the Freedom Charter’s
prescriptions on “nationalization of monopoly industries”, Bond: 2014; Odinga:
1967; New African.
55 The South African Communist Party (SACP) adopted the theory of “Colonialism
of a Special type’ in a 1962 document called The Road of South African Freedom:
Programme of the South African Communist Party.
56 Lipton: 1985: 18
57 Berger & Godsell: 1988: 287
58 Legum & Margaret: 1964: 108
59 Leo: 1984: 8. Leo considers that only a marginal group comprised of the “more
ethereal [,] literary and philosophical Marxists” would probably go against the
grain of “Marxists and non-Marxists [who] are as one in their acceptance of a
capitalist development path for Kenya” 9.
60 See Coughlin & Ikiara: 1992.
61 Olivier: 1927; Leo: 1984; Leys: 1975; Okoth-Ogendo: 1991; Mandela: 1993.  In
his autobiography Nelson Mandela writes that he was inspired in his militancy
during the 1950s and ‘60s by the ‘Mau Mau’ movement based in the central
highlands of Kenya and the movement’s leader Dedan Kimathi.
Pursuing Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving SDGs 177
References
A. Amsden “A Theory of Government intervention in Late Industrialisation” in L
Putterman and D Rueschemeyer (eds.) State and Market in Development (1992) 53.
A Boahen African Perspectives on Colonialism (1985).
A Bujra and S Lando ‘Introduction’ in A Bujra (ed.) Political Culture, Governance, and
the State in Africa (2010).
A. Hoogvelt Globalisation and the Postcolonial World (1997).
A Nove “Some Thoughts on Plan and Market” in L Putterman and D. Rueschemeyer
(eds.) State and Market in Development (1992) 39.
A P Nyong’o “Unity or poverty: the dilemmas of progress in Africa since
independence” in A. Nyong’o, A. Ghirmazion and D. Lamba (eds.) New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD): A New Path? (2002) 19.
A. Mafeje “Democratic governance and new democracy in Africa: Agenda for the
Future” A Nyong’o, A Ghirmazion and D Lamba (eds.) New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD): A New Path? (2002) 72.
A. Saad-Filho Anti-Capitalism – A Marxist Introduction (2003).
A. Smith An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776).
A. Thomson An Introduction to African Politics (2007).
B Berman and J. Lonsdale Unhappy Valley (1997).
B Davidson The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State (1992);
“The Outlook for Africa” The Socialist Register (1966).
B. Jones “Africa and the Poverty of International Relations” 26 Third World Quarterly
(2005) 987.
B Magubane “The Evolution of the Class Structure in Africa” in P. Gutkind and I.
Wallerstein The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa (1976) 176; “Whose
memory whose history? The illusions of liberal and radical historical debates” in Stolten
(ed.) History Making and Present-day Politics in South Africa (2007) 251.
C Gray and M. McPherson “The Leadership factor in African Policy Reform and
Growth” (1998) Economic Development and Cultural Change vol. 49, no. 4.
C Legum and M Legum South Africa: Crisis for the West (1964).
C Leo Land and Class in Kenya (1984).
C Leys Under-development in Kenya (1974); The Rise and Fall of Development Theory
(1996).
178 Pursuing Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving SDGs
C McMilan “Shifting Technological Paradigms From the US to Japan” in R. Boyer and
D Drache (eds.) States against Markets (1996) 116.
C J Robinson Black Marxism (1983).
D Birmingham The decolonization of Africa (1995).
D Chanock “Human Rights and Cultural Branding: Who Speaks and How” in An-
Na’im (ed.) Cultural Transformation and Human Rights in Africa (2002).
D Comaroff and J Comaroff (eds.) Law and Disorder in the Postcolony (2006).
D  Gachuki and P Coughlin “Structure and Safeguards for Negotiations with Foreign
Investors: Lessons from Kenya” in P Coughlin and G. Ikiara (eds.) Industrialization in
Kenya (1992) 91.
D Milonakis and B Fine From Political Economy to Economics (2009).
D Sayer Capitalism and Modernity (1991).
E  Brett Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa (1974).
E Mandel Marxist Economic Theory II (1970); Long Waves of Capitalist Development
(1995).
E  Stolten (ed.) History Making and Present-day Politics in South Africa (2007).
E Tucker (ed.) The Marx-Engels Reader (1972).
F Tchigoua “NEPAD or the challenge of catching up” in A. Nyong’o, A.  Ghirmazion
and D Lamba (eds.) New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD): A New Path?
(2002) 141.
G Hyden No shortcuts to Progress (1983).
G Mikell Cocoa and Chaos in Ghana (1989).
H Braverman Labour and Monopoly Capitalism (1974).
H Marais Limits to Change (2001).
H WO Okoth-Ogendo Tenants of the Crown (1991).
I Shivji Silences in NGO discourse (2007)
I Stelzer (ed.) Selected Anti-trust Cases (1986).
I Wallerstein The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the
European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century (1974); The Modern World
System (1979).
J B Foster The Theory of Monopoly Capitalism (2014).
Pursuing Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving SDGs 179
J D Barkan Beyond Capitalism Vs Socialism in Kenya and Tanzania (1994).
J M Keynes The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1920); General Theory of
Employment, Interest and Money (1936).
J Hobson, “Imperialism: A Study” in H. Wright (ed.) The “New Imperialism” (1976).
J K Nyerere Freedom and Unity: A Selection from Writings and Speeches (1967).
J Strachey The End of Empire (1959).
L Olivier The Anatomy of African Misery (1927).
M Grindle Challenging the State (1996).
M Lipton Capitalism and Apartheid (1985).
M Mamdani Citizen and Subject - South Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism
(1996).
N Mandela Long Walk to Freedom (1993); Conversations with Myself (2009).
N Swainson The Development of Corporate Capitalism in Kenya 1910-1977 (1980).
O Aseto and J. Okelo Privatization in Kenya (1997).
P Baran and P. Sweezy Monopoly Capitalism (1970).
P Berger and L. Godsell A Future South Africa (1988).
P Bond Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation (2006).
P Coughlin “Economies of scale, capacity utilisation and import substitution: a focus
on dies, moulds and patterns” in P. Coughlin and G. Ikiara (eds.) Industrialization in
Kenya (1992).
P Gay and R K Webb Modern Europe since 1815 (1973).
P Gutkind and I Wallerstein The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa (1976).
P Mehta and T Stewart Should Competition Policy and Law be Blind to Equity? The
Great Debate (2013).
P Zeleza Manufacturing African Studies and Crises (1996).
R Boyer and D. Drache (eds.) States against Markets (1996).
R Jenkins Transnational Corporations and Uneven Development (1987).
R. W Cox Production Power and World Order (1987).
R Whish Competition Law (1985).
180 Pursuing Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving SDGs
S Ademujobi and A Olukoshi The African Union and New Strategies for Develeopment
in Africa (2009).
S Amin “Understanding the political economy of contemporary Africa” (2014) Africa
Development, Volume XXXIX, No. 1, 2014, pp. 15-36; ‘Preface’in H. Marais Limits to
Change (2001); Imperialism and Unequal Development (1977); Unequal Exchange
(1976).
S  Buck-Morss Hegel, Haiti and Universal History (2009).
S Fischer, E. Hernandez-Cata & M. Khan “Africa: Is this the Turning Point?” IMF
papers on Policy Analysis and Assessment (1998).
T Biersteker “The Logic and Unfulfilled promise of Privatisation in Developing
countries” in L. Putterman and D. Rueschemeyer (eds.) State and Market in
Development (1992) 195.
T Hartzenberg “Regional Integration in Africa” (2011) World Trade Organisation
(WTO) Staff Working Paper ERSD-2011-14.
T  Pakenham The Scramble for Africa (1991).
W  Ochieng’ and R Maxon An economic history of Kenya (1992).
W  Rodney How Europe underdeveloped Africa (1972).
9
The State Incentives to Oligopoly in
Face of Small and Medium-sized
Enterprises in Latin America
RODRIGO DE CAMARGO CAVALCANTI
Doctor in Law by the Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
Brazil
Abstract
The participation of Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises (MSMEs)
in the economies of the developing countries is essential, at the same time
that we face a global increase of enterprises concentration in the sense of
creation of large economic conglomerates that have the main world market
shares.
The oligopolies’ matter, especially in Latin America, is correlated to
the democratisation and privatisation processes of the economy of those
countries which occurred more intensely in the beginning of the 1990’s,
after the fall of the dictatorships and infusion of neoliberalism prevailing
in the local State policies. Therefore, despite constitutionally most of the
Latin-American countries are protected by rules that value the social justice
and the distribution of wealth, the globalised economy, through economic
liberalism, undertook a process that lead to the current scenario of
oligopolistic presence of domestic or international enterprises, although
normally with transnational size.
Henceforth, considering those conditions as paradigms of a structural
condition conniving with oligopoly and consequently, the lack of incentive
to the productive efficiency of MSMEs, there should be a discussion,
especially within the Latin America scope, concerning the examples and
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references associated to such issues and the possible solutions for
implementation of conditions of development for those enterprises and,
consequently, provide compulsion to the necessary increase of competition,
for the sake of favouring the entire society.
Introduction
According to the last study (2010) of the International Finance
Corporation (IFC), a member of the World Bank, there are 125 million
formal Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (MSMEs) in the set
of 132 analysed economies, including 89 million in emerging markets.
The participation of MSMEs in the economies of the developing
countries is essential, at the same time that we face a global increase of
enterprises concentration in the sense of creation of large economic
conglomerates that have most of the world market share.
Those elements generate a challenge that will be emphasised herein,
among others, which is the major existence of oligopolies in most of the
national markets. Also in 2000, UNCTAD verified the oligopoly in those
countries as a major issue to be tackled by governments and the World
Bank working in partnership.
The oligopolies matter, especially in Latin America, is correlated to
the democratisation and privatisation processes of the economy of those
countries which occurred more intensely in the beginning of the 1990’s,
after the fall of the dictatorships and infusion of neoliberalism prevailing
in the local State policies. Therefore, the globalised economy, through
economic liberalism, undertook a process that lead to the current scenario
of oligopolistic presence of domestic or international enterprises, although
normally with transnational size.
In Brazil, as well as in several developing countries mainly in Latin
America, three political programmes that created and still perform such
condition, among others, are the following:
• the practice of the national champions theory, especially by
contributions of public investment, thus building a private relation
between the State and the large national enterprise, its stock in the
stock exchange and the public interest for the profit;
• the indirect imposition of the government to the antitrust divisions
of adopting a lenient posture against the acts of concentration so
that certain economic and political agenda is met, despite the fact
that in principle they give effect or strengthen the oligopoly, they
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are encouraged by financing and investment in public programmes;
and
• lack of parameters of the antitrust division to judge the acts of
concentration associated to the legal and normative concepts of
social justice and human dignity and preference to those of the
merely economic theory of ‘social wellness’ (in excess of the
producer/consumer).
Henceforth, considering those conditions as paradigms of a structural
condition conniving with oligopoly there should be a discussion,
concerning the examples and references associated to such issues and the
possible solutions for implementation of conditions of development for
those enterprises and, consequently, provide compulsion to the necessary
increase of competition, for the sake of favoring the entire society.
The global oligopoly is nowadays the most characteristic form of supply
while the centralisation of capital, combined with the decentralisation of
production, commercial and financial management, reorganise the
economy and geopolitics of the world. The mergers and ongoing acquisition
on the planet since the end of the 20th century dramatically altered the
international market power relationships, leading economies beforehand
domestic to global performance in competitive levels which current
boundaries are given by way of interdependence between companies.
In this sense, François Chesnais said that this oligopolistic condition
refers to the interdependence between firms, including ‘firms not reacting
to more impersonal forces coming from the market, but personally and
directly to their rivals’.1
These take their mutual dependence marketplace, by all kinds of
agreements (technical cooperation, joint determination of standards), of
which not much fits the antitrust laws.
The constitutive relations of the oligopoly become in themselves,
inherently, an important factor of barriers to entry, in which other elements
(such as sunk costs or the magnitude of the investments in R&D) can
then graft.2
In this scenario, since the 1980s, due to the economic crisis and the
consequent adoption of neoliberal doctrine of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, in force is a political and economic
platform of deregulation of the financial sectors of developing countries,
included therein Latin America, as well as a process of greater appreciation
of the private sector to conduct themselves, of free competition and
freedom of contract. The state, therefore, due to this booklet, should
work towards minimum intervention in the market and the
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internationalisation of the domestic economy as prerequisites for a good
management of the economy.
With this policy, due to the inclusion of Latin American countries in a
globalised international market, foreign direct investment rate (FDI)
increased considerably. In Argentina, for example, while in 2000 the stock
of FDI was about US$21,140mn, in 2010 jumped to US$29,840mn. In
Brazil, in 2000 it was US$51,946mn and in 2010 it went to US$188,637mn.
In Chile, in 2000 the amount was US$11,154mn and reached the level of
US$60,146mn in 2010 – and then there was a considerable increase in all
Latin American countries.3
This wave of internationalisation of Latin America economy has taken
place since the 1990s, with the expansion of business in this region from
various sectors of economic activity into new markets abroad.
Big Business and Oligopoly: Key Factors of Dissociation
with a Defence Policy of SMEs
Normally, the predominant perspective in studies on
internationalisation focusses on companies in the internal factors that
lead to this phenomenon.
In Latin America, there was a significant increase in FDI from the
1990s, a time when the economies of the region, from the neoliberal
policies of the IMF and the World Bank, have adopted plans of monetary
stabilisation and implemented market-oriented reforms (privatisation).
More open to a growing oligopolistic competition, Latin American
countries have seen some of its largest companies develop strategies to
reach overseas markets as well as access to capital and technology.
However, we intend to draw attention to the effectiveness of the role
played by the government to the success of multilatinas not only as
deregulation agent of domestic economies but also in an attempt to foster
by economic dynamism, including the promotion of expansion of certain
companies. The trend of concentration of wealth and market in the hands
of a few business leaders is one of the consequences of such policy, as the
antitrust agencies cast a blind eye to major mergers and acquisitions
(M&As) in the analysis of mergers.
Efficient international expansion of multilatinas depends much,
simultaneously, of inorganic growth through acquisitions and joint
ventures. Considering overseas acquisitions, compared to Latin companies
of local operations, those of global reach make on average almost four
times more joint venture operations and six times more business M&As.
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What must be considered about the oligopoly capitalism in Latin
America is that, ‘in decreasing the base of accumulation that is relevant
to capital, capital its own is responsible for destroying the excess of capital
in operation. Companies break, obsolete or surplus production structures
are eliminated, acts of the capital centralisation process, to keep running
the capital in a smaller base of accumulation, with higher profits for those
who remain’.4
Mexican and Brazilian economic conglomerates dominate the list of
top investors abroad, followed by Chile and Argentina. Chile, in turn, has
the largest number of companies on the list such as retailing and distribution
of energy. Obviously, they are ‘champions’ in the concentration and
centralisation of capital in their countries of origin in order to control
much of varied economic activities.
On the emergence of national champions companies, says Leandro
Bruno Santos, based on Michalet: “the multilatinas are those champions
after a long historical process of concentration and centralisation of capital
in their home bases under state support. The author relates the theory to
a concrete situation, but it cannot be assumed that all multilatinas will be
domestic champions, because it depends on historical and spatial
conditions or otherwise, the particular conditions of each socio-spatial
formation. The concentration and centralisation remain important as
theoretical parameters, while the role of the state which had been raised
should be analysed for its relevance in the broader process of capital
accumulation and power.”5
The specific concept of ‘national champions’ is considered by some
scholars restricted in Latin America, Brazil, in the face of the policies of
the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES). This
Bank, a financial institution of the government, acts since 2002 practically
performing loans to big companies in order to invest for the consolidation
of those on the global stage. This purpose, namely, to encourage large
domestic companies to become victorious competitors in the international
market is the so-called ‘theory of national champions.’
The economic policy of national champions is not restricted to direct,
positive, monetary investment, but is part of a set of factors observed in
much of Latin America, factors of which are the permission of certain
concentration acts which would be in the government’s aim.
What happens is the following: “we find a direct participation of the
State not only to allow for the economic concentration, but also for its
promotion. Such interference occurs always, in our view, for the sake of
an irrational logic of preserving a biased structure of the concentration of
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wealth in capitalism. We see therefore a reversal of nationalisation of
enterprises: privatisation of the state in which it passes to undergo ever
more intensely to gains and losses inherent in the market game.”6
There is, therefore, an indirect imposition of governments to antitrust
agencies to adopt lenient stance in the face of mergers to fulfill certain
political and economic agenda. Advocates, for example, Giovanni Dosi,
an Economics Professor at the School of Advanced Studies Sant’Anna in
Pisa, Italy: “I propose that developing countries build domestic oligopolies
able to compete with foreign oligopolies, both nationally and
internationally.”7 For the supporters of this theory, there is no
contradiction between competition policy advocacy and market
concentration, especially if taken into account the global market.
The consequence is thus a “shared power without the need for overt
collusion; the identity price is the general rule, and competition takes the
form of physically indistinguishable differentiate products through design
and particularly through advertising.8
The national champions, therefore, ‘can benefit from loans guaranteed
by the state or implicit support raising the rating of its debt and reduce
borrowing costs. It also helps access to natural resources, specific
budgetary allocations, tax benefits and exemptions by supervisory
authorities.’9
In Argentina, for example, in 2007, in the cement market, the Antitrust
Commission confirmed that three companies dominated 96 percent of
the business. In short distance fixed telephony, Telefónica and Telecom
controlled 80 percent of the market. After the engulfing of Quilmes by
Ambev, 81 percent of the beer consumed in Argentina comes from a
single Brazilian company. The Cablevision-Multicanal merger happened
stating that, nationally, these two firms held ‘dominant’ position, with 51
percent of cable TV subscriptions.
Still, from 1999 to 2006, the Comisión Nacional de Defensa de la
Competencia, Argentine antitrust agency, analysed 489 economic
concentration, of which 94 percent were authorised, only five percent
were subordinated to the fulfillment of any condition imposed by the
agency and less one percent was denied.10 i.e. low rates of impediment
and even subordination to conditions in view of the amount of
concentration led to the Argentine agency.
It is still worth considering that there is an obligation of analysis by the
agency as they fall within the following thresholds (Law 25,156, article
8): acts involving the participation of companies or groups of companies
in a quota equal or greater than 25 percent or more of the relevant market;
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or when the sum of the total turnover in the country of all the companies
concerned is more than the sum of US$200mn; or even when the total
turnover worldwide, of all the companies is more than US$2,500mn, i.e.
only large companies are subject to examination by the antitrust agency.
In Brazil, in turn, according to Law 12.529/11, the Conselho
Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE, the Brazilian antitrust
agency) should analyse the merger that portray one of the following: at
least one group involved in the operation has registered in the last balance
sheet, gross annual sales or total turnover in the country, in the previous
year to the operation, equivalent to or greater than R$ 400,000,000.00
(four hundred million reais); and at least one other group involved in the
operation has registered in the last balance sheet, gross annual sales or
total turnover in the country, in the previous year to the operation,
equivalent to or greater than R$30,000,000.00 (thirty million reais) (Art.
88, I and II). As it turns out, it is also of great size and relevance of
companies in the domestic market.
The oligopoly is also present vehemently in Brazil. In partnership with
the British counterpart Edmund Amann, the expert in Brazil Werner Baer,
Professor of the Department of Economics of the University of Illinois
(US), investigated 19 sectors of the country and found a strong
concentration in 14 of them, in which the top four companies hold over
60 percent of the market. The branch with less competition is the
petrochemical, with a 91 percent rate; automotive industry (85 percent),
wholesale trade (80 percent), mining (79 percent) and food and beverages
(76 percent) respectively. The broadband internet in the country, in turn,
in 2014, was controlled by just four companies: Hi, Telefonica, Net and
GVT. They dominated 90 percent of broadband in the country.11
But even with very high levels of concentration in the Brazilian market,
CADE, from January to July 2015, judged 192 cases of mergers, approving
restrictions with 5 of them and not condemning any.12
In Chile, the Subsecretaría de Telecomunicaciones (telecommunications
agency) reveals that in 2013, three companies of this sector concentrated
98.7 percent market share, with 37.34 percent Movistar, Entel 37.26
percent, and Claro 24.11 percent. The Chilean national air traffic, in
turn, as reported by the National Board Aerea in 2010 was concentrated
on LAN Express (40.8 percent) in the SKY Airline (16.9 percent) and
LAN Airlines (38.7 percent). With regard to pharmacies, the newspaper
Estrategia News informs that this sector is concentrated, in 2010, in three
companies, namely: Salco (25 percent), Fasa (30 percent) and Green Cross
(40 percent).
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The Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia (TDLC), the Chilean
antitrust agency, according to data from Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), from 2004 until March 2015 only
25 concentrations were submitted to that body, and that of the total, 11
mergers were approved, only two failed and in 12 cases the TDLC did
not issue resolution about.
Chilean law does not provide numerical thresholds to define the scope
of the inspection system. However, there is a Guide on concentrations
which indicates that it will not be investigate those horizontal operations
that are below certain Herfindahl–Hirschmann Index (HHI) levels. These
thresholds are not standard closing because it does not exclude the
possibility of control by the Fiscalía Nacional Económica (FNE) or the
eventual notification of the operation to the FNE.
HHI thresholds included in the Guide to FNE on Concentrations are
limited in scope, are not binding, and its application is dimensioned to
horizontal operations submitted to the FNE, entity that reserves the right
to investigate operations that do not meet the thresholds under one of the
following special circumstances: (i) one of the parties involved is a potential
competitor; (ii) a Party is a leading innovator and a strong independent
competitor (a “maverick” company); or (iii) there are current or recent
signs of coordination.
This oligopolistic situation presented in the Latin American country
markets, as exemplified above in relation to three major economies that
dominate the list of foreign investments, is strengthened by their
governments, and shows a preference towards production efficiency at
the expense of allocative efficiency and also limits the economic and
political power already quite limited for SMEs.
The national market for Latin American countries in view of the low
level of development, calls for a promotion by the government granting a
greater contribution of SMEs, taking into account the requirements of
those in the economy conditioned to the low levels of technology adoption,
little qualification of its employees and/or the employer himself, a relative
administrative fragility, and low productivity.
In this scenario, as indicated by Emilio Zevallos V., we come across
with “the demands of the new economy that in the process of globalisation
has developed a new production and institutional framework that calls
for substantial improvements in business processes, flexibility, quality
and low prices, and, for countries, systemic productive development
policies.”13
On the other hand, given the current globalised environment, Ana
Maria Nusdeo ponders that, in practice, the possibilities are remote that
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countries like Brazil issue differing decisions of those countries where
the headquarters of multinational companies are based. However, Nusdeo
points out that there must be a careful and an effort “affirmation of
competition to protect the interests of the country, with the imposition
of remedies deemed necessary to do so, or the even more radical solution
of denial of operation.”14
The high degree of productive efficiency of big corporations, combined
with the ease in raising credit and also to the indulgence of the state and,
more than that, to a state policy model encouraging these major economic
actors, reduces the possibility of SMEs in the trading market in the face
of consumers, making it difficult to insert new actors into the economy,
new actors that can contribute to the development of countries in which
institutional and financial fragility, with social consequences, is latent.
Research conducted by Santander Bank in 2013 showed that 99 percent
of companies in Latin America are micro, small and medium enterprises.
The study, conducted with data’s from the World Bank, the International
Labour Organisation, the Inter-American Development Bank and the
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean showed that
about half of these companies are in the informal sector and that a high
percentage of them respond to a goal of self-employment or livelihood,
not an ambitious or growth potential, as well as informality and access to
credit are compromised.15
It is also worth to note the study of Krekel, Van Der Woerd and
Wouterse, for whom there are three categories of small and medium
enterprises whose extinction is a natural consequence of the antitrust
current policies in the face of high levels of concentration. One type
concerns those companies ‘whose direction, production methods and
financial or commercial structure are inappropriate; they are working at
the limit of profitability and only remain for border protection force, still
in force, or by a more or less precarious persistence’16 linked to the past.
They have become so marginal companies whose ‘natural selection’ of
the market does not give truce.
Another type of SMEs endangered situation with regard to family
businesses that still resist the demand of professional managers, and
belonging to a single owner, or a single family without extinction of this
continuing process. And lastly, we can mention those that are far from
achieving an optimal size, and “its products can be industrialised, for
lower costs, by important companies.”17 These small and medium
enterprises as well, according to the aforementioned authors, succumb
to the concentration of larger companies.
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Conclusion
With this analysis, it is understandable that the development of small
businesses, therefore, regarding antitrust policies, basically depends on
the following programmes:
• effective control ex ante, on the debasement of oligopolies through
stricter decisions with respect to the concentration acts (worth
pointing out that all those under the supervision of the antitrust
agencies are, as a rule, large acts);
• clearer and more objective insertion of human rights in the analysis
of the antitrust agencies, teleologically to the dignity of the human
person in order to ensure proportional balancing to the concentration
acts effects on the widest possible number of factors; and
• finally, the encouragement of SMEs by sharing information of
companies forming part of the oligopolistic group with other
companies in the sector, under the supervision of the antitrust agency
(in order to avoid undue and untied information exchanges for the
decision goals), with the aim of minimising the technological and
informational imbalance involving distribution logistics methods and
storage products, among others, to a larger structural and
performative balance, always with proportionality and
reasonableness (in order to avoid exacerbated transfer efficiencies).
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Abstract
This paper provides an overview of selected national policies,
institutions and types of organisations that can help foster innovation in
developing economies. It discusses some of the essentials that are needed
to organically stimulate innovation in products and services within a
country. Stimulating a meaningful amount of innovation within a country
is essential for developing more mature and relatively competitive markets
that, in the longer run, will promote economic development and growth,
and sustained development of human capital. The paper provides a brief
illustration of innovation and value chain in global coffee markets.
Introduction
The literature on innovation encompasses a wide range of issues related
to patents on products and processes, copyrights, trademarks, among
others, and enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs). This paper
discusses selected issues related to innovation, the key benefits it bestows
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on national economies, manner in which innovation can promote
competition, and the government policies and initiatives that can foster
innovation in developing economies. The objective is not to provide a
comprehensive overview, but to highlight some key issues that may help
decision-making in framing policy.
More specifically, the paper addresses some issues related to institutions,
organisations and policies that are likely to organically stimulate innovation
in products and services, and technological development within a country.
In the longer run, these processes will also facilitate the development and
growth of internal markets, along with making them more competitive.
The policy insights from this paper will be helpful in achieving higher
economic growth and employment, and foster sustained innovation and
industrialisation in developing economies. These aspects are also key to
reducing the disparities in economic opportunities.
The paper briefly examines some issues in the relationship between
innovation and competition; and various institutions and organisations
that foster innovation and development of technologies. It discusses
selected issues related to regulatory and competition policies, and their
links to innovation and provides a brief illustration of innovation in
products and services in the global coffee markets. It concludes with some
policy prescriptions.
Innovation and Competition
Innovation is viewed as critical to fostering the growth of markets,
generating new products and processes, generating efficiencies and
improving economic welfare. The relationship between innovation and
competition is bi-directional and complex: the degree of competition among
firms has been recognised as one of the important factors influencing
innovation; and, greater innovation is viewed as one of the factors that
may affect competition and growth of markets.
The relationship between innovation and competition is, therefore,
important for several reasons. If innovation generates growth of markets
and increases efficiency, then creating institutions and markets that foster
innovation are vital to increasing economic welfare. Further, if relatively
more competitive markets generate greater innovation, then antitrust and
regulatory policies, for example, would need to be structured and enforced
appropriately to facilitate competition.
As has been recognised in the literature, instances where patents create
monopoly rights (e.g., in pharmaceuticals) can prove to be complicated in
assessing economic welfare effects as we need to trade-off the potential
Pursuing Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving SDGs 195
increase in market power with the availability of new innovative products.
However, even in an industry like pharmaceuticals, if there exist multiple
well-resourced incumbent firms – or potential entrants – who can generate
inter-patent competition, then these competitors can offer disciplining
effects on prices. An important role played by competition law and
enforcement would be to monitor markets effectively to, for example,
minimise mergers and acquisitions (M&As) that might lead to very high
levels of market concentration.
In the economics literature, the bookends linking innovation and
competition are the contributions by Schumpeter (1934, 1942) and Arrow
(1962). Schumpeter predicted that larger firms with rent earning
opportunities will generate greater innovation. Arrow, in contrast,
predicted that atomistic firms in competitive markets will generate greater
innovation. Recent important theoretical contributions by Aghion et al.
(2005) predict a non-linear relationship between innovation and
competition, with intermediate levels of competition delivering the highest
levels of innovation. The writings by Aghion and Griffith (2008), Cohen
and Levin (1989), Ahn (2002), and Gilbert (2006), for example, provide
excellent reviews of the broader theoretical and empirical literatures.1
One way to view how more innovative and entrepreneurial economies
and markets can foster more competition is as follows. The literature
generally shows that countries that generate greater overall innovation
are also those with high rates of new firm startup and entrepreneurial
activity. While not all of this startup and entrepreneurial activity will be
successful, some will succeed and grow to be larger firms.2
It is this process of creative destruction that generates new and
innovative firms and products that over time may replace the incumbents
and constrain their market power. These new entrepreneurs and firms
can provide effective competition to the incumbents creating a more
competitive environment.3
Institutions and Organisations that Foster Innovation
Significant initiatives, policies and institutions are needed to stimulate
innovation in developing economies. Without this, domestic innovation
will suffer, retarding growth and development in the longer run.
Examining the literature, there appears to be no single defining item
that helps foster innovation and technological development within a
country. The ingredients appear to include clear rules and protection of
IPRs, accommodative economic policies to support entrepreneurship and
innovation, an overall economic environment and regulations that support
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business creation and development, availability of private and public
financing, and a variety of key organisations.
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs)
There needs to be a well-defined system of protection of IPRs,
accompanied by clear infringement protections.4
Perhaps the most important point to note for developing countries is
that the presence of a well-run and enforced IPR regime is almost essential
for organic growth of innovation within the country. A lot of this discussion
gets clouded by comparisons between the more developed and less
developed countries. But this is missing an important point. Unless each
country develops a realistic and meaningful IPR system within the confines
of their own country, within-country innovators have less incentives to
innovate. Local entrepreneurs and innovators need IPR protection as this
provides them the incentives to innovate.
Lack of organic growth of internally developed technologies and
innovation will likely to result in lower rates of growth and economic
development in the longer run. While the optimal IPR protection period
can be debated and varies across countries, developing economies need a
well-structured IPR infringement system to protect innovators and
entrepreneurs, and stimulate growth.5
Business Incubators and Accelerators
Incubators and accelerators have played an important role in
development of nascent firms, products and technologies.6 While most of
the well-known and successful incubators and accelerators, but certainly
not all, appear to be concentrated in the relatively more developed
countries, there are important lessons for developing economies. The
objectives of incubators and accelerators, broadly speaking, are to foster
innovation, entrepreneurship and creation of new businesses.
An incubator is an organisation designed to increase the likelihood of
success of entrepreneurial firms. Incubators bring in external management
team to manage an idea, and can focus on tasks such as job creation,
professional services, training, networking, venture capital financing, and
utilisation of specific technologies.7 There are several different types of
incubators. The university-based incubators (UBIs) and university-
associated business incubators (UABI) primarily aim to connect
entrepreneurial talent and skills to specific types of technologies and
services. The private business incubators, in contrast, provide any aspect
of a wide range of support and services. The international business
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incubators, in contrast to all of the above, concentrate on international
firms that want to access foreign markets and resources.8
The emergence of accelerators followed the growth and maturation
of the incubator model.9 An accelerator can be either an advanced stage
incubator which assists more mature entrepreneurial firms, or they can
be an organisation that contains hybrid business incubation programmes
designed for incubators to enter the market. Some of the characteristics
of accelerators include competitive applications process, pre-seed
investments, and limited-duration and intensive mentoring.10
Table 10.1 briefly summarises some of the key similarities and
differences between incubators and accelerators.11
Table 10.1: Some Comparisons between Incubators and Accelerators
Incubators Accelerators
Duration 1 to 5 years 3 months
Business Model Rent; non-profit Investment, can also be non profit
Selection Non-competitive Competitive, cyclical
Venture Stage Early, or late Early
Mentorship Minimal, tactical Intense, by self and others
Venture location On site On site
Historically, in the development of incubators and accelerators, the
US attained significant benefits and growth. It has been noted that one of
the important barriers for the development of incubators in Europe was
the lack of entrepreneurship and the under-development of seed financing.
It has also been noted that many incubators, particularly in Europe, did
not screen potential firms on a balanced set of factors, but concentrated
on the characteristics of the firms’ market or the management team. It
has been observed that firms’ survival rate is positively related to a more
balanced screening profile.12
Table 10.2 presents selected examples of accelerators, the amounts of
funding, and some of the success stories in terms of the startup firms.
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Table 10.2: Selected Examples of Accelerators
Name (Start Year) Country (Location) $Total #Startups (Selected examples
($Average) of startups)
Y Combinator USA (Silicon Valley) $4,030 694 (Dropbox, AirBnb,
(2005) (5.8) Strip, Optimizely, Zenefits)
TechStars Boulder USA (Boulder) $250 (3.2) 77 (DigitalOcean, Gearbox,
(2007)  SendGrid, FullContact)
AngelPad (2010) USA (San Francisco) $232 (2.7) 85 (Crittercism, Postmates,
MoPub, ElasticBox)
TechStars Boston USA (Boston) $200 (2.4) 83 (Localytics, Kinvey,
(2009) EverTrue, GrabCAD)
Seedcamp (2007) UK (London) $131 (1.1) 118 (Transferwise, Basekit,
GrabCad, Profitero)
DreamIT Ventures USA (Philadelphia) $124 (1.9) 63 (SeatGeek, SCVNGR,
(2008) Adapt.ly, MindSnacks)
Mucker Lab USA (Santa Monica) $111 (5.8) 19 (Surf Air, Retention
(2012) Science, Lifecrowd, Younity)
RockHealth USA (San Francisco) $72 (1.5) 49 (Omada Health, Kit
(2010) Check, CellScope, Sano
Intelligence)
Flashpoint (2011) USA (Atlanta, Geo) $64 (1.7) 38 (Ionic Security, Pindrop
Security, Springbot, Lucena)
LaunchpadLA USA (Los Angeles) $62 (2.4) 26 (Tradesy, Chromatik,
(2009) ChowNow, Preact)
Springboard UK (London) $54 (2.2) 25 (PagerDuty, Hassle.com,
(2009) Birdback, PlayMob)
Portland USA (Portland) $52 (2.4) 22 (VendScreen,
Incubator (2009) Cloudability, Orchestrate,
Vadio)
StartmateLink Australia (Sydney) $17 (0.8) 21 (Scriptrock, Ninja Blocks,
(2011) Bugcrowd, Bugherd)
FounderFuelLink Canada (Montreal) $12 (0.3) 37 (ooomf, Notesolution,
(2011) Seevibes, Playerize, Urbita)
Chinaccelerator China (Shanghai) $11 (0.3) 31 (OrderWithMe, Aylien,
Link (2010) Splitforce, Piktochart)
Le CampingLink France (Paris) $10 (0.2) 48 (Sketchfab, infinit,
(2011) docTrackr, Augment, qunb)
Rockstart Netherlands $10 (0.2) 39 (3Dhubs, Wercker,
Accelerator (Amsterdam) Syndicate Plus, PastBook)
Link (2011)
* $Total ($Average) refers to the total (average) funding made available ($ millions).
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Incubators and accelerators are multifaceted organisational forms to
meet specific needs. They can be private, public, or public-private
partnership (PPP). For developing economies, there is a potentially
important role of government in later two, but also important to facilitate
and incentivise private participation.
There is meaningful evidence that relying on public investments and
initiatives only to stimulate innovation and entrepreneurial activity may
often lead to limited success. International evidence points to private being
more successful overall. Some of the underlying reasons relate to less
administrative, oversight and project content inefficiencies. Some of these
lessons in comparative analysis of incubator and accelerator successes
and failures are important for developing economies.
University Based Collaborations and Science Parks
There is increasing evidence that university-based science parks can
foster innovation and entrepreneurship. Studies show that university-
based technology ventures can lead to significant knowledge flows from
universities to incubator firms, and affect the likelihood of survival of
startups. Studies also find that the for-profit university technology transfer
offices are positively related to new venture formation, and that the more
traditional university and non-profit transfer offices are more likely to
correlate with the presence of university-based business incubators.13
Studies also find that a high-technology firm’s propensity to make
effective use of the university parks’ resources and support increases with
the lifecycle stage of the company.14 Finally, some studies find that the
number of spin-out companies created are positively associated with rules
on intellectual property protection, royalty regime of the university, and
the business development capabilities of the university technology transfer
offices.15
Table 10.3 presents a few university-based incubators. It reveals the
wide variation in the types and number of institutions that form such
organisations. The information on the institutions involved are mostly
from the website of UBI Index (http://ubiindex.com).
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Table 10.3: Selected Examples of University-Based Incubators
Name (Type, Start Year)
SETsquared (UBI, 2003)
ATP Innovations
(UBI, 2000)
IncubaUC (UBI, 2002)
Industry Accelerator and
Patent Strategy (UBI, 2013)
Instituto Genesis PUC-Rio
(UBI, 1997)
TEC Edmonton (UBI, 2004)
DTU Symbion
Innovation (UBI, 2009)
Melbourne Accelerator
Program (UBI, 2012)
HUST Science Park
Development Corp.
(UBI, 2001)
NDRC (UBI, 2008)
Chrysalis (UBI, 2012)
National Chiao Tung
University Business
Incubation Center (UBI,1998)
iMinds (UBI, 2004)
TechColumbus (UABI, 2005)
Montpellier Agglomeration
Business & Innovation
Centre (UABI, 1991)
Hub China (UABI, 2013)
Los Angeles Cleantech
Incubator (UABI, 2011)
Stiftelsen Chalmers
Innovation (UABI, 1999)
Nanotechnology Incubator
(UABI, 2005)
Nuvolab (UABI, 2011)
Country (Location)
UK (Bristol,
Southampton, Bath,
Guildford, Exeter)
Australia (Sydney)
Chile (Santiago)
Taiwan (Hsinchu City)
Brazil (Rio de Janeiro)
Canada (Edmonton)
Denmark (Copenhagen)
Australia (Melbourne)
China (Wuhan)
Ireland (Dublin)
Chile (Valparaíso)
Taiwan (Hsinchu City)
Belgium (Ghent)
USA (Columbus)
France (Paris)
China (Beijing)
USA (Los Angeles)
Sweden (Gothenburg)
Mexico (Monterrey)
Italy (Milan)
Institution(s)
University of Bath, Bristol, Exeter, Southampton,
Surrey
University of Sydney; University of Technology,
Sydney; Australian National University;
University of New South Wales
Pontifical Catholic University of Chile
National Chiao Tung University
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
University of Alberta
Technical University of Denmark
University of Melbourne
Huazhong University of Science and Technology
Dublin City University; Dún Laoghaire Institute of
Art, Design and Technology; National College of
Art and Design; Trinity College Dublin; University
College Dublin
Pontifica Catholic University of Valparaíso
National Chiao Tung University
University of Antwerp; University of Leuven;
Ghent University; Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Ohio State University; Columbus State Community
College; Otterbein University; Denison University
Montpellier University
Capital Normal University; Beijing Technology
and Business University; North China University
of Technology
University of Southern California; University of
California, Los Angeles; California Institute of
Technology; California State University,
Northridge
Chalmers University of Technology
Instituto de Innovación y Transferencia de
Tecnología de Nuevo León
Universita’ Cattolica del Sacro Cuore; Scuola
Superiore Sant’anna
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It has been noted that science parks can be an important strategy in
the overall strategy or development of technologies and fostering
innovation. One study using Italian data, for example, reveals that the
science parks attracted skilled entrepreneurs, that incubator-related firms
had better success rates related to technology adoption and technology-
related collaboration with universities, and easier access to business capital
including public subsidies.16
Other findings in this literature include a positive relationship between
incubators and economic growth (Abetti, 2004). Further, evidence appears
to find that by acting as open innovation intermediaries, publicly supported
incubators were able to transfer knowledge from large firms to society
(Clausen and Rasmussen, 2011), and that incubator and venture capital
support influenced technology commercialisation and the performance
of new ventures (Chen, 2009).
Universities can generate enormous knowledge and innovations. This
needs to be harnessed via university-based science parks and incubators
in the overall strategy of organic development of technologies and fostering
innovation. Incentivising researchers and faculty in STEM (Science,
Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) areas to participate in
innovation and entrepreneurial processes will facilitate local generation
of innovation and entrepreneurship in developing economies.17
The information and learning from the alternative models and
experiences across countries can be useful in framing of policies to
encourage formation of such organisations in developing economies.
Other Policies
There are other standard instruments that governments have used
worldwide for stimulating innovation. These include, for example,
government subsidies and research funding. R&D subsidies, for example,
is a common instrument used in many countries. The second instrument
– direct research funding – has much larger variation across countries.
These can be targeted to specific industries that governments may feel
important for future growth and development. Areas could include critical
sectors such as pharmaceuticals and generic medications,
telecommunications technologies, alternative energy technologies, among
others.
While government subsidies for research are a relatively common
instrument, the use and size of this instrument varies considerably across
countries. Developing economies in particular may be prone to allocating
far less resources to this area. While this at times is justified given the
202 Pursuing Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving SDGs
pressing needs in other areas such as alleviation of poverty, it is important
to recognise the longer run benefits that may accrue these resources.
Role of Regulatory and Competition Policies
The institutional and organisational characteristics are designed to
stimulate innovation and technological development. In thinking about
the innovation-competition nexus, some regulatory and policy dimensions
are explored.
While the precise relationship between innovation and competition is
debatable, there is ample evidence that economies that generate greater
innovation are more successful in the longer run. When evidence on
innovation is examined, it is clear that it does not come from any one
group of firms or product category. Important innovations are generated
by the smallest as well as the largest firms in the economy.
Further, innovation came arise in high-technology areas like ICT,
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, as well as in a wide range of other
areas like processed food products and beverages, agriculture,
transportation, among others. In addition, evidence shows that smaller
firms generate innovation in a more cost-effective manner than larger
firms; for example, evidence from many markets shows that the R&D
cost per patent is often lower for smaller firms.
First, we consider the lifecycle aspects of firms, growing from small
startups to larger corporations. In coffee markets Lavazza, a prominent
Italian and global coffee company originally started within in a small
grocery store in Turin, Italy. Starbucks started in 1971 opening its first
small store in Seattle’s Pike Place Market. Some of the most influential
technology companies that have at various points in time redefined markets
and consumers’ lives, the names that come to mind include Nokia, Alibaba,
Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, among others.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of these companies is that all of
them started as ‘tiny’ startups, and many of the most influential technology
companies literally started in peoples’ garages. The reason these companies
were successful are very complex. But many of the institutional and
organisational issues have generally been influential in ensuring higher
likelihood of startups maturing to well-established and stable businesses;
this is true in a wide ranging set of economies in Europe, North America,
and some Asian countries. This implies that the economic and regulatory
policy environments need to be structured in a manner to facilitate the
creation and growth of new companies.
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Second, the regulatory policies, institutions and enforcement need to
clearly facilitate more open internal markets and competition. There are
‘sector’ regulators – typically, for example, in energy, transportation,
banking and telecommunications – who are tasked with maintaining the
vibrancy of markets in their specific areas. While they play an important
role, they are not sufficient by themselves due to issues related to political
intervention and regulatory capture. This implies an important role for
(ideally) independent competition law enforcement agencies to provide
an added layer of checks and balances.
Third, we need a well-structured competition law and enforcement
environment. This will be complementary to the overall economic and
regulatory policies. With respect to competition law enforcement, there
is perhaps a fundamental conflict between small vs. large firms in an
economy. As small, entrepreneurs and firms want relatively easy entry,
access to capital, among other aspects, to succeed. As large, firms want
entry to be difficult and costly, in order to preserve their economic rents.
Think of a nascent telecommunications or internet or online content
provider. They would want easy access to network (net neutrality), capital,
among other aspects to enter and grow. A large telecom or internet or
online content provider, on the other hand, would want almost exactly
the opposite. This implies that to get buy-in of all types of businesses into
a common competition laws and enforcement mindset is a challenging
task.
Examining consumers’ preferences, they would prefer markets that
are innovative and provide them with greater choices regarding the range
of products, quality, and low prices. While large firms provide many of
these attributes, in important part the delivery of these attributes and
vibrancy of markets depends on the ease of entry, entrepreneurship and
competition.
Further, there is an important issue regarding stability of businesses.
Historical evidence from developed and developing economies shows that
small businesses, on average, have much higher failure rates. Larger
businesses, on average, are more likely to provide greater stability to the
markets.
The relative balance between small and large businesses is, therefore,
rather nuanced. While smaller business provide much needed vibrancy to
the markets, larger businesses may bring greater stability, substantial R&D
and innovation footprint, among other aspects. The above discussion
implies that an ideal market structure for optimal longer-run delivery of
growth (e.g., incomes, investment, and employment), competition,
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innovation, among other attributes would be one where relatively smaller
and larger firms coexist.
It is a challenging task to address the potential importance and
behaviour of smaller vs. larger businesses towards competition initiatives,
and broader buy-in of initiatives that will foster competition in markets.
Competition law and its enforcement, therefore, have to ensure that
markets remain relatively competitive and facilitate the emergence and
growth of new businesses, and foster innovation.18
Coffee Markets: An Illustrative Example and Scope for
Innovation
Innovation encompasses a wide range of issues related to patents on
products and processes, copyrights, trademarks, among others, and
enforcement of IPRs. Before moving to summarise a set of policy
prescriptions, the paper provides a brief example from coffee markets to
illustrate the multifaceted aspects of innovation, and what developing
countries may need to do to move up the value chain.19
Coffee is one of the top commodities globally, and coffee beans are
produced by many countries. The top coffee bean producing countries in
2014 were (in descending order):20 Brazil, Vietnam, Columbia, Indonesia,
Ethiopia, India, Honduras, Mexico, Uganda and Guatemala. However,
the value-chain for coffee is rather complex. The broader processing steps
related to roasting, grinding, blending and flavoring are very important
and add substantial value.21
Sophisticated and prominent multinationals like Nestle (including
Nespresso), Starbucks, Costa Coffee, Lavazza, among others, have devoted
significant resources related to R&D (e.g., in processes related to the
mix of roasting, blending and flavoring), branding (trademarks) and
marketing to elevate their standing in global markets, earn profits, and
employing thousands of workers. While these companies are
multinationals now, a prominent Italian coffee company Lavazza originally
started within in a small grocery store in Turin (Italy), Starbucks started
with its first small store in Seattle’s Pike Place Market, and Costa coffee
started in London with a small operation of selling coffee to few caterers
and their first coffee shop would not be established till a few years later.22
All of these firms had tiny beginnings. Their rise to multinational status
occurred via innovation in products and services, branding and trademarks.
To simply produce a commodity like coffee beans and sell a basic
ground coffee product is typically not sufficient to rise up the value chain.
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Why is rising up the value chain important? Higher profit margins. And
higher profits allow for potentially greater investments to be made to
grow the businesses beyond local and national markets. In turn, this
expansion would result in increased employment, incomes for the workers,
and other opportunities. Without the requisite broader investments in
R&D and innovation, branding (trademarks) and marketing, it is very
difficult to elevate the business to a higher, multinational level. To rise in
the value chain and reap greater profits, one of the root inputs is innovation
in products and services.
Policies to Foster Innovation, Entrepreneurship and
Growth
Innovation and related policies need to be thought of in full spectrum
which includes patents, copyrights and trademarks as well as the adequate
enforcement of intellectual property rights. As noted earlier, more
innovative and entrepreneurial economies and markets can foster greater
competition, economic growth and development via the process of creative
destruction. This dynamic generates new entrepreneurs and firms that
can provide effective competition to the incumbents creating a more
competitive environment. This dynamic also helps markets grow and
create opportunities for investment and employment.
The core innovation issues related to protection of intellectual property
and its enforcement are distinct from the regulatory and competition
related policies. Innovation related policies therefore should be thought
of as standalone, and not commingled with other policies. The latter
approach may lead to a diffused focus and not produce best results in the
longer run.
Cumulatively, the above issues point to the difficult balancing act policy-
makers have to undertake to ensure the competitive and innovative vitality
of markets in promoting growth and stability of smaller businesses, as
well as not discouraging growth of businesses from small to medium to
large. The challenge for governments, therefore, is to ensure that the
conditions are ripe for emergence of new entrepreneurs, and entry and
survival of small businesses, as well as ensure participation of larger
businesses in the nation’s growth.
Below is the discussion on a two-tiered strategy that governments in
developing economies can follow to boost innovation.
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A. Tier-one
A well-structured IPRs’ regime and infringement protection includes
patents, copyrights, trademarks, and related issues. This will ensure that
entrepreneurs and innovators within the country have their creative ideas
and innovations protected. In the longer run, this provides incentives for
more individuals and businesses to innovate. As noted in the paper, lack
of such a regime will thwart domestic innovation and entrepreneurship
in the longer run.
B. Tier-two
This constitutes what could be thought of as a suite of complimentary
policies that will foster innovation in the economy.
Governments can create National Science and Technology Foundations.
These can be designed to provide support in the areas of resources,
funding, technical advice, and operational guidance for high quality
research projects. Such funding can be targeted to specific areas of national
need and comparative advantage.
There are complementary vehicles via which governments can promote
innovation. These include encouraging University-based research and
entrepreneurship, which have been successful in numerous countries. In
addition, governments can set up innovation incubators and accelerators
on their own, in cooperation with universities, as well as in PPPs. Incubators
and accelerators, in different forms, can provide critical support to
entrepreneurs and small business to generate funding, management of
innovative ideas, patenting, successful commercialisation of innovation,
among other aspects.
While current research reveals that these types of organisations can
be effective in boosting innovation, evidence shows that private, as opposed
to public institutions, deliver better results. Perhaps an optimal strategy
in this dimension is to foster creative PPPs to stimulate innovation and
entrepreneurship.
To create more fluid and open markets, governments can examine
where their country stands in the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ reports.23
For example, the indicators point to costs and time involved in opening a
business. The indicators also point to regulatory and policy burdens to
start new businesses. Governments can systematically examine these items
and reduce the burdens on creation and growth of businesses. These will
greatly facilitate emergence of a vibrant entrepreneurial culture and create
new and innovative businesses.
Both regulatory and competition laws and enforcement must
incorporate innovation (as well as production and service efficiency,
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broadly speaking) as a focus of the policy objectives. These will likely
bring benefits related to greater longer-run innovation, increased
entrepreneurship, generation and success of smaller businesses, and their
role in imposing competitive discipline to markets and the larger firms.
There are traditional forms of support such as offering R&D subsidies
and small business financing specifically targeted to innovative activities.
While these can greatly help generate innovation and growth, they typically
tend to be limited by governments’ resource constraints. Policymaking
can be targeted to specific areas of national need and comparative
advantage.
Overall, the sets of policies noted above need to be framed and
implemented synergistically and with a longer-run view.
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16 E.g., Colombo and Delmastro (2002).
17 For example, Chen and Dahlman (2004), Dahman and Utz (2007) and Dahlman et
al. (2008) discuss alternative mechanisms including education and training that can
be synergised to increase knowledge growth and innovation. These insights can be
combined with the learning from the accelerator and incubator literatures to
provide a comprehensive strategy for stimulating innovation
18 Baker (2007) and Golodner (2001), for example, spell out the links between
competition policies and innovation and growth of markets.
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19 This example was motivated by the discussants’ comments to provide example of
scope for innovation and growth in specific markets in developing countries. The
example I provide is for coffee as it is widely grown, and is consistently in the top-5
commodities globally.
20 http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/top-10-coffee-producing-countries-2014.html
21 See, for example, the links below for a broad perspective on coffee markets and the
value chain:
http://ww2.unime.it/emaf/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=57&Itemid=45&lang=en
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/103114/starbucks-example-value-
chain-model.asp?header_alt=b
http://acetforafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Coffee-Dalberg.pdf
22 For brief histories of some of the companies see:
Starbucks: http://www.coffee.org/History-of-Starbucks
Lavazza: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavazza
Costa: http://www.costacoffee.ae/costa-coffee/the-costa-way/history/
23 http://www.doingbusiness.org/
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Section III:
Competition Reforms as a
Tool for Public Welfare
Integrating elements of competition reforms into
sectoral and for overall economic reforms to enable
developing country consumers and producers derive
measurable benefits
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Abstract
Governments in developing countries often control the private sector
in grain market operations to restrict the market power or speculative
trading that seems to go against the food security objectives. However,
the controls and interventions have not only held back the growth of
marketing and distribution networks for the farm produce, but also
prevented developing a competitive private sector in the Indian agricultural
sector. This paper evaluates the reform initiatives undertaken by the
government and points out the direction of future measures for a larger
private sector involvement in the grain sector.
Introduction
The food grain market in India operates with major government
involvements on marketing, public procurement, distribution and buffer
stock operations. Generally speaking, these controls and interventions
are based on the conditions of production shortfalls and scarcities with
the conviction that free trade would not maintain the domestic grain price
stability. However, the controls on marketing-movement-storage meant
for pursuing the government procurement-distribution-stockholding
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operations virtually allocates any space for the free-market and competition
to play a role.
The government in recent years has come out with several policy
documents and many of them, viz., Expenditure Reforms Commission’s
Report on Food Subsidy,1 Excess Food Stocks, PDS and Procurement
Policy,2 Long Term Food Grain Policy,3 Report of Committee of State
Ministers of Agricultural Marketing to Promote Reforms,4 Restructuring
the Food Corporation of India,5 etc., recommends for a larger private
participation in the country’s grain business.
Moreover, policy measures such as the National Policy on Handling,
Storage, and Transport of Food Grains, 2000; Removal of Control on
Food Grains, 2002; Agricultural Marketing Reforms, 2002, Removal of
Prohibition on Agricultural Commodities under Forward Contract
(Regulation) Act, 2003, can be seen as steps to remove these restrictive
provisions and promote competitive structure in grain marketing and
trading. Several other provisions, viz., direct-marketing, pledge-financing
and negotiability of warehouse receipt system are also likely to facilitate
participation of private firms in the domestic and global grain trading.
But, while the process of reforms is yet to be completed, governments
(both at the Centre and state) have often continued to use such restrictive
provisions on private trading to counter supply shocks and price
fluctuations in India.
While the legislative/administrative controls and regulations diminish
the incentives structure of the  private traders and corporations, the
interventionist instruments, viz., high support price, buffer stock
operations, open market sales, export ban, stock declaration order etc.
create the remaining roadblocks for the agribusiness in the country.
This paper evaluates the scope for private sector participation in India’s
grain (rice and wheat) economy. It provides a brief account of the
government’s interventionist instruments and measures of control. An
account of Food Corporation of India’s (FCI) cost of grain handling
operations is included. The paper provides a description of various policy
recommendations relevant for private participation in the grain sector. In
order to examine the nature of competitive elements, market powers
within the rice and wheat (flour milling products, biscuits, bread and
breakfast cereals) industries is analysed. The feasibility and areas of private
participation in grain business is deliberated and summary/policy
implications are provided.
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Instruments of Government Control
The Department of Food and Public Distribution (DOPD) within the
Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, the
Commission for Agricultural Costs and Price (CACP) of the Ministry of
Agriculture and the FCI provides the institutional structure for grain
management in India. The Ministry makes the grain policy for
implementation, the CACP advises on price policy, while the FCI
undertakes the procurement, handling, transport, storage and distribution
of grains on behalf of the government.
Further, the Directorate of Marketing and Inspection (DMI) of the
Ministry of Agriculture exercise its control on marketing and trading of
the grain produce in India. The functions of DOPD in the grain sector
are: i) implementation of the public distribution system (PDS) with special
focus on the poor, ii) provision of storage facilities for the maintenance of
central food grain reserves and promotion of scientific storage, iii)
formulation of national policies relating to export, import and buffer
stocking, iv) quality control and specifications of food grains, and iv)
administration of food subsidies relating to rice, wheat and coarse grains.
The instruments of government interventions and control are briefly
discussed:
Minimum Support Price and Procurement: The government announces
the minimum support prices (MSP) for procurement on the basis of the
recommendation of the CACP before the harvestings in rabi or kharif
crop season. The food grains procurement policy bears the twin objectives
of ensuring MSP to farmers and also ensuring availability of food grains
to the weaker sections at affordable prices. The FCI and various state
agencies establish a large number of purchase centres at mandis to procure
wheat, paddy and coarse grains under the price support scheme and rice
under the statutory levy scheme. The extensive MSP operation of FCI
over the years has resulted in sustaining the incentive structure for the
rice and wheat growers.
However, since a major portion of the public procurement originates
from a few surplus states, it is argued that the support prices cater only to
the surplus states. The government also procures rice through the levy
system, which is a compulsory procurement mechanism through which a
part of the produce is bought from the farmers, traders or millers at a
price lower than the market.
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Issue Price: The Central government issues wheat and rice to various
state governments at central issue price for the purpose of carrying out
PDS. It is believed that the off-take from fair price shops (FPS) is
determined by the difference between ration and market prices. On the
other hand, the stock allocation for rationing and the quantum of ration
off-take have been found to bear an impact on the market price of food
grains.
Buffer Stocks: The buffer stocks are required to carry out PDS and welfare
schemes, ensure food security during the production shortfalls, and
stabilise prices during periods of price fluctuations. As on April 01, 2015,
the central pool food grain stock remained at 170.84 lakh tonnes of rice,
172.21 lakh tonnes of wheat and 100.39 lakh tonnes of un-milled paddy.
The stock level with FCI bears a destabilising influence on the open market
grain prices. Technical groups under the chairmanship of Union Food
Secretary recommend the buffer stocking norms for different quarters,
which is given in Table 11.1.
Table 11.1: Food Grain Stocking Norm for the Central Pool
(Revised on January 22, 2015), Lakh MT
Operational Stock Strategic Reserve
Rice Wheat Rice Wheat
1
st
 April 115.80 45.60 20.00 30.00
1
st 
July 115.40 245.80 20.00 30.00
1
st 
October 82.50 175.20 20.00 30.00
1
st 
January 56.10 108.00 20.00 30.00
Source: www.fci.gov.in/stocks
Open Market Sale Scheme (Domestic): The open market sale scheme
(domestic) of food grains has been based on various models as per the
guidelines given by the Ministry. Although, price stabilisation during lean
months is kept as the main objective of this scheme, yet surplus stocks
are often disposed on account of limited storage capacity or to reduce the
carrying costs. Initially, there was a directive that the FCI sale may be
confined to Roller Flour Mills, Atta Chakkies, Super Bazaars and
Cooperative Stores, but the OMSS (D) in recent years has been carried
out for retail sale, bulk sales, sale to small processors, sale to small private
traders and sale to bulk consumers.
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Cost of Public Grain Handling Operations
The FCI operation is viewed as a major grain market intervention and
has attracted the policy analyst’s attention due to its high cost and
corresponding budgetary subsidies. It is important to note that government
policies bear a substantial impact on FCI’s business. For instance, every
MSP revision results in higher costs of grains and stock maintenance above
buffer norms add to its carrying cost.
The counter-critics therefore claim that subsidies may not be an
appropriate pointer to FCI’s uneconomic operations, since it arises due
to the multiple objectives of providing price support to the producer and
consumer subsidy to the poor as well as preventing the nation’s food
insecurity. However, the FCI enjoys autonomy in its field operations, viz.
procurement decisions, negotiation for RBI credit, storage decisions, grain
movement plans and the choice of transport. It seems that while
government policies may remain responsible for the high FCI costs, a
part of the cost can apparently be attributed to the inefficiency in FCI
operations.
The previous research have found that FCI in India remained a high
cost and bureaucratic organisation, which needed reorganisation in order
to fulfill its functions more cost-effectively.6 Several explanations were
offered in the literature to explain as to why the private trading cost is
lower than FCI cost of operations. It is claimed that private traders carry
out direct purchase from farmers by avoiding the mandi charges, reuse
gunny bags several times unlike FCI, transfer grains by trucks which are
Figure 11.1: FCI’s Economic Cost
Source: Author’s analysis using data from www.fci.gov.
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cost-effective and have lower transit losses. As a result, participation of
competitive firms in the grain market operations often feature in the
government agenda for inflicting efficiency in the system and also make
budgetary saving on FCI subsidies.
Figure 11.1 provides information on the recent increases in FCI’s
economic cost of rice and wheat. The critics have also pointed out that
much of the food subsidy actually covers the costs of FCI’s inefficiency
and therefore demand that FCI trim its grain market operations.
Reform Initiatives to Promote Private Business:
It is argued that given the sensitivity of the agricultural sector in terms
of food security, many governments have been hesitant to leave this sector
to unregulated market forces.7 But, the removal of legislative controls
and administrative orders as well as the introduction of agricultural
marketing reforms can initiate competitive grain businesses in many
developing countries. The competitiveness element can be taken to mean
a larger involvement of private firms in the marketing-storage-movement
operation of grains.
It is relevant to note that the involvement of private sector or its
collaboration with the public sector in a public-private-partnership (PPP)
model for the production and distribution of public goods and services
have been successfully implemented in several countries. Thus, provision
of goods and services in the areas of education, health, poverty programs,
urban infrastructures and housing, public utilities (drinking water,
electricity, sanitation, waste management, etc.), social services and even
government administration have witnessed private participation at the
global level. It may be mentioned that the notion of private participation
is rejected at times due to the apprehensions of poor service quality and
reduced governmental responsibility. The various arguments for and
against private participation of goods and services can be distinguished as
in Table 11.2.
In the recent past, several government reports and commissioned studies
in India have recommended to reform the grain market operations by
mainly removing the restrictive provisions, injecting efficiency into FCI
operations and liberalising the grain marketing. It can be discerned that
the government foresees the FCI’s role to change from the major buyer
and subsequently re-establish the private sectors in the areas of
procurement, storage and distribution of food grains in India (Table 11.3).
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Agricultural Marketing Reforms: Although the production of agricultural
commodities in India is free from controls, the same is not true for their
marketing and processing that remains under state control. The whole
geographical area in the state is declared a market area falling under the
jurisdiction of market committees. Since, any sale or purchase outside
the market yard is prohibited by the act; there is a virtual monopoly of
government regulated markets in most of the states.
Further, there are controls on processor to buy only from the notified
markets, incidence of multiple taxes on the processing activities and
restrictions on storage and movements. All these have worked as deterrents
for the development of competitive marketing systems in the country,
and have also failed to provide the incentive structure to the farmers,
traders and industries. The Expert Committee on Agricultural Marketing
suggested various legislative reforms and reorientation of policies, such
as, promotion of direct marketing, organized retailing etc. Subsequently,
the Inter-Ministerial Task Force on Agricultural Marketing Reforms
identified several priority areas to restructure agricultural marketing, and
prepared the Model Act on Agricultural Marketing to enable the states
frame their own Agricultural Produce Marketing Development and
Regulation (APMDR) Act.
Table 11.2: Arguments for and against Allowing Private Participation
Arguments for Arguments against
Savings on Public Finance Administration and Service
Monitoring Costs
Efficient Provider with Quality Profit Motive Costing Service Quality
Service
Increase Efficiency and Price Collusion Resulting in Higher
Innovation Price
Increases Accountability Reduces Public Accountability for
Service Failure
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Table 11.3: Policy Recommendations for Reforms in Grain Markets
Study/Policy Reports
Expenditure Reforms
Commission’s Report on
Food Subsidy, GoI [2000]
Cost of Acquisition &
Distribution of Food grains
by FCI, ASCI [2001]
commissioned by Ministry
of Consumer Affairs, Food
and Public Distribution
Working Group on PDS
and Food Security for the
10th Plan, GoI [2001]
Excess Food Stocks, PDS
and Procurement Policy,
Virmani and Rajeev [2001]
Long Term Grain Policy
GoI [2002]
Report on Central
Government Subsidies in
India, GoI [2004]
Final Report of Committee
of State Ministers, in charge
of Agricultural Marketing
to Promote Reforms, GoI
[2013]
Report of the High Level
Committee on Reorienting
the Role and Restructuring
of Food Corporation of
India, GoI [2015]
Major Recommendations
• Greater involvement of the state government and
private sector in the procurement and storage
operations
• Rationalise the tax/levy structure on procurement
from different states
• Restructure FCI
• Federalise FCI among states
• Decentralised PDSMSP in line with cost of
cultivation
• Review Essential Commodities & APMC Act
• State government and private sector’s
participation in procurement and storage
• Decentralised PDS
• Universal PDS, MSP in line with cost of cultivation
• Improve FCI’s performance
• Larger private participation
• Reduction of MSP
• Replace the present 2-tier system of APL-BPL issue
price with food-coupons for BPL
• Amend APMC acts
• Substitute licencing system of traders/commission
agents
• Remove physical barriers to trade like check gates,
• Single window registration for traders· Levy
market fee only for the first transaction
• Differentiate between genuine service provider and
hoarders under Essential Commodities Act
• Specify provisions for private wholesale markets
and terminal markets
• Revisit its MSP policy
• Relook at NFSA commitments
• Hand over FCI’s procurement operations to
specific states
• Private sector to compete with state agencies in
grain procurement
• Outsource FCI’s stock operations, Initiate
negotiable warehouse receipt system
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National Policy on Grain Handling, Storage & Transportation, 2000: This
policy recommends better grain storage practices, viz., automation in
handling and sliding of stocks, and also minimise on the transportation
costs. It further proposed that the bulk grain handling facility be built
with private participation on the basis of Built-Own-Operate (BOO)
model.
Futures and Forward Contract in Agriculture: It is often argued that future
trading can provide two major advantages to product marketing, viz.,
price-discovery and efficient price-risk management. In India, the removal
of prohibition on future trading was notified for some agricultural items
and their trading was organised through recognised exchanges, subject to
rules and regulatory procedures prescribed by the Forward Market
Commission (FMC). Future trading in agriculture involves various
regulatory authorities, viz., FMC, Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). Apart from these three
regulatory authorities, other four commodity exchanges were authorised.
The agricultural commodities that were given permission for trading are
soya oil, guar seed, guar gum, chana, jute, rubber, pepper, turmeric, wheat,
kapas (cotton) etc.
Negotiable Warehouse Receipt System: The market believes that cash-
settled contracts are liable to generate speculative trade, thus physical
deliveries are essential to provide the equilibrating mechanism in future
demand and present supplies. The warehouse facility, quality certification
system and transferability and negotiability of warehouse receipts backed
by legal provisions remain crucial for the growth of agricultural futures
markets in the country. The system of negotiable warehouse receipts could
potentially eliminate various transaction costs involved in the grain
marketing and also reduce the cost of maintaining public infrastructures.
The Expert Committee had suggested universalising the system of
warehouse receipts in future trading so as to raise volumes and minimising
the transaction cost. Since the quality aspect bears a crucial risk element
in agricultural future trading, its success depends on to what extent the
quality risk is covered in the contracts. The declaration of reform in this
direction can be viewed as a step towards removing restrictive provisions
and liberalising grain marketing in the country.
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Concentration of Market Power
Spiraling price increases or price volatility in the presence of market
power and speculative trading in grains markets have often been identified
as major risks to food security in developing countries. Mckeon [2015]
has recently illustrated how the corporate global food chains or the
financial and structural power of corporations can set the food security
rules to their advantage. The governments often justify control measures
for the private sector on the grounds of containing the speculation and
safeguarding the interest of farmers and consumers. The market power
refers to the ability of a firm to raise and maintain price above the level
that would prevail under competition. A firm with market power bears
the ability to engage in unilateral anticompetitive behaviours, viz., affect
either the total quantity or the prevailing prices in the market.
The Herfindahl index (also known as Herfindahl–Hirschman Index)
remains as the standard measure to evaluate the size of firms in relation
to industry, viz., the market concentration. The measure is defined as the
sum of the squares of market shares of the firms within the industry,
where the market shares are expressed as fractions. The index value ranges
from 0 to 1, depending on the presence of large number of firms to a
Table 11.4: Herfindahl Index of Concentration for Rice and Wheat
Based Industries (2001-2010)
Years Rice Flour Milling Biscuits Bread Breakfast
Products Cereals
2000-01 0.06 0.00 0.14 0.22 0.55
2001-02 0.07 0.00 0.14 0.30 0.56
2002-03 0.07 0.00 0.16 0.25 0.51
2003-04 0.09 0.00 0.19 0.25 0.48
2004-05 0.10 0.00 0.22 0.24 0.34
2005-06 0.06 0.00 0.25 0.16 0.35
2006-07 0.09 0.01 0.24 0.24 0.35
2007-08 0.09 0.02 0.24 0.26 0.37
2008-09 0.09 0.02 0.25 0.34 0.44
2009-10 0.11 0.02 0.23 0.36 0.47
Note: The numbers of sample companies are above 30 for both Rice and Flour
Milling Products, above 16 for Biscuits and above 5 and 4 for Bread and Breakfast
Cereals, respectively.
Source: ‘Market Size and Shares’ ((various issues), Centre for Monitoring the Indian
Economy.*
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single monopoly producer. Since the index takes into account the relative
size distribution of firms in a market, its value approaches to zero when a
market is occupied by a large number of equal sized firms and reaches to
one, when the market is controlled by a single firm.
The Herfindahl Indices of Concentration is analysed to examine the
market power in the rice and wheat based industries (Table 11.4). The
evidence of market power is much lesser in rice and flour milling products,
but somewhat higher in the processed segment that uses wheat and/or
rice, viz., biscuits, bread and breakfast cereals. The near zero values of
the indices indicate perfect competition in the flour milling industry. Since
no individual participant in the market bears significant market power,
anticompetitive behaviours, e.g., price setting, use of predatory pricing,
creating barriers to entry for potential new competitors, etc., do not appear
likely to take place.
Feasibility and Areas of Private Sector Development
Success of a reforms programme depends not only on the combination
of policies but also on their timing and sequencing. The grain market
reforms agenda should ensure that the decontrol and deregulation
measures are initiated for the beginning of private participation. However,
the reformist policies should not remain limited to removing the marketing
and movement restrictions, but also address fundamental issues like the
MSP and the buffer stock policies.
The MSP of almost all agricultural produce in the past have ruled above
the market price and at times the world price. Rising MSPs provide the
biggest roadblocks for the private participation because it finds
procurement at economically unreasonable MSP genuinely problematic.
Similarly, the scale of FCI procurement also poses greater uncertainties
for the private traders and corporations involvement at times.
While the Central government may start the set of reformist policies,
the task of implementation remains with the state governments, since
agriculture remains under state subject in India. It may be mentioned that
in the recent past the effort level of states has remained low in fully adopting
the Model APMC Act. In the same way, there remain uncertainties with
regard to government resolution banning the movement restrictions under
the Essential Commodities Act (ECA). The permission to carry out
purchase, movement and trade is yet to be fully granted by the
modifications of ECA and APMC Acts. It therefore appears that the
marketing reforms and decontrol on movement restrictions could provide
the vital incentive for generating the private response. Subsequently, the
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modernisation of grain storage and supply chains would become necessary
to provide the impetus to private participation.
A reduction in the size of public procurement could lead to more
produce reaching the market and there is an obvious scope that the post-
harvest activities (cleaning, drying, storage and transport) associated with
grain handling to pick up. The participation of firms in grain business
would get a further boost when the sector gets the permission to establish
and operate agricultural marketing infrastructures and supporting services.
The private sector can also be involved to carry out the procurement
operations on behalf of the FCI and fulfil the government’s PDS
responsibilities. The private sector’s involvement in the grain business
can be expected to move further in the direction of processing and exports
once the restrictive policies are removed.
There remain certain gaps and contradictions within the existing
provisions and policies that intend to reform the grain business. For
instance, future contracts necessitate that prices are determined by market
forces without any government control, and no single buyer-seller-
regulator bear any undue importance on prices. But, the present MSP
policy eliminates the price risk through assured government procurement
mechanism. Thus, when prices are fixed by the MSP policy and do not
adjust except through change in government policies, there remains a
little incentive for hedging a risk.
Likewise, the policy of promoting a processor-grower arrangement
cannot be successful without the judicial support of contract enforcement
and a crop insurance mechanism. Finally, the requirement of capital can
be expected to grow with the grain market liberalisation in India. The
private participation would expand if an appropriate mechanism for
providing advances against stocks is provided. The negotiable warehouse
receipt system can provide the source of inventory credit in the financial
transaction of agricultural commodities. One can expect a higher private
involvement with the creation of a legal framework for the negotiability
and transferability of warehouse receipts.
Summary and Policy Implications
The government controls and regulations impose some obvious costs
on the private grain business in India. At the same time, the public
management undertaken within regulated market condition is found to
be costly so that it already created huge subsidy burdens on the
government. It is being recognised that the public grain handling operations
are intertwined around such complex control and regulatory instruments
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that their executions at times remain beyond the capacity of the Central
and/or state governments.
It therefore appears that the dependence on control and regulatory
mechanism has to be reduced for carrying out the grain market operations,
and there is a strong case for substituting these as much as possible by the
market mechanism. Similarly, the ECA restricts the movement of
agricultural produce across states boundaries and also imposes stock
limitations on the traders. In the same way, the Agricultural Produce
Marketing acts necessitates that traders buy produce only from regulated
markets. These acts and restrictions have only made the accomplishment
of direct contractual relationship between the grower and processor
difficult.
A larger private participation, which bears a built-in competitive
mechanism, can be expected to improve the incentive structures of the
grower, trader and end-consumer. The entry of private sector may inflict
competition in the grain procurement process and make farmers get better
returns from the FCI, which acts as a monopsony buyer. The improvement
in agent’s incentives structures could make the grain market activities
more market determined. This may lead to enhancement in the market-
size with more produce reaching the market instead of getting used for
the public stock maintenance. A set of reform measures that allow private
participation can facilitate the use of modern technologies and exploit
the potentials of a whole range of value chains in the grain sector.
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Abstract
Competition enhances the levels of productivity through efficiency
gains, widens the frontiers of market access through increased entry
opportunities that in turn, results into increased investments and
continuous innovation to capture new market niches. This paper illustrates
the role of the Tanzanian government in competition reforms. While it
supports the view that achieving sustainable economic growth in most
developing countries is a function of regulatory reforms; it argues that
such reforms must essentially aim at eliminating or minimising costs of
doing business in order to stimulate investments, industrialisation, and
ultimately providing new employment opportunities that adds to stability
and total socio-economic and political welfare. Given the available
opportunities in Tanzania, strong political commitment in promoting
regulatory reforms is required for Tanzania to leap frog from a low to
middle income before 2050. This paper also argues that successes or
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failures of competition reform, or any regulatory reform, depend on the
political will of the government of the day.
Taking Tanzania as our case study, this paper will analyze the
government’s role in the competition reform process in this country, and
the role which competition policy has been playing in the economy in
promoting healthy markets, consumer welfare, employment, innovation
and industrialisation.
Finally, in order to realise the highest returns from competition or any
other regulatory reforms, participation of key competition stakeholders
is vital. The paper will examine the synergies that exist or need to be
established between those who support the competition reform agenda
and those who are beneficiaries of the reforms.
Introduction
Tanzania, a country that had erstwhile pursued a state-planned
economy, is now one of the developing countries that adhere to the tenets
of liberalised economy policies. Its adherence to such neoliberal
philosophy is not without reasons or history. As from 1961 when it attained
its independence to 1966 the country’s socio-economic life had a capitalist
flavour. The private sector was taking the lead in contributing to growth.
However, in 1967, it adopted the so-called Arusha Declaration. The
declaration, named after the town where it was promulgated, espoused
the philosophy of ‘Socialism and Self-reliance’ (Ujamaa na Kujitegemea).
All major means of production were placed under the hegemony of State
for the reasons that ‘the then private sector lacked both the capacity to
generate the needed economic growth and to efficiently allocate resources
in a young economy.’1 And, as UNCTAD correctly puts it, in such an
environment competition was considered ‘a suspicious capitalist tool’ and
not ‘a developmental tool’ of the country’s centralised economy2.
The days of fuelling socialist ambitions, however, did not last long.
From the mid-1980s and early 1990s onwards, several factors contributed
towards Tanzania shifting its political stance.  These include: a costly
war with Uganda, rising prices of oil globally, a shrinking world economy
and the fall of the Cold War curtains.
The country’s political and socio-economic landscape underwent a
surgical metamorphosis embedded in the so-called National Economic
Survival Programme (NESP) (1981), followed by 1982 Structural
Adjustments Programmes (SAP) and the Economic Recovery Programmes
(ERPs). In their totality, these IMF-World Bank backed reforms forced
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the government to bid farewell to the socialist policies it had embraced in
favour of market-led economic policies.
The parting with the old in order to embrace a new policy orientation
was an inevitable event. The country’s economic growth at the time was
unsustainable and crumbling. Moreover, the monopoly of the public
entities, nepotism, and corruption had worsened, and the country was
experiencing a low economic growth rate, high inflation and foreign
exchange crisis. Coupled with other inefficiencies, all these had brought
its economy to a near total market failure.3 The bottom line, however,
was the recognition that a public sector-led economy embodied with
restrictive investment climate was unhealthy.
Consequently, there arose a demand for changes; and, changes that
would not only bring to the front the noble role, which the private sector
could play in promoting sustainable economic growth, but also the rightful
breathing space for this sector in the economy. Embarking on a policy re-
think to create a fertile regulatory environment designed to correct market
failures, was thus an inevitable option. One essential element of that ‘fertile
and enabling environment’ was a sound, fair and transparent regulatory
framework in which an effective competition regime became its crucial
pillar.4 Such a noble realization, therefore, called for serious reforms meant
to spur the country’s economic growth.
Regulatory Reforms as a Baseline for Sustainable Growth
Sustainable economic growth is a function of reforms which include
regulatory reforms. As noted earlier, regulatory reforms in Tanzania begun
with relinquishing the State’s economic hegemony by embracing policies
in the nature of liberalisation and privatisation of the erstwhile State owned
enterprises. ‘Liberalisation aimed at inviting private sector participation
in economic development activities, coupled with attracting more Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) in the country, hence more competition.’5 It
involved creation of institutions, laws, regulation and procedures that are
consistent and compatible with the market-led economy, and, collectively,
they created the requisite environment for investment and sustainable
growth of the various sectors of the economy.
Overall, the importance of such reforms and the environment they
have created cannot be emphasised. They have continued to assist in
minimising costs of doing business in order to stimulate investments,
promote industrialisation, and ultimately providing new employment
opportunities that add to stability and the total socio-economic and political
welfare.
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From a competitiveness perspective, the adoption of competition law
and policy was a step further in the reform process. This is essentially so
because liberalisation and privatisation policies could not alone bring about
the desired benefits in the absence of an environment that fosters
competition among various economic players. Such a policy choice has
witnessed the formation of relevant competition regulatory structures
and operational entities, executive agencies, and privatisation of
commercial activities that could be carried out in a best way and
competitively by the private sector.
The government has since then disentangled itself from the monopoly
of public entities in such sectors like telecommunications, allowing
competition to flourish for the common good of the nation and the entire
public. Instead of being a key player in the market, it has assumed a
facilitative role rooted within its mandate to create and sustain a requisite
environment within which the market economy principles can flourish.
Government’s Role in Moulding Competition Reforms
It is without doubt that, one major role which any government has to
play in a liberalised economy is that of providing the necessary services
and frameworks needed for the effective operation of a market economy.
This economic system, in which the allocation of resources is determined
solely by the forces of supply and demand, needs proper guidance and
operational frameworks which, in the context of economic development,
ably gauge not only the parameters within which socio-economic activity
takes place but also the provision of public goods; regulation of economic
activities; reallocation of resources; and stabilisation of the economy.
For its better tailoring, the Tanzanian Government had to set in motion
the necessary reforms to remove controls that were earlier set under the
Ujamaa era. Having so decided, policy makers and the legislature were
persuaded to promulgate pro-competition policies and enact laws providing
for checks and balances in the market economy. Most of the post-Ujamaa
legislation enacted focussed, primarily, on not only establishing the legal
status of business enterprises and ensures the right and protection of
private ownerships (this being a key factor in encouraging entrepreneurship
within a country’s borders),6 but also promoting competition by taking
suppressive measures against anti-competitive agreements, abuse of
dominance, as well as to regulating mergers and acquisitions which result
in distortion of the market. One such legislation was the Fair Trade
Practices Act, 1994.
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Essentially, the Act laid down various general competition rules
governing anti-competitive activities. Under the Act, anti-competitive
practices could not be justified if they significantly affected competition
in a market.7 Basically, the Act covered four main areas; namely:
1. Restrictive business practices,(including those with horizontal and
vertical nature);8
2. Misuse (abuse) of market power;
3. Control of monopolies and concentration of economic power
through mergers and acquisitions; 9  and
4. Consumer protection.10
In order to ensure a smooth riding, however, the Government reviewed
the Act in 2001 and opted for a two pronged approach to effective
regulatory reforms, namely: economic regulation and competition
regulation approaches. The government’s role in the reform process may
thus be viewed from, but should not be limited to these two approaches.
Economic Regulation
While recognising that competition reforms and the culture of
competition need to be well entrenched philosophies in the economy, the
government was attentive to the fact that certain sectors of the economy
need specific form of regulation. In this regard, the government created
separate institutional and legal frameworks apart from the competition
regulation framework.
The need to execute change was due to the fact that the first competition
regime, established by the Fair Trade Practices Act, 1994, was beleaguered
with shortcomings that called for its repeal and a new Act was passed for
a better focus that separated economic regulation from competition
regulation. This re-enactment of the competition regime, led to the passing
of four legislative enactments for economic sectors from which the
application of the Competition Act was not directly envisaged. The
respective legislative enactments which limit the application of the
Competition Act are:
(i) The Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority
(EWURA) Act, 2001
(ii) The Surface and Marine Transport Regulatory Authority
(SUMATRA) Act, 2001
(iii) Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority (TCAA) Act, 2003
(iv) The Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA)
Act, 2003
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It is worth noting, however, that these four pieces of legislation regulate
certain forms of competition in the respective sectors in which they apply.
While they provide that the Authorities will ensure effective competition
in the sectors and will investigate anti-competitive conduct, they have the
option to refer any anti-competitive conduct in their respective sector to
the FCC for investigation. The structure created by these legislations,
however, is unfavourable as it complicates effective handling of
competition matters as it will be discussed later.
Competition Regulation
One of the rationales for the crafting of a competition law and policy
in Tanzania was the need to ensure that former state monopolies, and
which were now in the hands of private operators, do not turn themselves
as private monopolies. Considering this, governmental policy direction
with regard to competition policy is bent towards allowing competition
to regulate the market and, where competition is not available and natural
monopolies exist, then, some sort of administrative regulatory oversight
is available, especially where benefits are seen to out-weigh the costs of
regulation. Indeed, as noted earlier, with the exception of the four regulated
sectors, (mostly utility sectors) the rest of the economic sectors fall within
the ambit of competition regulation.
Following the need to re-shape the initial competition regime established
under the 1994 Fair Trade Practices Act, the prevailing law on competition
has been the Fair Competition Act, 2003. This Act replaced the 1994
enactment.
The Act has established a fully functioning and independent
Commission as a market support institution responsible for addressing
anticompetitive conduct in the market, and a Tribunal which determines
appeals arising from the decision of the Commission. The presence of the
Commission and the Tribunal in place to address fair play in the Tanzanian
market, offers a wealth of market opportunities for both to internal and
foreign companies.11
Generally, the Act and its enforcement machinery provide an
environment which not only guarantees for a fair exit from but also free
entry into the market. Such an environment provides for the conditions
necessary for fair competition and sound operations among the various
players in the economy, thereby adding flavour to the designation of
Tanzania as an attractive investment destination.
Currently, ‘with a population of [over 40mn] consumers, a rapidly
growing economy, and high levels of domestic investment spending, the
Tanzanian market remain[s] an important target destination for local and
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foreign products and services.’12 All these signify the benefits, which the
regulatory and competition reforms can bring and which has the impact
of not only alleviating poverty and increase investment and employment
opportunities but ultimately spur sustainable economic growth.
Competition Policy and the Participation of the State in
the Economy
As already noted in 3.0 above, the role of State in promoting competition
cannot be over emphasised. Notwithstanding this fact, in a country like
Tanzania, where hitherto the State had an upper hand in the market
through public corporations and institutions that regulated prices, for
example, the National Price Commission,13 there are few instances when
the State might act as a stumbling block to effective competition. This
might, especially occur where the State interferes with the effective
functioning of competition in the market place through the so-called state-
related restraints. Such state-related restraints may appear in various forms
including, but not limited to state’s ownership of shares in public
corporations or granting preferential privileges or protection to certain
entities ‘national champions’ as compared to others plying in the same
market.
In Tanzania, the framers of the Fair Competition Act did consider the
interplay between the introduction of competition policy and the
participation of the state in the economy. To be precise on this, section 6
of the Fair Competition Act (FCA) is a relevant provision to refer to
when dealing with the State’s involvement in the market. The section
provides as follows:
‘6.-(I) This Act shall apply to Mainland Tanzania, state bodies and
local government bodies in so far as they engage in trade.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-sections (1), the State
shall not be liable to any fine or penalty under this Act or be liable
to be prosecuted for an offence against this Act.
 (3) For the purposes of this section, without affecting the meaning
of ‘trade’ in other respects -
1. The sale or acquisition of a business, part of a business or an
asset of a business carried on by the State, a State body or a
local government body constitutes engaging in trade; and
2. The following do not constitute engaging in trade:
(i) the imposition or collection of taxes;
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(ii) the grant or revocation of licences, permits and
authorities;
(iii) the collection of fees for licences, permits and
authorities;
(iv) Internal transactions within the Government, a State
body or a local government body.’
As it may be seen from the above provision, the interplay between the
introduction of competition policy and the participation of the State in
the economy is limited only to the extent which the State bodies or local
government bodies are actively engaged in ‘trade.’ Although the Act defines
the term ‘trade’, under section 2, as including ‘commerce’, this definition
is not sufficiently elaborate. Nevertheless, from common knowledge, the
term ‘trade’ may be regarded involving the ‘intercourse for the purposes
of trade in any and all its forms, including the transportation, purchase,
sale and exchange of commodities.’14
Considering what section 6(1) of the FCA provides, where a
government department or a local government engages in a conduct that
amounts to doing business within the context of this provision, it has to
abide with the general competition law principles. If the conduct violates
the FCA, it will be subject to investigation and sanction under the Act. A
good example of a case, which considered the application of section 6(1)
of the FCA was the case involving the Tanzania National Roads Agency
(TANROADS).  This case involved the issuance of exclusive permits to
erect gantries and billboards along road reserves sites throughout the
country.
The permits were only issued to two firms by TANROADS, fact which
made other players in the outdoor advertising market to lodge a complaint
at the FCC. While determining the case, TANROADS challenged the
jurisdiction of the Commission stating that being a state agency was, by
virtue of section 6(2) of the FCA, immune from the application of the
Act.  However, the Commission was satisfied that since the alleged conduct
constituted a barrier to other potential entrants in the same business of
advertisements through gantries and billboards, it had jurisdiction to
determine the matter and, that, TANROADS fell within the ambits of
section 6(1) of the Act.
In the final analysis of the matter, the Commission held that
TANROADS was a State body and not the State, hence, not subject to
the exemption under the provision of section 6(2) of the Fair Competition
Act. Its agreements with the respective firms were declared null and void
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for having contravened the Fair Competition Act. All these developments
painted a new picture, which reveals that, with a guaranteed independence,
a competition authority can still oversee and build a culture of competition
and dispense ‘competition justice’ even against State-related agencies or
department when such are involved in perpetuating anticompetitive
conduct.
Unveiling the Policy, Institutional and Implementation
Challenges
It is now more than two decades since Tanzania adopted a competition
legal framework and a decade long since the Fair Competition Commission
(FCC), as an institution that oversees competition in the market, was
established. For all these past years, the path towards a flourishing
competitive market economy in Tanzania has not been smooth.
There have been challenging issues ranging from policy, legal and
institutional setting, as well as human and financial resources challenges,
all making it difficult, though not impossible, to sustainably carry-out the
necessary functions of building an environment within which the benefits
of competitive market economy could be fully realised.
Policy-Legal related Challenges
As already stated, from 1990s onwards, governmental policy direction
with regard to competition policy was bent towards allowing competition
to regulate the market. Where competition is not available and natural
monopolies exist, then, the government opted for some sort of
administrative-regulatory oversight, especially where benefits were
considered to be out-weighing the costs of regulation.
Thus, with the exception of the four regulated sectors mentioned
earlier, (mostly utility sectors) the rest of the economic sectors should
automatically fall within the ambit of competition regulation. While this
policy decision by the government was perfect when the country was still
crafting its regulatory route the whole scenario, if examined, and its
trajectory having been treaded for two decades now, it reveals some
challenges that pose a serious threat to a well-functioning competition
regime.
 Indeed, by creating regulatory institutions with concurrent mandate
to deal with certain competition issues in their respective sectors15, there
has been a loophole that anti-competitive conduct in those sectors may
be left unattended. This risk is supported by the fact that, unlike the
FCC, the rest of regulatory authorities spend more time and expertise on
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technical/economic regulation in their sectors than on competition
regulation. The reason for this is simple. They were not established, like
the FCC, to specifically address competition issues and, consequently,
their expertise on investigations and handling of anti-competitive conduct
that may be within their respective sectors is limited.
This is a challenge that necessitates a thorough review of the current
policy-cum-legal structure in order to separate economic regulation from
competition regulation in those sectors and to allow the FCC to have an
overriding mandate on competition issues even in those sectors.16
Furthermore, vesting the FCC with direct powers to intervene and
investigate anti-competitive conduct in any of the regulated sectors will
also help to remove any confusion or uncertainty which may occur should
a Regulatory Authority, for instance, pursuant to its enabling Act; punish
its subjects for violations of the laws and regulations governing the sector,
e.g., cancellation of a license, and at the same time refer an anticompetitive
conduct to the FCC for investigation.
In such a scenario, the culprit may rely on the Ne bis in idem (double
jeopardy) principle to challenge any decision which the FCC may wish to
take, hence unnecessarily prolonging the effective enforcement of the
competition principles.  There is at least an example from our experience,
which might assist to illustrate this point better.
Since 2011, the FCC has been pursuing a cartel-related case in the
petrol supply industry. The facts of the case are that, because petrol supply
sub-sector is a regulated sector, in 2011 the regulator (EWURA) issued a
cap price indicating price for which a litre of petrol or diesel was to be
sold.
The oil marketing companies, through the Chairman of their
association, Tanzania Oil Marketing Companies, ‘TAOMAC’ issued
statements through the media boycotting to supply fuel to the market in
opposition to the new cap-pricing regulations. The incident, which seems
to have been coordinated through ‘TAOMAC’, led to disruption in the
entire market and occasioned sufferings to consumers and the entire
economy for almost three consecutive days.
The regulator issued several compliance orders to some of the members
of ‘TAOMAC’ and referred a complaint against the conduct of both the
‘TAOMAC’ and its chairperson to the FCC. When the FCC took up the
matter and opened an investigation to establish whether the provisions of
the Fair Competition Act which prohibits collective boycott by competitors
were breached.
Although the matter is yet to be finalised, there has been several
objections by the members of “TAOMAC” to the effect that the matter
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ought to have been dealt with by EWURA, the regulator of the relevant
industry, since its establishing law gives it such a mandate. Such sorts of
arguments tend to prolong litigation unnecessarily. Their key roots,
however, is the underlying policy and legislative framework upon which
the whole idea of economic and competition regulation was pegged from
its inception.
Since the ‘TAOMAC’ case is still pending, it suffices here to state
that, there is a need to vest all mandate relating to overseeing competition
and investigating misconducts in an economy to one entity only.
Challenges Arising from the Current Institutional Set-up
The Fair Competition Act, 2003 established a fully functioning and
independent Commission as a market support institution responsible for
addressing anticompetitive conduct in the market, and a Tribunal which
determines appeals arising from the decision of the Commission.
The Commission became operative in 2005, and since then it has dealt
with cases ranging from merger applications (158 cases); un-notified
mergers (15 cases); abuse of dominance (2 cases), restrictive agreements
(10 cases), and 2 exemption cases, all being part of its mandate under the
law. The Commission has also defended appeals and applications arising
from its decision. There has been (9) appeal cases, (3) of which are still
pending at the Court of Appeal of Tanzania) and 11 applications filed at
the Fair Competition Tribunal. Figure 12.1 shows the number of FCC’s
competition related cases, in percent -wise, received as from 2007 to
2015.
Figure 12.1: FCC Cases: From 2007-2015  (in %)
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Despite the above noted successes and, although the Fair Competition
Act and its enforcement machinery provide for an environment, which
not only guarantees a fair exit from but also free entry into the market
and; even if this fact adds flavour to the designation of Tanzania as an
attractive investment destination,17 the current institutional design has
been, and remains to be open to challenge.
The current design combines investigatory, prosecutorial, and
adjudicative functions. This set up has created anxiety among legal
practitioners who view it as violating the constitutional principle of
separation of powers, even if the Commission’s modus operandi is
inquisitorial in nature.
Under section 69(1) of the FCA, read together with Rule 10(2) of the
Fair Competition Procedure Rules, for instance, the Commission can
initiate a complaint on its own and can investigate the same and make a
finding. In 2010, in TCC v FCC,18  an attempt was made to challenge this
provision at the High Court of Tanzania testing its constitutionality.
The Court, however, dismissed the petition on a technicality without
entertaining the matter on the merits since it was wrongly moved by the
petitioner. An appeal was preferred to the Court of Appeal and the same
has not been determined. Viewed from this perspective, one would
envisage a need to re-examine the current institutional set-up lest we find
ourselves in a messed-up situation like the one in which the Jamaican Fair
Trading Commission was thrown into following the decision of the
Jamaican Court of Appeal in Jamaican Stock Exchange Commission v
Fair Trading Commission (FTC), Supreme Court Civil Appeal No.92/97.
In this case, it was held, inter alia, that it was improper for the respondent
(FTC) to perform the functions of a complainant and adjudicator since
that was in breach of the principles of natural justice.
Taking the above example and, given the attempt to challenge section
69(1) of the FCA, there still remains  a looming challenge that hangs on
top of the to the FCC as the sword of Damocles. Indeed, if successfully
pursued in view of the pending appeal in the Court of Appeal of Tanzania,
the decision may paralyse the carrying out of the functions of the
Commission.
In view of this, and as once noted elsewhere, since “[a] regulatory
framework should clearly, appropriately and sufficiently address ‘how’
the regulatory functions are to be carried out – the processes and
governance arrangements - particularly as they pertain to agencies
established to carry out regulation of a sector or market area;”19 then,
there may be a need to re-consider the current set-up of the Commission.
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Although it is established that the Commission conducts its business
through an inquisitorial process (as opposed to the adversarial process),
one proposal, which may be taken up for consideration in order to ensure
separation of investigation and adjudicatory powers within the
Commission is to broaden the number of the Commissioners and limiting
the involvement of the Director General (DG) in the decision making
process.
Instead of having the DG as a Commissioner who sits in the case
meeting, the Commission may creating a committee of experts in which
the DG will sit (since he heads the secretariat, i.e. the Director General
and his management team of technical experts) and the Commission should
delegate powers to such a committee,  tasking it with the responsibility of
conducting preliminary hearing of the cases and making preliminary
assessments/ provisional findings of investigations for recommendation
to the Commission.
In my view, such a division of responsibilities between the Commission
and the Secretariat, which is headed by the DG, will ensures that there is
fairness and objectivity in the operations of the Commission and also that
there is a separation of powers between investigations and case
adjudication. Otherwise, the FCC may remain a purely investigatory body
while the FCT handles all adjudicatory issues arising from the investigations
conducted by the FCC.
It is also worth noting that the FCC handles consumer complaints as
well. The Commission, however, has been unable to address consumer
complaints effectively since most of the current provisions of the FCA do
not give the Commission power to punish the culprits who violate the
relevant consumer protections principles.
In most cases the FCC ends up advising consumers to resort to the
ordinary courts for redress, and, as well understood, such a route is less
favourable given the length of time, which a case may take in a court and
expenses that may be involved until one gets the requisite redress. To
address this shortcoming the FCC has proposed for the amendment of
the current law so as to allow the Commission to act as a small claims
court and also apply the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms
in dealing with consumer complaints.
Challenges Arising from Lack of Sufficient Financial and Human Resource
As depicted earlier on the historical overview of the competition regime
in Tanzania, competition was not a culture experienced in the country
but a ‘new baby in town.’ In view of this, more efforts to build a culture
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of competition among players have been an essential agenda from the
time when the FCC became functional.
This FCC’s agenda has to be implemented through competition and
consumer advocacy campaigns. The success of this strategy however, has
been starved by inadequate funding since the FCC is not fully funded by
the government. The FCC is a business support and not a business making
institution. According to section 78 of the FCA, it is provided that Funds
of the Commission will comprise of -the (a) fees not exceeding 2.5 percent
of business licenses; (b) any grants, donations, bequests or other
contributions made to the Commission; (c) funds allocated to the
Commission from the   Regulatory Authorities,  (d) funds allocated to the
Commission by Parliament; (e) fees collected by the Commission; and (f)
all other payment due to the Commission in respect of any matter incidental
to its functions.
Despite these sources being well noted by the Act, they have remained
undependable sources and funding the business of the Commission has
remained a hard nut to crack.
The current arrangement with the regulatory authorities mentioned
under the Act is for them to fund the budget of the FCC on pro-rata
basis. While the FCC submits its proposed budgets well in advance and
carries out consultative meetings with the relevant regulatory authorities
(RAs), the agreed pro-rata mode of remittances from the RAs has never
been effective.
The FCC’s requests for funding from the relevant RAs pursuant to the
available funding regulations made under section 78 of the FCA has never
been remitted 100 percent as requested. In summary, Table 12.1 shows a
comparative annual Regulatory Authorities budget performance
percentage view for three financial FCC years 2011-2012 to 2014-2015.
Table 12.1: Annual Regulatory Authorities Budget Performance
Percentage (2012-2015) – Amount in Million Tanzania Shillings
Year Request Disbursed Percent Percent
Deficit Performance
2012/2013 2,707 1,209 55% 45%
2013/2014 2,585 1,238 52% 48%
2014/2015 3,298 900 73% 27%
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As it may be seen from the three years analysis shown in Table 12.1
from 2012-2015 the Commission budget from Regulatory Authorities
has never been achieved by more than 50 percent. In the year 2012/2013
it was achieved by 45 percent followed by 48 percent in the year 2013-
2014 and 27 percent in the current year 2014-2015. These variations
have had a negative impact on Commission’s achievement of its objectives,
goals, targets and activities due to the fact that the Commission had to
drop some of its planned activities due to financial difficulties.
This challenge is further complicated by the fact that, although the
FCA provides for an allocation of equal to 2.5 percent of fees charged
from business licenses by local authorities, nothing has ever been remitted
to the FCC. In view of all this, one can imagine how frustrating it may be
when a competition authority is poorly funded. Even if it will plan, it will
not manage to carry out all its plans successfully.
It must be noted that ‘effective implementation of competition law
needs to be secured through sufficient funding’20. For that reason, the
Government needs to appreciate and practically addressed the funding
issue since the FCC is an important institution to the economic well-
being of Tanzania.
It is also worth noting that, apart from dealing with competition issues,
the FCC is also mandated to fight counterfeits from the market and protect
consumers. Up to the moment it has been able to confiscate and destroy
counterfeit products worth approx. Tanzanian Shillings 5 billion. The
figures 3 and 4 below illustrates what was done over the past three
financial years, 2010-2011; 2011-2012 and 2012-2013.
Figure 12.2: Annual Budget Performance for Three Years
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Another resource-related challenge which the FCC has been facing
relates to inadequacy of its manning levels. Since its inception to-date the
Commission has not been able to attain its full manning level.
This has an implication on its overall performance given that the
Commission (as an entity) discharges another separate mandate (through
the Director General as the Chief-inspector), of dealing with counterfeit
goods. Although it is well known that the FCC can recruit its own
members of staff, the other flip side to this fact is that payment of personal
emoluments to such staff members is a function of the central government
given that all staff members are public servants in the public service.
Figure 12.3: FCC’s Implementation of Its Anti-Counterfeit
Mandate in 2010-2013
Figure 12.4: Number of Raids Conducted
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This means there must be a permit to recruit from the central
establishment, (the Permanent Secretary Public Service Management) and,
such permits are often not easily issued especially because the interest of
the central establishment to recruit personnel might be in respect of other
areas, which are considered to be of priority. As a result, the Commission
fails to carry-out its mandate fully.
Challenge Resulting from the Risks of Regulatory Capture
As noted earlier, the adoption of market economy in Tanzania involved
privatisation of the erstwhile public entities and opening up various sectors
to competition. It is clear, however, that most influential people in politics
and business became shareholders in most of the privatised entities and,
since such entities had been enjoying less competition they would wish to
continue with such a state of affairs even after the new form of competitive
environment had come into the scene. That being the case, one of the
challenges that face most young competition authorities is the possibility
of succumbing to the regulatory capture syndrome21.
In such a scenario, politicians tend to use their political influence to
interfere with the exercise of regulatory mandate vested on the competition
authority, for instance, with regard to mergers and acquisitions considered
to be anti-competitive. To do so, they will do all they can, using their
political offices or influence, to instill pressure on the competition authority
whenever the authority takes a bold step to investigate alleged anti-
competitive conduct against them, with a view to make the authority lose
sight of the public or consumer interests it is supposed to safeguard and
protect the privileges of the particular firm in question.
One example, in our case, is a complaint concerning un-notified merger
and abuse of dominance which the Commission pursued against a dairy
milk processing plant, Tanga Fresh Ltd (TFL) from 2010 to 2015. In
2009, TFL acquired two of its competitors without first filing a notification
before the FCC.
When the Commission learnt of the transactions and initiated an
investigation in accordance with the provisions of the FCA, TFL, through
one of its shareholders, Tanga Dairy Cooperative Society, resorted to
political offices for salvation. The matter was brought to the attention of
a parliamentary committee responsible for trade, industry and economic
affairs and certain officials from the FCC were summoned to appear before
the committee.
Even so, the FCC was adamant in ensuring that the law is properly
adhered to and issued its final decision on the complaint, which was upheld
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by the Fair Competition Tribunal upon an appeal preferred by Tanga
Fresh Ltd. This is one of the cases that exposed the FCC to the risks of
regulatory capture, a fact which is still alive to most young competition
authorities, especially due to the reason that the culture of competition
has not sunk deep within the fabrics of the society. However, as once
stated, competition authorities doing their job properly should always
resist such pressures.22
Challenges Resulting from Lack of Sufficiently Entrenched Competition
Culture
‘A ‘culture of competition’, is the desirable situation that exists within
a country when the rules and benefits of competition are widely known
and supported, and where serious consideration of the likely impact of
actions and regulations on competition forms a natural part of the
background for decisions by firms and governments. Building a culture of
competition and an effective competition regime is a long-term endeavour,
and not just a matter [of] one-off events. Competition must be
‘mainstreamed’ in all sectors.’23
Lack of sufficiently rooted culture of competition within a developing
economy like Tanzania, and given its socio-economic and political history
explained above, creates another barrier to successful discharge of
functions vested on the FCC. The Commission has been facing obstacles,
for instance, in accessing bills meant to be tabled before the parliament
for its prior review in order to ensure that the envisaged legislation does
not become a barrier to competition.
Resistances have also been noted in sectors such as insurance where a
prudential regulator of the sector wants at the same time to assume the
role of regulating anticompetitive conduct unveiled by the Commission.
A case in point is one involving two insurance associations, the Association
of Tanzania Insurers (AIT) and the Association of Insurance Brokers
(AIB).
The two colluded and fixed motor vehicle premium rates to be charged
by their members. When the matter came to the attention of the FCC, as
the conduct is prohibited under the FCA, the insurance regulator
challenged the FCC before the Attorney General (AG) alleging that the
proper entity to deal with the matter is not the FCC but itself. Since 2013
the matter has been unattended as the AG is required to issue guidance as
the Chief advisor to the government on matters of law.
Looking at the whole issue, however, the only conclusion which can
be drawn is that the current tussle between two government regulatory
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entities is that there is still a lack of sufficiently rooted knowledge and
culture of competition within the sectors of the economy, a fact that calls
for more advocacy sessions to government entities by the Competition
authority as part of the corrective measures.
The Challenge Emerging from the Lack of Functioning East African
Competition Authority (EACA)
As it may well be known, regionally within the East African Community
there is a law to govern competition issues and protect consumers.
However, the Act has largely remained ineffective because some of the
member States to the community are yet to domesticate it. Due to this
fact, the envisaged EACA has not been functional and cross-border
mergers tend to be notified in all countries under the respective domestic
laws.
Even if the authority was to be functional, there still remain unanswered
questions regarding whether a merger with cross-border effect will still
need to be notified in the jurisdiction where it has its nexus or should
only be notified to the authority. Whether and at what rate should part of
the notification fees payable trickle down to the national competition
authority from the regional authority is yet another unsolved issue. It
suffices here to note that all such issues are challenging since some national
competition authorities partly fund their activities through fees payable
by notifying parties.
Conclusion
Ever since the time when Tanzania embarked on the competition
reforms’ process, the role which competition policy has been playing in
the economy in terms of promoting healthy markets, consumer welfare,
employment, innovation and industrialisation, is significant. Briefly stated,
the reforms have opened plenty of opportunities for investments and
economic growth.24
Notwithstanding this fact, it is worth emphasising that competition
policy is not, on its own, a panacea for a sustained economic growth.
Strong political commitment that seeks to promote and sustain on-going
regulatory reforms is still required on the part of the Government and its
various agencies if Tanzania is to leap frog from a low to middle income
before 2050. This is essentially the case because successes or failures of
competition reform, or any regulatory reform, depend on the political
will of the government of the day.
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As noted from the above discussion, the competition regime in Tanzania
is still faced with challenges that need to be addressed. Whereas the
structural design challenges that are hinged on the establishing legislation
may be addressed through amendments, other challenges such as poor
financing of the FCC are policy related matters that need to be taken up
by the government itself if at all it is strongly committed to reforms and
ensuring that a culture of competition permeates within the entire economic
fabrics of the society.
In our view, the first and foremost commitment which the government
needs to portray is strong and consistent support to the institutions vested
with the mandate to provide competition regulation oversights.
Governmental funding is a crucial support that must be given to the
authority. As noted in this discussion, while the FCC’s operational budget
has been growing perpetually, its financial support has been gradually
diminishing.
This tendency tends to reduce the necessary independence which a
competition authority needs to maintain. Lacking sufficient funding has
the potential to weakening the position of the agency and reduces its
visibility, relevance, and voice within the nation. It makes it difficult for
the agency to air its views or to be heard at the Governmental or political
levels because, important activities, such as advocacy, which could have
enhanced its visibility are not fully carried out.
Consequently, the agency becomes less or rather consulted late in all
processes relating to policy or legislative formulations, which, as a matter
of fact, ought to be scrutinised to ensure that they do not create barriers
to competition.
It is also worth noting that there are still grey areas which need to be
further explored for the sole purpose of captivating not only the culture
of competition within the various sectors of the economy but also  the
entire rationale for competition reform agenda.
Since it is agreed that competition among various players in the economy
has the potential to spur sustained economic growth there is now a need
to ensure that the would-be barriers to competition, be they artificial or
statutory are completely removed so as to ensure not only free movements
of goods and services but also effective enforcement of the competition
law by the respective machineries.
In this regard, the FCC has, for instance, come up with a strategy to
engaging with various government departments and agencies and
regulatory bodies through entering into Memorandums of Understanding
(MoUs), which aim at not only ensuring that the relevant governmental
departments, agencies or regulatory entity lend support to the effective
250 Pursuing Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving SDGs
carrying out of the Commission’s mandate but also ensuring that the
culture of promoting competition permeates into their daily operations.
Finally, we wish to express our views that, in order to realise the highest
returns from competition or any other regulatory reforms, apart from
addressing key challenges as those enlisted herein, above, participation of
key competition stakeholders in the reform process and those who are
beneficiaries of the reforms, is vital. This entails enhancing the role of
competition and consumer protection advocacy at national and regional
levels including, but not limited to holding regional and national
consultative meetings with the business community, investors, consumer
groups, governmental departments and ministries with a view to
disseminate the competition gospel thus winning their support for any of
intended future reforms.
Effective involvement of such key players is essential in not only building
or strengthening the requisite synergies that exists or that need to be
established but also helps to promote the enjoyment of a continued support
for the competition reform agenda within the given country or regional
economic grouping.
It is further argued that building or strengthening existing synergies
between regulatory institutions, relevant government agencies, and
stakeholders or players in the business circles, is vital since it enhances
the chances of instilling the competition philosophy and culture within
and among key players within a given market.
In particular, key reforms in the other areas such as the area of
governance, are vital ingredients for a sustainable economic growth. Such
reforms include, but are not limited to, reforms geared at enhancing cost-
effective measures such as reducing (and completely) eliminating
corruption, mismanagement of resources, enhancing efficiency in service
delivery, increasing consumer awareness of and their voice against
inefficiency costs in various service delivery sectors  such as ports, airports,
tax revenue offices, and licencing authorities, as well as improving
coordination and transparency among various government agencies and
stakeholders.
All these elements have the potential to contribute to sustainability
and economic growth because they have the potential to spur investments,
both local and freeing direct investments, enhances the ease of doing
business, promote trust and confidence in the underlying economic
systems, such as financial as well as operational systems in a given country,
thus ultimately promoting more competition in the economy, poverty
reduction, unemployment as a result of improved welfare and societal
development.
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Abstract
The Internet companies, often referred to as Over-The-Top (OTT)
firms have powered ‘sharing economies’ around the world (Weber, 2014).
Two Sided Markets (2SM) and associated Platforms form the basis of
operation of these firms. In a typical 2SM, there are two sets of users
who complement each other’s usage thereby increasing the network effect
for enhanced value for both1. Often, one side of users cannot exist without
another and a platform is possibly the only way for them to efficiently get
to know each other and transact commercially. India is unique in this
aspect, compared to many other countries since a large number of
unorganised set of firms exist and that too especially in direct consumer
related verticals, such as travel, consumer goods, healthcare, apparel,
fashion, to name a few.
India is also witnessing for the first time a deluge of ideas and 2SM
based start-ups coupled with an ensemble of angel investors, incubators
and accelerator. Part of this enthusiasm is due to improved adoption of
computers, mobiles, and smartphones and the increasing penetration of
mobile Internet broadband across the length and breadth of the country.
However, in India as in other developing countries, there are considerable
challenges to interconnect the two sets of users and that is where the
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value of platforms, such as the above comes out. The paper provides
taxonomy of such 2SM platforms in existence, especially in India, their
economic and social benefits, the competition effect, and the associated
regulatory and policy interventions.
Introduction
The Internet companies, often referred to as Over-The-Top (OTT)
firms have powered ‘sharing economies’ around the world2. Two Sided
Markets (2SM) and associated Platforms (P) form the basis of operation
of these firms. In a typical 2SMP, there are two sets of users who
complement each other’s usage thereby increasing the network effect for
enhanced value for both3. Typical examples include an e-commerce portal
that connects users on one side with suppliers of goods on the other side;
a travel portal that intermediates between travellers on one side and the
travel firms on another; and so on.
Often, one side of users cannot exist without another and a platform
is possibly the only way for them to efficiently get to know each other
and transact commercially. This becomes very important, especially in an
unorganised sector where it is of prime importance for the platform
provider to bring a semblance of organisation, thus facilitating commerce
between the two sets of users.
India is unique in this aspect, compared to many other countries since
a large number of unorganised set of firms exists and that too, especially
in direct consumer related verticals such as travel, consumer goods,
healthcare, apparel, fashion, to name a few. The growth of 2SMPs, though
not new, is fuelled by the proliferation of Information and Communication
Technologies (ICTs). ICT parameters for Indi are given in Table 13.1.
Though the Network Readiness Index has not progressed much and
the country is still ranked in the 89th position out of the 140 countries in
WEF (2015), there are some distinguishing characteristics. The mobile
subscriber base in India is the second largest in the world and the mobile
networks cover more than 90 percent of the country’s population.
Though Internet and broadband penetration is still low, more and more
of users access Internet only through their mobile devices. The start-up
eco system in the ICTs is very vibrant in the country, as exhibited by the
venture capital availability. Bangalore, India is rated consistently in the
top 20 global start-up ranking, along the leagues of Silicon Valley in the
US. Though the impact of ICTs on new products and services is still
evolving, it is still consistently ranked above 4 (scale 1-7) indicating its
potential.
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India is also witnessing for the first time a deluge of ideas and 2SMP
based start-ups coupled with an ensemble of angel investors, incubators
and accelerator.  Part of this enthusiasm is due to improved adoption of
computers, mobiles, and smartphones and the increasing penetration of
mobile Internet broadband across the length and breadth of the country.
Part of it is also due to the inherent inefficiencies of the current unorganised
sector and a possible solution in an organised 2SMPs.
However, in India as in other developing countries, there are
considerable challenges to interconnect the two sets of users and that is
where the value of platforms becomes important. On the other hand, due
to relatively low entry barriers, it is easy to set up the platform business,
and hence, the reason for hundreds of start-ups in this space.
The caveat is that until the two sides scale up considerably the value of
the platform remains minimal. In the following section, the theory and
characteristics of Two-Sided markets and platforms will be discussed; in
the subsequent section, we provide five case studies from different areas
of the Indian economy and illustrate their evolution and benefits for the
two sets of users; in the concluding section, provide indicative policy
steps for addressing these markets.
Table 13.1: ICT Data of India (as on Dec 2014)
Network Readiness Index (WEF, 2015) 3.7 (scale 1-7)
Mobile subscriber base (in Million)/ 930.20/74.55
Mobile density per 100 population
Number of Internet Subscribers (in Million): 18.70/235.70
Wireline/ Wireless
Number of Broadband subscribers (in Million) 15.13 /60.60
(Wireline/ Wireless)
Impact of ICTs on new products and services (WEF, 2015) 4.1 (scale 1-7)
Global start-up eco system rank: Bangalore, 15 (out of  Top 20)
India (Compass, 2015)
Venture capital availability (WEF, 2015) 20 (Rank out of 143)
Laws relating to ICTs (WEF, 2015) 3.9 (scale 1-7)
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Theory of Two-Sided Markets and Platforms: A Literature
Review
This Paper extends the principles of Appropriate Technology and
Fortune-Seeking from the Bottom of the Pyramid expounded by Kumar
& Du (2011). Through cases, this paper attempts to bring out the socio-
economic impacts of ICT enabled 2SMPs.
‘Network externalities’ are qualities of certain goods and services such
that they become more valuable to a user as the number of users increases.
Examples of products exhibiting network externalities include fax
machines, credit card networks, telephone services, broadcast industry
services, computer hardware and software4.
Hence, network externality is defined as the increasing utility that a
user derives from consumption of a product or a service as the number of
other users who consume the same product or service increases. The
network effects due to these externalities can be direct or indirect fuelled
by complementarity and compatibility of associated products and services.
Cross-side Network Effects
The theory of Two-sided Market Platforms (2SMP) and associated
platforms is not new. It has been in existence since the time Visa and
MasterCard were discovered and even prior to that. In a typical 2SMP,
there are two sets of users who complement each other’s usage thereby
increasing the network effect for enhanced value for both. The platform
enables these two heterogeneous sets of users to come together to conduct
commercial transactions.
Success of the platform depends on the number of users on each side
and the usage across them which is often referred to as cross-side network
effect5. Hence, in a 2SMP, the cross-side network effects typically
complement the same side network effects – direct or indirect or both.
These effects are captured in the case of a typical e-commerce market
place as follows. Figure 13.1 illustrates a typical 2SMP and its associated
characteristics.
A typical e-market place is a platform that connects sellers of products
on one side with potential buyers on the other side. The platform provides
the required glue between sellers and buyers. The cross-side network
effect complements the same side networks in a 2SMP as shown.
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Pricing in 2SMP
Pricing is one of the important strategies in a 2SMP. Typically, one set
of users are subsidized while the other set pays premium depending on
the price elasticity of the demand.  In a two sided market with positive
cross-side network effects, the platform provider, even if it is a monopolist,
has an incentive to reduce platform profit. This is because in order to
compete effectively on one side of the market, a platform needs to compete
well on the other side. This creates a downward pressure on the prices
offered to both sides compared to the case where no cross-side effects
exist6.
Waterbed Effect
A significant feature of the two sided market is that one group of users,
choose to use only one platform, i.e. they ‘single-home.’ The other group,
might ‘multi-home.’ For example, in the e-commerce platform example
in Figure 13.1, typically consumers multi-home while sellers of
merchandise single home. In such a market if a seller wishes to interact
with consumer it has no choice but to interact with the consumer’s chosen
platform.
Thus platforms have monopoly power over providing access to their
single-homing users for the multi-homing side. This leads to the possibility
of high prices being charged to the multi-homing side. By contrast,
platforms have to compete for single-homing users (i.e. sellers in the e-
market place), and their high profits from the multi-homing side are to a
large extent passed on to the single-homing side in the form of low prices
or even zero prices. This is known as the waterbed effect and has been
demonstrated in analytical models7.
Figure 13.1: Overview of a Two-Sided Market Platform (2-SMP)
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Competition
The prospect of increasing returns to scale in network industries
especially in 2SMP, can lead to winner-take-all battles, and hence, if not
monopoly, but a relatively less number of platform providers. So an aspiring
platform provider must consider whether to share its platform with rivals
or fight to the death8. Coping with platform competition is a two-step
process process as per Eisenmann, et al. (2006). First, is to determine
whether their networked market is destined to be served by a single
platform. When this is the case, the second step is in deciding whether to
compete alone or share the platform in a competition model.
Taxonomy of 2SMPs
A broad taxonomy of 2SMP is necessary to understand the scope,
responsibility and liability of platform providers9.
First are e-marketplace platforms that connect buyers with sellers that
normally have associated brand. These may be niche or horizontal in nature
covering large number of products and associated sellers. The platforms
do some due diligence in selecting the sellers. Quality of products/services
is taken seriously and the platform providers do provide enough
information to the buyers including ratings and facilities offered, so that
buyers make informed decisions.
However, the payment for products and services are handled by the
platform provider and the platform acts as a one-point contact for the
customer. Moreover, these platform firms build brands through advertising
and other means to attract both buyers and sellers and gain their trust.
Due to the above role, these platforms normally bear limited liability and
responsibility for any errors in the completion of any transaction that
passes through their platforms. For example, these platform providers
normally have customer grievance cell and toll free numbers for the same.
They also clearly state cancellation and refund policies for the transactions
done through the platform.
Second, there are essentially directory services that enable customers
to get information about the products or services. These firms enable
buyers and sellers to meet and complete the transactions. Though these
platform providers do some due diligence to select whom to list and also
provide rating services, the onus on successful partnership between buyers
and sellers is normally not that of the platform provider. Given the low
barriers to entry in such a service, there is often stiff competition in these
types of platforms.
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Third, are aggregator platforms who sell goods and services under
their e-brand, who do not have physical counter parts, who act as one-
point contact for the customer, and who source their products and services
both from recognised sellers/brands as well as from individuals and
aggregators who may not have any brand or even physical presence.
However, these platforms are the ones who promise to bring sanity
and economic prosperity to the unorganised and informal sector
workforce, especially in countries such as India. These platforms enable
products and services to be made available which otherwise would not
have been noticeable, and provide business opportunities for micro-
entrepreneurs.
Regulation and Policy
The responsibilities and liabilities of these platforms are still evolving.
Hence there is a regulatory arbitrage that the 2SMP firms try to leverage
at times10. Most of the transport aggregator firms describe themselves as
‘technology platform companies’  and try to place themselves outside the
ambit of regulation. Figure 13.2 illustrates how various competition and
regulatory factors affect different types of 2SMP firms.
Figure 13.2: Effect of Market and Regulatory
Factors on Various Categories of 2SMP Firms
Search costs
By playing a technology based intermediation role, the 2SMP firms
decrease search cost for the users on either side of their platform. In an
unorganised market, search costs are often very high. Even in a relatively
organised market such as in the US, the taxi sectors suffers from high
search costs and Uber through its platform based approach, minimises
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the search costs for both cab seekers and drivers to find each other, as
pointed out by Rogers (2015).
 The platform firms can potentially solve high search cost and the
resultant lower supply through effective intermediation. However, the
moot question is, during this process, if they bypass extant regulation,
what should the policy response be? Should the extant regulation be
applicable, which in effect might increase search cost and reduce
associated benefits? As given in Figure 2, directory services reduce search
costs more than the other forms of 2SMPs.
Disintermediation
The 2SMPs provide a way for either side users to connect with each
other directly, thus reducing intermediation. In emerging countries, it is
well known that intermediaries appropriate huge rents on each transaction
between the two sets of users and thus reduce public benefits.
Disintermediation also reduces search costs and improves the economic
welfare of the two sets of users. The disintermediation is higher for
directory services as they provide an easy way for the two sets of users to
meet and complete their transactions.
Regulatory intervention
As indicated earlier, platforms tend to get commoditised and the
winner-take-all nature of 2SMPs might lead to monopolisation or cartels
in the market place. Excessive market power can threaten consumer
welfare. Hence, regulatory oversight and Significant Market Power
assessment is needed to avoid predatory pricing, cartelisation, and abuse
of dominant power. In general the competition watchdog should frame
rules that are appropriate for the 2SMPs, that is welfare enhance and
does not reduce the public benefits of such market forms.
When firms in 2SMP aspire to become monopolies, they might engage
in discriminate in either sets of users due to economic, political and personal
reasons. There are cases in the U.S. against Uber for exhibiting such
discriminatory behaviour11. What should be done against such possible
discrimination?
There are also information privacy concerns due to collection of data
at granular level by the e-commerce firms. While on one hand the
collection and analysis of consumer data improves personalisation of
services, it might invade security and privacy of individuals. What is the
appropriate regulatory framework for protecting the security and privacy
of individuals interacting with 2SMPs while at the same leveraging the
power of technology to provide better quality of experience?
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As shown in Figure 2, the 2-market places have higher regulatory
arbitrage compared to director services due to nature and involvement in
associated business activities.
Liability
Though firms in this space use the caveat of technology providers to
reduce their liability, there are a set of minimum liability and responsibility
clauses that the firms need to adhere to.  For example, if one gets a spoilt
food delivered by a platform provider, who should be liable? – one who
delivered it (i.e. platform) or the one who produced it (i.e. the seller).
Today, most 2SMP companies provide reasonable options for returns
and refunds in the case of deficient products or poor delivery service, but
there are situations where the liability could and should extend beyond
just a refund.
This is somewhat similar to the many cases where infringement of
copyrighted material makes not only infringer culpable but even the
platform that facilitated the infringement to be culpable. The answer to
this question is not very obvious. However, use of the tort law to delineate
between (i) intentional wrong doing and (ii) careless and negligence in
causing loss financially or otherwise to the victims is essential in
propounding strict or limited liability to the platform providers.
There is limited literature on the risks and associated remedies of
electronic market places. Weber (2014) discusses the moral hazard
problems faced by the intermediaries, especially those that provide shared
accommodation and shows how all stakeholders benefit from
intermediated sharing of goods. As shown in Figure 2, the liability is more
with the e-market places. The aggregators also have some limited liability.
The hypothesis is that due to the above forces that shape the economic
value of platforms, it can be potentially high for aggregator services
compared to other two types of 2SMPs.
Research questions
Based on the above, the following research questions can be formulated:
• What are the economic models for 2SMPs for sustainable
equilibrium?
• What are the potential economic benefits of 2SMPs?
• What are policy and regulatory dimensions in 2SMPs?
This paper attempts to answer the above questions through a set of
five cases in India.
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Cases of Two-Sided Market Platforms in India
In this section we analyse five 2SMPs in India, indicating their
uniqueness, challenges faced, and the associated economic benefits.
Turning yellow pages: JustDial
Though YellowPage directory services have been in existent in
developed countries since 60s, in most of the emerging economies,
telephone service was provided by the government or government owned
Post Telegraph and Telephones (PTTs) until privatisation was initiated.
In India until 1995, the Government of India was providing telephone
services through its Department of Telecommunications (DoT).  The DoT
used to publish Yellow Page Directory once a year and it was through
this that one can get potentially telephone numbers of firms selling a product
or service. There was also a government help line which was either non-
functional or non-effective most of the times.
However, VSS Mani had this idea of people dialing one number and
getting whatever information they needed and hence started ‘Ask Me’
service, way back in 1989. However, the service was a non-starter due to
very low penetration of telephones in the country. In 1989, the tele-density
in the country was 0.53 per 100 population.
Mobile services were introduced in the country in 1995 by private
firms. With exponential growth of mobile phones, a decade later – in
1999, Mani launched JustDial, using telephone as a platform. JustdDial’s
search service bridged the gap between the users and small businesses by
helping users find relevant providers of products and services quickly,
while helping businesses to market their offerings.
However, due to the ‘Receiving Party Pays’ scheme that was in existent
until 2003, there was little incentive for anyone to list their names in the
Directory service (Sridhar, 2012). Coinciding with the liberalisation of
Internet Services in 1999, the web site JustDial.com was launched, soon
to be shut down in 2001 due to the DotCom burst.
Nevertheless, JustDial was able to ride on the exponential growth of
mobile services during the early 2000s along with the ‘Calling Party Pays’
scheme that was implemented by the DoT in 2003. The web site was re-
launched in 2007; a decade after the domain name was registered12 .The
firm went public in 2013 in the country’s stock exchange.
Currently, the mobile Internet searches surpass voice/SMS searches.
Finally, the mobile app revolution caught on and Just Dial released its
mobile app in 2013, referred to as ‘Search Plus’ that includes listing of
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any commercial product or services vendor augmented by the geo-location
information.
Apart from search, Search Plus service enables commercial transactions
between users and business, such as ordering flowers from local vendors,
booking doctor’s appointment, laundry pickups, courier pickups and
grocery shopping. For example, average of 400 Doctor’s appointments
are booked through Search Plus; JustDial earns 2 per appointment.
About 600-1,200 food orders are placed through the platform and the
platform pockets 2-10 percent of the order value as the platform access
charge13 .JustDial, be in its plan vanilla telephone platform based, Internet
or mobile app based in a 2SMP providing director service, with information
seekers on one side and commercial firms engaged in providing product/
service on the other side.
Table 13.2 illustrates the growth of JustDial and its 2SMP
characteristics:
Table 13.2: Growth and 2SMP Parameters: JustDial
Growth Parameters (as on Mar 2015)
Number of commercial firms listed About 275,000; mostly unorganized small
businesses
Number of information seekers 15mn; addition/update of about 50,000
listings/ day
Annual searches M1,000mn
Revenue M1,562.80mn
Net Profit M471.60mn
Market capitalisation More than M150bn
Invested firms SAIF Partners, Sequoia Capital, Tiger Global,
EGCS and SAP Ventures. 
2SMP Parameters
The two sides Side-1: Information seekers; side-2:
commercial firms engaged in products/ service
The platform features Intelligent search, multi-channel (telephone,
Web, mobile app), rating, direct connect
between the two sets of users, sales leads
Money side Commercial listed firms: fee range: average:
M17,596 to maximum of M60,000 for
premium
Subsidy side Information seekers
Competitors AskMe, Sulekha, ZatSe, Getit and Google
(local business search), Yelp (U.S.);
58.com (China)
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JustDial is a case where a platform has solved the information
asymmetry problem between information seekers and small businesses.
According to Eisenmann, et al. (2016), first mover advantage can be
substantial in platform business as long as it is leveraged properly. By
being the first mover in this space, and growing its listings relentlessly,
JustDial has so far retained its advantage.
As per Eisenman (2006), JustDial used the product envelopment
strategy to continuously provide new offerings through it platform ranging
from ubiquitous voice/SMS search, web search for Internet savy users,
mobile apps for Smartphone users and combined it lately with associated
services. This has kept JustDial ahead of competition.
JustDial addresses the needs of unorganised small businesses, such as
local hardware shops, plumbers, mechanics, packers and movers,
refrigerator and air-conditioning repair shops, which so far depended on
physical foot falls and word-of-mouth recommendations for their business.
There are around 40mn small businesses in India, out of which about
500,000 have online presence. JustDial has enabled many of these small
and even smaller business to come online through its platform. JustDial
provided an opportunity for them to scale up their operations through its
platform. This scaling up enhances the required cross side network effects
and provides the glue for the information seekers and business to stick to
the platform. There is potential for JustDial to scale and this will only
benefit the small businesses in India to prosper.
Labour market revolution: Babajob
India’s unorganised work force is estimated to be around 400mn.
Growth of urban centres in India has drawn a large migrant population
from rural and remote parts of the country to cities. These migrant works
who are employed through middlemen do not have enough information
about the labour market in their locations. Most get jobs through referrals
by their community friends.
Founded in 2007 by ex-Microsoft researcher Sean Blagsvedt in the
Silicon Valley of India (i.e. the city of Bangalore) with the objective of
providing job opportunities for the largely organized blue collar workforce
in urban areas, Babajob has come a long way. With over 1.5mn jobs and
80,000 employers, Babajob.com is India’s largest informal and entry level
job portal, that interconnects job seekers (i.e. employees) and job providers
(e.g. employers).
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Following is a quote from the founder14:
“…I thought – if only we could digitise the job seekers and the jobs –
to connect job seekers to better opportunities – we might be able to
catalyse the escape from poverty for millions of people. I also looked
around and saw that there were no digital tools to connect informal job
seeker and employers. Thus Babajob was an idea I fell in love with, an
experiment to find a scalable way to connect millions in the informal
sector to better jobs…”.
Babajob initially focussed on providing household jobs and the challenge
was to attract job seekers to the platform. Started as a web portal that
listed job seekers, Babajob introduced call centres for those who do not
have access to the Internet. Voice/SMS services were incorporated,
considering the good penetration of mobiles.
Partnership with telcos saw the implementation of ‘SMS 55444 to find
your dream job’ and such campaigns followed, thus allowing Babajob to
scale up to second 100,000 users. Missed call service enabled the job
seekers to call a designated number, so that the call centre person could
call back thus avoiding any call charges to the job seekers.
Through ties with telecom operators, the SMS subscription service
was initiated with revenue sharing arrangements with Telcos. Typical
job seekers include housemaids, drivers, plumbers, telecallers,
receptionists, security guards, and cashiers. Apart from connecting job
seekers with employees, Babajob included background verification
schemes to provide authenticity of job seekers. The start-up boom in
India has enabled Babajob to scale up its operations, especially for drivers
of taxi aggregator companies, and sorters and delivery boys for e-commerce
companies.
Babajob provides a platform for blue and grey collar jobs to seek
potential employers. Platform addresses this unorganised sector and solves
the information asymmetry problem between job seekers and employers
in urban areas of the country. It is often very difficult to build awareness
of platforms like this in the unorganised labour force.
As per Sean, Babajob went literally door-to-door advertising their
services. In unorganised sector, word-of-mouth spreads faster and hence
provides the required scaling up. However it is important for socio-tech
start-ups like Babajob to appropriately price the money side for the
platform to scale up and be sustainable.
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Media on local languages: DailyHunt
Language is an important attribute of a population, and has great
relevance and significance in a pluri-lingual and pluri-ethnic land like India.
The total number of scheduled languages in India is 22 as per Census
India 2001.
There are about 400, 100, 80, 60, and 50mn Indian population that
speak Hindi, Tamil, Telugu, Gujarati and Kannada respectively. According
to the 2001 Census, 30 languages are spoken by more than a million
native speakers. Majority of Indians in non-metros are not comfortable
in handling the English language. Unofficial estimates place the number
of Indians who can speak English to be not more than 10 percent of the
population. Unofficial estimates indicate that 92 percent of newspaper
circulation is in local languages and there are over 700 Television channels
in local language.
However, none of the major Indian languages figures in the top ten
languages that are used in the Internet and hence about 83 percent of the
users operate their phones in English, despite their discomfort. These
indicate the huge need for making local language content/ app to be made
Table 13.3: Growth and 2SMP Parameters: Babajob
Growth Parameters (as on Dec 2014)
Number of Job seekers listed 163,000
Number of Job providers listed 30,000
Cumulative job listings 550,000; with net monthly addition of
10,000-20,000
Job alerts sent to job seekers 1.5 Million/month
Mobile and web page views 2.5 Million/month
Markets Large metros of Bangalore, Delhi and Mumbai
Invested firms Grey Ghost Ventures, Khosla Impact Fund,
SEEK Ltd.
2SMP Parameters
The two sides Side-1: Job seekers; side-2: employees including
businesses and households
The platform features Web portal listing of job seekers, Voice/SMS
alerts, call centre, background verification
Money side Businesses needing workers
Subsidy side Job seekers; for Voice/SMS alerts job seekers
pay charges
Competitors Nanojobs, Merajobs, Jack On Block, Yelp (US);
58.com (China)
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available on the Internet and through mobiles to meet the needs of this
under-served market.
News aggregators are services that pull together online content in one
place for ease of viewing on mobile devices. The market for news
aggregator apps is dominated by Google, with its Google News & Weather
for personalised news and weather content, and Google Play Newsstand
for personalised curated content and topic-based collections of articles15
Though there are other news aggregation services, they are all primarily
for English content.
Virendra Gupta started DailyHunt (previously called as Newshunt) in
2007 with the objective of providing news in local languages on mobile
devices. The Newshunt app brings regional vernacular content (both
newspapers and books) from across the country to one platform. With
over 36 minute installs, Newshunt is leading the digital vernacular
revolution in India today. The platform connects media houses and
publishers on one side with the readers on the other side. The general
architecture of the DailyHunt platform is given in Figure 13.3.
Figure 13.3: Illustration of DailyHunt Platform Features
The platform using its tools converts the publisher content in various
languages to generic fonts and distribute to the users via web as well as
app.
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Apart from newspapers, DailyHunt has curated digital e-books in
various languages that can be bought/ subscribed by the users for a price.
The daily newspapers are available for free to app/ web users. DailyHunt
claims that its users on the average spend about 184 minutes per month
on and claims that it is greater than the monthly average time spent inside
Flipboard (86 minutes). In July 2015, DailyHunt bought BuyT, a product
discovery and recommendation platform, which would be integrated with
NewsHunt for delivering product recommendations to NewsHunt users,
and help it improve its mobile advertising based monetisation.
Table 13.4: Growth and 2SMP Parameters: DailyHunt
Growth Parameters (as on Dec 2014)
Number of publishers/ 100 (25,000 articles sourced daily); 15mn
content providers local language e-Books,
Number of subscribers (readers) 75mn; 20min active users
(i.e. number of app installs)
Monthly page views 1.5n
Regional languages supported 12
Invested firms Falcon Edge Capital, Matrix Partners,
Sequoia Capital and Omidyar Network
2SMP Parameters
The two sides Side-1: Content providers, publishers,
and regional language writers; side-2:
Content readers and subscribers
The platform features Language support in many types of mobile
devices, Publisher referrals, advertisement
integration, integrated micro payment platform
Money side Subscribers of e-Books; advertisers
Subsidy side Readers of daily news; newspaper providers
Competitors Google News & Weather, Google Play
Newstand, Breaking News, BuzzFeed,
Flipboard, Nuzzle, Vox Media, Feedly, pulse
Platforms like DailyHunt bring news and knowledge closer to the
masses thus breaking the English language barrier that exists on the
Internet today. By curating the content in local languages these platforms
improve knowledge and awareness of citizens, thus bridging the
knowledge divide.
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Though China, Korea and Japan continue to produce amazing platforms
that cater to the needs of local languages, the phenomenon in India is
strikingly different. Unlike the one language platform in these countries,
India has to cater to at least 30 language speaking population.
Hence, attaining scale economies in each language is difficult though
critical. By a careful monetisation model and the fact that marginal cost
of reproducing digital content is almost zero, such news and content
aggregation platforms do uplift the knowledge and awareness of citizens
thus creating a large consumer surplus.
Healthcare for everyone: Practo
The estimated healthcare expenditure in India is about US$150bn with
a growth rate of about 12 percent, and constitutes almost 5 percent of
the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, less than one
percent of its GDP is government spending on public health, compared
with 3 percent in China and 8.3 percent in the United States. Hence the
private hospitals, clinics, diagnostic labs and doctors meet significant
portion of public spending in healthcare.
Though large hospitals are relatively organised, smaller clinics,
hospitals, and labs do not have an organised appointment booking, patient
tracking and monitoring systems in place. Most times, patients have to
wait for long hours in clinics resulting in loss of productivity.
Shashank ND & Abhinav Lal, founded Practo, a healthcare start-up in
2008.  The platform on one side referred to as Practo Ray, provides
automated appointment scheduling, storage of healthcare records,
including x-rays, files, prescriptions and billing for clinics, hospitals and
diagnostic labs. On the other side, Practo Search provides patients ways
to search doctors, clinics and labs and book appointments appropriately.
At the time of starting the company, the biggest challenge was to bring
doctors online as the penetration of web was low and the smartphone
revolution was still nascent in India.
Today, Practo claims to have nearly 200,000 healthcare practitioners,
8,000 hospitals on its platform and over 10mn monthly searches by
consumers16. The growth is majorly fuelled by the focus on expansion
and getting doctors on the platform. As per Shashank, “We’re now looking
to make Practo the Google for any information needed in the space of
healthcare. Whether you need a doctor, surgeon, dentist, veterinarian or
a diagnostic check-up, we will have it all at Practo”17. Practo has been
using the ‘product envelopment’ strategy to continually augment the
platform with features organically as well as through acquisitions.
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The acquisitions are expected to augment Practo’s platform in the areas
of preventive healthcare, enterprise segment, and personalised fitness areas
respectively. Currently, Practo operates in 35 cities, most of them having
million plus population. The founders are also looking to expand beyond
the Indian cities in to smaller towns in India as well geographies outside
India that has similar needs.
The healthcare services can also be personalized using data analytics,
which is one of the future areas of expansion for Practo. Currently, Practo
is one of the largest doctor search platforms in Asia and is ranked sixth in
the world.
Table 13.5: Growth and 2SMP Parameters: Practo
Growth Parameters (as on Dec 2014)
Number of Doctors/ hospitals 200,000 Doctors; 8000 hospitals & clinics
Number of More than 1.5mn
Monthly searches by consumers 10 Million; more than 100,000 patient
appointments per month
Invested firms Sequoia Capital, Matrix Partners
2SMP Parameters
The two sides Side-1: Doctors, patients, diagnostic labs;
side-2: patients
The platform features Doctor endorsements, patient feedback
Money side Hospitals and labs
Subsidy side Patients
Competitors Qikwell, Librate, HelpingDoc, Ziffi, CrediHealth
In emerging countries, large population is served by private hospitals
and clinics. Without appropriate insurance coverage, the population needs
a good referral system for better health care. The problem is more acute
in smaller towns and rural areas. The lack of good healthcare centres in
these areas force patients to go to large cities for check-ups.
However, due to lack of information and difficulty of booking
appointments, the patients commute long distances and wait for their
turn to see doctors. Start-ups like Practo solve this problem by providing
a platform for patients and doctors to connect so that appropriate and
timely appointments are made and adhered to. Digitisation of patient
records and automated billing systems help doctors, small clinics and
diagnostic labs in terms timely availability of accurate information about
patients.
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Taxi Aggregator: Ola Cabs
It is estimated that the radio taxi market in India is US$6-9bn dollars
growing at 17-20 percent. However, the organised market forms a very
small percentage of this market. It is estimated that the number of taxis in
the organised sector will reach 30,000 by 201718 .
In most of the emerging countries, due to lack of adequate public
transport, a large unorganized taxi markets exist. Referred to as Radio
Taxi Operators, a large number of fleet operators provide (i) airport service
and (ii) inter-city service and (ii) intra-city service.  These cab services are
licensed by the State governments and tariff fixed by the rate card issued
by the State transport department.
A native alternate to Uber came up in India in 2010, through Olacabs
as an online marketplace for booking cabs and car rentals in India. The
founder – Bhavish Aggarwal stated his ambition as “to change how India
travels and revolutionise personal transportation in the country”.
In tune with the above, Aggarwal founded Ola Cabs disrupted this
highly regulated market, by providing an easy to use platform that
connected the cab renters to individual taxi drivers directly. Though Ola
started its service about 3 years before Uber entered in to India, the real
competition started after Uber’s entry. Started as inter-city point-to-point
service, Ola started its inter-city (including to and from airport) service
first in Bangalore followed by other large cities in India.
Compared to Uber, Ola customised its services to the Indian market
by recruiting mini cabs, and even autos in its market place. After acquiring
its competitor Taxi For Sure in 2014, Ola expanded its fleet and started
providing services in 15 other cities apart from the large metros.
Using a product envelopment strategy, Ola provided driver details
including photographs for identification and security of passengers, and
Ola Wallet – its own payment wallet for easy payments. Ola’s market
evaluation has crossed US$1bn and has become one of the Unicorn start-
ups in India. It is planning to add bus aggregation and a food and grocery
delivery services as well. The other initiatives including car pooling and
logistics.
Ola’s platform is very simple to use both for the passengers as well cab
drivers. The passengers interact with Ola mobile app to book cabs, track,
call drivers, pay using wallet, and submit review of drivers. The cab drivers
are equipped with a Smartphone given by Ola that provides GPS based
tracking, and billing system.
However, on December 24, 2014, an Uber cab driver sexually assaulted
a woman in Delhi and was apprehended. Uber’s first claim not to take
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full responsibility for the event, drew the wrath of public and governments
alike against Uber and such other taxi aggregators. The taxi aggregators
hired taxi drivers who held All India Permits for driving taxis.
 The initial reaction from the government was that the cab aggregators
are responsible for the driver who they hire in to their platform and hence
should be liable for any wrong doing on the part of drivers.
From then on, it was not an easy going for Ola as there was a total ban
on aggregators who were providing taxi services without the Radio Taxi
Operator licence. Its operations were cancelled in many states including
in the cities of Bangalore and Delhi since it was operating without the
Radio Taxi license in some locations. While Ola and Uber argue that they
are technology companies, not taxi operators, and come under the purview
of the information technology law, government has not changed its mind.
However, in a landmark judgement on July 15, 2015, the Delhi High
Court suggested to the city government to do away with the ban on app-
based cab service providers, saying they cannot be blamed for illegal acts
of the cab drivers, who were given All India Permits (AIP) by the authorities
concerned.
However, the Supreme Court reiterated that “no commercial vehicles
shall ply in Delhi unless converted to Single Fuel Mode of CNG
(compressed natural gas) with effect from 01.04.2001”, Justice Jayant
Nath said in his order19.  Hence, Ola cab is trying to convert all diesel/
petrol cabs that are on its platform to migrate to CNG to continue its
operations in Delhi.
Table 13.6: Growth and 2SMP Parameters: Ola Cabs
Growth Parameters (as on Dec 2014)
Number of taxis 2,00,000 (fleet size)
Number of cities in operation 100
Invested firms Sequoia capital, Steadview Capital, Falcon Edge,
DST Global, Matrix Partners, Softbank, Accel
Partners, Helion Venture Partners
2SMP Parameters
The two sides Side-1: taxi drivers; side-2: taxi riders/passengers
The platform features Location based taxi assignment; Passenger
endorsements and feedback; automated billing;
mobile wallet for payment
Money side Taxi drivers; 15-20 percent of the bill value is paid
by drivers to the platform provider as transaction fee
Subsidy side Passengers
Competitors Uber, Meru, Savaari, EasyCabs
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Summary of cases
Figure 13.4 gives a summary of the above five cases and indicate how
they fare across different market and regulatory factors.
Figure 13.4: Performance of the Platforms across
Various Market/Regulatory Dimensions
While social benefits are directory services, such as JustDial are
minimum, they are expected to be higher for job portals such as Babajob
and literary content providers, such as Dailyhunt.  The market efficiency
due to lower search costs and more disintermediation is higher for
transport aggregators such as Olacabs. Competition effect is higher for
directory services.
Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications
As the above cases indicate, the 2SMPs in different areas seem to have
generated consumer surplus, mitigated day-to-day problems of common
citizens, reduced the information asymmetry problems and hence the
appropriation of rents, provided better job opportunities for blue collar
workers and those at the bottom of the pyramid.
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Though VC funds have played their role in these platforms scaling up,
the sustainability depends on the theories and outcomes of 2SMPs,
including pricing strategies, stickiness of both sides of users, and the
magnitude of cross side network effects.
Apart from the sustainability of these 2SMPs, the firms also have to
deal with regulatory and policy dimensions that are still evolving.
Countries around the world have been trying to extend the applicability
of the extant laws and regulations to this platform economy. While the
responsibilities and liabilities of these platforms are still evolving under
the extant laws, the platforms cannot take a ‘caveat emptor’ approach of
their legal position on their website20. Hence, the need for a balanced
approach to dealing with 2SMPs and associated regulation and policies.
We indicate below certain policy guidelines for dealing with 2SMPs.
1. Significant Market Power Assessment: Much like in any other sector,
Significant Market Power (SMP) assessment shall be done
periodically by the regulator or as and when needed to prevent
market dominance by one or a few set of players in the specified
market space.
2. Light touch regulation and mandatory compliance: Since social
benefits tend to be higher, the 2SMPs shall be treated with light
touch regulation. A subset of existing rules shall be defined as the
mandatory rules. The minimum liability and responsibility shall be
defined for the mandatory compliance part of the regulation. For
example, if taxi cabs need to run only on environmental friendly
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), the rule should be equally applicable
to those recruited by the taxi cab aggregator such as Ola Cabs.
Regulatory arbitrage should not be extended in this case as the social
and public harm due to highly polluting Petrol/Diesel run cabs exceed
the benefits due to disintermediation and lower search costs.
3. Fare regulation: Though platforms tend to create larger providers,
fare regulation should not be extended to 2SMPs. Since the platforms
are easily replicable and there is often less barriers to entry, any
predatory pricing or additional rent extraction by the incumbents
will be thwarted by new entrants.
4. Market share regulation: Any horizontal and vertical integration
shall not be discouraged by regulation. The platforms tend to attain
economies of scale and scope only through integration. Due to
increasing returns to scale of such platforms, integration is likely to
increase social benefits. Integration also brings about the much
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needed organisation to the unorganised sector, thus improving
accountability, responsibility and ownership of the market place,
thus providing superior benefits to both consumers and producers
on the platform as pointed out by Rogers (2015).
5. Regulatory levies: Regulatory levies increase cost of providing
platform service which in turn reduces the social benefits. Hence,
the regulatory must be careful to avoid levying additional tax on
2SMP providers.
6. Investment regulation: The high potential of these 2SMP firms and
their global characteristic have attracted foreign investments. Any
restriction on ownership and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) will
affect the much needed capital for the start-ups to scale up their
operations.
As has been witnessed in many cases, the incumbents often feel
threatened by the 2SMP providers and lobby against them. The regulators
and policy makers should be cognizant of the fact that resultant social
benefits due to 2SMPs tends to be higher, and hence, not be swayed by
the incumbents. Keeping a watch over the market, at the same time nurture
the proliferation of the 2SMPs through light-touch regulation is the key
for embracing the new technology revolution for larger social benefits.
There have also been criticisms of the 2SMPs. The simplicity of 2SMPs
and hence the analytical frameworks that revolve around them were
questioned in the context of Internet broadband provisioning by Sridhar
& Prasad (2016). As these 2SMPs evolve in to multi-sided platforms, the
economics and associated regulations have to be restructured. Further,
the competition regulation also has to evolve to address the various issues
including vertical integration, price discrimination and market
contestability.
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Abstract
Many regional integration arrangements (RIAs) have adopted
competition policy and regulatory frameworks to guide competition issues
between and among Member States. At the multilateral trading system,
the prioritisation of Competition Policy as one of the Singapore Issues at
the WTO 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference was a clear indication
of the fundamental role of competition policy in regional integration and
international trade. It has been generally accepted, that effective and
efficient competitive and regulatory reforms at national and regional levels
foster equitable regional integration considering the different levels of
socio-economic development that characterise most RIAs in Africa.
Has this been the case in Africa? The grand question emerging in the
face of the Post-2015 Agenda is: What are some of the key priorities in
African developing countries (DCs) and least developing countries (LDCs)
for effective regulation of markets for equitable regional integration and
international trade? This paper establishes the critical role of competition
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policy and regulatory reforms in facilitating equitable regional integration
in Africa. Using a trend analysis of specific successes, challenges and
prospects of regional integration in African RIAs; this paper further
identifies the key Post-2015 Development Agenda priorities for DCs and
LDCs in as far as competition and regulatory reforms are concerned.
The study focusses on regional integration reality cases in African RIAs,
such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African
Community (EAC), Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), Economic Community for Central African States (ECCAS),
among others.
Introduction
With the intensification of regional integration and trade liberalisation,
the world has been witnessing an exponentially increasing international
trade in goods and services in terms of volumes and values. The World
Investment Report of 2014 reveals that in the year 2013, foreign direct
investment (FDI) flows to developed countries increased by nine percent
to US$566bn and to developing countries reached US$778bn.1
On the other hand, the total global trade exports value for the year
ending 2013 increased by two percent to be US$18,8tn according to the
WTO.2 This signifies intensive competition for within RIAs. However,
most RIAs have committed themselves to ensure equitable socio-economic
development within and among Member States as part of their vision.
Competition policy and regulatory frameworks are instruments and
strategies adopted to guide competition issues between and among
Member States. At the multilateral trading system, competition policy
has been prioritised as one of the ‘Singapore Issues’ at the WTO 1996
Singapore Ministerial Conference.3
Member/Partner States in African RIAs are at varying levels of socio-
economic development, and in most cases RIAs comprise one or two
Member States that are far-much industrially advanced than the rest. This
has largely defined FDI inflows and cross-border investment trends within
RIAs.
This paper presents a critical assessment of how competition law and
regulatory reforms can be adopted and implemented to achieve equitable
regional integration amongst Member States in African RIAs specifically
addressing the concerns of the poor citizens, producers, small and medium
enterprises (SMEs), and state-owned enterprises/parastatals in small
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developing countries. It will further recommend how competition and
regulatory reforms can be packaged to achieve the sustainable development
goals (SDGs) within the framework of Post-2015 Agenda.
Regional Economic Integration in Africa: Who is
Benefiting?
Since the early 20th century, regional integration schemes have been
increasing through the signing of RTAs mostly by countries within the
same geographical proximity. To date, RTAs are even extending beyond
geography as countries seek to maximise economic, social and political
cooperation within defined areas of common interest. The WTO notes
that as of April 2015, a total of 612 notification of regional trade
agreements (RTAs) had been received [by the GATT/WTO] and of these,
406 were in force.4
Regional integration in Africa is now driven more by socio-economic
interests of Member States unlike first generation RIAs that were largely
motivated by decolonisation and political unity motives. RIAs are meant
to facilitate closer cross-border political, economic and social cooperation
between and among Member States through progressive trade
liberalisation, harmonisation of standards, regulatory frameworks and
elimination of barriers to effective cooperation with the end being to
foster economic growth and enhance the living standards of the citizens.5
Thus out of their membership to effectively organised RIAs, it is widely
argued that Member States accrue several benefits, viz, trade gains through
preferential market access, reduced costs of doing business through
regional trade facilitation initiatives, increased investments, regionally
instigated domestic reforms, improved collective bargaining power, and
returns on enhanced competition.
In economic theory and practice, the level of socio-economic benefits
that RIA Member States secure from the preferential market access is
largely dependent on various factors. This paper argues that national
productive capacities, availability of supporting infrastructure and
existence of an effectively implemented regional integration strategy at
national levels are three key determinants of how many states derive
reasonable gains from their RIA membership. The reality across Africa is
that not many African countries can manage to maximise on these key
determinants which result in more-efficient economies reaping greater
benefits at the expense of less-efficient economies.6
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This has been the case globally, for instance Germany and France in
the European Union (EU), South Africa in the SADC, Kenya in the EAC,
Nigeria in ECOWAS, Malaysia and Indonesia in the Association of South-
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Brazil and Argentina in the Mercado
Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR), among others.7 Such a practical reality is
always inevitable given the inherent institutional and structural differences
within RIAs in terms of industrial development, hard and soft
infrastructure, level of entrepreneurship, national resource and income
distribution, economic governance, and among other related variables.
In Africa, this is statistically revealed by the Economic Commission
for Africa which reported that in the year 2009, Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire
jointly accounted for 78 percent of intra-ECOWAS exports; South Africa
accounted for 64 percent of Intra-SADC exports; Libya, Tunisia and
Algeria accounted for 90 percent of intra-regional trade recorded in the
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); Cameroon provided 77 percent of intra-
Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) exports;
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) provided 66 percent of exports
within Economic Community of the Great lakes Countries (CEPGAL)
whilst Kenya accounted for 79 percent of intra-EAC exports.8 Such trade
domination usually depicts the existence of lopsided industrial,
infrastructural and economic development within RIAs which ultimately
influence the direction of FDI inflows.
The above trend, therefore, perpetuates inequitable regional integration
and damaging regional disparities as liberalisation of the movement of
goods, labour and capital across borders works in the economic favour of
the ‘big brothers’ within RIAs since they are better capacitated to fully
exploit the benefits of preferential regional markets and cross-border
investments. As aptly observed by Lanchman, many regional integration
attempts have failed because the more advanced economies were the
winners of the integration and the weaker ones ‘lost out’.9
It is through the use of competition law and policy that small DCs and
LDCs within RIAs can develop their capacities to compete regionally
and globally in the face of excessive competition whilst also ensuring that
domestic industries are guarded from unfair market practices by dominant
sector players.
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Equitable Regional Development: Why Competition
Policy and Regulatory Frameworks Matters?
African RIAs have long envisioned equitable regional integration and
development and this commitment is reflected in all their founding treaties.
For instance, in one of the recitals in the Preamble of the SADC Treaty,
Member States declared “[t]o promote the interdependence and
integration of our national economies for the harmonious, balanced and
equitable development of the region”.10 Likewise the ECOWAS Treaty
accepts “the need for a fair and equitable distribution of the benefits of
co-operation among Member States.”11
As discussed and illustrated above, the reality on the ground is that
few countries dominate within RIAs in Africa which obviously frustrates
efforts to achieve equitable regional integration and development as
envisioned. Small DCs and LDCs are struggling to survive stiff competition
from firms that are expanding into their territories thanks to liberalised
cross-border investment regimes.
The effects of uneven distribution of economic power within RIAs
should be ameliorated by the design, formulation and effective
implementation of progressive competition laws and policies in RIAs
where these are not yet introduced, and the reform of competition laws,
policies and regulations where these are already adopted in order to
facilitate free and fair market competition so as to protect consumer
welfare and further protect other players from uncompetitive conduct of
their counterparts. The ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition
Policy of 2010 defines competition policy as “government policy that
promotes or maintains the level of competition in markets, and includes
government measures that directly affect the behaviour of enterprises
and the structure of industry and markets”.12
Competition policy and regulation seeks to ensure that the process of
rivalry by companies to gain sales and make profit is not ridden by
anticompetitive behaviour by firms. Regulation complements competition
policy and it refers to the ‘diverse set of instruments by which governments
set requirements on businesses and citizens’, and the regulations can be
economic, social or administrative.13
Through regulation, governments manipulate prices, quality and
quantity of goods and services with a view to achieve socio-economic
sustainability whilst also protecting other players within a specific sector.
It is through competition law and policy and regulation that the evils of
‘unfettered’ competition are lessened.
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The increased adoption of competition policy, law and regulations by
most DCs at both national and regional level is a clear indication and
demonstration of its utility. Most RIAs have formulated regional
competition policies and regulations, for instance, SADC has a Declaration
on Regional Cooperation in Competition and Consumer Policies (2009),
COMESA has the COMESA Competition Commission (CCC) and
COMESA Competition Regulations, the EAC enacted the Competition
Act in 2006, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) has the
Competition Agreement, the West African Economic and Monetary Union
(UEMOA) has a Regional Competition and Anti-dumping Law, and the
CEMAC has the CEMAC Joint Competition Regulation adopted in 1999.
As acknowledged by SADC, “[f]air competition among businesses is a
cornerstone of free trade and is vital to the economic development of a
region, playing an important role in promoting growth, efficiency and the
alleviation of poverty”.14
Competition policy and law and regulations will thus ensure proper
functioning of RIA markets and both less and more developed members
of RIAs benefit from their membership. Competition policies assist in
the search for equitable regional integration and development, especially
considering the fact that small DCs and LDCs are more vulnerable to
abuse of market power by firms through engaging in anticompetitive
behaviour, such as abuse of monopolies, monopsony, market-distorting
subsidies, bid-rigging, collusions, cartels, abuse of dominance or market
power, price fixing, anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions, predatory
pricing and dumping, and exclusionary practices, among others.
It has been widely argued that the effective implementation of
competition policies at national and regional levels within RIAs has the
massive potential to reduce the exercise of anticompetitive behaviour and
then spur competition which promotes competitiveness and
innovativeness; gives incentives to firms to improve their allocative and
productive efficiency which reduces market prices of goods and services
thereby enhance consumer welfare.15
One of the main reasons why small DCs and LDCs are being left behind
in regional socio-economic development within RIAs is that the socio-
economic disparities within RIA economies is not well-regulated to the
extent that small DCs and LDCs are struggling to cope and compete.
Due to regional trade liberalisation and reduced barriers to entry, small
firms or SMEs would need strategic protection and a level playing field in
the face of more efficient regional or cross-border investments.
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With reference to the EAC, Mutabigwa argues that competition law
in the East African regional body will ‘help protect SMEs from the vagaries
and greed of larger companies in the region’ whilst assisting to ‘unlock
potential for SMEs to blossom and in the process benefit EAC
consumers.’16
Within COMESA, cartels have been reported in the fertiliser, bread
and construction industries.17 And as noted by the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), whilst cartels have
adverse effects on all consumers, it is the poor citizens and SMEs who
suffer more.18 In a recent study by Ivaldi et al (2014) focussing on 38
countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe; it was confirmed
that ‘cartels impact in developing countries can indeed be substantial.’19
Cartels are formed when competing firms (producers or manufacturers)
tacitly collude and agree to fix prices, market shares and allocate customers
with a view to reduce competition and increase profits.
The above is also the case with firms that engage in vertical and
horizontal collusions, predatory pricing or abuse of dominance. In most
instances, such companies engaging in anticompetitive behaviour are
usually created out of FDI inflows in small DCs and LDCs. FDI in RIAs
is mostly concentrated in more advanced economies. With time, these
companies expand into other RIA Member States through cross-border
investments. As observed by Levenstein and Suslow (2004), cartels [and
other large firms likely to abuse their market dominance] usually com
form industrialised countries and this has ‘simultaneously harmful effects
on developing producers.’20
The fatal effects on DCs can even be worse when it comes to hard-
core cartels formed by very large competing firms.21 This will force SMEs
out of the market whilst at the same time making it difficult for new
investments to enter the market yet the key objective of RIAs is trade and
investment liberalisation. The suffocation of small firms is detrimental to
socio-economic development of small DCs and LDCs given that SMEs
are ‘necessary engines for achieving national development goals such as
economic growth, poverty alleviation, democratisation and economic
participation, employment creation, strengthening industrial base and local
production structure.’22
When SMEs are driven out of the market due to anticompetitive
practices of large firms, the end result is inequitable regional integration
and development whereby small DCs and LDCs in RIAs experience
stunted industrialisation, slow economic growth and minimal employment
creation whilst the more industrialised economies, within the same RIA,
progressively experience more socio-economic development.
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Across all African RIAs, anticompetitive practices has always been to
the advantage of regional giants. The merger case of East African and
South African Breweries was argued to have an immediate effect of
lessening competition in EAC, with small DCs and LDCs in EAC such as
Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi likely to feel the impact more.23 Similarly
in EAC, concerns have been raised over allegations of anticompetitive
behaviour by Safaricom, SABMiller, Kenya Breweries, Tanzania Breweries
and MultiChoice Kenya’s DStv brand.24
In SADC, South African-owned companies are dominant throughout
the region and beyond. Given their huge capital base, production efficiency
and technological advantage, they can easily out-compete small firms within
the RIA. Effective competition policy and regulation is key to ensure that
these firms compete with domestic firms fairly. For instance, South African
Breweries (SABMiller) operates in 15 African countries within SADC,
COMESA and ECOWAS, over and above operations in Europe, North
America, and Asia Pacific.25
South Africa also has several firms investing in mining, manufacturing,
transport, energy, food processing, financial, telecommunications, retailing
and tourism sectors within SADC and beyond. By April 2015, Shoprite (a
retail joint), had 357 outlets in different African countries, including 115
Shoprite supermarkets, and more than 100 other furniture, home decor,
pharmacy and restaurant stores in 14 African countries.26
In EAC, Kenyan firms dominate the region. By 2012, Kenya was
reported to be the biggest EAC investor in Rwanda with firms investing
in the banking sector (namely Kenya Commercial Bank, Equity Bank,
I&M Commercial Bank, and Fina Bank), retail stores, and education.27
The case has also been the same in ECOWAS wherein Nigerian firms
such as Dangote Cement, Dangote Sugar Refinery, Guaranty Trust Bank
Plc, Zenith Bank PLC, and Stanbic IBTC Bank, among others, were singled
out as grabbing a huge market share within the regional block.28
Given the companies’ huge capital base, as evidenced by Dangote
Cement with a market capitalisation of US$10.5bn, the ramifications of
their operations in small countries will be fatal if left unregulated since
these big firms take advantage of their strength and maximise on economies
of scale which the small domestic players cannot manage.
The significance of competition policy and law in this regard can never
be under-estimated if equitable regional integration and development in
African RIAs is forever to be attained. Most large firms take advantage
of national competition authorities with weak capacity to investigate and
prosecute anticompetitive practices coupled with absence of effective
regional competition law and policy institutions.
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Assessing the Implementation Record of African Regional
Competition Instruments
As argued earlier on, developing regional competition laws and policies
is crucial in assisting RIAs to adopt a comprehensive regional approach
when dealing with anticompetitive behaviour exhibited by foreign
companies whilst facilitating regional cooperation on matters of
competition whenever RIAs engage or negotiate with others players in
the multilateral trading system. This ensures that RIAs accrue the benefits
of regulated competition and sustains competitive market interaction
within the region. However, RIAs are making varying progress in adopting
regional competition regimes and have been experiencing several
challenges in the processes.
Some RIAs are yet to establish competition authorities/commissions/
bodies to enforce competition laws at the regional level and harmonise
Member States’ national competition regimes. The absence of regional
regulators definitely perpetuates rampant cross-border anticompetitive
practices by firms which heavily affects weaker market players and also
encumbers the operation of a fair trade market system within the region.
COMESA has already established its Competition Commission. The EAC
has made commendable progress, albeit at a slow pace, in establishing its
own regional competition authority.
In October 2015, the setting up of the EAC Competition Authority
which had been set for July 2015 was reported to be delayed by the Partner
States of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda which were yet to submit their
nominees for commissioners to sit in the board.29 This is against a
background where the EAC Competition Act was enacted in 2006, but it
is almost a decade before the RIA sets up a regional competition body.30
At least the EAC Competition Authority is now scheduled to begin work
in the year 2016.31
Other RIAs such as ECOWAS, SADC and AMU, among others have
made progress in adopting competition regulations and declarations but
are yet to establish regional competition authorities. This challenge has
been compounded by the absence of competition regimes within Member
States themselves. For instance, although Tanzania (with Fair Competition
Commission for Tanzania) and Kenya (with Monopolies and Prices
Commission for Kenya) have the most advanced competition laws and
competition authorities within EAC, Burundi and Uganda are yet to enact
national competition legislations.32
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Certainly, this does not only slow down the process of adopting
competition regimes at regional levels, but also result in implementation
complexities and inertia whenever the regional competition laws and
policies are finally adopted.
Where regional competition laws and authorities exist, there is very
little awareness on their existence and importance by the stakeholders.
As argued by Odhiambo, the slow progress in the implementation of EAC
Competition Act of 2006 is as a result of this factor.33 The recommendation
is that there should be more awareness, training campaigns and
sensitisation programmes in RIAs to ensure effective implementation of
regional and national competition law and policy and regulations (CLPRs).
Trade Mark Southern Africa (TMSA) says “media coverage could help
to promote a culture of competition by increasing awareness among
consumers and other stakeholders”.34 COMESA is already implementing
this strategy. In July 2015, the CCC organised a sensitisation workshop
in Livingstone, Zambia for business journalists to raise awareness in the
region through media reporting.35
Competition authorities in RIAs are facing the challenges of conflict
of jurisdictions. Whilst national competition laws principally apply to
transactions that affects one Member State, and regional CLPRs apply to
transactions that have a regional impact or cross-border dimension; there
have been challenges of uncertainty in cases that some transactions found
themselves being referred to either of the two. For instance, the CCC
even acknowledges that in some instances “Member State(s) requests for
a referral of the transaction to be assessed that Member State’s national
law as provided for under the Regulations.”36
In any case, the reality is that given the global nature of business in
contemporary times, it is now difficult to find business transactions whose
impact can be exclusively confined within national borders whilst even
business transactions that are considered to have a regional dimension
also have a national perspective.
In the case of EAC, TMSA observes that there are “legislative conflicts
between national and EAC competition regimes leading to disharmony
and enforcement hurdles”.37 Moreover, some regional competition laws
are defective and laden with legal loopholes. For instance, some regional
completion legislations contain provisions that do not have regulations to
that effect. This is the case with EAC Competition Act of 2006 which
has provisions on subsidies but does not have regulations to this area.38
This, therefore, calls for amendments to regional competition laws to
ensure that they are aligned.
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However, such a process should be initiated first at the national level
where in most of the countries’ cooperation between competition
authorities and sector regulators is blurred and conflictual. It is the urgent
address of such institutional challenges which is key in search of regional
harmony. Horizontal collaboration (between and among RIA competition
authorities), and vertical collaboration (between RIA competition
authorities and national competition authorities at national level) can prove
helpful in this regard. This is key for information exchange, joint
investigations, capacity building and sharing of best practices.
For instance, CCC signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
with the Competition and Fair Trade Commission (CFTC) of Malawi on
September 04, 2015 which seeks to facilitate and promote the
harmonisation of competition laws of the CCC and CFTC as well as
foster cooperation in capacity building programmes, exchange of
information on investigation and consultations.39
Overlapping membership to RIAs poses a challenge in the smooth
implementation and enforcement of regional competition laws and
regulations as it may create inter-RIA conflicts of jurisdictional nature.
With the African regional integration spaghetti bowl reality, wherein
countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) belonging to
several RIAs, namely COMESA, SADC and ECCAS, the policy conflict
dilemma is an inevitable implication. Likewise, when it comes to the
domestication and implementation of competition policy regimes,
complications arise.
Initiatives such as the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade
Area (TFTA), and the African Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) both
launched in June 2015, are recommended. The TFTA has worked on the
establishment of a harmonised Joint Competition Authority which will
assist in curing effects of the regional jurisdictional overlap and conflict
in competition rules within overlapping RIAs. It is refreshing to note that
the TFTA Joint Competition Authority on Air Transport is now in place.
The mere fact that RIA member states are at different levels of economic
development is an impediment to the effective implementation of
competition laws.  This has been the case in RIAs in developing countries
within which there are apparent economic development disparities. Using
the case of EAC, TMSA argues that this scenario results in ‘a quest for
protectionism by the governments of some of the EAC member states’.
This is made worse by the fact that transaction fees remain very high.
Smaller economies, which are usually dominated by relatively smaller firms,
are severely affected than their more economically advanced counterparts.
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For instance, in COMESA, merger notification filing fees cap is pegged at
US$200,000, itself a reduction from the US$500,000 set until 2014. This
affects business operators.
There are also challenges related to the independent status of
competition authorities at regional and national level. Since most
competition authorities are hardly independent from the state, as they
are politically and administratively subordinated to the government; they
are easily manipulated to protect the interests of a political elite and small/
powerful minority business players. Moreover, they get their budgets come
from the state. This is the case with almost all national competition
authorities in SADC member states. As a result, there is a tendency that
anticompetitive behaviour by government bodies or parastatals are rarely
investigated in an impartial manner. This distorts the regional market in
RIAs.
Key Priorities for Africa in the Post-2015 Agenda
Regional integration, as stated above, ultimately aims at enhancing the
equitable and sustainable socio-economic development of Member States.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) notes that regional
integration ‘holds considerable promise for supporting inclusive growth
and accelerating and sustaining human development outcomes’ and further
points out that ‘human development considerations’ should be
incorporated from the onset in order to achieve results.40
With the intensification of cross-border investments and trade in goods
and services within RIAs, it is critical for African countries to focus on
collectively pursuing the SDGs through ensuring that their competition
law and policy and regulatory frameworks address the issue of equity and
inclusivity in development.
In pursuit of the SDG number 10 which aims to ‘reduce inequality
within and among countries’, African countries have the obligation to
reform their national and regional competition law and policy and
regulations such that they promote industrial competitiveness, eliminate
anticompetitive behaviour and promote fair competition, enhance
productive efficiencies, promote the growth and expansion of SMEs
through technology transfer and progressive partnerships which ultimately
promote sustainable and inclusive growth across all African RIAs.
Thus, in the Post-2015 Development Agenda, the key priorities for
DCs and LDCs in African RIAs should be to fully develop and adopt
regional competition law and policies; align national CLPRs with regional
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competition law and competition policies; develop effective regional
implementation mechanisms to ensure compliance.
Whilst most RIAs such as COMESA, EAC, SADC, SACU, UEMOA,
CEMAC, ECOWAS, among others, have made noticeable strides in
developing competition law and policy and regulatory frameworks, the
success of these regional competition policies is dependent on the
existence of effective institutional and legal enforcement mechanisms. It
is through an effectively implemented regional competition policy
framework that the differences in terms of industrial development and
the apparent economic disparities existing within African RIAs are not
worsened.
DCs and LDCs, through their collective efforts within RIAs, should
prioritise addressing the above-explained challenges and ensure effective
regional competition policy implementation, it is imperative that the
competition law is well-designed and the institutional framework to
administer the competition law and policy is capacitated enough to carry-
out its functions in terms of human, technical and financial resources as
well as conferred with the necessary powers to execute its functions.
Capacity building of both regional and national competition authorities is
critical.
Regional competition laws should be structured with clear guidelines
on how national and regional competition authorities interface in a
complementary and harmonious manner so as to avoid conflicts over the
scope of their respective jurisdictional enforcement powers. The extent
of application of the principle of subsidiarity in RIAs should be considered.
RIAs in DCs and LDCs also need to prioritise the harmonisation and
amendment of both national and regional competition laws so that they
are aligned to each other. Further, competition law enforcement can only
be strengthened by introducing a stronger and more effective RIA
community law system that allows for more powerful regional court
system. For instance, COMESA has the COMESA Court of Justice (CCJ)
for the re-dress of competition law and empowers COMESA citizens to
take even their governments to the CCJ for competition law-related cases.
Complementary initiatives will also be helpful to strengthen the
implementation of regional competition laws and policy in RIAs.
For instance, COMESA established a ‘One-Stop Shop’ so that ‘all
transactions with an appreciable effect on trade between Member States
are filed with the CCC instead of having these filed with individual Member
States’. The ‘One-Stop Shop’ concept ensures regional fluency in dealing
with competition issues within RIAs.
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With properly regulated markets and fair competition, the African
regional integration process will be more even and equitable thereby
ensuring inclusivity and sustainability in regional development. It is
inevitable that small DCs and LDCs, and the more advanced members of
African RIAs usually have divergent economic interests as the former are
more inclined to be over-regulative and protective of their markets and
domestic industry, whilst the latter exhibit tendencies of being over-
protective of RIA markets and at the same time pressure less economically
advanced RIA member states to liberalise markets through de-regulation
and relaxation of competition constraints. Political will and commitment
from both sides is needed in order to strike ‘win-win’ outcomes.
Conclusion
African RIAs have intensified regional trade and cross-border
investments through progressive trade liberalisation. More advanced
economies within RIAs have taken advantage of trade openness to venture
into regional markets thereby establishing market dominance leveraging
on scale economies. There is a propensity to engage in anticompetitive
business practices by larger firms investing from more advanced economies
through forming cartels, price fixing, bid-rigging, collusions, abuse of
dominance or market power, anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions,
predatory pricing, among other practices. Such practices perpetuate
inequitable development amongst RIA members.
African countries should address the legal, policy, structural and
operational challenges that they are facing at national and RIA level with
regard to the implementation of competition laws and policies so as to
ensure equitable regional integration. Only reformed and capacitated
competition law and policies can assist in restoring fair competition within
RIAs. The full adoption of regional competition law and policies, together
with the establishment of effective enforcement mechanisms is considered
key in pursuit of the post-2015 Development Agenda, specifically the
achievement of SDG number 10 which aims ‘to reduce inequality within
and among countries’.
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to broaden the current discourse on regional
trade agreements (RTAs), market integration, and the competition rules
and obligations within RTAs. The paper describes some of the major
issues, practical lessons and ‘best practices’ on how competition policy
and law and related regulatory reform obligations within RTAs that have
developing economy and other lower income member states, can promote
regional integration, more inclusive economic growth, improved
livelihoods, and sustainable development across member states. The paper
draws on the experience, successes, and challenges from incorporating
competition policy and law and related regulatory reform obligations within
many RTAs over the past 30 years.  Because of the Conference’s location
in Nairobi Kenya and the author’s recent consulting experience and
research, special attention is given to the efforts of COMESA, SADC and
other African regional trade agreements to promote competition and
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related regulatory reforms in their regions and member states, which in
some cases have overlapping memberships.
The paper has two main arguments. The first argument is that
competition and related regulatory reform initiatives and obligations can
strengthen economic growth and regional market integration within RTA
regions that have developing economy members; and can also promote
stronger competition regimes, including improved compliance with and
enforcement of competition and related policies, laws and regulations
within and between the region’s member states. The second argument is
that developing economies have available to them a variety of regional
competition models, which offer their own distinct benefits, opportunities
and challenges. Two arguments and major issues are assessed in this paper
through employing a more comprehensive and hopefully innovative
methodology, which incorporates to some degree the insights from
behavioral economics, neuroscience and other less conventional literatures.
Introduction and Background
Developing economies presently have available to them a rich literature
and practical real-world experience on incorporating competition rules
and related regulatory reform obligations into their regional trade
agreements. This paper will largely focus on competition rules and
obligations within RTAs, but many of these issues are also relevant to
related regulatory reform commitments.  The major findings in this paper
are based on an extensive review of the RTA literature of the past quarter
century and the author’s personal experience over the same period in
government and the private sector, including:
• Conducting in 2011 an EU project to assist the SADC Secretariat and
the region’s 15 MS to enhance the design and effectiveness of
competition, consumer and related policies, laws, regulations and
SADC’s information sharing and enforcement cooperation initiatives
and platforms.
• Canadian representative and active contributor to OECD and related
Canadian work in the first half of the 1990s on competition policy and
law convergence and enforcement cooperation, the competition law
challenges faced by transition and developing economies, and the
interactions between trade and competition policies.
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• Consulting work on urban and regional development and infrastructure
planning in China and other Asian developing economies over a 15
year period, which focussed on regulatory reform and the introduction
of competition in previously regulated infrastructure and other sectors.
• PhD research programme and dissertation from 2003 to 2008 on
competition policy, law and institutions and regulatory reform in
developing economies, the evolution of competition policy and law in
India from 1965 to 2008, and the implications for India’s traditional
business groups, other businesses and its new competition law.
• Personal research, published articles, conference presentations, and
consulting assignments for the Government of Canada on competition
and consumer policy and law, and regulatory reform, modernisation
and impact analysis –  including the consumer benefits, costs and risks
and related competition, supply-chain and business impacts from
domestic regulatory reform, and enhanced regulatory alignment and
cooperation between Canada and the United States under the
Regulatory Cooperation Council agreement of 2011.
Section two of this paper describes the potential regional and
competition benefits from incorporating competition rules and obligations
in RTAs. Section three summarises some of the lessons on MS differences
to be accommodated, and the RTA approaches that can be problematic
for competition and market integration. Section four lists some of the
major questions to be addressed when determining the preferred RTA
competition model, and the final section returns to the two major
arguments presented in the Abstract and provides suggestion on future
ex-post research. Appendix A provides an overview of competition policy
and law obligations and progress in selected regional trade agreements.
Potential Regional and Competition Benefits from
Incorporating Competition Obligations in RTAs
Benefits to Regional Trade Agreements
Much of the trade and competition literature on competition and
related barriers to trade has focused on the benefits to RTAs and their
member states from incorporating competition policies, rules, institutions
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and obligations within the RTA framework.  These include the ability of
regional competition laws, rules and agreements to address and remedy:
• government and private barriers to business entry, establishment
and growth and related anticompetitive conduct and arrangements
and barriers to market access within national borders, which cannot
be reduced by lower tariffs and quotas and other trade policies and
instruments;
• cross-border anti-competitive practices of private and public
enterprises that harm two or more MS, act as trade barriers, and
could not be remedied by trade policies;
• potential negative interactions between competition and trade
liberalisation when more open MS and regional markets can lead
to the ‘importation’ of cartels, abuse of dominance, and other
anticompetitive business practices from other members and from
businesses and governments outside the region; and,
• the anti-competitive effects of trade remedy laws, through employing
competition rules rather than anti-dumping, subsidy and countervail,
safeguards and other trade policy instruments.
Benefits to Competition Authorities and Regimes
Less attention in this literature has been given to how embedding
competition rules either formally or informally within RTAs can provide
important benefits to the competition policies, laws, and authorities of
members.  The RTA and its major objectives, provisions and obligations
on trade, investment, technology, industrial policy, and related regulatory
reform and marketplace issues can inform and guide member state’
competition laws, policies, and institutions, and can ‘frame’ domestic
discourse on competition policy and law in a more positive manner that:
1. Promotes and accelerates the introduction of new and better national
competition policies, laws, and authorities – that are more likely to
survive new governments that have different views about the
importance of fair competition to socio-economic development and
prosperity.
And that, through positive encouragement, technical assistance,
and the threat of ‘naming and shaming’, accelerates the introduction
of modern competition laws and authorities by the MS sceptics and
laggards that otherwise might delay the introduction of modern
competition laws and authorities for years and even decades.
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Expands the visibility, credibility, legitimacy, independence and
effectiveness of the competition authorities and regimes in each MS
through:
• promoting formal and informal convergence, alignment and
cooperation between members
• strengthening the competition compliance cultures within MS
• reinforcing and disciplining concurrent competition and related
regimes such as sectoral regulators, fair trading laws, and foreign
investment rules
• increasing the potential for competition rules to take precedence
when there are conflicts with sector specific and other regulations,
and with trade, industrial, innovation, intellectual property, and
other policies
• reducing political, bureaucratic and vested interest influences on
competition law enforcement – including from powerful and
entrenched business groups and conglomerates  and
• more readily identifying the competition regime ‘slackers’ that
are not meeting their RTA obligations through failing to establish
a modern competition regime, or through weak, incorrect, and/
or politically influenced enforcement of their existing national
competition rules.
The trade and competition literature, combined with recent
advances in the behavioral, neuroscience, institutional and related
literatures, indicate that MS and regional efforts to better align
policies, laws, regulations, analytical methods, and compliance,
enforcement and education functions – and increase information
sharing and enforcement cooperation between national authorities –
can reduce the administration and compliance costs, irritants,
frustrations, as well as the excuses and rationalisations to not comply,
of companies, industries and other regulated entities.
As a consequence of these and other institutional, behavioural
and social mechanisms, enhanced alignment and the establishment of
cooperation platforms promote competition rules compliance and
performance through improving relationships between the authorities
and the regulated population, and making compliance easier, less
costly, more automatic, and the ‘default option’ for companies and
other regulated entities.
2. Allows member state authorities within RTAs, with regional
competition authorities that have case enforcement responsibilities
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and capabilities, to transfer more economically complex and politically
sensitive and divisive merger, cartel, abuse of dominance and other
enforcement cases to the regional authority.
Thereby helping to preserve the effectiveness and credibility of
competition policy and law throughout the region. Moreover, member
states can apply the RTA rules domestically until national competition
laws and rules are in place.
3. Provides regional technical assistance, expertise and support that make
it easier for member states to establish new or more modern
competition laws and authorities.  The experience of South African
Development Community (SADC) and other RTAs indicate that
support and assistance from the competition law MS leaders and the
regional authorities in both more formal and informal RTA regimes
can be especially helpful to the establishment of functioning
competition laws and authorities in smaller member states. Evidence
on the importance of regional assistance and support has been
provided by both more formal and informal RTA models, but as noted
in point three above can be, especially important for RTA competition
regimes with regional authorities that have enforcement
responsibilities and capabilities.
Furthermore, being a member of an RTA strengthens the
arguments for smaller and less developed economies to establish their
own competition policies and laws because of the risk of ‘importing’
cartels and other anticompetitive conduct, arrangements and harms
when trade, investment and other barriers are reduced under the
regional trade agreement (see above).
4. Broadens political, bureaucratic, business, consumer, public and voter
interest, understanding and support for competition policies, laws
and authorities.
Through clearly establishing the linkages and causal relationships
between RTA and MS competition rules and obligations, and the
RTA’s broader trade, economic development, industrial policy,
inclusive growth, equity, sustainable development, and other
economic and social objectives that are more understandable to many
stakeholders and the general public.
Great support would be expected to expand through time by means
of the growth in trade, investment and technology flows between
MS, and a growing regional business community and other
stakeholders that are benefitting from the RTA and its competition
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rules. Making these linkages and causal relationships clearer can,
especially build support for competition policy and law among the
key ministries responsible for finance, international trade and
investment, and industrial, innovation and economic development.
5. Facilitates the more rapid establishment and more effective
deployment of bilateral and multilateral information sharing, positive
and negative comity, and enforcement cooperation agreements and
platforms between members and with countries outside the RTA.
6. Encourages the application of more dynamic and forward looking
analytical frameworks for mergers, Abuse of Dominance (AOD) and
other rule of reason cases – through taking account of the RTA’s
current and future progress and achievements, and the remaining
constraints to regional market integration that can be addressed
through competition advocacy and compliance promotion
programmes.
7. Reduces the number and complexity of enforcement cases of in
particular under-resourced and  less experienced Member State
Competition Authorities (MSCAs) – through regional integration,
more open borders, lower trade and entry barriers, and regional
information sharing and case enforcement cooperation involving more
experienced competition authorities (CAs).
8. Brings regional presence and bargaining leverage to competition
matters and enforcement cases that involve large international
corporations; and sends a strong message to regional and external
businesses that there is “no place to hide” when they attempt to
establish cartels and other anticompetitive arrangements within the
region.
9. Provides opportunities for developing economy and other MS to more
efficiently and effectively participate in and benefit from global
competition policy and law and related policy networks – Industry
Capability Network (ICN), Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), World Trade Organisation (WTO) etc.
and the regional networks now emerging in Africa, Asia and Latin
America.
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And therefore allows developing economy member state (MS) to
compete on a more equal footing in the ‘market for competition policy
and law ideas’ that is now dominated by the United States and the
European Union.
10. Can generate positive externality, feedback and demonstration effects
within other regulatory regimes of the RTA and its member states –
when regional competition successes encourage the establishment of
regional cooperation platforms in other policy and regulatory areas.
11. Potentially can provide competition, consumer and/or trade benefits
to neighbouring and other non-members, which can help to offset
any actual and perceived trade distortion and diversion effects of the
Regional Trade Agreements (RTA).
Through these and other positive outcomes, incorporating competition
policies, laws, and rules within RTAs can increase stakeholder interest
in, understanding of, and support for the regional and MS competition
regimes, and pressures for competition regime improvements – which go
beyond the traditional competition policy and law community.
Future ex-post research should focus on the dynamic, interactive,
cumulative, lock-in, feedback and related path dependent effects between
the support that competition policies, laws, rules and institutions receive
from being incorporated within RTAs, and the broader benefits that RTAs
receive from these competition rules and obligations (see section 5.0
below).
Contributions from More and Less Formal RTA Models
The literature and authors’ experience suggest that these RTA benefits
from ‘embedded’ competition obligations can be generated by either EU
type formal models or more informal, ‘best efforts’ models of North
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), South African Development
Community (SADC) and Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN).  Future ex-post research should explore whether and the extent
to which, for some RTAs, the more informal models with lower negotiation
and implementation costs could generate net benefits that are comparable
to or greater than the EU type models.
For example, the number of SADC MS with functioning competition
laws has expanded from three in 2004 to eleven in 2015; ASEAN and
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APEC have been making similar progress in recent years; and Mexico
reportedly accelerated the introduction of its modern competition regime
when this became a NAFTA obligation. Informal commitments, moral
obligations, aspirational objectives, policy entrepreneurs within member
states, and ‘modernisation’ to keep up with the competition Joneses”,
can be major drivers of change in some national and regional settings.
Moreover, the behavioral, psychological, neuro-economics, institutional
and other less conventional literatures illustrate that, under some
circumstances, MS incentives and motivations to comply with informal
and best efforts commitments can be equal to and even greater than more
formal regimes that employ binding commitments.  Furthermore, MSCAs
under these regimes can be just as willing to impose monetary,
reputational/naming and shaming, social and other penalties on non-
complying and uncooperative members.
Problems and Challenges Associated With RTA
Competition Obligations
MS Differences to be Accommodated
Many articles on RTA competition rules that involve developing
economies have focused on the constraints, mistakes, and alleged failures
of regional rules and authorities.  This author prefers a more positive
‘glass-is-half-full’ approach, in order to identify progress, lessons, best
practices, and challenges that can be addressed and remedied through
time.  The RTA competition literature indicates a number of conditions
that can raise challenges but do not prevent formal and informal regional
competition rules from generating benefits for the RTA region and its
member states and stakeholders.  Reasonable benefits can occur even
when:
• Members are not at the same or similar levels of economic, social,
political, and institutional development; and MS competition regimes
are not at the same or similar levels of development and experience.
• Not all MS have modern competition laws, rules and authorities
from the outset – although this should be the long-term goal except
for the smallest “microstates” in e.g. CARICOM and other RTAs
(see Appendix A).
• Full agreement and consensus have not yet been achieved on more
general competition policy and law principles, standards, coverage
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and interventions, such as using competition rules to discipline
government subsidies, procurement practices, and state-owned
enterprises, and to replace antidumping, countervail, safeguards and
other trade remedy laws. At the same time, the EU model and Closer
Economic Relations (CER) agreement clearly indicate that replacing
anti-dumping with competition rules is feasible and beneficial given
the required political will and some commonality in the relevant
competition rules and their enforcement across member states.
• As long as there is some common ground on core principles,
objectives, the anticompetitive conduct to be addressed, and
analytical methods, some diversity in objectives, standards,
enforcement practices, coverage, and cultures can be
accommodated; and can promote experimentation, innovation, and
imitation and learning from more experienced MS jurisdictions.
Based on the SADC experience, developing common ground can
be facilitated by: “organic convergence” across MS in competition
rules, case selection, analysis, and management, market definition,
and enforcement methods; and the preparation and distribution of
practical “best-practice” guidance documents on key enforcement
and analytical issues and enforcement cooperation platforms – which
led to the launching of SADC’s web-based competition case resource
database in 2012.
For similar reasons, not all RTAs in the global economy need to adopt
the same regional competition rules model.  Some experimentation,
innovation and healthy global competition in the design and administration
of RTA competition rules are desirable.
RTA Approaches That Can Be Problematic for
Competition and Market Integration
RTA scholars and competition law practitioners have also identified
some aspects of region-wide competition rules and their enforcement
that can be problematic for competition and market integration under
RTAs.
Their research indicates that only competition penalties should be
applied to anticompetitive conduct and arrangements in the RTA and its
MS.  Applying trade sanctions to the member states where the anti-
competitive conduct is taking place can have more negative effects on
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competition, consumer welfare, efficiency, market integration and other
public welfare objectives than the anticompetitive conduct that is being
sanctioned.
Evaluations and assessments of existing RTAs with regional
enforcement functions also suggest that competition and market
integration problems can arise when:
(i) The RCA does not have the mandate to conduct its own cases and
apply its own competition penalties, without first receiving approval
from the affected member states.
(ii) Trade effects tests for allocating enforcement and other matters to
the RCA are interpreted in a very narrow manner that limits the
regional investigation and sanctioning of anticompetitive conduct that
substantially lessens competition in two or more MS.
(iii) Regional rules and authorities are replacing functioning competition
laws and authorities in MS before the RCA is fully operational; the
preference of the current author and many other authors is that
regional and MS laws and authorities should function in parallel in a
complementary and coordinated manner.
(iv) Industry, professional, occupational and other exemptions and
exceptions from the region-wide rules are granted too often and too
easily; competition law practitioners contend that such exemptions
and exceptions should be limited to the greatest degree possible, and
should be difficult to acquire by vested interests and relatively easy
to remove when warranted.
Previous RTA experience also indicates that regional case selection,
investigation, decision making and other processes should be designed to
minimise the risk that regional competition activities and decisions
systematically favour the interests of the larger and more highly developed
MS at the expense of the smaller economies and their firms, industries
and consumers.  Distributions of benefits and costs that are perceived as
unfair will discourage smaller, less advanced, and other members from
participating in and contributing to the regional regime – even when they
are receiving some benefits.
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Other insights and possible lessons of a more general nature from studies
of existing RTAs include the following:
• Regional and MS regimes and authorities that cover the
anticompetitive conduct of both private and public undertakings
are likely to be more effective and receive greater stakeholder
support.
• The regional entity responsible for the RTA’s competition
obligations should be appropriately resourced and structured; and
should be placed in a location that is accessible to other MS and
will attract and retain high quality personnel.
• Binding and non-binding commitments under the RTA should
minimise the risk that  competition obligations impose information
collection, analytical, investigation and related standards that are
overly complex and burdensome and difficult to achieve by
inexperienced and under-resourced national authorities.
• Overlapping membership whereby countries are members of more
than one RTA has to date been mainly a theoretical concern, but
could become more problematic as regional markets become more
integrated, regional commissions are more active, and MS more
often use regional enforcement cooperation platforms to address
cross-border matters1.
• To be effective and sustainable over the longer term, the regional
regime requires  understanding, support and commitment from all
MS governments and their business communities and other
stakeholders.
One final lesson from these assessments is that the expectations of
MS, their governments and business communities, and other interested
parties and stakeholders should be appropriately managed from the outset;
and false expectations and promises that all MS and stakeholder groups
will benefit from all regional competition decisions should be avoided.
Regional decisions will benefit some MS more than others, and some MS
may experience or perceive they experience detriment – especially when
the MS and its companies are the source and major beneficiary of ‘beggar-
thy-neighbour’ anti-competitive conduct within the region.  The MS losers
can theoretically receive financial and other compensation from the
“winners”, but this rarely occurs in practice.
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Key Lessons and Questions When Selecting the
Regional Competition Rules Model
Lessons Learned
These more positive insights from the RTA competition literature
indicate that “the art of the possible” and incremental step-by-step
approaches, which build success and minimize the risk of early failure,
are important to designing and applying regional competition rules and
obligations.   Under a step-by-step approach, RTAs could first adopt a
more informal regime to build the foundation for a more formal model in
the future.  This is the recommended approach of some assessments of
the current SADC system, and has been proposed as the next step for
ASEAN.
However, such an approach could have its own downside risks.  The
time, energy, attention span, and scarce cognitive resources and political
support needed for members to design and reach consensus on more formal
regional rules, mandates, scope and functions, may be better allocated to
building competition law experience, credibility and legitimacy through
better enforcement of existing national laws and developing and
establishing effective enforcement cooperation platforms between
member states.
When considering a more comprehensive and formal “hard law” model,
regional authorities, proponents, and external advisors should recognize
that MS and their CAs, business communities and other stakeholders
have made major investments of time, energy and money in the current
regime and can be quite satisfied with its performance – even though a
“superior” option is now on offer.
Attention should also be given to possible trade-offs between different
forms of convergence whereby, near perfect convergence in the objectives,
provisions, and language of MS competition laws, can lead often
unintentionally to divergences in enforcement practices, analytical
methods, compliance and performance because of the ‘poor fit’ for some
MS.  One model out of the various regional competition options that are
now available should not be seen as superior in all contexts, and as the
inevitable final stage in the evolution of the RTA competition rules process.
On the one hand, the more formal EU model can potentially enhance
regional competition law efficiency and effectiveness through:
• pooling resources and removing duplication, overlap and
inconsistencies between MS;
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• economies of scale and scope in enforcement, compliance
promotion, education, and advocacy, and related positive
externalities;
• extending the regional and global reach, visibility and credibility of
national and regional competition rules;
• providing more consistent and effective remedies;
• reducing the transactions, regulatory and other costs and burdens
of government, private, and other stakeholders; and,
• reducing political pressures from national interest groups.
On the other hand, achieving these potential benefits and advantages
has been challenging for some RTAs; and “imposing” the EU model on
reluctant MS may threaten existing domestic and RTA regimes that are
now generating reasonably satisfactory compliance, enforcement,
advocacy, and other outcomes through:
1. national competition regimes that have some “common ground”
but are tailored to the socioeconomic and institutional conditions
and stage of development of each member;
2. bilateral and multilateral enforcement cooperation between MS on
an as needed basis to address cross-border matters;
3. and shared interests, information, learning, experience, mental
models, trust, and reciprocity of trust involving MSCAs, the RCA,
and other stakeholders.
The “imposition” of region-wide rules and authorities could also be
used as an excuse by member governments and MSCAs to reduce their
resources and enforcement efforts, and for MS without national
competition laws and authorities to further delay.
Finally, the co-existence of different and competing regional
competition systems operating in parallel and involving some of the same
MS provides opportunities for experimentation, innovation, comparative
systems analysis and shared learning for RTAs, developing economies
and their external advisors.  Competition, innovation and diversity are
desirable in most contexts   –  including between regional competition
regimes.
Ten Key Questions
Prior to when a new RTA is established and before an existing RTA
and its MS decide to move “up-scale” and adopt a more formal model,
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the following ten questions should be addressed and answered to the
extent possible:
1. How many MS have functioning competition laws and authorities
and practical experience with case selection, investigation, analysis,
and sanctioning anti-competitive business arrangements and
practices?
2. Are the larger MS with significant competition law experience fully
supportive of the regional competition rules and authority – and
therefore prepared to accept the perceived and actual loss of national
sovereignty, independence and control over key markets and sectors?
3. How similar and different are the MS competition objectives, policies,
laws, standards, functions and enforcement practices; and how much
convergence would be needed to reduce these differences and make
regional rules and authorities functional and effective in achieving
national and regional competition, consumer welfare, market
integration, and other objectives?
4. Can this degree of alignment and convergence be achieved in the
short to medium term to allow the regional rules and authority to be
established and appropriately tested, evaluated, and modified where
required, and placed on a positive trajectory?
5. Is there sufficient market integration and cross-border trade within
the region to generate the number and quality of cross-border and
regional enforcement cases and related matters, which would be
needed for the RCA to develop experience, expertise, visibility,
credibility and legitimacy among MS governments, CAs, businesses,
and other stakeholders within the region, as well as governments,
CAs, corporations and other stakeholders outside the region?
6. Is there reasonably strong empirical evidence that existing more
informal bilateral and multilateral instruments between members have
failed to deter, remedy and prevent some cross-border cartels,
anticompetitive mergers, dominant positions, and other
anticompetitive conduct?
7. Has consensus developed on easy to understand and apply guidelines
on the scope of regional versus national rules; and the allocation of
cartel, merger and other enforcement and related matters between
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national and regional levels – in order to minimize conflicts between
jurisdictions and promote transparency, certainty, compliance and
enforcement across the region?
8. Is the consensus on these guidelines and related issues on jurisdiction,
enforcement practices and competencies, and extraterritorial
application likely to be stable and sustained across MS, regional
entities and other stakeholders?
9. Are the regional competition rules and functions on offer expected
to support and help to achieve the broader economic, social and
institutional goals of the regional community and its members on:
• inclusive growth and development and greater equality of
opportunities, incomes, wealth and consumer and producer
welfare;
• sustainable development goals and other broader socioeconomic
goals and objectives;
• fair and efficient markets, fair competition and trading practices,
legal  and regulatory processes  that are fair, transparent, open to
all, and consistent with due process, and reduced rent seeking
and corruption;
• poverty alleviation, and the establishment and growth of micro-
enterprises and other smaller enterprises within member states
and the total region;
• innovation, technological change, and institutional change; and,
• a level playing field between private and state-owned enterprises?
10. Are the human resource and leadership skills, and MS financial,
political and other commitments, needed to sustain a regional regime,
available now and in the future?2
Many of these questions recognise that establishing, operating and
sustaining a regional competition regime – which encompasses many MS
at different stages of development — requires much stronger technical,
management, negotiation, political, and leadership skills and savvy than
establishing domestic regimes.  Regional regimes need to accommodate:
(i) mixed and conflicting influences, incentives, signals, and pressures from
various government, business, civil society, and other groups; and (ii)
distinctive national characteristics, values, philosophies, experiences and
interests that are embedded within and ‘absorbed’into MS competition
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policies and laws and the enforcement, compliance promotion, advocacy,
education and other practices and priorities of MSCAs.
Negative responses to and/or limited evidence on the majority of these
questions may suggest that the potential net benefits from establishing a
new regional competition regime or moving “up-scale” based on the
modified EU model might be less than expected and required.
Transplanting any regional competition rules model to a developing
economy RTA requires considerable care and attention to the unique
characteristics of the regional economy and its various member states;
and to the mixed history and at times negative outcomes associated with
transplanting advanced economy laws, regulations, and institutions with
little modification from the developed to the developing worlds. While
transplanting laws, regulations, rules and models is relatively easy, making
them function effectively in developing economy environments can be
more challenging.
Finally, advanced economy CAs, international organizations, and the
academic community are often better positioned to provide advice and
technical assistance to MSCAs than to RCAs – the consequence of the
limited empirical evidence, comparative systems research, and shared
learning on regional competition regime functions, limitations, and
outcomes.
Concluding Comments and Proposals for Future
Research
Competition rules, obligations and objectives within developing
economy RTAs have at times fallen short of expectations and predictions
when compared with the EU and other developed economy RTAs.
However, the “glass-is-half-full” approach adopted by this and other
authors indicates many reasons for optimism in the future – especially if
RTAs and their MS and external advisors take account of the full range
of competition rules models that are available and select the model that
best meets the current needs and stage of development of the regions and
its member states.
The modified EU model has many attractive features; but the more
informal and non-binding models can also generate net benefits for RTAs
and their member states, particularly in regions where members display
considerable socioeconomic and institutional diversity, and only some
members have functioning competition laws and authorities.  The ability
of less formal arrangements to generate net benefits, and contribute to
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competition and broader RTA objectives in a cost-effective manner, should
be given appropriate weight by RTAs, their member states and external
advisors when they are considering options for regional competition rules.
The Appendix provides an overview of currently available RTA
information. This overview and other sources indicate that there are now
close to 130 countries and jurisdictions in the global economy with
competition laws and authorities, compared with about 30 mainly OECD
economies only 25 years ago. These nearly 130 countries encompass the
34 current OECD members, and therefore the remaining more than 90
competition regimes are situated in countries that are typically categorised
as developing, emerging market and/or middle income economies.
The Appendix identifies more than 80 countries that have functioning
competition laws and authorities and are also members or associates of
RTAs. The implication is that close to 50 of these MS are not OECD
economies and therefore can be characterized as developing, emerging
market and/or middle income countries.  Therefore, the majority of the
90 plus developing and emerging market economies with functioning
competition laws and authorities are either members of or are associated
with one or more RTAs – while some others have bilateral trade and
other agreements that may include competition obligations such as under
Contonu and other partnership agreements with the EU.
Anecdotal evidence, limited data, and the impressions of this and other
RTA authors suggest that developing and emerging market CAs in
countries that are members of one or more  RTAs appear on average to
be better resourced and funded and more effective than developing
economy and emerging market CAs in non-RTA countries.  However,
this “impression” should be subjected to much greater ex-ante and
especially ex-post research to confirm the benefits of RTA membership
for MS and regional economies and their competition authorities and
regimes; and to better determine the existing RTA competition rules
models that best meet the needs of members and regions at different
stages of economic and institutional development.
Additional ex-post RTA evaluations and related research are especially
needed to identify and assess:
1. Specific enforcement cases and other competition matters where RTA
information sharing and enforcement cooperation platforms resulted
in higher quality decisions and outcomes for MSCAs and their
economies.
2. Specific cross-border and other merger, cartel, AOD etc. enforcement
cases that could not have been investigated and remedied without an
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RCA with formal enforcement powers and capabilities under the
modified EU model – because of e.g. the complexity or political
sensitivity of the enforcement case  for the member  states and their
competition authorities.
(i) Performance indicators for and empirical evidence on RTA
competition regime progress, outcomes and successes that go beyond
the number of enforcement cases and other inputs and activities to
encompass progress, improvements and successes in such areas as:
• Business rivalry, competitive intensity, corporate culture,
compliance promotion, and alternative case resolution through
e.g. successful implementation of voluntary compliance action
plans by regulated entities.
• Competition policy and law education and advocacy efforts
within MS, at the regional scale, and at multilateral fora –
including on the interactions between competition, trade,
consumer policy, intellectual property, innovation, sectoral
regulation and related matters.
• MS cooperation and information exchange – including the extent
to which RTA platforms and RCA enforcement capabilities
reduce the number, cost and complexity of regional and national
enforcement cases.
• Promoting fair, efficient and more open economies within and
across member states, including competition policy and law and
related regulatory and procurement processes that are deemed
to be fair, efficient, transparent, and consistent with due process.
Leading perhaps over time to more inclusive growth, greater
equality in incomes, wealth and opportunities, and substantial
reductions in corruption, rent-seeking and other harmful
opportunistic conduct and perverse ‘social norms’ within MS
and the total region.
• And key empirical evidence, findings and lessons from ex-post
research on specific RTAs that can be extended to other regional
trade agreements and can also be used to strengthen arguments
for and help to determine the appropriate competition rules and
obligations for multilateral competition rules under the WTO
architecture.
3. The potential for RTA competition regimes to better identify and exploit
the linkages between competition policy, law and consumer protection
policy, law and advocacy.
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Through e.g. the regional authority identifying enforcement matters
and investigating cases where the alleged perpetrators are employing
various forms of deception and misrepresentation to mislead consumers,
business customers, competitors, and competition authorities in order
to exploit their market power and strengthen cartels, dominant
positions and other anticompetitive arrangements.
4. Ex-post empirical evidence which recognises that the enforcement of
regional competition rules and obligations can result in both national
and corporate “winners and losers” at least for the short-term.
This research would be designed to identify situations where the
efforts of member states to “protect and compensate” their national
corporate ‘losers’ impeded national and regional competition, trade,
economic efficiency, competitiveness and innovation over the longer
term.
As well the alternative situations where the member state ‘losers’
agreed with or at least did not attempt to impede and offset the effects
of the regional competition decision, and thereby benefited from a
stronger and more competitive national and regional economy over
the longer term.
This resulted in substantial increases in both consumer and producer
surplus at the national and regional levels and important contributions
to broader national and regional development objectives (that are listed
earlier).
5. The potential for innovative and effective ‘mid-way points’ between
the more formal and informal RTA models described in this Paper –
for example through providing an existing regional legal institution
with the mandate to investigate and adjudicate especially important,
complex, large and politically sensitive cross-border enforcement cases
and other matters that cannot be successfully addressed by member
state competition authorities (MSCAs).
6. Benefits to regional trade and national and regional economies,
competitiveness, productivity and innovation, through employing RTA
competition obligations to replace anti-dumping laws with competition
rules and to use competition rules to discipline state aids/subsidies,
state-owned enterprises, government procurement practices, and other
anticompetitive government administrative practices and interventions.
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7. And the extent to which incorporating competition rules and
obligations in RTAs help the member states and total region to better
employ competition policy and law to achieve more inclusive growth,
sustainable development goals and other broader socio-economic and
public welfare goals and objectives of member states and the total
region through for example:
• Enhancing the competition policy research and advocacy efforts of
member state CAs and other ministries and departments, civil
society groups, business community, and the academic community.
• Addressing cartel, collusion, bid-rigging, abuse of dominance and
other enforcement matters involving anticompetitive conduct that
especially harms more vulnerable and disadvantaged economic
actors: final consumers, small farmers, small and micro-enterprises,
governments and their taxpayers in smaller member states etc.
• Applying a more holistic value and supply chain approach which
identifies and remedies potentially anti-competitive conduct and
arrangements at different stages of value chains – regardless of the
member state where the anticompetitive conduct and impediments
to enhanced consumer and producer welfare is taking place.
• And better demonstrating and providing strong empirical evidence
on the positive and negative interactions between trade and
competition policies and why trade liberalization requires
competition policy and law reforms at the member state and regional
levels.
Perhaps most importantly, ex-post research of existing RTAs with
competition rules and obligations and ex-ante research of proposed RTAs
should be conducted on the potentially positive dynamic, interactive,
feedback, and path dependent effects between, on the one hand, the
benefits that RTAs and their national and regional economies receive
from their regional and national competition rules and obligations; and
on the other hand the benefits that national competition regimes and
authorities receive from incorporating competition rules and obligations
within regional trade agreements.
This research should include the learning, network and path dependent
effects and benefits and related positive network externalities that result
from the interactions between the different RTA competition law
‘platforms and networks’ (which in some cases have overlapping
membership); and between the RTA platforms and networks and the
other competition policy and law networks and forums that are now fully
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operational or are emerging – including the very unique, expanding and
influential CUTS network of competition, consumer, and regulatory policy
and reform experts and advocates from government agencies and
ministries, international organisations, the academic community, civil
society and other groups in both the developed and developing worlds.
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European
Union (EU)
North
American Free
Trade
Agreement
(NAFTA)
28 member
states, as well
as five
candidate
countries and
two potential
candidate
countries.
Current
members are:
Austria,
Belgium,
Bulgaria,
Croatia,
Republic of
Cyprus, Czech
Republic,
Denmark,
Estonia,
Finland, France,
Germany,
Greece,
Hungary,
Ireland, Italy,
Latvia,
Lithuania,
Luxembourg,
Malta,
Netherlands,
Poland,
Portugal,
Romania,
Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden and the
United Kingdom
Three members:
United States,
Canada, and
Mexico
EU wide competition rules and enforcement have been in place since the
Treaty of Rome of 1957, and are administered and enforced by the
Competition Commission in Brussels. EU competition rules include
anti-competitive agreements and forms of abuse of dominance by
private undertakings in Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) of 2007, the EU Merger
Regulation, and competition policy rules on the behaviour of public
undertakings and state aids (subsidies).
There are as well formal obligations for current and new member states
and for prospective members to develop and enforce competition laws
that are similar to EU wide rules, and to cooperate with each other and
with Brussels when enforcing their national competition laws. All
current EU members have established competition policies, laws and
authorities and are meeting their EU competition law obligations.
In addition, under the European Economic Area (EEA) negotiated with
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), EFTA members are
expected to adopt EU competition rules and standards, and similar
competition obligations are contained in EU agreements with Eastern
and Central European and Mediterranean countries that are not EU
members.
Finally, the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the African,
Caribbean and Pacific countries, which was signed on 23 June 2000 and
entered into force on 1 April 2003, includes Article 45 on the
introduction and implementation of effective and sound competition
policies and rules by the parties to the Agreement.   In sum, EU
agreements with non-member partners include commitments to apply
common standards and disciplines in such areas as antitrust/
competition law, state aids and state monopolies (Hoekman 2002:6-10).
The RTA competition policy and law literature indicates that the EU
competition rules system has had greater enforcement success than any
other regional competition policy and law system; and has been
promoted widely and with considerable success to other RTAs — with
the result that most but not all RTAs with regional competition rules
and obligations have adopted some form of the EU model (see e.g.
Botta 2011 and Marquis 2015).
There are formal obligations in the NAFTA Treaty for all three parties
to develop and enforce competition laws and to cooperate with each
other when enforcing their national laws. There are no formal
obligations to develop regional competition rules and/or ensure
similarity, convergence and harmonization of competition laws, rules,
standards and enforcement practices.
Appendix A:
Overview of Competition Policy and Law Obligations
and Progress in Selected Regional Trade Agreements
(RTAs)
Formal and Informal Obligations of Member States (MS) under the
RTA and Progress in Achieving Obligations and Objectives3
Member States
(MS)
Regional Trade
Agreement
(RTA)
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However, the NAFTA literature and developments over the past two
plus decades indicate that informal processes of ‘soft’ convergence and
alignment of objectives, enforcement practices and analytical methods
are taking place through frequent bilateral contacts and other contacts
and cooperation at multilateral forums: OECD, ICN etc. – including
what is called “pick-up-the-phone” personal relationships. All three
members are complying with their treaty obligations and contributing
to informal processes and platforms of information sharing,
enforcement cooperation, positive comity, and soft convergence in
competition policy, law, and enforcement practices (see e.g. Hoekman
2002, footnote on page 13, Crawford 1997, and Aydin 2015).
Mexico’s competition authority, the Federal Competition Commission,
generally receives high marks from the OECD and other groups for the
quality of and recent improvements to its enforcement, competition
advocacy and education, and related functions – in particular for its
recent enforcement and other efforts to reduce anticompetitive practices
in value chains that supply essential food and other products to lower
income and other consumers and households (OECD 2012:31-36 and
Aydin 2015).
Signed in 1983, ANZCERTA required the two countries to examine the
scope for taking action to harmonize the CER requirements that relate
to restrictive trade practices. This started a process of convergence
largely through changes in New Zealand’s competition law in order to
facilitate the elimination of antidumping on the two countries’ bilateral
trade flows, which occurred in 1990.
At the same time, controls on subsidies that distort trade and
competition within the free trade area were established; and soon after
domestic competition law prohibitions on the misuse of market power
were extended to trans-Tasman markets. Moreover, measures to
coordinate the enforcement of competition law are now in place
between the two countries.
As summarised by Hoekman (2002:10): “in the ANZCERTA context
full trade liberalization was judged necessary but not sufficient to
eliminate the need for antidumping. Such elimination required active
enforcement of similar competition laws and agreement that the
jurisdiction of competition agencies extend to matters affecting trade
between New Zealand and Australia.
In this connection it was agreed that nationals of one state could be
made the subject of an enquiry by the competition authorities of the
other state and be required to respond to requests for information.
Australian (New Zealand) antitrust legislation was amended to extend
its scope to the behavior Australian and/or New Zealand firms with
market power on either one of the national markets or the combined
Australia/New Zealand market; Courts were empowered to sit in the
other country; orders may be served in the other country; and
judgements of Courts or authorities of one country are enforceable in
the other country. In 1994 the competition authorities of the two
countries concluded a bilateral Cooperation and Coordination
Agreement to reduce the possibility for inconsistencies in the
application of legislation in instances where this is not required by
statutory provisions …”
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Accordingly, the two countries still have their own competition laws
and authorities, but have developed the cooperative and coordinated
approaches and platforms needed for a single economic market, mainly
through active and proactive bilateral informal, as needed, and ad hoc
cooperation based on legislation, agreements, arrangements and
ongoing informal links.  The success of this approach has been
recognized by the OECD as a best-practice international model. The
consensus is that, except for the European Union, the CER has made
the greatest progress with using competition policy and law and related
regulatory reform, alignment and cooperation measures in order to
promote a single market within the CER RTA and region – while
employing a more informal model.
What is interesting and provocative is that the CER made this
substantial progress through an interesting mix of binding and non-
binding commitments and without fully adopting the EU model of
regional competition rules, a regional commission, and regional
supremacy over national rules and authorities.
Whether this alternative model involving two advanced OECD
economies at broadly similar stages of development and close political
and economic relations could be extended to RTAs – which encompass
many developing economy member states at very different stages of
economic, social and institutional development and with different
competition and other economic objectives and priorities – is an
unanswered question that requires more theoretical and empirical ex-
ante and especially ex-post research and policy analysis.
There was no competition chapter in the Mercosur Treaty of 1997, but
the Fortaleza Protocol of 1997 established a regional competition policy
to be applied to anticompetitive behaviour that has an impact on intra-
block trade. All Mercosur members and associates now have
competition laws and authorities — with the exception of Bolivia,
which however has some provisions on competition and unfair trading
practices in its constitution and in other statutes. Paraguay was the
most recent member state to enact a competition law in 2014.
The Mercosur regime was originally based on a modified EU model,
but with no merger control, no control of state aids, and no elimination
of intra-block anti-dumping duties. In addition, Mercosur has an inter-
governmental framework of enforcement, which led to questions
regarding the supremacy of the region-wide rules and CA.
The agreement based on the EU model was ratified by only two MS,
Brazil and Paraguay, even though Paraguay had no competition law
and authority at that time, and ratification by the other MS was highly
doubtful. Therefore, the EU model has been replaced by more modest
information sharing and enforcement cooperation agreements first
between Argentina and Brazil in 2003, which was then extended to all
MS. It is reported that the revision process was fully completed in 2010
(Araujo 2001, Cotta 2011:8-17 and OECD 2012 on Brazil, Argentina
and Chile).
Limited progress with Mercosur competition rules is reportedly the
result of ideological differences and limited cooperation and trust
between member states and their competition authorities, limited
Formal and Informal Obligations of Member States (MS) under the
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competition law resources and experience of some MS authorities, and
arguably the adoption at the outset of a Mercosur system that was too
complex, ambitious and challenging — which was “doomed” to fail
because of the above considerations and other conditions and
constraints.
In addition, the Mercosur experience suggests that starting with a very
challenging and arguably too ambitious regional regime, which requires
a high degree of competition law experience, commonality, cooperation
and consensus across MS from the outset, may be problematic for some
RTAs. A phased step-by-step approach that begins with a less ambitious
regional competition model and system may be preferable.
Among other considerations and risks, early failure with a more
ambitious model may place RTA competition rules and authorities on a
negative development path and trajectory that can hinder, complicate
and even undermine the later adoption of a less challenging and more
informal “best-efforts” or other RTA model. However, this presumption
should be the subject of future ex-post research.
Three of four full members have competition laws and authorities – as
noted above, the exception is Bolivia. The Ecuador authority was
established in 2012 and its competition law was enacted in 2013. The
Community has received financial and technical assistance from the EU
to establish its regional competition law framework, and reportedly has
adopted the EU approach to Community wide competition rules
(Marquis 2015:17). Under Articles 93 and 94 of the Cartagena
Agreement, the Andean Community adopted Decision 285, which has
the objective of preventing or correcting distortions in competition that
are caused by restrictive anticompetitive practices and covers
agreements, concerted practices or parallel actions among competitors,
and the abuse of a dominant position (Ferreira 2005).
Under the current regional system, the enforcement of the region-wide
Community rules is limited to cases with an impact on intra-regional
trade and therefore local anti-competitive practices are investigated and
sanctioned under national competition laws. However, Bolivia (and
Ecuador until 2013) can apply the Community rules domestically until
national laws are in place. Botta (2011) concluded that the Andean
Community has an effective regional competition policy in terms of both
its substantive provisions and its enforcement system, which is
considerably better than the regional competition policy and law regime
in Mercosur.
However, despite the improvements in the institutional framework, the
extent of enforcement is reported to be disappointing – the consequence
of: (i) the trade effects doctrine combined with the limited market
integration and cross-border trade within the Community, (ii) the non-
supportive political climate in some MS where e.g. some MS see
competition law as an instrument to regulate and control prices rather
than to promote the competitive process and fair and efficient markets,
(iii) the long list of exceptions to the region-wide rules, and (iv)
continuing questions regarding the supremacy of region-wide rules in the
Community (Botta 2011:17-25; see as well OECD 2012 on Peru,
Columbia and Chile and Beneke 2015).
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One issue for future research is that Chile, which is one of the more
advanced economies in South America and has an experienced
competition authority, is only an associate member of Mercosur and
the Andean Community (see e.g. OECD 2012 and Roberts and Tapia
2013). At the same time, Chile has free trade agreements with a quite
large number of developed and developing economies and jurisdictions,
which often include competition provisions, is a member of APEC, and
is one of twelve countries that is participating in the negotiations on the
Trans-Pacific Partnership Free Trade Negotiations which are now very
close to completion and MS approval (discussed below)4.
Future research could address whether full participation by Chile in
Mercosur and the Andean Community would have strengthened their
national and regional competition policy and law initiatives – in light
of the possibility that Chile could have played more of a leadership
role similar to South Africa’s contribution in SADC.
With a relatively few important exceptions, CARICOM is largely
comprised of small island nations which have less developed
economies, and do not have the resources and administrative capacities
to establish and administer their own competition rules and authorities
(Stewart 2004 and Botta 2011). Therefore, the EU competition model
and rules adopted by CARICOM focused on region-wide
(supranational) rules and a regional competition authority, and
prohibitions against anticompetitive practices and abuses of dominant
position are being applied.
However, regional competition law progress, enforcement, and
positive outcomes have been limited by:
(i) less than expected and desired economic integration and intra-
CARICOM trade flows;
(ii) major differences in economic and institutional development
between CARICOM member states;
(iii) continuing tensions between MS national sovereignty concerns and
regional integration “aspirations”;
(iv) a multi-level system of enforcement which requires consultation
and cooperation between relevant MS and the CARICOM
Competition Commission (CCC) before the CCC can impose a
fine on a private undertaking;
(v) the failure of many MS that may have the resources to establish
their own national competition authorities;
(vi) limiting the region-wide competition rules to anticompetitive
conduct that affects intra-regional trade, which does not allow the
regional authority to address potentially anti-competitive conduct
and arrangements that could be harming competition, economic
efficiency, consumers and other market participants in two or
more MS; and,
(vii) continuing questions on the scope and supremacy of region-wide
competition rules.
The available information indicates that only Jamaica and Barbados
have complied with the CARICOM obligation and now have
functioning competition laws and authorities.
As well, the competition law of Trinidad and Tobago has been
approved but has not been fully enacted; Suriname is consulting on a
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draft competition bill; the OECS sub-region has completed an
agreement and draft competition bill; and Belize has prepared a
strategy for competition policy and law implementation.
As a result, as of 2011 or ten years after the Treaty to establish the
CCC was signed, the Commission had no cases that resulted in the
enforcement of the CARICOM competition rules (Botta 2011, Beckford
2009, Kaczorowska 2012, and CCC 2013).
Despite these limitations, the decision of the smaller nation states in the
OECS sub-region to work together and establish a sub-regional
competition law and authority should be considered as a potential
international “best practice” which should be followed closely in the
future for application by other smaller states and “micro-states” in the
global economy such as the smaller countries and micro-states in the
South Pacific (see e.g. Reddy 2013 on the limited development to date
of functioning competition laws and authorities in the  Pacific Region.
This RTA has adopted the EU model with COMESA wide competition
rules enforced by the COMESA Competition Commission (CCC) in
Lilongwe Malawi. COMESA competition law and commission became
fully operational in January 2013. The COMESA competition law
includes provisions on restrictive business practices, prohibited
practices, abuse of dominant position, merger control, and consumer
protection – as well as authorizations whereby undertakings can apply
to the CCC for authorization of potentially anticompetitive activities on
the basis that the public benefits outweigh the anticompetitive
detriment.
There are as well formal obligations in the COMESA Treaty for each
member state to have a modern competition policy and law that is
similar to and aligned with COMESA wide rules. 14 of 19 COMESA
members now have competition laws, the other five are now drafting
their competition laws, and ten of nineteen MS now have functioning
competition authorities including six which are also members of SADC
(see below).
Furthermore, Kenya, which has one of the more experienced
competition authorities in COMESA and Africa, is also a member of
the EAC (discussed below). Therefore, 7 of the 10 COMESA members
that have functioning competition laws and authorities are also
members of other RTAs5.
COMESA likely has the most developed and well-articulated regional
competition regime of any RTA in Africa and has one of the most
highly developed among all of the developing economy RTAs in the
global economy. Its Competition Commission is led by a well-known
and highly experienced and influential Director and Chief Executive
Officer, who previously was the agency head of the Zambian
competition authority.
As a consequence, the COMESA competition rules and authority has
received a great deal of attention (both positive and negative) from the
business, financial, and general media, international institutions, the
legal community, and other sources (see e.g. Rudman and Wilson 2013,
Coulson Harney and Slaughter and May 2013, and The Antitrust
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Source 2014). Its progress, successes, and alleged and actual
“shortfalls” on merger review and other provisions will be closely
monitored and reported on in the coming years; and as well will
provide important ex-post evidence for future research on the strengths
and weaknesses of different RTA competition regimes and models.
There are no formal competition obligations in the SADC Treaty, but
MS have made best-efforts commitments to develop and enforce
competition policies and laws and to cooperate when enforcing these
laws. These commitments have been incorporated into many major
legal and policy documents signed by SADC Heads of States and
Governments including the Protocol on Trade in 2002, the Regional
Indicative Strategic Development Plan of 2003, the Protocol on Finance
and Investment in 2006, and the Declaration on Regional Cooperation
in Competition and Consumer Policies of 2009.
At the present time, 11 of 15 SADC member states have competition
laws and fully operational competition authorities, Madagascar
enacted a competition law in 2005 that is not yet in effect; Lesotho has
prepared a draft competition law, and one of the purposes of the
country’s Privatization Act is to promote competition and reduce
monopolistic behaviour; and the two remaining member states, Angola
and DR Congo, are reported to be at an early stage of competition law
development.
Therefore, the member states with functioning competition laws and
authorities are South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania,
Namibia, Mauritius, Swaziland, Seychelles, Botswana in 2011, and
most recently Mozambique in 2013, with a competition law that is
inspired by the laws and rules in Brazil, Portugal, other European
countries, and the European Union. The 11 SADC member states in
2015 represent major progress in a relatively short period of time since
only three MS: South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia, had fully
functioning competition laws and authorities in 2004.
Six of the eight SADC members that are also members of COMESA
have competition laws and authorities. Moreover, five SADC member
states are also members of the Southern African Customs Union
(SACU) which also has informal competition obligations. The five
SACU member states are Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland and
South Africa. Based on the available information, within SACU, only
Lesotho does not currently have a functioning competition law and
authority.
Unlike COMESA, there is strong opposition, mainly from the non-
COMESA member states in SADC, to establishing region-wide SADC
competition rules and a regional commission. One important regional
constraint is that only one SADC Secretariat officer has been
designated to coordinate and manage regional competition issues
across the 15 MS.
Nonetheless, the regional competition entity with the support of the EU
and other donors has provided advice, assistance and support to
existing CAs and the establishment of new CAs in the areas of for
example: (i) competition policy and law best practices, (ii) information
sharing and enforcement cooperation platforms, (iii) specific
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enforcement cases with cross-border ramifications, (iv) assistance with
international competition forums and networks, and (iv) the linkages
between competition and consumer protection policies, laws and
advocacy(Khandelwal 2004, Gal and Wassmer 2012, Senona et al 2013
and Ireland 2012).
The East African Community Competition Act was developed and
approved in 2006 and contains sections on restraints by enterprises,
abuse of market dominance, mergers and acquisitions, state subsidies,
public procurement, enforcement procedures, consumer welfare and
protection, and establishment of the East African Competition
Authority.
The regulations to administer and enforce the Act were developed and
approved in 2010, but progress with implementing the law and
regulations has been slow — reportedly because of limited awareness of
the importance of competition policy and law within the EAC region,
and because for a long time one of the five member states, Uganda, had
not adopted the EAC law. However, the EAC Council of Ministers
decided that the law should become operational by December 2014
bringing to an end an eight-year delay; and other media reports indicate
that the EAC competition authority would become operational by mid-
year 2015. However, more recent reports suggest that the establishment
of the EACCA may occur later in 2015 or early in 2016; and that as of
December 2015 the EAC competition authority was still not fully
functional6.
The RTA literature and media reports indicate that among the five
member states, Kenya and Tanzania have the most competition law
experience. Burundi’s competition law and authority were established in
2010 but were not fully operational as of 2014. Rwanda has
competition rules in various statutes, including the Competition and
Consumer Protection Law; and the authority to administer enforce that
law will reportedly become operational sometime in 2015.
Uganda drafted a competition law in 2004, which was then revised in
2007, but as of 2014 the proposed law had not yet been approved by the
Uganda Parliament and then enacted and enforced; however media
reports in 2014 indicate that the Uganda Cabinet would soon approve
the competition bill, and pass on the bill for debate and approval in
Parliament; the bill would create an independent body called the
Uganda Competition Commission.
As noted above, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda are also
members of COMESA, and Tanzania is a member of SADC and was
previously a member of COMESA (see e.g. Angwenyi 2013 regarding
the challenges of multiple RTA memberships with overlapping
competition law jurisdictions, and the Tripartite MOU between
COMESA, EAC and SADC signed in 2011)7.
ECOWAS was established in 1975.  Articles 50 and 60 of the
ECOWAS Treaty provide the legal basis and justification for a
competition policy for ECOWAS; and the formal and informal
competition policy obligations and requirements of ECOWAS member
states are described in its “Regional Competition Policy Framework”
document which was completed in 2007.
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This framework has six segments on: (i) the objective and basic
principles of a competition policy; (ii) justification of a regional
competition policy for ECOWAS; (iii) current status of competition
laws within ECOWAS; (iv) the main outlines of Community rules on
competition within ECOWAS; (v) implementation conditions including
preconditions for effective application of regional rules on competition;
and, (vi) capacity building.
The limited literature on ECOWAS competition policy and law
indicates that meeting these obligations and requirements continues to
be a “work in progress” (see e.g. Mathis and Dawar 2008; and Drexel
et al 2012). For example, as of 2007, except for the WAEMU members
noted below, the non WAEMU members did not have fully functioning
competition laws and authorities at that time. The available
information suggests that since then Gambia now has a competition
law and commission and is making progress on the enforcement of its
law; and Ghana, Nigeria, and Guinea have continued to work on draft
competition policies and laws – with some evidence that through the
work of CUTS and others some progress is being made in Ghana and
Nigeria.
The case of Nigeria, one of the largest and most important countries
and economies in Africa, may be important in this regard.  Nigeria
has been drafting, debating, consulting on, and receiving outside
technical assistance on a new competition law for a number of years
and a new Federal Competition Bill was drafted a few years ago.
However, more recent media reports indicate that, while Nigeria has
competition provisions in some other laws especially in the
Communications Act, the country still does not have a fully functioning
competition law and authority (see e.g. Odion 2015)8.
When one of the major economic leaders of an RTA is a competition
law “laggard”, smaller and less advanced countries may have a good
excuse for not developing and implementing their own competition laws
and authorities. The Nigeria and ECOWAS situation can be compared
with the leadership roles played by for example South Africa and
Brazil in their respective RTAs and regional competition law
communities. This situation is consistent with the insights from
behavioral economics which illustrate how and why individuals,
companies, other organizations and even countries tend to follow,
imitate and learn from national and regional leaders.
As of 2014, none of the WAEMU member states had implemented a
national competition regime (see ECOWAS discussion above). The
ECOWAS framework document of 2007 indicates that the WAEMU
members of ECOWAS are covered by the WAEMU/UEMOA
competition law obligations as set out in WAEMU’s three regulations
and two directives that were introduced in 2002 and came into effect in
2003.
The three Regulations cover concerted anti-competitive practices, abuse
of a dominant market position, and state aid, while the two Directives
apply to (1) transparency in financial relations between Member States
and public enterprises, and between Member States and foreign or
international organisations; and (2) cooperation between the WAEMU
Commission and national competition authorities. However, other
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more recent sources suggest that these regulations and directives are
not yet being effectively enforced (see e.g. Bakhoum and Molestina
2012 and Staples 2012).
Some studies have indicated that one of the major lessons from the
WAEMU competition policy and law experience is as follows: “The
distribution of competences between the WAEMU Commission and the
national competition authorities is the most contentious issue in the
WAEMU enforcement approach. The centralization of the decision-
making power has evidenced its limits. National competition
authorities should enjoy the freedom to protect national markets by
directly addressing national restrictions of competition” (Bakhoum
and Molestina 2012:24; see as well Gal and Wassmer 2012:6 and
Wieck 2010).
This paper and appendix has noted some “best practices” for RTA
competition regimes. Transferring competition rules enforcement from
functioning national competition authorities to a regional authority
that is not yet functioning and has limited resources should be
considered as a lesson and “worst practice” to be avoided by RTAs in
the future.
As of 2014, CEMAC had not yet implemented a regional competition
policy, and only Cameroon and Gabon had functioning competition
laws, authorities and regimes. However, it is reported that expanding
trade and economic activity in the CEMAC region may lead to greater
interest in competition legislation and a regional competition policy
among member states and stakeholders in the coming years.
Limited progress appears related in part to limited resources and
commitment at the regional level, where only two officials have the
responsibility to deal with competition issues; and the CEMAC
Competition Council is a temporary not a permanent body (see e.g.
Gal and Wassmer 2012 and Staples 2012).
The ASEAN Experts group on Competition was established in 2007;
and a major commitment in the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)
Blueprint of the same year is that all ten member states need to
introduce national competition policies and laws by 2015.
Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia now have
functioning competition laws and authorities; the Philippines Congress
approved its Competition Act in June 2015; the Myanmar competition
bill was approved and signed into law by the President in February
20159; and media reports and ASEAN documents indicate that Brunei
Darussalam, Cambodia, and Lao PDR are currently drafting
competition laws. In addition, a coordination mechanism for
competition law enforcement across the ASEAN region is planned for
development by the end of 2015 (Marquis 2015:17).
The ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy of 2010 are
designed to provide guidance to ASEAN MS that have not yet
developed competition laws and authorities, and to other MS that may
be planning to improve their competition policy and law regime in the
future. These guidelines and other regional measures are consistent
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with informal, soft law, organic convergence processes involving
shared information, learning and mental models and imitation; and
non-binding “MS best efforts” initiatives towards greater alignment
and convergence of competition laws, rules and functions across
ASEAN MS.
ASEAN therefore has reportedly not adopted a modified EU model,
and apparently is moving towards a regional competition model that
is closer to the NAFTA and SADC models — based on: (i) competition
laws in all MS, (ii) guidelines, education, and capacity building, (iii)
intra-regional and extra-regional networking initiatives at the ASEAN
regional level, and (iv) encouragement of information sharing,
enforcement cooperation, and competition policy and law education
and advocacy instruments and platforms between MS (see e.g.
Wisuttisak and Binh 2012, Rodyk 2012, Lee and Fukunaga 2013, and
the ASEAN 2013 Handbook on Competition Policy and Law for
Business).
American documents indicate that the United States and some other
countries have placed significant emphasis on stronger rules for
competition and many other laws and regulations – including attention
to the implications for: (i) regulatory coherence, (ii) supply chain
competitiveness, (iii) “competitive neutrality” between state-owned and
privately-owned enterprises to ensure that SOEs are not provided a
competitive advantage by their governments compared with private
enterprises; (iv) minimisation of regulatory and other non-tariff
barriers to foreign markets; (v) minimization of regulatory and other
non-tariff foreign barriers to market access and competition; and, (vi)
increased participation of small and medium-sized enterprises in
regional trade.
“The November 2011 framework indicates that the TPP partners are
discussing language for a chapter on competition policy to ‘promote a
competitive business environment, protect consumers and ensure a
level playing field for TPP companies.’ The text will include language
‘on the establishment and maintenance of competition laws and
authorities, procedural fairness in competition law enforcement,
transparency, consumer protection, private rights of action, and
technical cooperation.’  The U.S. business community has indicated
that the provisions on competition policy will be critical in dealing
with state-owned enterprises (SOEs), particularly in addressing issues
concerning their financing, regulation, and transparency, to ensure that
they are not provided an unfair competitive advantage” (Fergusson et
al 2015).
Overview reports on the TPP Agreement indicate a separate chapter on
competition policy and law provisions and references to competition in
some other chapters in the agreement.  The major features of the
competition policy chapter are as follows.
“TPP Parties share an interest in ensuring a framework of fair
competition in the region through rules that require TPP Parties to
maintain legal regimes that prohibit anticompetitive business conduct,
as well as fraudulent and deceptive commercial activities that harm
consumers.
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TPP Parties agree to adopt or maintain national competition laws that
proscribe anticompetitive business conduct and work to apply these
laws to all commercial activities in their territories. To ensure that
such laws are effectively implemented, TPP Parties agree to establish or
maintain authorities responsible for the enforcement of national
competition laws, and adopt or maintain laws or regulations that
proscribe fraudulent and deceptive commercial activities that cause
harm or potential harm to consumers. Parties also agree to cooperate,
as appropriate, on matters of mutual interest related to competition
activities. 
The 12 Parties agree to obligations on due process and procedural
fairness, as well as private rights of action for injury caused by a
violation of a Party’s national competition law. In addition, TPP
Parties agree to cooperate in the area of competition policy and
competition law enforcement, including through notification,
consultation and exchange of information. The chapter is not subject to
the dispute settlement provisions of the TPP, but TPP Parties may
consult on concerns related to the chapter”10.
It appears therefore that the competition obligations do not adopt the
more formal EU regional rules and enforcement; but go beyond the
relatively simple NAFTA model through the direct references to
consumer protection, economy-wide coverage which would address the
commercial activities of state-owned enterprises and designated
monopolies (addressed in a separate chapter), private rights of action,
procedural fairness in competition law enforcement, transparency, and
technical cooperation. Other chapters include references to steps to
promote competition in international mobile roaming services. These
competition policy and related provisions on competition could be just
as important and consequential for competition in the TPP member
states as the competition law chapter described earlier.
One future development that could be a “game changer” for the TPP
and for competition rules within RTAs is the possibility that the
People’s Republic of China could join the TPP in the not-too-distant
future. Media and academic reports indicate that China continues to be
an active and at times controversial enforcer of its relatively new Anti-
Monopoly Law (AML) which started to be enforced in August 2008 (see
e.g. Ng 2015).
There are no formal competition law obligations but APEC has given
important attention to competition policy and law almost from the
beginning in 1989.  Established in 1996, APEC’s Competition Policy
and Law Group (CPLG):
(i) promotes an understanding of regional competition laws and
policies,
(ii) examines the impact of competition policy and law on trade and
investment flows,
(iii) identifies areas for technical cooperation and capacity building
among member economies,
(iv) and maintains a Competition Policy and Law Database, which
provides access to the various competition policies and laws that
are in force within the 21 APEC member economies.
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As might be anticipated given U.S. participation in APEC, CPLG’s
mandate reportedly does not include contingent trade protection and
replacing antidumping, subsidy/countervail and safeguards with
competition rules (Hoekman (2002:12).
All 21 members except for Brunei reportedly now have functioning
competition laws and authorities; many of these were established in the
past decade or so including: PRC, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Papua New
Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam.
For many of these countries, in addition to domestic pressures, the
combination of the more formal ASEAN obligations and the soft law,
moral suasion, and information based approach of APEC can take
some credit for the significant expansion in functioning competition
regimes in the Asia Pacific region over the past ten years.
The BRICS group of countries is an informal association of five
emerging market economies which now meet annually for formal
summits. The Brazil (BRICS) group of countries does not currently
involve formal trade and commercial arrangements with competition
policy and law obligations.
However, media and other reports indicate that:
(i) the BRICS relationship could become more formal and
comprehensive at some point in the future;
(ii) all five BRICS economies have functioning competition laws and
authorities;
(iii) and are clearly becoming leaders among the developing and
emerging market economies that are now participating in various
global and regional competition policy and law institutions,
forums and networks.
The BRICS have held four conferences on competition policy and law;
and these conferences are now held every two years. The conference in
November 2013 held in New Delhi India focused on competition law
enforcement in the BRICS economies. The most recent conference from
November 11-13 2015 took place in Durban South Africa and its theme
was “Competition and Inclusive Growth”.  Some of the major topics
included:
(i) “Behavioural Economics and Its Meaning for Antitrust Agency
Decision Making” by Professor William Kovacic of George
Washington University;
(ii) ‘Behavioral Screening’ and “Collusion and cartels: successes and
challenges” by Professor Joseph Harrington of the University of
Pennsylvania;
(iii) “Unilateral effects in Mergers” and “Alliances and horizontal
agreements” by Professor Tom Ross of the  University of British
Columbia;
(iv) “The use and misuse of economic evidence” by Jorge Padilla of
Compass Lexecon Europe;
(v) “Perspectives on judging competition law cases: the role of
economic evidence” by Professor Frederic Jenny (OECD);
(vi) “The economics of antirust sanctioning” by Professor Yannis,,
Katsoulacos of Athens University of Economics and Business;
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(vii) “Two sides of the same coin – how can the BRICS countries use
the interplay between Competition law and Intellectual Property
Rights to spur economic development?” led by Nelly Sakata;
(viii) And other sessions on the interactions between competition and
trade, competition and economic growth, competition and
innovation, regional integration and competition policies, dealing
with dynamic counterfactuals, and research and support for
competition including the role of BRICs’ academic institutions.
Formal and Informal Obligations of Member States (MS) under the
RTA and Progress in Achieving Obligations and Objectives3
Member States
(MS)
Regional Trade
Agreement
(RTA)
334 Pursuing Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving SDGs
Appendix B:
Applying the Ten Questions in Sub-Section 4.2 to
Proposals that the Southern Africa Development
Community (SADC) Should Move Upscale and Adopt
a Modified EU Model
Question Rating from
Low: One to
High: Five
Comments on the Rating
1. How many MS have functioning
competition laws and authorities
and practical experience with case
selection, investigation, analysis,
and sanctioning anticompetitive
business arrangements and
practices?
2. Are the larger MS with
significant competition law
experience fully supportive of the
regional competition rules and
authority – and therefore prepared
to accept the perceived and actual
loss of national sovereignty,
independence and control over key
markets and sectors?
3. How similar and different are
the MS competition objectives,
policies, laws, standards, functions
and enforcement practices.
And how much convergence would
be needed to reduce these
differences and make regional rules
and authorities functional and
effective in achieving national and
regional competition, market
integration, and other objectives?
4. Can this degree of alignment
and convergence be achieved in the
short to medium term to allow the
regional rules and authority to be
established and appropriately
tested, evaluated, and modified
where required, and placed on a
positive trajectory?
5. Is there sufficient market
integration and cross-border trade
within the region to generate the
number and quality of cross-border
11 of 15 MS have functioning
competition policies, laws and
authorities with expanding enforcement
and related experience — including with
cross-border mergers and anticompetitive
conduct.
Little interest and support from South
Africa and no apparent interest from
other non-COMESA members – which
appear to recognize and understand the
South African concerns.
Organic convergence now taking place,
differences in content of law, standards,
enforcement practices and analytical
methods are not substantive and
consequential and are narrowing, and
differences in SADC objectives of
policies and laws are not large enough to
represent major constraints to adopting a
more centralized EU model.
Convergence and related trends in
answering question three, and large and
expanding number of MS with
functioning competition laws and
authorities, suggest that required
convergence would take place in the
medium term and would not be a  major
constraint to a more formal and
centralized RTA regime based on a
modified EU model.
Fairly low but with an upward trend as
regional integration, trade, and
investment flows expand with SADC
economic growth  and fuller
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Question Rating from
Low: One to
High: Five
Comments on the Rating
and regional enforcement cases and
related matters needed for the RCA
to develop experience, expertise,
visibility, credibility and legitimacy
among MS, CAs, businesses, and
other stakeholders both within and
outside the region?
6. Is there reasonably strong
empirical evidence that existing
more informal bilateral and
multilateral instruments between
members have failed to deter,
remedy and prevent some cross-
border cartels, anticompetitive
mergers, dominant positions, and
other anticompetitive conduct?
7. Has consensus developed on easy
to understand and apply guidelines
on the scope of regional versus
national rules; and the allocation
of cartel, merger and other
enforcement and related matters
between national and regional
levels.
In order to minimize conflicts
between jurisdictions and promote
transparency, certainty,
compliance and enforcement across
the region?
8. Is the consensus on these
guidelines and related issues on
jurisdiction, enforcement practices
and competencies, and
extraterritorial application likely to
be stable and sustained across MS,
regional entities and other
stakeholders?
9.  Are the regional competition
rules and functions on offer
expected to support and help to
achieve the broader economic,
social and institutional goals of the
regional community and its
members on broader socioeconomic
goals and objectives?
10. Are the human resource and
leadership skills, and MS financial,
political and other commitments,
needed to sustain a regional
implementation of the other provisions
of the SADC agreements on trade,
industrial policy, investment and other
matters.
No strong empirical evidence to date but
some recognition that this risk could
increase in the future – in terms of both
frequency and consequences for trade,
investment flows, and competition with
members states and the total SADC
region.
Question 7 has been given minimal
attention to date, consistent with
answers  to  earlier  questions.
But underlying issues are recognized and
discussed by some SADC MS
competition authorities and other
ministries and agencies.  In general
though, the perspective is that current
more informal model is sufficient and
functioning in a satisfactory manner
However, sources and author’s 2011
experience in SADAC suggest that
consensus could be quite easily
developed if political decision is made to
adopt modified EU model.
Links with broader socioeconomic goals
and objectives given some attention by
MS and the SADC Secretariat but not in
the context of moving upscale to a more
formal model with binding commitments
and centralized enforcement.
Given the small budget allocated to the
SADC competition and consumer policy
and law budget which allows for only
one contracted employee, this question is
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Question Rating from
Low: One to
High: Five
Comments on the Rating
regime, available now and in the
future?
given the lowest rating and would be a
significant risk if a political decision is
made to adopt the more formal modified
EU model.
Comments on the Possible Overall Rating: Would depend on the weights given to individual
questions but the importance of and low ratings given to several questions including 2, 5,
and 6 to 10 suggest that the overall rating would be no more than  two. The higher ratings
for the other four questions and the comments on  some other questions regarding future
trends suggest that in theory  the overall rating could improve in the years ahead but this
would remain theoretical without stronger interest and support from the SADC MS leader,
South Africa, from the other more experienced non-COMESA members, and from the major
leaders in the SADC Secretariat, and stronger evidence from the COMESA experience  that
a more formal  model generates much greater net benefits compared with the current SADC
model that as of 2011 when the SADC study was completed was and likely still  is
considered to be satisfactory and sufficient.
Sources: Ireland (2012), Enabling Environments (2011) and Appendix A.  As indicated in Appendix
A, eight of the fifteen members of SADC are also members of COMESA.  These eight members
are: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland,
Zambia and Zimbabwe; as well Tanzania is a member of the East African Community (EAC).
Based on the sources and the author’s SADC experience and discussions with the head of the
COMESA Competition Commission, the effect of overlapping membership on SADC MS support
for adopting a more formal and centralized EU regional competition rules is not known at this
time and is contingent on a number of factors including: (i) the success of the more formal,
comprehensive an centralized COMESA model; (ii) problems that may emerge in the future
regarding the more informal SADC model; and, (iii) the progress and success of the COMESA-
EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement that was signed in June 2015, which includes
Annex 07 on Competition Policy and Consumer Protection.
This Annex has twelve separate articles on: (i) the importance of fair competition; (ii) prohibition
of anti-competitive business behaviour; (iii) determination of a dominant position; (iv) abuse of a
dominant position; (v) prohibited practices; (vi) mergers and acquisitions; (vii) consumer protection;
(viii) sanctions; (ix) implementation; (x) cooperation and exchange of information; (xi) tripartite
competition policy and consumer protection forum; and, (xii) cooperation between national and
regional authorities for competition.
See e.g. http://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/comesa-eac-sadc-tripartite-free-trade-area-
launched/
http://www.tralac.org/resources/by-region/comesa-eac-sadc-tripartite-fta.html and
http://www.tralac.org/images/Resources/Tripartite_FTA/
TFTA%20Annex%2007%20Competition%20Revised%20Dec%202010.pdf
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Endnotes
1 In this regard, RTA, competition and other scholars and practitioners should
monitor the progress, achievements and possible limitations of MoU on Inter
Regional Cooperation and Integration between the COMESA, EAC and SADC
signed in 2011 which addresses enhanced cooperation and stronger coordination
of competition policies in Article 5 – see: www.atf.org.na/cms_documents/d22-
tripartitetriparrtitemousignedversion.pdf
2 See Appendix B for a preliminary effort to apply the ten questions to the informa-
tion collected and analysis conducted by the author in 2011 when conducting the
EU TradeCom/Enabling Environments (2011) consulting assignment.
3 Throughout this paper and appendix, the term functioning or functional competi-
tion law and authority is used in the broad sense of some evidence of enforcement
capability, action, progress, performance and success.
4 For example, the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement of August 28 2013  has
Chapter J on competition, monopolies and state enterprises, which has the  quite
standard provisions and obligations on competition law, as  follows:
“i. Each Party shall adopt or maintain measures to proscribe anti-competitive
business conduct and take appropriate action with respect thereto as such meas-
ures will enhance the fulfillment of the objectives of this Agreement.
ii. Each Party recognises the importance of cooperation and coordination among
their authorities to further effective competition law enforcement in the free trade
area. The Parties shall cooperate on issues of competition law enforcement policy,
including mutual legal assistance, notification, consultation and exchange of
information relating to the enforcement of competition laws/policies in FTA.
iii. Neither Party may have recourse to dispute settlement under this Agreement for
any matter arising under this Article.”
See Global  Affairs Canada 2015 http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agree-
ments-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/chile-chili/chap-j26.aspx?lang=en
See as well Global Affairs Canada on the Canada-European Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/index.aspx?lang=eng – which
includes Chapter 19 which has more extensive and detailed competition policy and
law obligations compared with the NAFTA competition chapter discussed earlier.
5 As noted earlier, throughout this paper and appendix, the term functioning or
functional competition law and authority is used in the broad sense of some
evidence of enforcement capability, action, progress, performance and success.
6 See for example The East African “East African Community to set up authority to
push for free, fair trade” June 1 2015 https://asokoinsight.com/news/east-african-
community-to-set-up-authority-to-push-for-free-fair-trade/
7 MoU on Inter Regional Cooperation and Integration Amongst COMESA, EAC
and SADC, available at:
http://www.tralac.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/12/files/2011/uploads/
MoU_Inter_RegionalCooperationIntegration_19_01_2011.pdf
8 See as well Economy & Politics “Antitrust and Competition Laws and Regulations
in Nigeria” Monday 02, November 215 http://www.economyandpoliticsng.com/
articles/2816/-Proshare – similar arguments could be made for Ghana which is
another larger and more important African country with currently does not have a
fully functioning competition law and authority (see e.g. Ellis et al 2010).
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9 See e.g. Edwin Vanderbruggen, Nishant Choudhary, and Chris Sheridan (2015)
“Myanmar’s New Competition Law: A Pitbull or a Paper Tiger?” VDB/Loi Client
Briefing Note –March 08, 2015 indicating Myanmar’s new competition law is
based on Viet Nam’s 2004 competition law  http://www.vdb-loi.com/wp-content/
uploads/2015/03/VDB-Loi_Client-Briefing-Note_Myanmar-Competition-Law-
Pitbull-or-Paper-Tiger_8Mar2015.pdf
More recent media reports indicate that the Myanmar competition will become
fully operational in February 2017 after more than a year of competition policy/law
education and advocacy directed at the business community and other stakeholder
groups.
10 Office of the United States Trade Representative “Summary of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement” October 2015 https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/
press-office/press-releases/2015/october/summary-trans-pacific-partnership
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Abstract
It is widely recognised that the ongoing globalisation is considerably
driven by trade and investment liberalisation. The lowering of trade and
investment barriers,1 and increased market access coupled with advances
in international communication (including digital networks),
transportation, finance, trade facilitation and knowledge-based services
have led to increasingly interdependent economies in a global marketplace.
Trade flows have grown in an unprecedented way alongside a sharp
increase in foreign investment.2
In an environment where firms are increasingly organising their
operations on a global scale and commerce is getting internationalised,3
firms are more exposed to the regulatory systems (including competition
law and policy) and business practices of different countries. Trade policy
is not sufficient, on its own, to deal with the frictions that may result.
Therefore, increasingly, trade agreements are being used to push for
domestic regulatory liberalisation related to investment, competition and
other key regulatory areas.
The international community has tried and tested various approaches
to effectively tackle competition issues with a global dimension. They
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include efforts to achieve a multilateral agreement within WTO,
incorporating competition provisions within free trade agreements (FTAs),
signing agency-to-agency bilateral agreements and informal cooperation
between competition agencies.
This paper examines role of competition provisions within the
framework of regional trade agreements (RTAs) and their effectiveness
for cooperation. It draws on the existing research, discussions with
scholars, practitioners and colleagues and personal experience of handling
international competition cooperation and regional trade negotiations.4
Link between Trade Liberalisation and Competition
Policy
Trade and competition policy have a complementary relationship as
both aim to improve efficiency of resource allocation, promote growth
and enhance welfare, by keeping markets open and accessible whether it
is by lowering governmental barriers to trade or through lowering barriers
to competition. Consequently, both policies can be strongly pro-
competitive5 and pro-consumer, notwithstanding that one deals with
government action at the border, the other with private action behind the
border. Not surprisingly, it was during the period of increased liberalisation
in the 1980s and 1990s that many countries enacted competition laws to
ensure that the process of liberalisation leads to a more pro-competitive
economic environment. Competition law and policy6 provide essential
tools for countering cartels, abuses of dominant position, and
anticompetitive mergers that that limit competition, impede development
and thereby reduce economic welfare in developed and developing
economies alike.7
Trade liberalisation can be a powerful tool for enhancing competition
in many contexts.8 On the other hand, as state barriers to trade and
investment are being lowered, there are increasing concerns that the gains
from this liberalisation may be thwarted by cross border private
anticompetitive practices. This is because with the increasing integration
of the world economy through trade liberalisation and expansion of foreign
direct investment (FDI), abuse of market power has transcended national
borders and acquired trans-border dimension affecting several nations.
Activities, such as international cartels and anticompetitive mergers
pose a serious challenge to global welfare by curtailing potential trade
and investment opportunities. It is critical for harnessing benefits of trade
and investment liberalisation that such anticompetitive practices may be
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checked through competition law and policy. The policy is also vital to
ensure that international trade and global value chains operate in ways
that are inclusive and open with respect to participation by all competitive
suppliers9 (Perez Motta, 2016).
Need for International Cooperation
Globalisation has specific implications for competition law and policy.
Alongside the growth in international trade and FDI, the number of cross-
border mergers10 and competition cases with a global dimension11 (beyond
the national jurisdiction)12 has risen substantially. A purely domestic focus
on competition policy is therefore no longer sufficient. The international
nature of anticompetitive conduct opposed to the national jurisdiction of
competition agencies implies a presing need for international cooperation
to effectively deal with the transnational competition law violations.
In the past two decades, competition law has gone global with its
remarkable proliferation around the world.13 This implies that as business
increasingly globalises, same transaction or conduct may be subject to
overlapping scrutiny by multiple competition authorities.14 Consequently,
this may lead to multiplication of costs for business and public exchequers,
possible conflicting outcomes (including divergent remedies) and in some
cases ineffective enforcement.15
This can have a chilling effect on legitimate business activity or (less
likely) a freeing effect on harmful business activity with potential to impose
additional costs on the global economy, and harm the consumers. Further,
as more authorities16 become more active in enforcement regarding global
activity, lack of effective cooperation would increase the risk of application
of substantive rules differently by various competition authorities over
time. This implies a need for greater coordination of enforcement standards
and remedies in competition law cases with transnational effects.17
Capobianco et al. (2016) observe that the purpose of international
enforcement cooperation is twofold. Cooperation offers authorities the
opportunity for more effective investigations and to generate efficiencies,
for the authorities and affected businesses. Secondly, cooperation aims at
minimising risks of divergent outcomes.
The evidence suggests that developing countries should also actively
work for international cooperation in competition policy as a large share
of competition problems of most developing countries emanates from the
international sources such as import distribution monopolies and cartels;
the influence of dominant firms based in other countries, including
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neighbours; overseas export cartels; and regional market sharing.18 This
speaks of the great untapped potential in terms of North-South as well as
South-South cooperation in competition policy enforcement.
Competition Provisions in Trade Agreements
Regional integration is increasingly being recognised as an important
means for promoting economic growth and reducing poverty and globally,
FTAs have become a key instrument to achieve it. This is why; there has
been phenomenon growth in FTAs in number and importance since the
early 1990s. As effective trade liberalisation requires more than just a
reduction of tariffs; FTAs are increasingly being used to address a host of
behind-the-border domestic regulatory issues such as investment,
competition, government procurement, environment and labour and
human rights that may impact foreign trade.19
Although, most countries agree on strong relationship between trade
and competition, they diverge on the merits, potential modalities, and
even the necessity of adopting a multilateral competition framework.20
Therefore, competition is no more on the multilateral agenda21 and global
attention has shifted to regional trade agreements.22 Increasingly,
competition provisions are being incorporated in negotiations for WTO-
plus bilateral, sub-regional, and hemispheric agreements.
In a recent mapping exercise, Laprevote et al. (2015) found that out of
216 FTAs23 reviewed by them, a substantial majority (88 percent) address
competition-related issues in one form or another. This trend extends to
FTAs concluded by developing countries, 87 percent of which included
competition-specific chapters or provisions.  The ongoing negotiations in
the framework of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) further illustrate the continuing
importance of competition policy considerations in the context of modern
trade negotiations and policy formulation (Anderson and Muller 2015).24
Why Competition Provisions in Trade Agreements?
The question arises why competition related provisions are increasingly
being incorporated in trade agreements. A most often quoted objective is
to ensure that the benefits of trade and investment liberalisation are not
compromised by cross-border anti-competitive practices.  Competition
chapters in FTAs are considered to be useful to act as a catalyst to bolster
domestic support for competition policy (including adoption of
competition law and its enforcement) in developing countries that domestic
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interest groups otherwise might resist. They are also aimed at fostering
cooperation in the area of competition enforcement to curb anticompetitive
practices.
Further, new generation agreements focus more on economic
integration than reduction of tariffs for which competition provisions are
necessary structures.25 Competition provisions in FTAs are also
incorporated to create region-wide competition policies and institutions
that seek greater levels of integration including, in the limit, forming
common markets or economic and political unions.26
Further, Laprevote et al (2015) find that a limited proportion of the
FTAs that contain competition-related provisions (6 percent) expressly
describe the goal of these provisions in terms of broader economic
objectives such as “economic efficiency and consumer welfare,” or
“economic and social development”.
Competition provisions have been used by developed countries such
as EU and the US to advance their trade interests. The literature suggests
that the inclusion of competition provisions in trade agreements may be
potentially beneficial for developing countries also as they are particularly
vulnerable to intra-regional anticompetitive practices such as international
cartels.
Key Provisions in Competition Chapters
Literature review indicates that competition policy provisions in trade
agreements can be of two types: a) those incorporated in chapters
concerning state aid and enterprises, procurement, investment, intellectual
property and also in terms of the core principles governing the RTA as a
whole, such as transparency, non-discrimination and due process; and b)
those covered as special chapter on competition policy. This section
focusses on the provisions in the specific chapter on competition policy.
Diversity, it would seem, is the dominant attribute of provisions on
competition law and policy27 in trade agreements. Solano and Sennekamp
(2006) find that FTAs take different approaches as to substantive
competition rules and setting up of mechanisms on competition-related
matters. Laprévote et al. (2015) also observe significant formal and
linguistic differences between various approaches to addressing
competition-related issues. They find competition provisions in FTAs
ranging from ambiguous obligations through to deep commitments. At
one end of the spectrum, there are provisions that lay out, in very broad
terms, the obligation of promoting competition without further
elaboration.
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At the other end, FTA obligations are more clearly defined and involve
detailed provisions relating to addressing anticompetitive practices and
promoting cooperation amongst the parties. Further, Cernat (2005) noted
that there are two sets of competition provisions that can be found in
FTAs: provisions that provide for harmonisation of competition rules of
the contracting parties such as EU bilateral FTAs, and/or provisions that
provide for cooperation on competition-related issues such as  bilateral
RTAs signed by the US and Canada.
A review of relevant literature28 indicates that broadly, competition
provisions in FTAs cover a range of issues as briefly discussed below:
i) Adopting and maintaining competition laws
This category of provisions is particularly broad and diverse. While
some FTAs contain rather vague obligations to adopt ‘measures’ or ‘laws’
against anticompetitive practices, many others define the anticompetitive
practices to be regulated and/or the measures to be implemented to that
effect, although the level of detail may vary. These practices cover (i)
anticompetitive agreements, (ii) abuses of market power, and (iii) anti-
competitive mergers.29
ii) Competition enforcement principles
Laprevote et al. (2015) note that only around 26 percent of FTAs30
require the parties to enforce their competition laws in a transparent and
non-discriminatory way and/or to ensure procedural fairness.31 Mostly,
they are supplemented by principles of procedural fairness, or, more rarely,
timeliness, and comprehensiveness. By contrast, provisions requiring that
the parties’ competition authority be independent are rare (two percent).
There may also be special and differential treatment (S&DT) provisions
in case of FTA parties being at different stages of competition development.
iii) Regulating designated monopolies, state-owned enterprises and
State aid
One of the most common provisions32 aims to address trade distortions
and concerns over competitive neutrality resulting due to designated
monopolies and state owned enterprises. While recognising the parties’
prerogative to establish and maintain such enterprises, these provisions
aim to level the playing field to the extent practicable and display substantial
variations in scope and language.  Around 41 percent of the FTAs33 contain
provisions concerning the regulation of subsidies or state aid with varying
levels of scope; and obligations.
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iv) Competition-specific exemptions
Some FTAs allow the parties to either (i) implement competition-
specific exceptions and exemptions provided they are transparent,
undertaken on the grounds of ‘public policy or interest’ or being ‘no broader
than necessary’ to achieve ‘legitimate policy objectives’; and/ or (ii) to
carve out specific sectors that are already exempted from their domestic
competition laws.
v) Cooperation and coordination on competition
Provisions on cooperation and coordination encompass a wide array
of mechanisms, ranging from mutual legal and technical assistance, to
notification, consultation, and exchange of information.34 Mutual legal
and technical assistance35 may include assistance for ‘the provision of
independent experts’ and for ‘training for key personnel,’ and help in
drafting guidelines, manuals and, where necessary, legislation.  Notification
refers to duty to inform the other party of any enforcement activity that
could affect the important interests of the other party. Consultation
provide for the parties to consult with each other to eliminate particular
anticompetitive practices affecting trade or investment amongst the parties.
Exchange of information is typically limited to non-confidential and/or
public information.36 Several FTAs now also contain provisions on positive
and/or negative comity, in which the parties agree to cooperate on a
reciprocal basis in implementing mechanisms for competition law
enforcement.37
vi) Recourse to Trade Remedies
The overwhelming majority of FTAs38 allow the parties to resort to
trade defences in one form or another (i.e. anti-dumping, anti-subsidy,
and safeguard instruments), either by means of specific provisions or by
reference to the corresponding General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) rules.39
vii) Dispute Settlement
Competition provisions in FTAs have mostly been expressly exempt
from the dispute settlement mechanism40 of these FTAs.41 In effect, the
lack of dispute settlement has created soft law within the guise of a hard
law agreement. Laprevote et al (2015) find that 47 percent of the FTAs in
their sample set up competition-specific dispute settlement mechanisms,
which usually take the form of consultation procedures. They oblige the
parties, either by default or upon another party’s request, to consult with
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each other to settle competition-related disputes, sometimes within a
specific committee or in an inter-agency setting. At the deeper end of
obligations, dispute resolution or consultation mechanisms could be
provided for, or the creation of a supra-national authority that can apply
competition law directly on private entities within the FTA (such as the
EU, COMESA, CARICOM, the Andean Community, and Mercosur).42
Laprevote et al. (2015) found that the 190 FTAs that refer to
competition policy in one way or other display numerous combinations
of these provisions, with only one (European Union [EU]-Republic of
Korea) including all of them. Thus, the provisions listed above are not
cumulatively perceived by the contracting parties as indispensable
components of a pro-competitive FTA43. Anderson and Evenett (2006)
observe that the competition chapters of some RTAs appear to be as
advanced, if not more advanced, in their provisions to foster cooperation
between competition agencies on enforcement matters as second-
generation inter-agency agreements between competition authorities.
Relatedly, it is worth noting that the competition elements in many recent
FTAs go well beyond the degree of cooperation that was envisioned in
the proposals for a multilateral framework on competition policy in the
WTO.
Indian Scenario
India is still relatively less globally integrated and not an effective part
of the global supply chains. Further, India does not want to be an island in
the sea of ever-rising regionalism and suffer disadvantages for not being a
part of the trend. Hence, India has been actively participating in FTAs
and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP),44 which
is being presently negotiated.
India has been enforcing a modern competition regime since 2009.
However, India is a late entrant to the specific competition provisions in
its FTAs45 as they were not included in its earlier trade agreements. With
countries moving towards economic integration through FTAs,
competition provisions are now demanded by developed countries like
Japan, EU and Korea. India is also globalising at a fast pace with rising
trade and investment interests in foreign countries, which require a level
playing field. Further, the Competition Act, 2002 under Section 32
envisages extra territorial reach which may be facilitated by competition
provisions in FTAs. In view of the above, they have now become integral
part of all the recent Indian FTAs. The FTA with Korea was the first
agreement which had a very simple version of a competition chapter.
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Competition chapter is also included in Comprehensive Economic
Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Japan and is being negotiated in
Broad Trade and Investment Agreements (BTIAs) with EFTA and EU as
well as the RCEP with ASEAN and its trading partners. However, there
is hardly any experience of cooperation amongst competition agencies
based on the chapters in FTAs, although the Competition Commission of
India has signed MOUs with some of the key jurisdictions and is in the
process of signing with few others. Robust cooperation is taking place
either within the framework of these MOUs or informally.
Implementation of Competition Provisions in FTAs
Implementation
Extensive UNCTAD work46 on the subject shows that47 despite various
countries’ eagerness to sign RTAs with competition provisions, there is
very little experience concerning their implementation and their
effectiveness with regards to improving competition.  Sokol (2008) observes
that until now, the effectiveness of competition policy chapters has
remained unanswered. Gal (2012) finds that most regional competition
agreements (RCAs) have yet to realise their potential. Almost all the newly
sprung RCAs thus far have not significantly enhanced competition law
enforcement in their regions, or have encountered serious difficulties in
doing so.  This empirical finding applies regardless of the region and the
special characteristics of the jurisdictions within it. He goes to the extent
of observing that rather, most do not justify their costs of creation and
some even create negative welfare effects on their member states48.
Dawar and Holmes (2011) also argue that it is difficult to assess the
implementation of competition provisions. Where it is possible, most
existing research suggests that the level of implementation of regional
competition provisions tends to be low, particularly in developing
countries. This has led to questioning of the value of incorporating such
provisions into FTAs, in view of the burdens of negotiating them and
building institutions. But the research has also generated analyses that
seek to identify and solve implementation challenges to harness the
regional public goods that such provisions can potentially provide.
Laprevote et al (2015) observe that that the data collected by them
does not allow for a solid assessment of the practical effects of competition-
related FTA provisions. While several countries (for example, South
Africa, Mexico, Canada) have reported that their FTAs including
competition-related provisions contributed to “the institutional
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development and resulting capacity of their [competition] agencies”49,
further research is required to assess whether such provisions have
stimulated the adoption or modernization of competition laws and
enforcement.
Dawar and Holmes (2011) also find that in North-South agreements,
the implementation record is somewhat better. Canada-Costa Rica, EU-
Jordan, and EU-South Africa competition regimes have had some success
in advocating a competition culture and in promoting cooperation between
competition authorities through learning by doing. In North-North
agreements, with fully centralised competition regimes such as the EU,
the implementation record is better.
The existing evidence does not point to a ‘one size fits all’ approach.
Approaches used by developed countries to deal with competition issue
at regional level may not be relevant for FTAs among developing
countries.50 Studies indicate that most of the deeper regional competition
systems such as in Latin America have mirrored the EU competition model,
especially in relation to its substantive provisions. Nevertheless, with the
exception of the EU, no other regional competition law system has so far
proved to be successful in terms of enforcement results.51
Further, the creation of a supranational authority in a South-South
agreement52 raises a series of political economy problems in these settings
which might make the implementation of regional competition provisions
difficult.53
Sometimes, RTA cooperation on competition provisions in FTAs may
be useful but informal cooperation may be more effective as seen in many
cases. Most competition agencies utilise less formal agency-to-agency
cooperation agreements54 more often than complex state-to-state co-
operation mechanisms in competition chapters in FTAs.55 Informal
relationships built up among competition enforcers through interactions
at international meetings or technical cooperation or informal bilateral
agreements also play an important role in practical cooperation.56
Lessons
Question arises why implementation record has been so poor? What
are the emerging lessons for future? This section attempts to answer these
questions.
It may be mentioned at the outset that the fundamental problem arising
from the implementation of substantive competition provisions in FTAs
relates to the loss of policy autonomy, or space (UNCTAD 2013). This is
accentuated in cases where the countries concerned have different levels
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of development and hence widely diverging priorities. The underlying
obstacle has been identified as the problem of supra-nationality,57 that is,
the relationship between regional and national laws.58
The weak implementation record can be partly explained by the fact
that FTAs with Competition provisions are a relatively new phenomenon.
The history of regional integration has shown that ‘deep integration’ rules,
such as competition provisions, need time to fully materialise, particularly
in FTAs involving developing countries.59 Further, domestic competition
enforcement and regional cooperation are correlated. Many developing
countries still either lack a competition law or the law being of recent
origin, they suffer from low institutional capacity of domestic competition
institutions as well as weak competition culture impacting potential for
cooperation.60 Dawar and Holmes (2011) observe that in the absence of
the requisite laws, institutions, and expertise, the country cannot absorb
or take advantage of the benefits offered by provisions.
Further, several factors undermine cooperation under the competition
chapter such as poor design of competition provisions, asymmetry of
competition law development and capacity to enforce the law,61 lack of
requisite competition culture, lack of political will to promote domestic
competition law enforcement and lack of mutual trust62 among the
competition authorities.63 Significant legal and social differences between
the parties compound the problem.64
There is wide heterogeneity of participating countries in terms of size,
level of development or maturity of their competition systems or even
existence of competition law. Since different legal and administrative
systems and capabilities make a ‘one size fits all’ approach unsuitable, it
may be a complex and challenging task to negotiate competition chapter
agreeable to all the parties. UNCTAD (2013) findings suggest that
involving competition authorities in the negotiation of an RTA might help
to make the competition chapter more effective.
Gal and Wassmer (2012) suggest that while a basic understanding and
national application of competition law is not a prerequisite for the success
of regional competition agreements, a successful competition law regime,
at least in some member states, can act as a catalyst to the adoption of
competition agreement in FTAs and its successful operation. For one, the
positive experience of some member states can serve as a basis for
competition law advocacy. Second, the accumulated knowledge can be
built upon in operating the agreement.
Gal and Wassmer (2012) argue that the benefits of regional competition
provisions are determined, inter alia, by the modalities of cooperation on
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which they are based. Obviously, the lower the level of proposed
cooperation, the lower the potential benefits, but possibly also the lower
the obstacles to its adoption and enforcement. Therefore, the level of
cooperation should be determined with regard to the realistic capabilities
of member states, including institutional weaknesses.
Sufficient resources (both financial and human) are an important
precondition for an operational regional competition authority (RCA).
Indeed, resource deficiency has plagued many RCAs.65 Insufficient
resources often result from wider macro-economic conditions in member
states such as deep poverty, regional conflicts or natural disasters and
competition law often is not a priority. This fact strengthens the need to
determine, from the outset, whether indeed it is in a country’s or a region’s
interest to invest in competition law. Yet, as studies show, there is often
an economic justification for investing in competition enforcement to
increase total welfare, and thus the question becomes one of sequencing
and of governmental preferences of what to do first.
Lack of implementation of competition Chapters also may be
attributable to the fact that the benefits of devoting efforts to cooperation
are insufficiently clear and long term, while the costs are high and
immediate.66 The challenge is to craft the competition provisions so that
the accruing benefits are seen to exceed the implementation costs. For
developing countries, S&DT provisions may help achieve a proper balance
between costs and benefits.67.
Contribution
Does the above analysis imply that RTAs have really no value?
Competition provisions in RTAs contribute to promoting international
trade and investment by building transparent and predictable trade regimes.
Introducing competition provisions in an FTA may signal ‘a credible
commitment to potential foreign investors that a country is market-oriented
and pro-investment’. Conversely, ‘the symbolic inclusion of competition
policy within [F]TAs may create domestic legitimacy and assist competition
agencies to pursue their competition enhancing missions’ (Sokol 2008).
Further, as competition laws and policies are discussed during RTA
negotiations, government officials, domestic and foreign companies, and
the general public come to recognise the necessity of competition provisions
in RTAs.68 This can be expected to make a significant contribution to
disseminating competition culture across the world in the long term.
One common trend that seems to emerge is that RTAs are a means of
opening communication channels, which may be subsequently expanded
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by the competition authorities until a satisfactory level of cooperation
has been achieved. Also, it is important to note that the ‘domino effect’ of
RTAs tends to spread competition legislation to new countries (due to
conclusion of trade agreements having competition chapters), which may
increase the opportunities for cooperation and experience sharing among
competition authorities (UNCTAD 2015).
Gal and Wassmer (2012) observe that regional competition agreements
have a potential to further the goal of a common, integrated market as
demonstrated by the European experience of joint competition law
enforcement. They might also increase certainty and compatibility of
competition law enforcement either by transferring enforcement powers
to the regional authority69 or by adopting tools to increase compatibility
between national competition laws. This, in turn, may strengthen incentives
to enter and expand in regional markets.
Sokol (2008) further observes:
In spite of the non-binding nature of competition policy chapters
in RTAs, these chapters may still have value, which is related to
how these chapters may help to identify, shape, and implement
norms of competition policy in member countries. In the case of
North-South agreements, they can help strengthen competition
policy regimes in developing countries through technical assistance
and capacity building support. However, their limitations need to
be recognised. Should expectations for them be too high (given what
they can deliver), and should negotiations over the inclusion of RTAs
take up too many resources, the value of their exclusion may exceed
the value of their inclusion.
Thus, it is clear that in spite of poor implementation record, competition
provisions in RTAS have value and substantial potential for promotion of
competition law and policy in the region, provided their limitations are
recognised.
Limitations
Competition provisions included in FTAs belong to the category of
soft laws as they are not legally binding and generally out of the purview
of the dispute settlement mechanisms.  Even the jurisdictions most
committed to competition and free trade routinely exclude competition-
related matters from their FTAs’ general dispute settlement mechanism.70
They are based on best endeavour depending on the goodwill of the parties
to have meaningful effect. This naturally makes them less effective;
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however, soft laws may lead to increased compliance through norm
creation.71
Exclusion of competition-related matters from the general dispute
settlement mechanism72 in numerous FTAs is a crucial weakness and
raises concerns about the potentially purely symbolic nature of these
provisions.73 Because there are no minimum international obligations in
competition law, countries may be less willing to give up sovereignty in
this area, as they have not done so previously. This also illustrates the
difficulties of agreeing to a binding multilateral framework. It may be
worthwhile to consider whether international dispute resolution could
be progressively introduced so as to elicit participation of national
competition authorities.
Another critical element, which determines to a large extent the
parameters and success of cooperation in competition law enforcement,
is the definition and use of confidential information. Generally,
competition provisions in FTAs place restrictions on exchange of
confidential business information, which limits enforcement cooperation.
The definition of confidential information, as well as its potential use
may be studied. Despite the constraints imposed by confidentiality,74 ways
may be found for exchange of confidential information by providing for
adequate safeguards against unauthorized disclosure.
The Way Forward
In principle, competition provisions in RTAs can address market failures
that national competition laws cannot and they can offset, to some degree,
the absence of an international regime.75 However, the available evidence76
clearly shows that countries are eager to ink RTAs with CRPs but are far
less eager to implement them.77
Despite limited evidence about the impact of the regional competition
regimes, it is clear that lack of regional competition can undermine the
benefits from liberalisation and integration of regional markets.78 The
need for competition law enforcement cooperation is driven by the
increasingly interconnected nature of economic activity; and the increased
number of jurisdictions enforcing competition law, and the increasing
activity that can be expected from young/new competition authorities.79
Hence, importance of international cooperation to ensure effective and
coherent enforcement of competition laws around the world has never
been greater or more complex to achieve.
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Extensive UNCTAD work over the last decade80 shows that there is a
large untapped potential for cooperation under existing competition
provisions in FTAs, the remaining barriers to cooperation should be
explored and strategies to overcome them designed. Therefore, this section
examines what steps can be taken to realise the beneficial potential of
competition provision in FTAs.
Achieving favourable outcomes with competition provisions in FTAs
requires that the provisions be well designed taking into account
differences in the size, current socioeconomic conditions, level of economic
development, legal developments and institutional capacity of each member
state; have strong political and stakeholder support; and be effectively
enforced within each member state. Ensuring the wide stakeholder
participation in the development of a soft law instrument like competition
chapter may be helpful in securing domestic support. The ICN experience
shows that stakeholders are typically sympathetic to the ‘best practices’
approach.81
There should be clarity about the objectives to be achieved and their
relative importance.82 Goals should be set in relation to the conditions of
countries in the region, the special competition law issues facing them,
and the tools at their disposal to deal with such issues.83 Competition law
and policy work within the larger development context to create a more
competitive environment and to encourage growth and productivity.84
Rather than focus only on preventing anticompetitive measures that
may undermine the trade agenda, it is vital to emphasise the importance
of competition policy to achieving economic development goals.85 This
may make the inclusion of competition provisions in FTAs more acceptable
to developing countries.86   Conversely, continuing to frame international
competition policy as a pure market access issue may risk antagonising
domestic constituencies in developing countries.87
Further efforts are needed in the actual process of chapter negotiations
and the ways in which competition provisions are tailored to a specific
agreement. It may be particularly useful to involve competition authorities88
in the negotiation of competition chapters in FTAs.89 This may enhance
potential for effective cooperation in several ways: a) competition
authorities get opportunities for repeated interactions over long periods
of FTA discussions helping in fostering informal relations even before
signing of FTAs; b) competition authorities are likely to negotiate
provisions taking into account practical differences in their enforcement
capacities, legal frameworks and other relevant factors; and c) provisions
on technical cooperation and S&DT may be better designed based on
realistic assessments of needs of less developed partners.
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While it is true that competition policy can be a powerful policy tool,
getting the benefits from effective competition policy involves human
capabilities and specialised expertise. Strengthening human and
institutional capacities in the weaker partners may provide a conducive
politico-socio-economic environment in the countries to fully exploit the
benefits of the competition provisions in FTAs and ensure a level playing
field in international trade.90
Cooperation among agencies can be set at different degrees – from a
low level (information sharing, technical assistance) to a high one (RJCA).
Level of cooperation should be determined with regard to the realistic
capabilities of member states, including institutional weaknesses.91 In
FTAs involving members with no or little experience with competition, it
may be good idea to initially restrict the cooperation provisions to
information exchange, technical assistance, and capacity building. More
general commitments could be implemented after the necessary expertise
and cooperation mechanisms have been developed. The inclusion of such
an evolving clause allowing members to adopt a gradual approach to enlarge
the scope of regional competition provisions would introduce additional
flexibility in implementation and likely to enhance its potential for
successful implementation.92
It may be useful to compare the impact of competition provisions in
FTAs with other instruments used to promote cooperation, whether in
terms of informal arrangements, bilateral agency-to-agency agreements
(ATAs) or Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) where possible.93
There may be merit in promoting direct inter-agency cooperation as a
complement to regional competition provisions by signing direct agency
to agency cooperation agreements.94 This may be done either outside the
competition chapter95 or by providing in the competition chapter itself.
Agency to agency agreements have better prospects for enforcement
cooperation rather than state to state competition chapters, who may be
more useful for creating support for competition policy in the domestic
economies.
As to some extent, poor implementation also results from lack of dispute
settlement, non-binding ways of dispute settlement such as consultations
on issues relating to the implementation of agreements and diplomatic
methods of dispute settlement such as conciliation, mediation and good
offices in the context of international cooperation on competition policy
may need to be incorporated in the competition provisions in FTAs.
For successful adoption of regional competition regimes in lesser
developed partners, it may be useful to demonstrate benefits of cooperation
Pursuing Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving SDGs 363
vis-a-vis its costs.  Perez Motta (2016) suggests that to highlight and
enhance the benefits of the adoption of a competition chapter among
competition authorities and governments, it would be useful to: (i) precisely
identify the key common areas of agreement in FTAs and reconcile the
differences between approaches; (ii) increase awareness regarding the
benefits of competition provisions in FTAs in order to reduce political
costs; (iii) facilitate technical assistance96 to states that face difficulties in
implementation; and (iv) assess the potential trade concessions that might
be needed to incorporate competition clauses in FTAs.
Further research is needed on economic and development impact of
regional competition law and policies.  There is need to understand various
issues such as whether effective cooperation instruments can be designed
for regional integration in the absence of effective institutional powers?
How much co-operation is going on under formal provisions and how
much informally? Whether competition provisions have fostered
cooperation between agencies on actual enforcement cases? What are
the impediments to co-operation? What disputes have arisen on
competition provisions in FTAs between signatories of agreements? How
were they solved? What are the pros and cons of binding competition
enforcement and so on?
It may be pointed out that very significant progress in promoting better
understanding of the objectives, modalities, and effects of competition
policy around the world has been made as a result of work undertaken by
international organisations such as the ICN, the OECD; and UNCTAD,
in addition to national competition agencies and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) such as CUTS.97 Developing economies have now
far greater practical experience with the application of competition
policy,98 reflecting the capacity building that has taken place and the
proliferation of competition laws across such countries in recent years.99
Further, increasingly frequent inclusion of competition policy provisions
in FTAs and their overall substantive convergence as regards the most
basic principles suggest that there may be fertile ground for international
harmonisation in the form of a model FTA competition chapter.100
Perez Motta (2016) argues that in addition to fostering further
cooperation and convergence in enforcement matters, future or presently
negotiated trade and investment arrangements could act as a vehicle for
incremental harmonisation of competition laws and practices in the
absence of an international agreement on these issues.101
Capobianco et al (2016) even suggest that if jurisdictions can adopt
common approaches both to enforcement itself and the cooperation, it
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makes sense to embed these in a multilateral instrument rather than a
plethora of bilateral agreements.
To conclude, cooperation under competition provisions in FTAs has
so far been quite low but it is slowly growing. The fact that there is
discourse on further minimising differences between competition regimes
through platforms like ICN is indicative of further enhancement of the
level of cooperation. Given significant progress in promoting understanding
of benefits of competition policy and developing common approaches
towards competition enforcement as well as capacity building even in
developing counties, better implementation of regional competition
provisions can be expected in future.
However, there is need to understand that the extent to which a
regional competition regime can deal with market failures depends largely
on the appropriateness of design of the provisions and the will of the
parties to enforce them. Expeditious progress can be achieved if
strengthening of implementation capacity in developing and transition
FTA members is accompanied by reinforced commitment from developed
members to effectively address the competition policy concerns of their
trading partners. Finally, neither trade nor competition policy tools can
provide complete solutions to the problems that emanate from the mix of
governmental and private anticompetitive restraints.
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programmes. According to the Private International Cartel (PIC) database, about 3
cross-border cartels per year were revealed via competition authority decisions or
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cross-border cartels has been revealed per year reflecting a 527% increase in cross-
border cartel enforcement between 1990-4 and 2007-11.
12 Ibid.  Cases and investigations reflect the increasingly cross-border activities of
businesses and often require support from foreign enforcers.
13 Ibid.  From 23 jurisdictions in 1990 to about 127 jurisdictions as of October
2013.
14 Ibid. Around two-thirds of the merger decisions by the Competition Commission
of India in its first three years of merger review had an international dimension.
15 Ibid.
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16 For example, during June 2011- March 2015, India issued decisions for 236
merger reviews. Source: Annual report 2014-15, Competition Commission of
India, www.cci.gov.in.
17 Supra Note 6
18 Utton 2008.
19 Sokol 2008.
20 Hufbauer, and Kim 2009.
21 Anderson and Muller 2015. Interaction between trade and competition policy was
an important element of Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations. However,
at 2003 Cancún Conference, majority of WTO Members rejected launching
negotiations on a multilateral framework on competition policy. Hence, General
Council of the WTO in 2004 decided not to undertake further work on competi-
tion policy. India also like many other developing countries did not support the
multilateral agreement on competition policy.
22 This trend appears to have accelerated following the suspension of work in the
WGTCP.
23 FTAs included in the WTO’s RTA database – by far the largest sample of FTAs
analysed. Solano and Sennekamp (2006) analysed 86 trade agreements that include
competition related provisions, and found that about two thirds were between
developing countries (often referred to as South-South agreements), and more than
a fourth covered signatories from developing and industrialised economies (so
called North South agreements)
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41 Laprevote et al. 2015.
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where more experience and greater institutional development are required.
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64 UNCTAD, 2007 and Dawar and Holmes, 201.
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within the context of an FTA : i) to ensure that partner country maintains commit-
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Pursuing Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving SDGs 369
83 Ibid.
84 Porter 2004
85 Evenett 2005
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importance of competition to development and industrialisation
87 Supra Note 19
88 For example, in the US, the US antitrust agencies are centrally involved with the
negotiation of the text of the competition chapter.
89 The author as economic adviser at the CCI (2009-2015) was the lead negotiator on
competition chapter from Indian side in several rounds of RCEP presently under
negotiation.  Other parties too had mostly negotiators from the competition
authorities.
90 UNCTAD 2013.
91 Gal and Wassmer 2012.
92 UNCTAD 2007, Dawar and Holmes 2011.
93 UNCTAD 2007. For instance, whether the inclusion of competition-related
provisions (CRPs) in RTAs leads to the signing of dedicated legal instruments for
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94 Dawar and Holmes 2011.
95 The Competition agencies of India and EU signed bilateral Memorandum of
Understanding for cooperation in 2013, while competition chapter in the trade
agreement between the two countries is still under negotiation.
96 Need based tailor-made technical and capacity-building assistance to strengthen the
institutional and enforcement capacity of less developed partners.
97 Anderson and Muller 2015.
98 Supra Note 6
99 Ibid. whereas during 1997 to 2004 (when competition policy was active on Doha
agenda),  an estimated 40–50 WTO Members had active national competition
regimes, current surveys cite 110–120 countries having such laws.
100 Laprevote et al.  2015.
101 Among the various possible fora for carrying out such an undertaking, the ICN
stands out as the only international platform that has both the needed flexibility
and ability to influence policymakers
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